The stability-instability paradox is a concept in “strategic stability.” It implies that stability at the strategic level will induce instability at the sub-strategic and vice versa. The acquisition of nuclear weapons can create stability at the strategic or macro-level and instability at the sub-strategic or micro-level. There is a paradoxical incentive for two nuclear-armed states to engage in low-intensity conflicts or provocations below a full-scale nuclear war threshold when they have attained a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and have secure second-strike capabilities. The theory is that both states may feel empowered to engage in regional wars or other provocations with a certain amount of confidence that the situation will not develop into a nuclear war because they know that an all-out nuclear warfare would be disastrous for both parties and utilizing nuclear weapons would be self-destructive and irrational. This concept is rooted in “Deterrence Theory” which holds that “nuclear weapons deter states from attacking each other with nuclear weapons through the promise of retaliation and possibly MAD.”
This article analyzes the tussle between Indo-Pakistan, post-nuclearization and how nuclear weapons assuaged these conflicts. Both archrivals fit perfectly in the stability-instability paradox as both possess nuclear weapons with a history of skirmishes. The detonation of nuclear weapons changed the panorama of the South Asian region. Nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction prevail in the region, contributing to nuclear stability. The stability at conventional and sub-conventional levels is prone to conflicts on international boundaries, lines of control and proxies. The presence of nuclear weapons curbs both states from escalating to the nuclear threshold but instead they engage in limited military skirmishes. The 1948, 1965, and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan were on conventional and geopolitical grounds but after the development of nuclear weapons, the conflicts were limited and on a smaller scale. This article will shed light on Operation Brasstacks, Compound Crisis the Kargil Conflict, the Balakot Crisis and military standoffs that constitute the post-nuclear era conflicts.
The “Brasstacks Crisis” of 1986-1987 refers to a tense period in India-Pakistan relations from November 1986 to January 1987. It was a huge military exercise initiated by India and according to an estimate, more than half a million men comprising 10 Divisions and three Brigades were involved, more than any NATO exercise or national exercise since World War II. It was the time when India had detonated its nuclear weapons in the so-called “peaceful nuclear explosions” titled “Smiling Buddha.” Pakistani scientists and diplomats gave a clear warning of using nuclear weapons if India pressed forward.
In this situation, the “Stability-Instability Paradox” came into play, at the strategic level the presence of nuclear weapons contributed to deterrence and hindered escalation of the conflict as the fear of nuclear exchange created a stabilizing effect. At the lower level, conventional rows such as troop mobilization, military brinkmanship and border skirmishes were reported. Both states were not committing open violence against each other, but the whole scenario created an unstable environment that could lead to inadvertent escalation. The presence of nuclear weapons during the Brasstacks crisis deterred an all-out war but catalyzed instability at the conventional level. In 1990, the “Compound Crisis” was initiated solely due to the apple of discord ‘Kashmir.’ People of Indian-administered Kashmir rose for freedom and independence which led to chaos. India blamed Pakistan for this disorder in their land, decided to teach Pakistan a lesson and warned that it would not let go of Kashmir without a war. The Indian forces started to mobilize and amass in the north. Strike corps were deployed in the Rajasthan sector. Pakistan counter-mobilized and the conventional balance between both was heavily tilted in favor of India. This caused intense instability at the sub-strategic level. The use and threat of use of nuclear weapons refrained both states from going for an all-out war highlighting that the South Asian jingoism might translate into reality. The deterrence stability remained intact thus positing stability at the higher level.
A short and intense conflict began after nine years precisely in May 1999, centered in the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. The penetration of Pakistani soldiers and militants into Indian territory served as the reason for this war. In this situation, nuclear deterrence influenced the dynamics of conventional conflict portraying the stability-instability puzzle. The Kargil conflict is often categorized as a “staircase nuclear conflict” as the incentive for the first use of nuclear weapons was imminent but both states refrained from launching nuclear attacks. Communication lines between the two states remained intact at the highest level. At the strategic level, India and Pakistan avoided nuclear use, on the sub-strategic level shelling, infiltrations across the line of control (LoC), airstrikes, and offensives kept on adding fuel to the fire causing more instability.
Soon after Kargil, a Military Standoff in 2001-2002 known as the “Twin Peaks Crisis” or “Operation Parakram” happened right after the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. India and Pakistan mobilized their forces on borders and the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. India wanted to attack what it said were the militant training camps across the border in Pakistan. The hostilities led to strained relations and instability at the lower level whereas the presence of nuclear weapons created a strong deterrence against the outbreak of a fullscale nuclear war. Deterrence at the nuclear level contributed to stability because neither side wanted to outface the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear exchange.
The deterrence of Pakistan was not considered by India and it attempted a misadventure again in the Balakot Crisis, 2019. A bombing raid conducted by Indian warplanes claimed to target the terrorist training camps in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack. Pakistan also shot down an Indian warplane and held its pilot prisoner. The forces were mobilized on the borders displaying India’s willingness to use military forces. The conflict created instability at the lower level and Indian Prime Minister Modi worsened the situation by stating that India would launch missiles on Pakistan if it did not return their pilot. The international community stated that these two states are on the brink of a nuclear war but, somehow the nuclear deterrence remained intact as neither state crossed the red line.
To conclude, Pakistan and India have fought conventional wars in the absence of nuclear weapons. After the advent of nuclear weapons, the character of war changed and infused more instability in the sub-strategic levels. The instability is solely due to the conventional superiority that India enjoys and often tries to drag Pakistan into low-intensity conflicts by not crossing the nuclear threshold. India tries not to escalate war due to the presence of nuclear weapons and their detrimental consequences.
