In the ever-evolving chessboard of South Asian geopolitics, Pakistan finds itself at a critical juncture, grappling with the unintended consequences of its once-vaunted alliance with the Taliban. What was envisioned as a strategic triumph – a friendly regime in Kabul and a buffer against Indian influence – has morphed into a complex web of challenges. The Taliban, now in power, have charted an independent course, forging ties with India and resisting pressure to curb the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group wreaking havoc on Pakistani soil. This unexpected realignment has left Pakistan isolated, forcing it to recalibrate its regional strategy amidst escalating cross-border violence, economic disruptions, and India’s growing diplomatic foothold in Afghanistan. As Pakistan navigates this precarious landscape, it must balance military action against the TTP with diplomatic outreach, all the while contending with the broader ambitions of global players like China, the US, Russia, and Iran. The stakes are high, and the path forward demands a nuanced, multifaceted approach to reclaim its influence and stabilize a region teetering on the edge of uncertainty.
Since the Taliban’s return to power, cross-border attacks have escalated in Pakistan. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) reported a 40% increase in militant attacks in 2024 compared to the previous year. TTP claimed responsibility for most of these attacks, using Afghan soil as a sanctuary and has intensified its operations, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan sees the Taliban government’s inaction as tacit support for the TTP’s activities.
Furthermore, the longstanding border dispute over the Durand Line adds to the tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. Like previous Afghan governments, the Taliban refuse to recognize it as the official boundary, leading to frequent border clashes. Frustrated by Kabul’s lack of action against TTP, Pakistan intensified its efforts by conducting airstrikes on suspected TTP hideouts in Afghanistan, particularly in December 2024
This military escalation occurred during a visit to Kabul by Pakistan’s Special Representative, Mohammad Sadiq, who was engaged in talks on bilateral relations. This timing led to speculation about whether he was informed of the planned strikes. The operations, which reportedly resulted in 46 fatalities in Paktika province, were denounced by the Taliban as a breach of Afghan sovereignty
While Pakistan maintained that the strikes targeted TTP training facilities, Afghanistan argued that the victims were mainly refugees from Waziristan. The airstrikes aligned with Pakistan’s heightened counterterrorism efforts along the Pak-Afghan border, including in the strategically vital Wakhan Corridor, aimed at disrupting TTP activities in the region.
This narrow stretch of land, linking Afghanistan to China and separating Pakistan from Tajikistan, holds significant geopolitical value, particularly for China and Pakistan. It is seen as a potential pathway for extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and incorporating Afghanistan into China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Meanwhile, India attempted to leverage the situation, with its media spreading false claims that Pakistan had seized the Wakhan Corridor and portraying its counterterrorism operations as aggressive acts.
This narrative sought to exacerbate tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan and heighten diplomatic friction, highlighting India’s strategic efforts to influence regional dynamics. In the current scenario, Pakistan’s strategy appears to be twofold: military action against the TTP combined with ongoing diplomatic engagement to avoid further escalation.
This approach reflects Pakistan’s evolving stance on countering the TTP while managing its fragile relationship with the Taliban. However, these actions have prompted Taliban retaliation, and the resulting trade disruptions have exacerbated economic and political instability. The closure of key border crossings, such as Torkham and Chaman, has had a severe impact on trade between the two countries, with both sides incurring substantial losses.
Official figures from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that during the 2023–24 fiscal period, bilateral trade stood at roughly US$1.6 billion, with Pakistan exporting about US$ 1.06 billion and importing around US$539 million from Afghanistan. These closures not only disrupt the timely movement of goods – causing daily losses of approximately Rs540 million – but also force traders to resort to alternative, more expensive transit routes, thereby eroding long-term trade confidence. Moreover, prolonged closures have resulted in cumulative revenue losses exceeding Rs88 billion for both governments.
Amid escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, India has strategically adjusted its approach by initiating diplomatic outreach to the Taliban. The first notable engagement occurred in November 2024 in Kabul, where JP Singh, the joint secretary at India’s Ministry of External Affairs overseeing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, met with the acting Afghan Defence Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob.
This marked a significant step in India’s efforts to establish dialogue with the Taliban. Following this, the Taliban appointed Ikramuddin Kamil as their representative to New Delhi, signaling their desire to deepen ties, even though India has not yet formally recognized the Taliban-led government. Building on these developments, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi on January 8, 2025, further strengthening political and economic collaboration.
During these talks, India emphasized its interest in boosting investments in Afghan infrastructure and enhancing trade connectivity through Chabahar Port, reflecting its broader strategic goals in the region. This growing partnership between India and the Tal iban poses a direct challenge to Pakistan’s historical influence in Afghanistan, complicating Islamabad’s diplomatic stance. Islamabad perceives New Delhi’s expanding role in Kabul as a significant threat to its traditional position in the region, fueling concerns about being sidelined in Afghan affairs.
These developments underscore India’s pragmatic and calculated approach to engaging with the Taliban, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of South Asia and amplifying Pakistan’s anxieties over its declining influence in Afghanistan.
TTP’s militant actions forced Islamabad to evolve its regional strategy, which includes seeking alliances with countries like Tajikistan, which share concerns about militant groups operating from Afghanistan. By supporting anti-Taliban factions like the National Resistance Front (NRF), Pakistan aims to pressure the Taliban into reconsidering its support for the TTP.
The increasing activity of the NRF and other factions is seen as a direct response to Pakistan’s engagement with these groups. DG ISI, Muhammad Asim Malik’s recent visit to Tajikistan underscores Paki stan’s efforts to build regional alliances to counter the Taliban’s influence. This outreach to Dushanbe is part of a broader strategy by Islamabad to create a regional coalition that can exert pressure on the Taliban Government to curb the activities of militant groups operating from Afghan soil.
Pakistan will have to mitigate the security and diplomatic fallout while reinforcing its regional position by adopting a proactive and diversified approach. Failing to act decisively could result in further strategic isolation and heightened security challenges.
Strengthening surveillance and counterterrorism efforts along the Durand Line is essential to prevent cross-border militant activities. Pakistan must also consider the implications of its actions on its relationship with other regional players, including China, Russia, and Iran, all of whom have their interests in Afghanistan. Pragmatic diplomatic engagement with the Taliban should be pursued while leveraging regional partnerships with China, Iran, Russia, and Central Asian Republics to exert collective stress on the Taliban to curtail TTP activities.
Expanding trade routes beyond Afghanistan, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Central Asian Republics, will help reduce economic dependence.
Pakistan must emphasize to the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan that aligning solely with India is a strategic miscalculation. India’s interests may not always align with Afghanistan’s long-term security and prosperity. A strong and stable relationship with Pakistan is crucial for Afghanistan’s future. Pakistan should also highlight the benefits of a balanced approach, where Afghanistan maintains good relations with both Pakistan and India rather than tilting too heavily towards one side. This approach could help stabilize the region and create a more conducive environment for economic development and security cooperation.
