From hubris springs delusion, from delusion false assumptions — and in the end only madness remains. Who would have thought that an air battle in South Asia would become the stuff of legend—where a presumed Goliath, intoxicated by its own sense of supremacy was handed a bitter and painful dose of reality.
And, who could have imagined that a parallel spectacle would unfold not in the sky, but on the screens—where an entire media apparatus spiraled into full-blown madness, manufacturing triumph from delusion and feeding an entire nation its own hysteria and lunacy. Such a collective neurotic meltdown is pitiable even in an inveterate adversary.
Many international ‘experts’ wary of taking sides will go on mistaking their reticence for balance, as if balmy denial could substitute for truth. But facts cannot be conjured from opinion—they will write their own history. The following is a fragment of a much larger story.
The post-war international system remains viable only when its core principles, already codified in the UN Charter, are universally respected and faithfully upheld. The Indo- Pak Balakot crisis of February 2019 was a clear reminder that the simmering problem of Kashmir would continue to threaten peace in the region in unpredictable ways and that the status quo was increasingly untenable, lest another trigger came into play (“Whither the International System Post Balakot Escalation”, Pakistan Politico, April 5, 2019). Elsewhere it was argued that peace was hanging by a thread during the 2019 crisis, and ’Pakistan was holding that thread, very firmly’.
The Pahalgam terrorist attack six years later, and India’s use of it as a pretext of war against Pakistan this month of May 2025 – with many credibly believing it to be a false flag operation given the security ‘lapses’ in Pahalgam, the jingoistic prelude and utter refusal to engage to uncover the truth – reinforces concerns about the dangers in ignoring the Kashmir issue. This is a larger subject with many strands to it. For this piece, we restrict ourselves to the kinetic or the associated air operations that took place, when the Indian aggression brought two neighbouring nuclear weapon states with common borders, into a kinetic war arena. Brinkmanship born of arrogance is what triggered this war as predicted six years ago. It was clear even then that Balakot 2.0, whenever it came, would be trickier and that Pakistan needed to be ready as soon as possible to be able to handle such a challenge.
Since we are contextualizing this discussion with the air battle, and hence primarily the role of the PAF, it would be pertinent to note that the PAF had the foresight to plan well ahead. It was highly committed to develop itself to meet any new challenges, in line with the evolving character of war. Post2019, it worked consistently to conceive, strategize, operationalize and execute its plans that covered a 360- spectrum . It is rightly said that without commitment, one can never start. But more importantly, without consistency, one can never finish. PAF displayed both of these virtues at the optimum level, by being committed and remaining consistent, through its seamless readiness in all facets and manifestations.
The process post-Balakot undertook an objective gap analysis to ensure effectiveness and potency of the PAF in an era of radical technological transformations. It involved focused decisions about inducting highly capable systems in niche domains, through a technology road map. PAF reviewed its in-house resources, adjusting costs to build a qualitative air force. Such resource rationalization was further augmented with some timely Governmental resource allocation, along with complete synergy with the Pakistan Army and the Navy, this meant total synchronization and political will at the strategic level. PAF worked with simultaneity in conceptual, physical and moral dimensions, including but not limited to, strategizing doctrinal imperatives, niche inductions, focused human resource, intensive training, and inspiring leadership.
Such preparations abounded during the period of peace since Balakot that was nonetheless laced with growing paranoia on the other side. The resources were acquired promptly, and the Pakistani military at large and the PAF in particular, trained hard to become ready for any eventualities. What ensued thereafter was a truly multi-domain environment, in five major domainsEW, space, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), net centricity and cyber. The PAF conceived and acquired the full aerial campaign architecture – augmented the fighter and multirole fleet through acquiring, inter alia, sophisticated 4.5 Gen aircraft, the J10C. Such system thinking led to improving the “eyes in the skies” synergy with AWACS, as part of its complete EW suite, with requisite variety involving multitude of air and ground based EW systems, thereby covering the full spectrum. A com prehensive Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) architecture comprising sensors, shooters, and ground/air based assets, augmented technologies for the air defence umbrella. The communications network carried required redundancies, and a command centre for real time information jointness and decision making, remained an essential part of this architecture. The flying machines included not only the aircraft like the JF-17, the J10C, and F-16 but also UCAVs, UAVs, and a whole range of munitions’ options. The environment was further reinforced with sufficient management of the cyber space through a specially created cyber command. All operations and inputs were thus managed with sophisticated integration.
So well before the eventual Balakot 2.0 would be thrust upon Pakistan, there was synergy for decision making at the strategic level and seamless collaboration amongst the services at the operational level. The PAF worked through its part using the classic doctrine of centralized command, distributed control and decentralized execution. Senior leadership would remain available for strategic direction at all times.
Now all this can still be wanting, despite the availability of the sophisticated equipment, unless two more aspects were considered before the run up to the conflict. First, the intense training environment at the service level, further augmented with near real-life scenarios building via multinational exercises. For the air element, several air forces opted to participate in a multi- bogie, network centric warfare with multi-domain, joint and combined operations’ environment provided in such exercises. The battle scenarios were fierce and debriefs focused and prudent. The above said, the deciding element was leadership – further amplification of the aggressive spirit in time- compressed situations. It became amply clear that the service believes in ‘right person for the right job’.
For example, within the PAF, the Air Chief gave a directive on assumption of his command, for training rejuvenation at all levels . His emphasis was at the optimum encouragement and achievement of a well-rounded leadership, at all levels of command. He led by example displaying and encouraging meticulous planning and smart execution. He brought to bear on the mission leadership defined by composure, discipline, and clear—guidance with quiet confidence. The result was clarity on a resultoriented end game, and focus on the entire process to achieve these objectives.
It would nevertheless be prudent to factor what was happening on the other side. The BJP came into power and has held it for eleven years thus far. In its party manifesto, BJP had recognized the inadequacy in the strike potential of the Indian military. Prime Minister Modi lamenting that despite the deal, Rafale aircraft were yet to be delivered to India during Pulwama- Balakot war, should be seen in this backdrop. In 2025, however, the IAF had already acquired and operationalized Rafales, in addition to other weapon systems like the S-400 missiles and other sophisticated equipment. Such capabilities were considered by IAF to be beyond sufficient. This led to sheer arrogance at the political level which is readily borne out by declarations and claims of invincibility.
There was thus a flawed assumption that the IAF had the ability to blind off the PAF and create air dominance. It also wrongly assumed Pakistan’s reaction of denial at best. This notwithstanding, still conscious of the memory of one of its pilots getting captured in Balakot scenario, India wanted to avoid any similar situation. During the run up to hostilities, the jamming of a flight of Rafales, that made this formation turn back, and also reportedly led to firing of an IAF Air Marshal, would cause more concern about the operational readiness of its aircraft. All these issues probably affected IAF’s Rules of Engagement during the war. Until the actual kinetic operations were initiated by India, PAF remained watchful, yet restrained. In its initial execution, India started further aggression by resorting to simultaneous missile and drone attacks, involving deliberate attacks on civilians and mosques.
It claimed having attacked nine sites, calling its actions ‘non-escalatory’, as it did not attack any military targets. However, this clearly implied that since it omitted military targets, India was admitting that it had attacked civilians deliberately.
It is almost laughable that a seasoned former diplomat-turned-politician, Dr Jai Shankar, the Indian Foreign Minister, stated that it ‘gave an option’ to Pakistan, thereby displaying yet again, how deeply flawed was the Indian assumption that Pakistani ‘military could opt out of it’, implying that Pakistan might do nothing against a blatant violation of its territorial integrity. The rest as they say is history. Pakistan bravely defended its territorial integrity.
The night between 6-7th May 2025 was quite telling. It demonstrated that times of meticulous planning paid off. Pakistan’s response was definitive. It came swiftly and surely. In the words of a PAF veteran, “there has never been an air conflict of such composition in modern war fare. The global militaries will teach this as a lesson.” From Pakistan’s perspective, electro-magnetic spectrum, celestial framework, artificial intelligence, about 150 machines of all forms from both sides, various types of air-to-air and surfaceto-air weaponry – all operated in a synchronized format in a limited air space for over one hour. The PAF proved yet again that whoever controls the EW spectrum, would rule the air campaign.
What ensued however would require careful re-construction of the aerial engagement. The environment was complex and multi-bogie. Well over a 100 fast jets were in the arena of this aerial battle, that went on for over one hour, involving over 70 IAF and 42 PAF aircraft. As the fighter buffs would know, in air combat seconds and minutes count. One hour therefore, is a really long time. The fast jets, most with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons mingled in an air combat. Many sophisticated weapon systems were being war tested for the first time ever. The experience of real-time battle simulation practices helped the PAF pilots and air defence controllers very meaningfully. The weapons galore similarly involved real battle use for the first time ever. The spectrum superiority came out as the major winner.
At the global level, the initial reactions were cautiously lukewarm. Most advised restraint but refrained from any active role. Perhaps many of the global actors carried another flawed view that the numerically superior eastern neighbor would dominate any military encounter with Pakistan.
What actually occurred was that sophisticated and modern, largely Western, weapon platforms crumbled against the standoff missiles fired off Chinese weapon systems. Three Rafales, and one Mirage 2000s, Mig 29, and SU 30 each that went down probably never saw the BVR missiles coming. The PAF confirming these six BVR kill shots means that it found its missiles reaching the no escape zones of the respective targets, and thereafter, the targets disappearing from the radar scopes, i.e., a digital confirmation.
This was followed by validations through multiple human sources. This author has learnt of two or three more Indian aircraft on which the killer criteria was met. In reality, therefore, the official score is much more conservative applying a stringent burden of proof, than the eight or nine aircraft downed that the order of events and digital evidence suggests. In most cases the Indian aircraft radars were not even painting the PAF aircraft when the latter fired the fire-and-forget systems from standoff ranges.
While the debate about ascendant Chinese technology in competition with the West has just begun, age old respect for the ‘man behind the gun’, has eclipsed mechanistic explanations of victory.
The Indian performance must have embarrassed the manufacturers of the highly rated Rafales with their SCALPs and hammer bombs. The PL -15 air to air missile came out as an optimum weapon of choice. This then was a highly intense, electrifying air battle, in a target rich environment.
It tested human limits – of endurance, stress levels during intensely limited decision making time, the list goes on. The Air Chief was informally heard saying that one of his challenges was making his pilots exercise strategic patience where required, as the young and fiery ones were always on a roll.
The overall ambit of the PAF counter- response across the border or LOC was in three cycles – multirole jets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS) and missiles or other no contact weapons, all highly integrated into a network- centric system in five domains.
The command guidance was clear, unambiguous and swift – kill the intent of the intruders. The Chinese technologists would be proud of how the PAF made optimum utilization of the equipment they produced.
PAF response also included offensive drones. Our actions were spread over the EW spectrum, as well as in terms of altitude and speed. By the night, the PAF UAVs were launched. While the killer drones went to the military targets, the UAVs were over several major cities including for example, New Delhi.
After a lull, India escalated further. It realized that its initial defeat largely came from the aerial response by our air force. It decided on a direct messaging to the PAF with its second big escalation wave by aiming to target PAF Bases. India also sent several drones, ostensibly to cause a public scare. The risk-taker India thought this time it would overwhelm Pakistan. The loitering munitions and the long range surface –to- surface missiles were used to attack air bases and other sites, though the Abhinandan lesson from 2019 still kept them away through the use of standoff category of weapons.
The Pakistani counter- response was nevertheless ready and waiting, through a network centric, multi-domain operation, with seamless integration of the three services’ operational plan, in air, land, sea and cyber space. The PAF targeted the elements that had tried attacking Pakistan. It struck 14 Indian bases, the Brahmos missiles storage sites at Beas and Nagrota, S- 400 bases (Adampur and Bhuj), and Indian C2 centre at Barnala. All this was in sync with and supplemented by Pakistan Army’s Fateh 1 & 2 missiles that struck 26 sites across LOC and mainland India, took out Brigade HQ, intel fusion sites, various field units and several posts across LOC. The myth of invincibility, ostensibly being fed to the unsuspecting Indian audiences, was broken. The 84 drones that got reported, none was able to go back.
From Rafales to drones – the story of IAF manifested swift deterioration within 24 hours, as they were overwhelmed into both the manned and unmanned spheres.
While the kinetic actions were ongoing – complicated, swift and decisive, as they were, there was another war, much crazier and angrier happening in the region elsewhere. The intense and explosive India’s media war went to a higher level of frenzy. While the misinformation and disinformation has always been part of psy ops, but this time the planted and fake news broke all earlier records. Like its false flag operations that served as a trigger to the commencement of the battle, Indian media found new levels of spreading fake news.
Never before in the history of mankind, has the lust for power and toxic ambition of a national leader brought the world to brink of a nuclear abyss.
This time the doomsday clock got even closer to mid-night. After all, there are no other nuclear weapon states, with a lower strategic warning time across common borders.
The international actors now got into an act. The regional bully was losing face, and also its fast jets. While the stated concern was of saving the world from a nuclear abyss, it would also allow some respite to the regional bully with a bloody nose. The result was a ceasefire, an uncomfortable silence, never mind the venomous media war that continues unabated.
Yet again the world stopped short of a total disaster. The air battle ended, but the war remains. Pakistan’s military success would continue to be substantiated through diplomatic and other outreach. The gnawing question now is not “if “it will sizzle again, but “when”. Whenever it does the intensity as well as speed would be significantly high.
While Pakistan’s military response was calibrated yet effective, it occurred within a highly volatile and compressed environment where the risks of inadvertent escalation were very real. The fact that escalation did not spiral beyond control is as much a testament to strategic planning as it is to Pakistan’s institutional discipline and restraint.
There has been a declaration by the Indian Prime Minister that ‘nuclear blackmail’ will not be tolerated. Wounded self-pride retreats into denial and contrives excuses. In a nuclear environment, the aggressor is the one risking nuclear escalation. You cannot blame the defender for not playing by the rules you invented to suit your hubris and hegemonic ambitions. By violating international law, rejecting international mediation, spurning even bilateral engagement to sort out the political problems, you are the ones showing disdain for responsible and civilized conduct yet complaining about possible nuclear escalation because the other side refuses to roll over and submit to your bullying. What this war displayed in very tangible terms is that change is the only constant in aerial warfare. Every new air battle shall be unique and different from the previous ones. The lessons drawn from swift retort of 2019, led the PAF to build beyond the experience, strategy and capability of that time.
This became possible through leadership dynamism, a constant focus on transformative training, synergistic planning, immaculate execution inclusive of niche inductions, carefully established and articulated indigenous efforts, all through a sustainable force development mechanism. As for the future, as before the PAF will sustain watching the ramparts, by augmenting the whole ambit. With the added synergy amongst all military domains, the impact would remain forceful. Any misadventure can bring more surprises for the adversary, should it consider nudging the precarious strategic balance in the region.
