Damascus has fallen, but what rises from its ashes? A moment of triumph turns into a gamble on hope as Syria enters a fragile dawn. The end of Assad’s reign marks both liberation and uncertainty, with old divisions threatening to resurface and global powers circling like vultures. Amid promises of unity and fears of chaos, the question remains: can Syria rebuild a future from the ruins of its past? December 8, 2024: A dramatic turn unfolded in Syria as opposition forces, spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), seized control of Damascus.
This decisive victory culminating in a ten-day offensive initiated with the capture of Aleppo on November 30, forced President Bashar al-Assad to flee and end his 24-year rule. The Assad regime’s fall marked the end of an era – a half-century of Assad’s family dominance and four years of relative stalemate in the Syrian Civil War that erupted in 2011. Following the capture of Damascus, deposed President Assad sought refuge in Moscow, where he was granted asylum, while rebel forces liberated regime prisoners across the newly acquired territories.
HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), vowed to steer clear of the chaos that engulfed Iraq after the 2003 invasion. However, global skepticism persists due to his past links to Al Qaeda and ISIS and HTS remains designated as a terrorist organization. To navigate the transition, HTS appointed Mohammed al-Bashir, former head of the rebel civilian administration in Idlib, to lead a transitional government until March 1, 2025.
The 2011 protests against Assad’s regime rapidly escalated into a fullblown conflict. The Syrian government backed by Russia and Iran clashed with anti-government rebel groups supported by a diverse array of actors, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Jordan, and the UAE.
The conflict was further complicated by three key dynamics: the coalition effort to defeat the Islamic State, ongoing clashes between the Syrian government and opposition forces, and Turkish military operations against Syrian Kurds. With the Assad family’s rule now over, the world watches closely as Syria grapples with the profound uncertainties of its political future.
Humanitarian Crisis in Syria
The fall of the Assad regime has triggered a significant humanitarian crisis in Syria. Over 1.1 million people have been internally displaced, with many seeking refuge in Idlib, Hama, Rural Damascus, Aleppo and Tartous. While security has improved in some areas, northeastern Syria remains volatile due to ongoing clashes, blockades, and civil unrest. Refugee movements remain cautious, with under 10,000 Syrians returning from Lebanon and about 30,000 displaced Syrians arriving in the Hermel-Baalbek region. UNHCR highlights the need for voluntary and safe returns while providing essential services like emergency shelter. A harsh winter, security issues, and inadequate infrastructure hinder the return of many displaced individuals. Cross-border humanitarian aid resumed on December 9, with substantial aid deliveries reaching Idlib and surrounding areas. Neighbouring countries, including Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, are experiencing mixed refugee movements;in turn returning individuals face numerous challenges, such as high transportation costs and uncertain prospects for reintegration.
Main Fractions Inside Syria
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: HTS governs Idlib with a strict internal security apparatus, and protests against its authoritarian practices raise concerns about its ability to manage Syria’s more diverse population. HTS has promised amnesty for lower-level regime workers but vows to hold senior officials accountable for crimes such as torture. Ahmed al-Shara fought for Al Qaeda in Iraq before founding the Nusra Front, which evolved into HTS, now focusing on Syrian governance rather than global jihad. HTS has committed to forming a government based on unity and inclusivity, still its Sunni Islamist ideology and history of hardline governance in Idlib create doubts about its acceptance across Syria and the future direction of the country.
ISIS: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a transnational jihadist group gained global notoriety in 2014 after seizing large territories in Syria and Iraq and declaring a Caliphate. Although it was territorially defeated in 2019, ISIS remains active in parts of Syria with increased attacks in 2024. The group has also attempted prison breaks and continues to exert influence in northeastern Syria. On December 10, 2024, ISIS killed 54 former Syrian military personnel who had fled during Assad’s collapse, highlighting the group’s ongoing threat during Syria’s fragile transition.
SDF: Composed primarily of Syria’s Kurdish ethnic minority (around 10% of the population) and primarily led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the SDF became a key U.S. ally in the fight against ISIS. However, Türkiye views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group it has designated as a terrorist organization. Following the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019, the SDF gained control of northeastern Syria, establishing an autonomous region. However, the SDF faces opposition from Türkiye, which views the group as an affiliate of Kurdish separatist insurgents within its borders.
SNA: The Syrian National Army, supported and funded by Türkiye, is a coalition of various factions with differing ideologies. Its key components include a variety of armed factions such as Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, Firqat al-Hamza, and Jaysh al-Islam, among others, representing a mix of Islamist and secular groups. These factions collaborate under the SNA umbrella which operates primarily in northern Syria, including regions like Aleppo, Idlib, and Afrin. Türkiye aims to establish a buffer zone along its border to counter Kurdish militant activities and to resettle some of the three million Syrian refugees currently in Türkiye. The group lacks a unified ideology and depends on Türkiye for financial support, such as monthly salaries of $100.
Druse Militia: The Druse, a religious minority in Syria mainly located in Sweida joined the effort to overthrow the Assad regime. The Druze community has formed several militias to protect their interests and maintain regional stability, especially during the Syrian civil war. Notable among these are the Jaysh al-Muwahhidin, Al-Jabal Brigade, and Sheikh al-Karama Forces.
In December 2024, the newly formed “Southern Operations Room” launched an offensive in the southwest consisting of various rebel factions. The Druze community, a unique offshoot of Islam influenced by Christianity, Hinduism, and Gnosticism, numbers over a million in the Middle East, primarily in Syria and Lebanon, with smaller groups in Jordan and Israel.
Global Players in Syria
Syria has become a battleground for competing global forces. Russia, a long-time ally of the Assad regime has provided extensive military support, including airstrikes and strategic bases like Tartus and Khmeimim, though its reduced presence signals shifting priorities. Israel has escalated its military operations, conducting airstrikes on former Assad-held sites and advancing ground forces into strategic zones, drawing international criticism for breaching ceasefire agreements.
Türkiye, under President Erdogan, has supported Syrian rebels, clashed with U.S.-backed Kurdish forces, and influenced dynamics through its refugee policies and indirect ties to extremist groups. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains focused on combating ISIS, maintaining a military presence and collaborating with Kurdish forces to prevent the group’s resurgence. These intertwined agendas underscore the complexity of Syria’s geopolitical landscape.
Syria’s Uncertain Path to Stability
The future of Syria remains uncertain as it transitions from the authoritarian rule of the al-Assad family. Key to this process is establishing a caretaker government, featuring HTS members in important roles to tackle immediate political and administrative challenges. HTS, led by Ahmed al-Shara, has become the main force in post-Assad Syria after orchestrating his downfall. The group aims to restore the country to its pre-civil war state, encouraging displaced Syrians to return and aid in rebuilding efforts. Initiatives include reopening schools, restoring social services, and facilitating a reconciliation process in Latakia for former regime personnel, allowing them to register for new IDs if they did not commit atrocities.
Ahmed al-Shara has emphasized a vision for Syria rooted in unity, nationalism, and peace. He has pledged to respect minority rights, ensure equal treatment for all communities, and disband Syria’s various rebel factions. He stated that fighters would be trained to join the ranks of the defense ministry, and all weapons would be placed under state control, emphasizing that “all will be subject to the law” with strict oversight to prevent the return of individuals with “blood on their hands.”Al-Shara has also committed to the 1974 demilitarized zone agreement, ensuring Syria will not be used to launch attacks against Israel.
He also called for lifting international sanctions, arguing that they targeted the Assad regime, which no longer exists. He further acknowledged that the country is not yet ready for elections due to ongoing challenges.
Syria’s fragmented political and ethnic landscape poses significant challenges to stability. With a diverse population of Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze, a unifying governance model is essential—many advocates for decentralisation and federalism, particularly the U.S.-backed Kurdish SDF. The new leadership must gain legitimacy at home and abroad by moving away from past authoritarian practices.
Countries like France, Turkiye, and Qatar are reopening embassies in Damascus, signaling cautious international engagement. Turkiye’s Foreign Minister urged the removal of global sanctions during a meeting with Ahmed Al-Sharaa. However, concerns about extremist resurgence persist, leading the U.S. to continue airstrikes on ISIS operatives.
The possibility of the West mainstreaming HTS reflects a troubling precedent. Historically, the West has a pattern of allying with militant groups for geopolitical gain, only to abandon them when they become inconvenient. This strategy can have unintended consequences, such as the rise of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This selective support reveals a double standard: while rejecting the Taliban regime in Kabul, the West has welcomed Syria’s takeover by equally ideological groups, driven by weakening Russia and Iran and bolstering Israel.
The effort to rebuild Syria after years of conflict requires more than just restoring physical infrastructure. It calls for addressing the significant social, political, and economic challenges left in the aftermath. Establishing an inclusive transitional government recognized internationally is essential for meaningful recovery. Equally important are lifting sanctions, promoting stability, and empowering civil society. The reconstruction process must focus on upholding human rights, fostering democracy, and enforcing the rule of law. Meeting the needs of all Syrians, especially marginalized groups should remain a priority. Global support in the form of financial aid and technical expertise will play a vital role, while education and community engagement are critical to healing Syria’s social fabric and renewing hope among its people.
Syria’s future depends on overcoming decades of authoritarian rule, ethnic divisions, and external interference. Rebuilding the country will require lifting sanctions, fostering international cooperation, and implementing a governance system that serves all Syrians. Without careful negotiation and global support, Syria risks replacing one form of instability with another, leaving its people to endure yet another uncertain chapter. The risk of Syria becoming a breeding ground for renewed extremist activity, including a resurgence of IS remains high. If this happens, the Western bloc will bear significant responsibility for destabilizing yet another Muslim state.
