In 2024, the escalating missile attacks between Iran and Israel highlighted their long-standing geopolitical rivalry and underscored the increasing sophistication of their military technologies. These exchanges were rooted in decades of hostility, primarily stemming from Iran’s support for proxy groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which actively oppose Israel, and Israel’s targeted campaigns to neutralize perceived threats from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. The immediate trigger for these strikes can be traced to Iran’s alleged involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict and Israel’s proactive strikes against Iranian positions in Syria and Lebanon, aimed at curbing Tehran’s regional influence.
The background of this Israel-Iran missile conflict can be traced to multiple provocations from both sides in 2024, with a series of retaliatory strikes and high-profile attacks. The conflict began with Israel’s April 1, 2024 missile attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, which killed 13 individuals, including top IRGC commander Major General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.
In retaliation, Iran launched about 300 missiles and drones at Israel on April 13, marking the first direct missile strike into Israeli territory. The Israeli defense system, with assistance from the US, UK, and France, intercepted the majority of the missiles while Jordan also assisted in neutralizing some projectiles.
The tension further escalated after the July 31 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran which was attributed to Israel. This assassination, along with the killing of Hezbollah commander Hassan Nasrallah in late September, resulted in Iran’s increased military actions.
On October 1, 2024, Iran again launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for the deaths of these top Hamas, Hezbollah, and IRGC figures. This strike included the use of hypersonic missiles, marking a significant advancement in Iran’s missile capabilities.
Throughout these months, both sides suffered casualties, with civilian injuries in Israel reported from missile fragments during the April 13 attack. In response to the growing missile threats from Iran, the U.S. deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to Israel in October 2024. This system is designed to intercept and destroy short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase of flight.
The deployment of THAAD represents a significant enhancement to Israel’s defense capabilities, complementing its existing Iron Dome system, which primarily targets short-range projectiles. THAAD provides an additional layer of defense against higher-altitude threats posed by Iranian missiles, and is particularly suited for intercepting long-range projectiles that might overwhelm Israel’s existing defense systems.
This situation highlights the ongoing arms race in the region, especially with Iran’s focus on missile and drone technology, and Israel’s reliance on the Iron Dome system for defense. These missile strikes are part of a broader regional conflict, where geopolitical tensions and military engagements have intensified, involving not only Israel and Iran but also regional powers like Hezbollah and Hamas.
Comparing Iran’s drone capabilities against Israel’s Iron Dome defense system is an exciting study of offensive and defensive technologies. Both systems were built to meet different strategic goals, with Iran focusing on drone warfare and Israel creating a powerful missile defense system. In a confrontation between Iranian drones and Israel’s Iron Dome, the effectiveness of the defense system would depend on the scale and complexity of the drone attack, as well as Israel’s ability to integrate additional layers of its air defense (like David’s Sling or Arrow) to handle more advanced threats. Iran’s drone technology plays a significant role in the country’s defense strategy by enhancing its surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive capabilities.
These drones allow Iran to project power across the region, maintain an asymmetrical defense posture, and compensate for its relatively weaker air force compared to other countries like the U.S. or Israel. Here’s how Iran’s drone technology contributes to its defense. Iran’s drone technology has become a cornerstone of its defense strategy by providing it with a cost-effective, asymmetrical means of defending its airspace, projecting power across the region, and deterring adversaries. The following are some versions of the Iran’s drone system.
Ababil Series
The first family of Iranian drones is the Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) Ababil. Developed by Qods Aviation Industries, which is managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ababil-1 was a suicide drone that was initially used during the Iran-Iraq conflict and was typically launched using pneumatic truck launchers. They have since created a unique unmanned loitering munition drone called the DIO Arash. The Ababil-2 and its various variants were made possible by this experience in the 1990s. These included the Ababil-B, which was used for air defense exercises, the Ababil-S, which was the first Iranian surveillance drone, and the Ababil-T, a twin-tail variant that was adopted by Hezbollah and the Houthis and could be used for both surveillance and strike munition payloads. Since 2016, the latter has employed the 30-kilogram warhead Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K Abadil-2 versions as hovering munition against the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia. The Ababil-3 is an Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) drone that Iranian troops have heavily utilized in the Syrian civil war. It is believed to be a replica of the South African Denel Dynamics Seeker. The final member of this family, the Ababil-5, debuted in April 2022 and looks to be a UAV akin to the American Predator.
Mohajer Family
The Mohajer is another family of Iranian drones; it was the first ISR drone manufactured in the 1980s and widely disseminated to Iranian proxies. Many Iranian drones are the result of a reverse-engineered version of Western drones, such as the IAIO Fotros, IAIO Yasir, HESA Hamaseh and IRIAF Kaman-22. The most important of them are the Saegheh, an entire family of drones that are the result of the acquisition of the US Lockheed RQ-170 Sentinel, downed in 2011.
Shahed Series
The Shahed drone family is the most significant one. The HESA Shahed-129 is a dual-role drone that the Iranian Army and Navy use for patrols and direct strikes, and the HESA Shahed-136 is a loitering munition intended for swarm attacks against ground targets. The HESA Shahed-149, a reusable attack drone with electronic warfare capabilities and the ability to shoot missiles and bombs, is the final addition.
The Fotros Series
Aiming for both prospective offensive missions and strategic observation, Iran’s most ambitious unmanned aerial vehicle project is the Fotros, a High-Altitude long endurance (HALE) drone.
Bavar Series
The Bavar-373 is largely recognized as an air defense system, but it also incorporates UAV monitoring capabilities to improve the efficiency of targeting and interception.
Saeed Series
A small tactical drone called the Saeed-1 is intended for close-quarters reconnaissance and real-time battlefield intelligence gathering. On the other hand, The Iron Dome is an advanced air defense system developed by Israel to intercept and destroy short-range rockets, artillery shells, mortars, and drones that are fired toward populated areas. It is a key component of Israel’s multi-layered missile defense strategy, designed to protect civilians and critical infrastructure from missile attacks, primarily from hostile groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
The Iron Dome, like drones, has no clearly labeled versions such as “Mk I, II, III,” and its development has been marked by ongoing improvements and specialized adaptations to address growing threats and operating requirements. Iron Dome has evolved from its original deployment to intercept short-range rockets to specialized models built for UAV and naval defense, and it remains a key component of Israel’s multilayered missile defense system.
Ongoing improvements that focus on improved interceptor technologies, AI integration, and system interoperability ensure that Iron Dome continues to react to the evolving terrain of aerial threats.
Different Tiers of Israel’s Missile Defense System
Following the “Summer War” between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the system was designed. Iron Dome, which was developed by Israeli companies Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries with some support from the US, was put into service in 2011. The militant group based in Lebanon damaged an extensive amount of assets and killed dozens of Israelis with approximately 4,000 rockets fired into Israel. The amount of missiles that Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hamas and other militant groups have shot into Israel in recent years has made Iron Dome the most combat-tested air Defense system in the world.
All around Israel, there are Iron Dome batteries. Each launcher in a battery holds twenty interceptor missiles, and there are three or four in total. Iron Dome uses radar to identify and track incoming missiles, determining which ones are most likely to land in populous areas. After that, it launches missiles at these rockets, leaving the others to crash into open space. Ninety per cent of the rockets that Iron Dome targets are destroyed, according to prior claims made by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The estimated cost of each of its “Tamir” missiles is $50,000.
How does the David’s Sling work
David’s Sling, known as the “Magic, in Hebrew, can intercept missiles from up to 300 km away. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems of Israel and Raytheon of the United States jointly developed it, and it began operations in 2017. Its “Stunner” missiles are intended to shoot down short–, mid-, and long-range ballistic missiles from low altitudes.
David’s Sling, like the Iron Dome, only targets missiles that threaten populated areas. Both David’s Sling and Iron Dome are meant to intercept airplanes, drones, and cruise missiles. Each David’s Sling missile costs roughly $1 million. In September 2024, the system was utilized to intercept a ballistic missile launched by Hezbollah from Lebanon.
How does the Arrow 2 work
Arrow 2 is designed to destroy shortand medium-range ballistic missiles as they pass through the upper atmosphere, about 50 km above Earth. The system’s development began in 1991, following the First Gulf War when Iraq launched dozens of Soviet-made Scud missiles toward Israel. It initially entered service in 2000. It can detect missiles from a 500 km distance. It intercepts them at quite close range, up to 100 km from the launch site. Its missiles move at nine times the speed of sound and may attack up to 14 targets at once. Arrow 2 was reportedly used for the first time in 2017 to shoot down a Syrian surface-to-air missile.
How does the Arrow 3 work
Arrow 3 was initially deployed in 2017 and is intended to intercept long-range ballistic missiles as they pass at the apex of their arc, outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. It has a range of 2,400 kilometers. It was first employed in battle in 2023, intercepting a ballistic missile fired by Yemeni Houthi rebels towards the southern Israeli seaside city of Eilat. The system was created by stateowned Israel Aerospace Industries, with the support of the US corporation Boeing. This table summarizes the Iron Dome system’s development and improvements over time. It includes important details from each phase as well as specialized variations.
| Feature/Phase | Initial Deployment (Phase 1) | Upgrades and Enhancements (Phase 2) | Specialized Variants | Continuous Improvement |
| Primary Purpose | Intercept short- range rockets and artillery shells | Enhanced interception capabilities and integration | Defense against UAVs and naval threats | Advanced interceptors, AI integration, cybersecurity |
| Radar System | EL/M-2084 multi-mission radar | Upgraded EL/M- 2084 for better tracking and detection | Adapted radar systems for specialized deployments | Integration with space-based surveillance systems |
| Interceptor Missiles | Tamir interceptors | Enhanced guidance and warhead efficiency | Modified interceptors for drones and naval targets | Development of next-gen interceptors |
| Battle Management & Control (BMC) | Centralized command and control | Improved soft- ware algorithms and automated deployment | Specialized command protocols for variants | Al-driven decision- making and autonomous operations |
| Mobility | Mobile launcher units | Increased mobility and rapid redeployment capabilities | Sea-based launchers and compact designs | Modular and scalable components for global deployment |
| Integration with Other Systems | Standalone operation | Enhanced interoperability with David’s Sling and Arrow | Seamless integration with naval and urban defense systems | Synergy with layered defense networks and space systems |
| Operational Capabilities | High interception success rate, selective interception | Better threat discrimination, increased interceptor supply | UAV interception, naval protection | Al-enhanced targeting, protection against cyber threats |
| Cost and Efficiency | High initial costs with effective defense | Cost optimiza- tions through improved software and hardware | Specialized variants may have varied cost structures | Focus on cost- effectiveness through advanced technologies |
| Deployment History | Deployed in conflicts like the Gaza wars | Upgraded during ongoing conflicts to meet evolving threats | Tested in naval environments, urban protection scenarios | Ongoing enhancements based on emerging threat landscapes |
News, Euronews, research articles, and the book, the Future of Land Warfare.
The table below outlines the key differences between Iranian drones and Israel’s Iron Dome system. The table focuses on their core functionalities, operational roles, and technical features.
| Feature | Iranian Drones | Israel’s Iron Dome |
| Primary Purpose | Offensive (strikes), Reconnaissance, Surveillance | Defensive (intercepting incoming rockets, missiles) |
| Types | Shahed, Mohajer, Ababil, Kaman, Fotros, etc. | Multi-layered missile defense system |
| Range | Up to 2,000 km (Shahed-136); varies by model | Up to 70 km (typical engagement range for interceptors) |
| Speed | ~200-350 km/h (drones); varies by model | Mach 2.5 (~3,062 km/h for interceptors) |
| Payload | Reconnaissance gear, bombs, missiles (varies by model) | Tamir interceptors; warhead fragments to neutralize targets |
| Endurance | Up to 24 hours (Shahed 129) | Continuous, as long as interceptors are available |
| Primary Function | Offensive (targeted strikes) and Surveillance | Defensive (protection against rockets and missiles) |
| Key Capabilities | -Precision strikes -Long-range reconnaissance -Electronic warfare (some models) | Intercepting rockets, artillery, and short-range ballistic missiles Detecting, assessing, and intercepting incoming threats |
| Autonomy | Semi-autonomous to fully autonomous (varies) | Fully automated interception with human oversight |
| Cost | Relatively low cost, especially kamikaze drones (shahed) | High cost per interception; each Tamir interceptor costs around $50,000 – $100,000 |
| Detection Method | – GPS, Inertial Navigation, EO/IR sensors | – Advanced radar systems (EL/M-2084) |
| Targeting | – Capable of autonomous target acquisition (loitering munitions) | – Detects and tracks projectiles, calculates trajectory |
| Countries Deployed In | Iran, Syria, Yemen (Houthi forces), Lebanon (Hezbollah) | Israel (national deployment), U.S. tested it |
| Strengths | – Stealth (low radar signature for some drones) – Long-range capabilities – High precision with low cost | – High success rate in intercepting projectiles – Effective multi-layered de- fense against rockets, artillery, and missiles |
| Weaknesses | – Vulnerable to electronic warfare, interception – Limited by the endurance and operator range for some models | – Expensive to operate – Can be overwhelmed by mass attacks |
| Operational Use | – Used in asymmetric warfare (proxy conflicts) – Direct strikes on military infrastructure and urban targets | – Defends civilian areas, and military installations from rocket fire, short-range missile threats |
Sources: Drone Databook Update: March 2020. Open-Source Analysis of Iran’s Missile and UAV Capabilities and Proliferation (2021) and A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program (2020) by Michael Rubin.
Conclusion
The escalating conflict between Iran’s drone capabilities and Israel’s Iron Dome defense system exemplifies the evolving nature of modern warfare. Iran’s drones, particularly the Shahed series, present a significant challenge to Israel’s multi-layered defense. Their low cost, longrange capabilities, and potential for swarm attacks overwhelm traditional air defense systems. While the Iron Dome has proven effective against short-range rockets and artillery, its ability to counter the increasing sophistication and volume of Iranian drones remains a critical concern.
Each system’s success is largely determined by its size, sophistication, and frequency of contact. This expanding arms race emphasizes the growing importance of air defense systems in asymmetric warfare when non-state actors and governments use low-cost technology to challenge more sophisticated defense networks. To sustain an advantage, Israel’s Iron Dome and layered defense systems must be constantly innovated. Iran sees the proliferation of UAVs as a low-cost, high-impact tool for influencing regional dynamics, particularly in proxy battles. As drone technologies and missile defense systems evolve, the strategic balance of offense and defense will shift. Iran and Israel are likely to push the boundaries of innovation, influencing the future of warfare in
the area and beyond. The conflict between Iran and Israel serves as a microcosm of the broader challenges posed by asymmetric warfare and the proliferation of advanced technologies. As drones become increasingly prevalent, the ability to effectively defend against them will be crucial for national security. This arms race will continue to shape the future of warfare, demanding innovative solutions and strategic adaptations from both offensive and defensive actors.
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