Pakistan and its embroilment in a planned conflict on Kashmir from its infancy is a sordid chapter of our history. This drama was enacted right with the Radcliff Award. Sir Muhammad Zafrullah, who was pleading the case of Pakistan before this Commission in his opening statement, summed it all by stating, “My Lord, a drama is being enacted in this court. We all are here to play our role and part in this. I will play my role as dutifully as I can. I believe that all the decisions have already been made and proceedings in this court are just mere formalities.” He proved prophetically correct! A conspiracy had been hatched between the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten and Sir Radcliff. It had all come at the initiative of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. It had been decided that to provide access to India to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a strip of land in the Muslim Majority area of Gurdaspur District would be awarded to India while adjudicating the partition of Punjab Province. It was part of a poetic British Justice. I am reminded of a line from an English poem to describe this. It goes like this; “Whatever the British do, they do it on principles. Even if they cheat, they cheat on principle.” All plans to induct the Indian Army in Kashmir had been made, and provisions for that had been already arranged and kept at the ready.
This is how the seed was sown for a perpetual conflict between the two emerging states. To make the matters more confounded, a decision was also inflicted on Pakistan to keep a Joint Command over the two new and separate Armies. But Quaid refused, they still had a British C-in-C to implement their policies. This left Pakistan with little freedom to use its own Army at its own will, if the situation so arose on any possible conflict that may arise in Kashmir.
This is how the course was chartered for the future planning and determination of the fate of this state with an overwhelming Muslim majority. When the movement for the seeking of freedom from the Dogra ruler was shaping and picked up its momentum, he signed accession to India to formalise an excuse for the Indian Government to intervene in the state militarily. At first, the dominant Dogra Army of the Maharaja tried to suppress the uprising of the Muslims, through the brutal and naked use of force. At this stage, to help provide some buoyancy to the freedom struggle of the Kashmiri’s, a tribal Lashkar was hurriedly raised. This was caused because the poorly unarmed Kashmir’s could not possibly survive against the fully armed and trained Army of the Maharaja.
This immediately showed results as the Dogra Army was made to retreat and the Tribesmen reached up to the outskirts of the Srinagar Airport. Seeing the looming danger, the Hindu Maharaja, in a state of panic or may be a part of the already planned strategy, signed the documents of accession to India. This provided an immediate excuse to the Indians to fly in their troops to Srinagar. The planning for this operation had been made well in advance. Field Marshal Manekshaw has now clearly and candidly described all the details of this conspiracy.
This immediately changed the course of the war as the regular Indian Army built up their troops and started assuming the offensive against the disorganized Tribal Lashkars, who had no planning and coordination in their efforts. It fell to the role of some volunteers from the regular Pakistan Army to hurriedly fill in this vacuum; both for planning and also for providing some elements of the hardcore of regular troops. This was voluntary. It was to stem the Indian Offensive launched by their regular Army, which was now threatening and assuming menacing proportions. That they put to grinding halt this threatening headway that the Indian Army was making in their offensive campaign; is a tribute to the spirit and the dedication of this handful of volunteers. They achieved this through grit, gallantry and steadfastness and earned a permanent name in our early history of Pakistan’s Wars. Without going into the details, as they have been already covered in many accounts that have been written by those who were a part of this struggle and led it admirably. The names of Generals Akbar Khan and Sher Khan stand out most prominently. These regular officers of the Pakistan Army on their own initiative and against the directives of the Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, not only helped in the resistance’s buildup against the advancing Indian Army, but also carried out the most daring and bold offensive in the capture of the Pandu feature in the Uri sector and Chunj and Pir Sahaba in the Tithwal sector. This successful accomplishment fully explains the will of this volunteer fighting force and their spirit and motivation to stand up against this forced war of oppression unleashed on the unarmed poor Muslim Majority of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. While the Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army was under instructions not to allow the regular Pakistan Army to enter the operations in Kashmir as it may lead to an allout war between India and Pakistan there were no such restrictions imposed on the Indian Army. In this unequal match, Pakistani Volunteers still gave a very commendable and professional performance. The capture of Pandu and Chunj had secured our positions in the area, and it also denied the Indian Troops any land link up to Poonch from this sector. Thus, this summer offensive was totally blunted and made to peter out.
After the failure of the summer offensive towards Muzaffarabad, India began preparations for another offensive, this time from Jammu, westwards and north, for the relief of Poonch. On August 24, 1948, there was first news of enemy build up observed at several points in the Naushera Sector. To meet this impending threat, we needed timely action on our part. It took
India some time to accomplish this build up, but we still remained tied up not only in mind but also necessarily to create our own capability to counter and react. The reasons I have already explained. Until the 20th of November, the Azad Forces kept holding this Indian offensive. There was a severe fighting at Mendhar, and the Poonch Garrison also attempted a breakout. This was the climax, and within a day or two of this Poonch Garrison was relieved. We lost the total area east of the line Naushera and Poonch, including Mendhar Tehsil, the granary of Kashmir. This was because of the inactiveness of the higher command at GIQ, Rawalpindi, which was in control of the British Officers now serving with Pakistan Army. Many reasons were given. Shortage of troops, the possibility of it faring out into an allout war with India and perhaps a lot of foreign pressure, were some strong reservations shown and advanced. But, in the ultimate analysis, it was primarily up to the political leadership to give a timely policy and direction. Unfortunately, it was not forthcoming because of the untimely death of Quaid-e-Azam.
Even so, the Indian positions were most vulnerable to any planned action to cut their lines of supply. It had and in fact still has very long, extended and vulnerable lines of ground communications. Since the buildup of Indians on the main line of thrust in the Uri Sector, which was leading up to Srinagar, was well prepared and reinforced by now, we had to hit them in their soft belly. It was on this concept that a plan was prepared to cut their lines of control in the area of Beri Pattan in the Southern Sector.
This kind of operation hardly suited the mind, and the tactics adopted by the Tribal Lashkar. So some regular troops needed to be inducted for this. This took a rather late approval of the Government It is rather surprising that within two weeks of this action of the Indians to link with Poonch, a force of 25,000, comprising Azads, Tribesmen and Regulars was raised. Only a portion of this force, if brought up early, could have prevented the link up. It was not to be. But still. it was not too late. After much planning and preparation, this force was ready, and we were in a position to cut in the middle the long line of communication stretching from Jammu to Poonch. This would threaten the very existence of the large Indian Force beyond Naushera. It is to the credit of Maior General Tottenham, who was commanding the 7 Division of the newly raised Pakistan Army that he envisioned it, planned it and finally launched it. This he did in total defiance of the orders given by the acting Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey, who had forbidden the use of regular Pakistani Troops and in particular any British Army Officers now serving in the Pakistan Army; to proceed and fight in this disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir. He did this entirely incognito, traveling in civilian clothes and using private transport. Without going into any further details of this operation. it may be highlighted only that when it finally was launched, the Indian Troops completely abandoned this area and it was just left at the beckoning of the Pakistani troops to advance and capture. At this critical juncture, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sensing the gravity of the situation went rushing to the United Nations asking for the ceasefire. This had been in the offing for some time. We did not have to rush into it. We should have accomplished the mission for the start of which we had already lost much time and many opportunities. It was the most fatal and frustrating mistake committed. The blame would squarely be on the shoulders of the political leadership. Regardless of what advice and counseling they got from different quarters, we on our part should have remained firm and in full resolve; to secure our own vital national interests foremost by capturing the aim so planned and set. And unfortunately, we have been condemned to keep repeating this mistake repeatedly.
These feelings we had not fully shared and experienced ourselves, as we were still cadets under training at Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul. But some of our colleagues had participated in this struggle before they joined the Academy. Notable amongst those were GC N.K. Babar and GC Mahmud Kureishi. We had only some partial idea through their inputs about the course of the operations, but we were enlightened about the dynamism and the spirit of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the other volunteers to secure their freedom. It was in the beginning of 1949, that Major General Akbar Khan, who had been fully involved in these entire operations and had been nicknamed as General Tariq for this, came to PMA to address us. It was our first detailed and comprehensive exposure to the account of this war of liberation in Jammu and Kashmir It was a very professional presentation by a mind which had the benefit of all the actual and detailed experience of the unfolding of the events on the ground and also in the minds of some of the key decision makers. Again, without going into the details of it, one may highlight only the most prominent enunciations of this and those who caught our imagination and got embedded in our minds. He started with some details of the background of the raisings of these Tribal Lashkars and their performance. He was clearly full of praise for their contributions and efforts, despite some of the mistakes made by them. The most glaring mistake being, as described by him, was the wasting of time in the capture of Srinagar Airport, when the opportunity so presented itself. The most impressive and the one coming from the depth of his heart was the planning, conduct and the actual capture of Pandu feature in the Uri Sector. It sealed the fate of all further Indian plans of advance in that area. But the most emotional was the description by him of the conduct of the planning and launching of the plan of attack at Beri Pattan. Why we failed to follow it up to its logical conclusion and did not cut the Indian lines of communications between Jammu and Poonch was a question that was raised. He in no uncertain and unambiguous words condemned it. Finally, choked up in emotions, he said, “Gentlemen, wars are not fought by the armed chaired politicians seated in the comfort of their offices. They are fought by the soldiers on the ground looking into the eyes of the enemy in the thick of battlefield” These words have been all embracing and summed up all his frustrations and the bitterness that he endured and experienced. They epitomize on our failings of not relying on collective wisdom and rushing to hasty decisions which have a touch of foreign advice. His words still keep echoing and reechoing in our minds since then. We need a better, more appropriate, logical and essential system of mutual consultation amongst the core people in the corridors of power; to discuss and dilate to finally reach a consensus to come to a logical conclusion on all important issues. It must be based on informed judgment rather than being emotional or tutored. This failing has been haunting us all along and is our bane and misfortune! Whatever, be the outcome of the earlier struggle for the liberation of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, the burning desire of the people of the area cannot be kept suppressed and chained indefinitely. The cunningness of the entire motivated plan by the British to leave behind a strong irritant to be exploited, whenever so needed, are now since becoming the lynchpin of the perceptions, plans and the “Greater Game Plan” of the powers to be in this unipolar world.
This has not emerged just suddenly. It has its own history. Without going into the details of the Mckinder and Bresinsiki doctrines, what is pertinent and singular to the struggle of the freedom movement of the people of Jammu and Kashmir is that America has never been sincere with us in this fight. They have used their relationship with Pakistan to meet their own ends and national interests. For illustration, one may cite a message they sent to General Ayub Khan in 1962, which had been kept secret and confidential up till now but has been recently declassified. It was the time of war between India and China on their border conflict over NEFA. The Message was clear, terse, blunt, firm and explicit. He was advised, “Any attack by Pakistan in Kashmir will be considered as an attack on America and the United Kingdom.“ The justification given was that their troops were present in Ladakh and undertaking some construction work in the area. No such unambiguous warnings were ever given to India to support the cause of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and even with their open, naked and brazen involvement in the attack on East Pakistan. This has kept the fate of the people of the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir unresolved and the source of permanent friction between India and Pakistan. This perhaps suited the vested interests of these powers in the quest of their bigger geostrategic interest in this region. But you cannot keep muzzled the voice, aspirations and the feelings of these peoples indefinitely.
Having been kept frustrated for so long, the minds in Pakistan’s corridors of power kept looking for opportunities to seek a solution to this longstanding problem. The choice was either to forget about the very cause of these deprived Muslims of this disputed area or else to act in support of them. It was implicitly clear India would not act on the United Nations Resolutions and continue strengthening their hold through military occupation. The times were not favorable for Pakistan, and there could be no delay. If some action was to be carried out, now was the time to do so. Very secretively, a two-stage plan of action was formed. It was an idea shaped through the initiative of Major General Akhtar Ali Malik, GOC 12 Division located at Murree and kept restricted to a small group. The plan was to send a group of volunteers into the occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir to (or Intending to) assimilate internal resistance, and to kindle a movement for the liberation of the area by the local populace would be launched. The execution of this plan, however, was quite flawed. There was little to no attention to detail and minimal coordination. May be that there was not enough time for it. Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, who was commanding the Special Services Group at Cherat, had some evaluation carried out of this plan.
Notwithstanding that, the Operation Gibraltar was still launched. It did not meet the desired aims and objectives. In fact, it proved a failure as enough contacts and liaison had not been done with the local population and their active leadership. In retaliation, Indian forces had begun to look wearier of our troops and this started to assume military reverses for us. This Operation Gibraltar did not envisage any significant military action, as we lacked the resources and strength to undertake that in that area. It also seems that little attention and importance was given to this aspect. What was rightfully appreciated was that we must strike at their most vulnerable point and do so swiftly to provide them with no time to react? The “Operation Grand Slam” was the counter to the inevitable Indian Offensive in retaliation to “Operation Gibraltar.”
It was an excellent plan, the most logical and most appropriate response. It was a professional approach, and on the lines of the Operation at Beri Pattan, conducted in the war in 1948. The account of this I will endeavor to cover in details and graphically as I was a part of it. But this would rather form the part of the full and total reflection of the entire 1965 War. Of significance is the assessment and appreciation of the situation by Major General Akhtar Ali Malik, when Operation Gibraltar was faltering, and we faced some military reverses in consequence of that. It is reproduced in his own words:-
“Haji Pir Pass did not cause me much anxiety. Because the impending grand slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir after Akhnur could only help us, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender the gains and may be more. Actually, it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would encash the full value of Gibraltar, but this was not to be”.
