Israeli kinetic operations in the region for over a year were taking all the space of international headlines when the Bashar al Asad regime in Syria collapsed within a few days in December 2024. Regional and international military and intelligence analysts and policy makers are now faced with a new puzzle. After the collapse of a government, it usually takes one to two years before the dust settles, the list of winners and losers becomes clear, players review their situation and plan for new moves. When the deck is shuffled at the poker table and a new hand is dealt with, players need some time to evaluate the stakes and the cards they are holding. Currently, Syria is at that stage of transition and action of one actor adds a new force to the situation and reaction of another actor changes the trajectory that makes predictive analysis extremely challenging if not impossible.
The nature of conflict has changed globally where networks of militant organizations are repeatedly getting the better of hierarchies of nation states and pulling surprises. The Syrian theatre is a good case study for researchers and analysts to study the success of networks against hierarchies. Nation states are hierarchies with top-down linear bureaucracies while non-state actors are networks with non-linear nodes. There is no clear boundary between hierarchy and network and there is a lot of overlap. Hierarchies use networks to advance their interests and networks use hierarchies for their own advantage. In two cases in Afghanistan and Syria, networks have toppled the government and transitioned into hierarchies as they now control the state. Religious, sectarian, ideological, ethnic, and tribal identities played a key role in the decade old civil war and these identities will continue to play a significant role in the Syrian theatre. Syrian Kurds, secular and Islamist Syrians, Arab tribes, Alawites and Druze are all important communities operating in specific geographic areas.
Sunnis are in the majority but not a monolithic entity. They come in all shades including secular, Muslim Brotherhood, salafis, trans-national jihadis and tribal and kinship-based business networks. These groups are the variables in the Syrian theatre with complex cooperative, competing and conflicting inter-relationships. An overview of the variables and focus on monitoring the trends can provide a road map for how the events are likely to unfold. In the lengthy list of variables in the Syrian theatre, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is currently playing the dominant role, but it will be a grave mistake to ignore other actors. HTS originated as a branch of al Qaeda but in 2016 broke the link with al-Qaeda and presented itself as a moderate group. HTS became the dominant faction by fighting and absorbing rival Sunni militias but is facing an enormous challenge to run a government of a devastated country. Other Sunni religious groups include Muslim Brotherhood inspired groups like Ahrar al-Sham, salafis, tribal groups and remnants of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Ahrar al Sham aims for a government based on Islamic law and it will continue to pressure the new rulers to incorporate Islamic laws in the country’s Constitution. Salafis are keeping a low profile but are carefully watching the moves of the government. During the civil war, several local tribal militias emerged all over the country to safeguard their communities and control local resources and tolls. These militias will try to get the share of local resources under the new government and those left out of the tent will sell their services to the highest bidder through kinship-based business networks based in the Gulf countries.
Currently, about 12’000 ISIS fighters, including around 4000 foreign fighters from over fifty countries and about 50’000 of their family members are in detention camps in northeast Syria guarded by Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF). This is the single most important group to watch. If Turkey and SDF clash in the area, ISIS will attempt to break out of the area and regroup threatening the whole theatre. According to a BBC report, around 68,000 people linked to ISIS are being detained at the alHol camp. More than 94% of them are women and children, and 11,000 are foreign nationals. These camps are the nurseries for the next generation of the trans-national jihadis. Several prisons are located near the Turkish border, such as Ain Issa, Qamishli, and Derik. If ISIS fighters escape from these camps, it is highly likely that many will slip into Turkey creating a challenge for Turkish security forces.
Turkey’s main security concern is revitalization of Kurdish separatist activities in Turkey taking a cue from assertive Syrian Kurds. A détente between Turkey and SDF is in the interests of both parties and a ray of hope is Turkey’s recent reconciliation efforts with Turkish Kurds by allowing Kurdish Parliament members to meet incarcerated Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan and announcing $14 billion investment in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast. Ocalan appealed to Turkish separatist Kurdistan Workers Party to cease their armed struggle.
This had a positive impact on Syrian Kurds and provided an opportunity for a constructive dialogue between Turkey and Syrian Kurds. Washington mediated between Turkey and Syrian Kurds led by Mazloum Abdi and Turkey in turn helped in negotiations between the interim Syrian government and Kurds. The agreement stipulated that Kurd fighters would be incorporated in Syrian defense forces over ten years.
However, the painful experience of Syrian Kurds in the history of the state has left deep scars and trust deficit is the main hurdle. Recent clashes between Alawis and government supported militias resulting in large scale killings has raised alarm bells among Kurds. It is likely that Syrian Kurds will follow the course of Iraqi Kurds to maintain autonomous regions with their own security apparatus. They have also shown interest to open channels with Israel to build an alliance in case of possible disintegration of the Syrian state. This will be in line with the strategy of Iraqi Kurds who developed wide ranging relations with Israel in economic and security areas. Kurds should remember their proverb that ‘Kurds have no friends but the mountains’ that summarizes their tragic history of loneliness, betrayal and abandonment by empires and nation states over the last one hundred years.
Alawites occupied positions in government and security apparatus for five decades under Assad’s family rule. They are the biggest losers in the game. In March 2025 clashes, deaths of over one thousand mostly civilians in Alawite majority western coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartous has sent shock waves among Syrian minorities, especially the Druze. Many Druze leaders are now viewing Israel as a guarantor of their survival as Israeli Druze have progressed and integrated in Israeli society. Several Syrian Druze leaders recently visited their shrine in Israel and Israel is finalizing details of allowing Druze workers to come to Israel to work. Israel has already drawn a red line for the southern Syrian provinces and has declared that it will not allow the Syrian government security forces to deploy in Druze areas.
This cooperation will increase, and Israel will have a robust presence and penetration along its north-eastern border. Alawites hope that Russia will keep it’s naval and air bases located in their areas and will seek Russian protection and Iranian support. They will use Syrian nationalism slogan to rally support. Important regional players include Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf sheikhdoms. During the civil war, there were multiple ‘axis of violence’ operating in the theater.
One party is the duo of Turkey and Qatar. The relations between the two blossomed during the boycott of Qatar by fellow Sunni neighbors in 2017 when Turkey used the opportunity to get a foot in the Arab tent. Both cooperated in the Syrian theatre supporting the Muslim Brothehood-influenced and linked Sunni militias.
The rival party is Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with Egypt and Jordan as junior partners who loath the Muslim Brotherhood and they banded together to stand up their own proxies to get a foothold and try to shape Syrian events.
Saudi Arabia in coordination with UAE, Jordan and Washington was trying to stand Sunni Arab militias. The fly in the ointment was the ‘Salafi question’. The ‘rebellious salafi’ are those who denounce monarchies and were most effective in combat. The ‘loyal salafis’ do not oppose existing monarchies, but their fighters were not effective on the battlefield in contrast to the ideological commitment of ‘rebellious salafis’. Saudi Arabia and Jordan were concerned about the blow back. A stringent vetting process to prevent the ‘rebellious salafi’ lot getting in the tent and strict control of weapons flow and insistence on keeping records of ordnance hindered the process as fighters had the choice to join other militias with plenty of opportunities for pilferage as well as banditry. The Kuwaiti government under pressure from its angry private citizens allowed the flow of large sums of money during the civil war to beleaguered fellow Sunnis with no checks where it ended.
This was finally stopped due to pressure from Washington and Saudi Arabia. Turkish security interests include keeping a lid on Syrian Kurdish aspirations and preventing their linkage with Turkish Kurds and a resurgence of ISIS. It also wants to get return on its investment to get the lion’s share of reconstruction bonanza in Syria. It will encourage Sunni Arab allies in the north to take control of mixed cities of the north and east. Turkey may also be contemplating having a military footprint in Syria. If this path is pursued, then we may see deployment of drones in upgraded Syrian air bases.
This move will bring them in direct conflict with Israeli interests as the Israelis have no wish to replace Iranian influence with Turkish which under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has become more anti-Israeli in rhetoric and at some stage can translate into a more concrete threat.In the short term, Iran got the major blow by losing its base in Syria and severe degradation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The Syrian section of the land bridge between Iran and Lebanon has been taken out and this will have negative impact on weapons supply to Hezbollah. Tehran is extremely cautious due to aggressive moves of Israel and the anti-Iran administration in Washington but with usual Persian patience, it will try to recover some lost ground in Syria. It will regroup its old allies Alawites and make new inroads in Sunni tribes in the south near Israeli border to tap in growing resentment in the area due to the heavy- handed approach of Israeli forces. It will also try to rely more on traditional tribal smuggling networks than ideological allies. Iran will significantly dial down its reginal profile in the short term carefully watching Israeli and American moves. However, it will try to create a Sunni version of Hezbollah in southern Syria in the medium to long term betting that angry and wounded Israelis will repeat the same mistake that they made in Lebanon.
Bashar al Asad was no threat to Israel and during the Israel-Hamas war, he kept Syria out of the conflict. His ouster removed an Iranian ally on the border but created potential twin Sunni threats in the shape of former al Qaeda reincarnated as HTS and ISIS, even if both entities have intentions but have no capabilities at this stage to pose a serious threat to Israel. A more serious threat could be if ISIS makes inroads in some disaffected tribes in northern Jordan bordering Israel.
The second order of concern is the growing role of Turkey in Syria. Israel would like Saudi Arabia and UAE to engage with HTS leader Ahmad al Sharrah and keep him in the lane of Sunni Arab countries that have working relations with Israel. It will continue close cooperation with Jordan to keep a close eye on Northern Jordanian tribes and rely on the United States to limit the role of Turkey, especially deployment of military assets in Syria. Israeli military and intelligence assets will be increasingly involved in Syria to thwart the emergence of a new front on its north-eastern frontier that has been quiet for several decades under the Assad regime. Israel wants a ‘cordon sanitaire’ along three southern Syrian provinces, prevent deployment of Syrian troops of new government south of Damascus, provide protective umbrella to Syrian Druze, open channels with Syrian Kurds and keep freedom of aerial action all over Syria.
Tel Aviv should look at its experience of mishandling impoverished Shia of southern Lebanon who had no dog in the fight and initially welcomed Israeli incursion to get rid of Palestinian militia oppression. However, Israeli arrogance, disdain and oppressive measures created Hezbollah. In the end, it was neither Palestinians nor Lebanese army but Hezbollah that forced the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon after two decades of attrition. Air strikes on several Syrian air bases were a direct message to Turkey to warn them against any military deployment in Syria as Israel wants no hindrance in its control over Syrian skies.
President Donald Trump has friendly relations with very few foreign leaders and Benjamin Netanyahu and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are among this small group. Washington used its good office for direct contact and now Israel and Turkey are directly negotiating in Azerbaijan that has good relations with both countries. This should be encouraged as direct contact is always better to talk about differences frankly and try to find common ground on complex issues. Both countries have no interest in a direct clash in Syria but attempts to expand room of maneuver breeds mistrust and suspicion. A little pull back by Israel from its current aggressive posture in Syria and Turkish assurance of not deploying military assets in Syria can provide a conducive environment for continued engagement.
The Gulf Sheikhdoms are playing their own little games in the Syrian theater punching way above their weight. The main rivalry is between Qatar in alliance with Turkey and Saudi Arabia and UAE and both sides are supporting rival groups. During the Syrian civil war, the United States was caught in the Byzantine intrigues of allies and adversaries on the poker table of Syria. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ran a covert program to arm and train Syrian rebels code named Operation Timber Sycamore from 2013 to 2017.
(The most comprehensive details of the programme are documented by Jonathan Hackett in Small Wars Journal, 04 March 2025). Under this programme Washington opened a ‘northern front’ in coordination with Turkey and Qatar with a Musterek Operasyon Merkezi (MOM) in Turkey. A Military Operations Command (MOC) for the ‘southern front’ was established in Jordan in coordination with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The aims and objectives of all countries were not aligned and, in several cases, completely opposite. Militias took advantage of these rivalries of the nation states and fleeced everyone. The cost of Operation Timber Sycamore was $ one billion per year from 2013 to 2017.
In addition, the Department of Defense’s Syria Train & Equip Program (STEP) spent $ one billion in one year in 20214-15 before it was shut down due to complete failure. The amount spent by Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE is not known but by conservative estimates, it is at least equal to the US expenditure. Washington’s main concern is the re-emergence of ISIS in the volatile transition phase in Syria. It is working as a bridge between Syrian Kurds and Turkey to avoid clashes that can have a negative impact on the security of camps where ISIS fighters are incarcerated. On the other end of the spectrum, it is coordinating with Saudi Arabia and UAE to enhance their influence with the new regime. President Donald Trump is the wild card as his instincts are against direct involvement of Americans in foreign lands. It is important to note that in 2017, he pulled the plug on Operation Timber Sycamore and in 2018-19 came remarkably close to a complete pull out from Syria. Currently, there are about two thousand American troops in Syria, and he is planning to decrease the number of American troops in Syria. If Erdogan plays his cards for influence and convinces President Trump, then there is a distinct possibility of U.S. troops pull out of Syria and repositioning in Jordan. This can happen as soon as in the fall of 2025. The only obstacle to this outcome will be successful lobbying by Israel.
Russia lost its main client in the Middle East but it is holding on to Hmemeim
Air Base and Tartous Naval Base on the Mediterranean coast. This is Russia’s foothold on an important coastline and a launching pad into Africa and Russia is working overtime to negotiate with the new regime to maintain both bases. Under the President Joe Biden administration, American preference was exit of Russians from the theatre. The Israeli interest is to have Russia maintain its presence as Russians had working relations with the Israelis and kept Iranians away from the Israeli border in a careful balancing act. In the second act of the play, Israelis wish that Russia can play the same role but this time by keeping Turks away from the border. There is no other country that has major objection to the Russian presence. The current U.S. administration has an exceptionally soft spot for Russia and if Israelis are successful in arguing the case, then it is highly likely (more than 80 percent chance) that the Russians will keep their bases.
The current intelligence in support of policy is sucking all the oxygen from the system. There is lot of pressure on the intelligence community for analysis about short term outcomes focusing on indications and warnings. This process assumes that existing forces will move in a linear fashion. It is all focused-on events that are important, but it is crucial to follow the trends. There is little investment in the study of medium- and long-term trends but policy makers will need this essential element. This approach should be in the context of network models to understand flexible inter-relationships, assuming that existing forces will not only change but new forces will be added, and the trajectory will be non-linear. The lesson from conflicts of the last two decades is that even a lightweight player will attempt to change the trajectory in its favor by attempting a ‘disruptive event’.
“It is precisely when the resources are stretched and the tasks many, when the forces are evenly matched and the issue trembles in the balance, that good intelligence and sensitive interpretation matter most”.
David Dilks: British historian
Notes:
• The quotes are from Charles Lathrop’s The Literary Spy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004)
• Jonathan Hackett. Covert Action in Irregular Wars: Unraveling the Case of Timber Sycamore in Syria (2012-2017).
• https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/04/covert-action-in-irregular-wars/
