SIALKOT SECTOR

After the Indian attack across the International Boundary, the Sialkot Sector had suddenly assumed the Central Position. There was some confusion about the readiness of our troops and in particular their occupation of their defensive positions, when the Indians launched their attack. This is on account of a surmise that the Foreign Office had given to GHQ, that the Indians will not cross the International Boundaries. It is not true as despite any assurances to this effect, General Musa had given the orders,” To take all defensive measures,” and a Flash Signal from Directorate of Military Operations had been sent to all formations.

All had acted on that and the only formation which did not take prompt action on it was 10 Division at Lahore. They had taken only half measures. As explained by Brigadier Gul Hassan, they had misinterpreted the Flash Signal. Their troops occupied their defences only on the night of the 5th of September. Even if the defences at Lahore Sector had not been fully occupied and also not in full readiness, an attack by only one Indian Infantry Division against another one Infantry Division of Pakistan, could not have even miraculously achieved that alluring sight of Indian Forces having drinks in Lahore Gymkhana, as was being hoped by General Chaudhry, the Indian C-in-C. Lahore was a big city and fighting in built-up areas can consume many a division to achieve any results. Have we lost sight of the battle of Leningrad in World War II? It along with attack at Jassar Bridge and Kasur Sector was only part of their diversionary attack.

It was clear for any military planners that for Pakistan, Khem Kharan was the pivotal prize and for India; it was the Sialkot Sector that held the key. The ultimate fate of the war had to be resolved in these two critical sectors. The positions in Sialkot Sector as on 4th September 1965. Annexure-811.

On the news of the attack; some adjustments in field formations had to be undertaken immediately. 4 Corps Artillery Group and some other units concentrated for the attack at Chamb, as part of “Operation Grand Slam”, had to be immediately relieved from there and rushed back to Sialkot Sector, their original area of responsibility. As a part of that, 1 Army Aviation Squadron less a Flight, was ordered to move to Sialkot and report to 15 Division. The positions from 5-7th September. Annexure – 912,

The move of 1 Army Aviation Squadron to Sialkot was completed by the evening of September 6, 1965. The Squadron occupied the strip at the Polo Ground on the right side of the Sambrial-Sialkot Road. The flight of Major Rabbani, ex 2 Army Aviation Squadron, which had already come under the operational control of 1 Army Aviation Squadron, since the 1st of September during Chamb-Jaurian operations, had been earlier moved to Adamke Strip on 4th September, in support of 6 Armoured Division. They were specifically assigned to work with 6 Armoured Division, which was located in area Pasrur, as part of 1 Corps reserve.

Deployed across the road at Sialkot strip, where 1 Army Aviation Squadron was based, was 8 Medium Regiment, which too had just been moved back from Chamb area. Having arrived there, we just carried out our liaison with 15 Division and had a peaceful night after all the hectic activities of the fateful day of September 6; foremost being the confusion and chaos of Jassar Bridge.

On the morning of the 7th of September, the Squadron embarked on immediate familiarization of the area. Also HQ 15 Division and HQ 6 Armoured Division were visited. There was no noticeable enemy activity. But on our side, there was still a state of confusion, uncertainty and lack of adequate information even about our troops and their locations. Since the morning of the 6th September, the prevalent conflicting reports coming in from Jassar Bridge had provoked hasty, ill-informed, panicky and illogical assessments and decisions. The essential factor was that many contradictory reports kept emanating from HQ 115 Brigade. This was being further compounded by the inept reactions of the Corps Commander, who was based at Gujranwala. The situation of panic and confusion being so created was earlier settled down due to the recce and information provided by me to 15 Division on September 6, 1965. On the morning of the 7th of September, there was again a state of total confusion of yet another colossal proportion. There was again a chain of misreporting, panicky reactions, confused and ill-informed judgements; all resulting in illogical and contradictory decisions. Some reports were received that the enemy had established a foothold on the own bank of River Ravi at Jassar Bridge. Corps Commander personally gave orders for the blowing up of the Bridge and was himself monitoring its implementation.

There is also a version that General Ayub also directly phoned Major Irshad Ullah Khan Bazid, officer in charge of demolition party, to blow up the bridge. Ultimately, when the Bridge was blown, two companies were left stranded in the enclave across the Bridge, and they had to wade through the River to return to our own bank of the river. There were also three tanks in support, and these had to be abandoned in the river bed as they could not cross it. 115 Brigade was part of 15 Division, and they were also reacting irrationally; haphazard and illogical decisions were being made with no authentic information. It was an outright sardonic act.

Since we had arrived in the area on the evening of the 6″ of September, we spent the entire next day doing detailed recce and familiarization of the area. When I arrived at the 15 Division HQ in the evening, I was shocked to see the panic and a state of helplessness. This was the worst, and the most compounded state of a self- inflicted chaotic confusion. It was a pandemic situation. 24 Brigade along with 25 Cavalry had been positioned in area Charwa as part of the defensive plan of 15 Division. They were tasked to defend the most likely enemy line of attack in the area. By evening on the 7th of September, 24 Brigade (minus 3 FF) and 25 Cavalry had been ordered to move to the area Jassar Bridge for any possible counter-attack. This was done on some panicky, irrational, illogical and ill-founded reactions of the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Muzaffar-ud-Din. He was making some false reporting of even if the bridge had been captured by the enemy. This illusionary and imaginative threat had been blown out of all proportions throughout the day. It is a pity that no one contacted us to get the facts verified about the situation as it obtained on the ground. Earlier in the day Colonel Mehdi had sent Captain Hidayat Ullah Khan Niazi for a general surveillance along the International Border and to particularly observe for any unusual movements or concentrations of enemy troops in the area.

He found no such activity and reported to Division Headquarters accordingly. No concern or apprehensions were shown for any likely threats at positions held at Jassar Bridge, and no mission was ordered in that area. In consequence, the most sensitive corridor of Maharajke-Charwa — Chobara-Chawinda had been denuded of troops. This vital sector and the line of most likely direction of the enemy attack had been left with only one Battalion i.e. 3 FF (less a company) and a Company of 2 Punjab to defend the entire front and thus made it most vulnerable.

When I reached the Headquarters 15 Division in the evening, the absurdity of their panicky reactions and the glaring blunder of sending 24 Brigade Group to the area of Narowal for a possible counter-attack in the area had dawned on them. Some patchy information was coming from the fact that the enemy is preparing to launch his major attack along the axis as appreciated all along. That the assault at Jassar Bridge was only a diversionary attack was the harsh reality which now was staring into the eyes and faces of all present there. The confusion, uncertainty and even the helplessness of the situation were all telling on their minds. They were expressing their anxieties, misgivings and forebodings in muted tones and very subdued state of minds. To make matters more confounded, GOC Brigadier Ismail had rushed to the area of Narowal himself, to give further orders to the troops already dispatched and perhaps still on the move, for the counterattack at Jassar Bridge.

It was nearly at midnight on the 7th of September that the full reality was thoroughly hammered into all those confused and panicky minds; when the loud and the deafening sounds of the enemy guns started reverberating the area and the distance skies towards the International Border were lit up by their flashes. This could be heard and seen all the way from Sialkot to Jassar Bridge.

GOC 15 Division was at Narowal at that time and was about to enjoy his meal served on a table with proper linen and shining silver cutlery laid out. Brigadier Muzaffar, 115 Brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik, Commander 24 Brigade and Lieutenant Colonel (late Brigadier) Nisar Ahmad, CO 25 Cavalry, were all sitting on the table along with him. They sat there all composed and oblivious of the whole day’s stupid and imbecile decisions and acts on the part of Commander 115 Brigade and GOC 15 Division. The sound of the guns and the sight of their lightening, rather than his own appreciation of the battlefield situation, had suddenly and abruptly delivered the message to the GOC. The futile moves of 24 Brigade Group and 6 Armoured Division are shown as at- Annexure-1013.

It had suddenly become clear to them that the enemy had launched its attack from the expected direction of Maharajke, Charwa and Chobara. GOC 15 Division abruptly sat in his jeep and left for Sialkot. He just generally and vaguely told the Commander 24 Brigade to do something. 1 Army Aviation Squadron was operating in support of 15 Division; no one ever briefed them to verify these reports which had created all the confusion and panic. The Army Aviation had been used for some other missions, but they were not used where the decisions had to be made.

Army Aviation too remained ignorant of all news regarding Jassar Bridge as they had been busy familiarising themselves with the corridor area from Sialkot-River Ravi, with a definite eye towards the areas of Maharajke, Charwa, Chobara, as this was a likely line of the Indian attack. The crisis peaked with the destruction of Jassar Bridge and got further compounded when 24 Brigade Group was pulled out of their defensive positions in the most sensitive corridor, for a possible counterattack at Jassar Bridge.

It was a figment of our own imagination and all self-fabricated and assumed Indian penetration in the area. Since there was no wireless or line contact available, messenger’s had been sent. The formal orders for 24 Brigade Group to return to their original positions was given only when the GOC 15 Division rushed back to Sialkot from Narowal. The uncertainty of the locations of both 24 Brigade and 25 Cavalry was the leading cause of widespread confusion and matter of great concern to everyone. This confusion persisted the entire night as no one knew what was happening on the ground.

On the evening of September 7, 1965, 15 Division asked for a sortie of the L-19 aircraft along the International Border. Orders stated that the Indian side should be observed without crossing the boundary. The Army Aviator was asked to specifically look for any significant concentrations and movements of the enemy in the area of Charwa. Captain (Later Major General) Niazi was detailed on this mission and flew along the boundary from Sialkot to River Ravi, noticing no movement or concentration of the enemy. He went to HQ 15 Division and briefed Colonel Staff, Colonel Mehdi.

At midnight September 7, 1965, a call came from HQ 15 Division. Colonel Mehdi told Captain Niazi that the Indians had launched their attack at Charwa. The pilot was instructed to fly at first light the next day to confirm this news and to observe precisely the strength and the direction of the enemy attack. Captain Niazi, while doing reconnaissance, noticed an enemy column of tanks moving towards Sialkot on the track Maharjke-Sialkot. He saw the leading tank heading in the direction of Aik Nadi near Faizabad (6431). He tried to get closer to this column in an attempt to get a better estimate of their strength, but the aircraft came under heavy small arms fire. The strength could not be determined and Captain Niazi returned to the Sialkot strip and gave the news to Colonel Staff 15 Division personally. At the strip, the maintenance team headed by Major (Later Brigadier) Saeed counted 32 bullet holes in the aircraft. 15 Division immediately sent some Recoilless Rifles to Aik Nadi.

As the enemy tanks arrived near Aik Nadi, Recoilless Rifles fired upon them, forcing them to turn back. It was only a diversionary move. The morning of the 8th of September saw this confusion and the predicament of the previous day assuming alarming proportions. When I visited 15 Division on the early morning on the 8th of September, Colonel Staff informed me that at first light, the enemy had launched its attack. The central axis of the line of attack was Gadgor- Charwa-Chobara-Phillarauh. Attached as Annexure-1114.

The news was alarming. As explained earlier, the 24 Brigade Group had been ordered to move to the Jassar area. Later, when the news of the Indian attack along the initially expected direction dawned in the minds of GOC 15 Division while sitting at Narowal, and Headquarters located at Sialkot, the recklessness of their earlier action was staring on their faces as stark reality.

They started to realize the gravity of the situation and its possible consequences. Panic and confusion gripped them alike. Hastily, a message was sent to 24 Brigade Group to rush back to their original defensive positions. But beyond that, no one knew if they had gotten it and more importantly their current location. One marveled at the functioning of this Divisional Headquarters, a place where they weren’t even in communication with their important and vital formations.

The entire area, which was the primary defensive position of 24 Brigade Group, was held now by only 3 FF (excluding one company) and one Company of 2 Punjab. I decided to fly to the area to see the situation myself. I flew out in an L-19 aircraft, first reached Chawinda and then started flying towards Phillaurah. At a distance, I saw a cloud of dust on the track: Charwa- Chobara- Phillaurah.

The 2 I/C, Major Nazir, was sitting in the rear seat. As we approached this area and started flying alongside with this column, we saw a long line of enemy vehicles, led by armoured cars, coming along this track towards Phillaurah at high speed. No estimate of their strength could be made. Earlier, while flying from Chawinda to this area, we saw no sign of our troops in this area. 24 Brigade Group had not arrived back yet. It was a critical situation; this sight was of utter helplessness. The enemy was having an unopposed and free run towards Chawinda and beyond to the MRL Canal. I could only pray to God for help. There was nothing that an L-19 could do now; all we could do was to wait and watch.

The Indian column kept charging along the track towards Phillaurah. Suddenly the 2 I/C gave a shout of bandits to me on the wireless. I took my eyes away from the column and looked up in the sky. I suddenly saw a flight of 4 aircraft. The instinctive reaction was to brace for any evasive action that may be required. To my surprise, I saw those planes diving towards the enemy column. The rockets fired were accurate in targeting the enemy vehicles. It seemed that Allah had almost immediately answered my prayers. The subdued mood changed almost spontaneously into one of excitement and exhilaration. The aircraft belonged to the Pakistan Air Force, and they had started to inflict heavy damage on the advancing enemy. There were puffs of smoke and fire coming out every time these planes would dive towards their targets and fire their rockets. I remember that I counted up to nine and then suddenly my focus shifted to the panicky reaction of the tanks and the other armoured vehicles in that attacking column.

They immediately started to disperse and rushed towards the mud houses of the nearby villages. There was a great excitement, and the sight was very reassuring. To save themselves from a lethal pounding, they went charging into those mud houses to find a suitable camouflage for their Tanks and other Armoured Vehicles. This gave them some respite. By now it was becoming clearer to me that it was an Armoured Formation. The earlier story of the news of the capture of 1 Armoured Division mail bag flashed in the back of my mind. I sensed that this is their main strike force- 1 Armoured Division. The timely action of our Air force, between 0700 hours and 0730 hours on the morning of September 8, 1965, had brought the Indian advance to a grinding halt. The air strike lasted for about 25-30 minutes. But the advancing enemy columns had lost precious time. They remained dispersed, static and buried in those mud houses for nearly over an hour.

When the Indians recovered, regrouped and resumed their advance, they lacked the original speed and ferocity of their attack. The column formed up again as they emerged out of the villages around Phillaurah and began their advance towards Chawinda. I could notice only the focal column advancing in line formation from Phillaurah on the track to Chawinda. I could now distinctly see that some Armoured Vehicles were in front in the lead and the tanks came following them, mostly in line and not dispersed.

I kept the L-19 flying alongside the Indian advancing column. The need’ for fire support capability with the Army Aviation was never so acutely felt before. But sitting unarmed in an L-19 aircraft was quite depressing.

The advancing enemy column came close to Chawinda. So far there had been little to no resistance to their advance on the ground. While I continued flying around the area, evaluating the situation on the ground, I was keeping my eyes focused on the advancing Indian columns approaching Chawinda and at the same time looking for some signs of movement and activity from the direction of Chawinda, waiting for our troops to arrive. The fear of our own troops not arriving in time was creating an unsettling feeling among us.

While I was immersed in these thoughts, I suddenly saw some signs of movements from the direction of Chawinda. To my delight, I saw the 14 tanks emerge in extended line formation and arrive right in the way of the advancing Indian Column. It was a dream comes true! Here they came, out of the blue; our broad line of defence came rolling out of Chawinda to suddenly confront and challenge the thin but long line of enemy forces approaching in that direction. This unexpected appearance of our force took the enemy forces by surprise. They had enjoyed a free run so far.

They were not expecting to see our Patton Tanks in this area of operation. Equally, they were intimidated by the sight of 14 Tanks all appearing in one line abreast formation. It gripped them in panic, and they immediately turned around and sought a rapid retreat. The sight was very heartwarming, and the assessment was that a very precarious situation had been very dramatically stabilised. This encouraged the tanks of 25 Cavalry to close on to the retreating enemy columns, even so, there was no tank engagement that I observed.

The approximate one- hour delay imposed by our Air Force on the advance of enemy armour had proved to be one of the single most critical and vital interventions. It was the biggest of the blessings of Allah (SWT). None of our accounts, even the official history of the Pakistan Air Force, has highlighted this most meaningful and valuable contribution. Major Mohammad Ahmad arrived with his Squadron at Chawinda at the nick of time. Just another 10-15 minutes delay in the arrival of our own troops would have dramatically turned the events into a grave situation for us to handle and control. Seeing that the situation had been stabilised, I flew back to Sialkot and went straight to Headquarters 15 Division. They had been anxiously waiting for my arrival and along with it the first credible news of the situation. For the second time in two days, accurate and authentic information provided by Army Aviation sources proved salutary. Calm prevailed in the same minds that I had seen in disarray earlier in the day. Their recklessness had been timely covered up and saved them, and the Army, from any humiliation of a major defeat on the very first day of battle.

On return to the strip at Sialkot, I took off in a helicopter which was piloted by Captain Nauman Mahmud. We went to Chawinda and from there flew to Phillarauh. As we were nearing Phillarauh, at a distance near Gadgor, I saw the tank battle raging, leaving a cloud of dust and smoke in their trail. Some sounds of tank fire were heard. The enemy tanks, which had reached close to Chawinda, had been checked and brought to a grinding halt. Now, I was watching a reversal of the initial situation.

We had the advantage and the enemy tanks were being forced to withdraw in the first major tank engagement in this sector. There was a lot of dust in the area due to which I was not able to distinguish between our tanks and the enemy tanks, but felt a sense of satisfaction that during the short span of time that I was away, our forces had made considerable progress. I was keen on landing and contact our ground troops to get a close and more accurate sense of the actual situation on the ground.

The area of the tank battle offered no such possibility, and so I decided to fly towards Phillaurah. At a distance, next to a building, I saw a few jeeps and some personnel in uniform standing around them. From the looks of them, they appeared to be Pakistani. It encouraged me and we decided to land close to them. On landing, I was very pleasantly surprised to see 24 Brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik and CO 25 Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Nisar, along with their skeleton staff standing there. The building turned out to be a local school. We could not have hoped to have a better contact on the ground other than these two persons. They had seen, endured and experienced the entire fiasco and the flap that went along the entire day of September 7, 1965. And now they were central to the most crucial stage of the combat which was to ultimately determine the entire course of the war in this critical Sector. Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik, very excitedly mentioned that a major tank battle was going on in the general area of Gadgor.

I informed him that I had already seen the action from the air, but I could not assess, evaluate and determine as to the exact progress made so far. I could only draw consolation from the fact that the enemy tanks which had reached close to the vicinity of Chawinda had now been pushed back to the general area of Chobara and Gadgor. He confirmed my assessments and further explained that our armour had so far inflicted very heavy damage on their tank formations and were forcing them to retreat. From our side, the battle was being fought by entirely 25 Cavalry alone.

He, at that time, had no assessment of the strength of the enemy, but could safely guess that it was an Armoured Formation of the Indian Army. According to his estimation, they had so far knocked out over 16 enemy tanks against the loss of 4 tanks of our own in the area of Gadgor. This news was very heartwarming. Some of this was already evident to me from the helicopter, but coming from the force commander on the spot and in the area of his direct responsibility, it was the first accurate assessment I had heard. The Brigade Commander was explaining all these details with full confidence and appeared to be a person completely in control of the situation. Along with CO 25 Cavalry, he was directly in contact with the enemy and had stabilized the unhinging of the defences caused by the hasty and irrational decisions made on the previous day. His message was very clear: the catastrophe that had been inflicted upon ourselves by our higher command had been averted by the timely arrival of 25 Cavalry and 24 Brigade. But the battle so far was only that of 25 Cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel Nisar just briefly filled me in with what had gone through his mind, how he had drawn his own conclusions and finally the sketchy orders that he had given.

It started with the narration of the orders for a move to Jassar, a more graphic account of the dinner at Narowal, being served with full linen and silver cutlery and finally exploding with the sounds of the guns. I had already heard most of the details in my briefings at Headquarters 15 Division, and have covered already. What is more pertinent are the reactions that all these events had caused and the sequence of their unfolding? Just as it dawned on their minds that the main enemy offensive had been launched in the corridor of the long anticipated and appreciated direction, the Acting GOC, Brigadier Ismail, got up from the dining table abruptly, and before rushing to his jeep to return to Sialkot, he could only tell Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik to do something! It obviously did not mean any damned thing.

But it only spoke of the calibre and the professionalism of the man in Command. The Brigade Commander could only tell the CO 25 Cavalry to rush back with his tanks towards Chawinda while he orders the rest of the Brigade to also move back in all haste and urgency. The lead squadron picked for this step was B Squadron, commanded by Major Mohammad Ahmad. He was told to proceed to Chawinda post haste while the CO brings the rest of the regiment behind him. All these were just blind moves, just intuitive rather than based on any information about the position and the strength of the enemy. Since the area was all familiar to them so no time was lost and despite all the hassle and the congestion on that narrow road, Major Ahmad arrived with all his 14 tanks at Chawinda. The rest of his action I have already covered as witnessed by me. It is the move of the Regiment less this squadron and their direction of advance which proved most critical and decisive.

Describing this and thoughts behind it as narrated by Lieutenant Colonel Nisar, clearly reflect their significance and importance. As appreciated by him, since he had no precise information about the enemy positions and his direction of attack, all he could do was to only fish for it. It was basically a matter of instinct and gut feeling that they decided to move the regiment less B Squadron to the general area of Dugri. As stated earlier all this was only a blind move. But as described by him, maybe that it had the hand of the providence in this! It had all developed into a classic armour manoeuvre. It was by accident rather than by design or choice. One squadron of 25 Cavalry had suddenly met and contained the onslaught of the approaching enemy armour at Chawinda frontally and the Regiment less this Squadron had accidently appeared at the flank of this armour thrust. This turned the tables on the enemy.

The fight of the unequal, through their ignorance and our bliss, had shaken the enemy, and they recoiled back from where they had debouched in the early hours of the morning. All these details I had already witnessed from the L-19 and described as such. He further said that the Regiment less this squadron moved to the area of Dugri via Chawinda. A blind move turned into a classic armour manoeuvre. The attacking enemy force had decided to advance along with three columns and along three axes. What I had earlier visualized was that opponent came advancing on two axes but it transpired later to be three, with a regiment along two axes and a motorized Infantry Brigade Group covering their right flank on the third axis. The column which was moving along the Central axis was ahead of the other two columns.

This resulted in very heavy casualties of the enemy tanks. From some estimates 10-15 enemy tanks had been destroyed in this early encounter so far. But most importantly, the enemy soon lost the initiative and started to withdraw towards Chobara.

I flew back to Sialkot and gave the news to HQ 15 Division. There was a great feeling of joy and elation. I then flew to HQ 6 Armoured Division. This was my first visit. Later, it became a routine. GOC 6 Armoured Division was very pleased to see the aviator, as he had a high hope and expectancy of attaining accurate and real battlefield information. He was not disappointed. They had been moved into the area earlier. They had carried out their liaison with 15 Division and had also done the recce of the area. But they were totally blank about the situation at Jassar Bridge and the possible line and penetration of the enemy attack. When the full account of the operations was given, there were jubilations all over. Major (Later General) KM Arif, who was G-II (Operations) excitedly remarked, “Sir, it was a typical armour manoeuvre.”

He was quickly reminded that it was not planned and executed as such. I told him he should not try to take any credit for it. The whole move, deployment and advance of 25 Cavalry was a blind operation and was by accident only; rather than any part of a plan. No one knew where the enemy was. By accident one squadron had moved frontally and the Regiment less than one Squadron had hit the enemy armoured formation on the flank. This incident is being highlighted again, because when later in major engagements of tank formations; such occasions presented themselves for such typical tank manoeuvres, there were no Guderian’s thinking of it and develop such standard Armour outflanking moves. It was always a case of frontal engagements of own tanks against onrushing enemy tank formations. It was always a slugging match with hardly any initiative shown by both the sides. There was no strategy or tactics involved in the handling of the armour units and formations! Regardless of where the credit lay for this, the timely arrival of 25 Cavalry, proved very momentous.

The courage, determination and fearless action of the crews of 25 Cavalry must be recognized and recorded as such. Later in the day, from the wreckage of one tank of 16 Cavalry, a complete plan of their attack was recovered. From the captured document of the Operational Order “Nepal” to the utter horror and surprise of everyone, it transpired that it was the full-fledged and even fully reinforced Indian I Armoured Division, which had launched this attack. The leading regiment was 16 Cavalry and on its Left flank was 17 Horse; with 4 Horse in reserve. That 25 Cavalry had grappled with the enemy 1 Armoured Division single handed came as a total surprise, shock and disbelief, but it was entirely correct.

No annals of any Military History can offer any comparable action. But with pride it must be recounted that it was done very efficiently, boldly and admirably. I had a close look at the operation from early morning to late afternoon. There was no more enthralling experience than that. I was a privy to watching it most closely, both from the air and on the ground. The words fail me to describe the day’s battle adequately, but the actual memories and recollections gathered, linger on as fresh and vivid in mind as it happened only yesterday on that fateful day. This full-fledged enemy Armoured Division attack supported by two Infantry Divisions and a lorried Brigade, as 14 Division did not reach the area in time, was not only halted after it had gained its momentum but forced to recoil and withdraw back to the positions close to from where the attack was launched on the morning of the 8th of September. It penetrated up to Chawinda, and by the evening on the 8th of September, the entire enemy might were made to roll back to just south of Charwa. From some accounts, one troop of 25 cavalry had even got as far forward as Maharajke but had to be pulled back. Operational orders recovered from the destroyed tank of 16 cavalry in the evening of 8th September give all details. Annexure-1216. To everyone’s disbelief, 25 Cavalry had single-handedly fought the entire day’s action with admirable bravery and courage.

This attack was successful in earlier creating a surprise element and started to gain some momentum. At the end of the day, the result was that these forces recoiled back to their firm base, which was earlier secured by their Infantry Division, and they sat there now nursing their wounds of the entire day‘s most ambitious and adventurous action; which all seemed so unbelievable. The amazing part was that this feat was accomplished by the daring of 25 Cavalry, all by themselves. 24 Brigade Group through their timely arrival had stabilised the battlefield and had subsequently taken defensive positions in the area Gadgor-Phillaurah by the evening of the 8th of September. 3 FF less one Company, which had earlier been the first to have encountered the main enemy attack at the border, put up a gallant fight but were ordered to withdraw to Chawinda by Col Staff 15 Division, when their positions were overrun by the enemy onslaught. They trickled back individually, but formed up into a Battalion again, and to their credit were back at Phillurah-Gadgor defence complex of 24 Brigade by evening on the 8th of September, and were again ready, fully determined and full of spirit to grapple with the enemy.

It was a remarkable transformation after being routed earlier in the day. They braced there and held back all the subsequent enemy attacks and even carried out some limited counterattacks. It showed their grit and mettle. But it is the spirit of this attack and action of 25 Cavalry, the entire day of the 8th of September, which stands out in full reality and endeared it in the hearts and the minds of those, who were privileged to witness and feel it.

In the evening, I went to Gujranwala and briefed HQ 1 Corps, about the entire day‘s fighting. They had been completely in the dark up to this point; they did not even know the location of the own troops on the ground. I was totally amazed and astonished at the lack of information at that level of Command. After I gave a detailed briefing to the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana, he felt more composed and enthusiastically asked me to keep visiting Corps HQ regularly to keep briefing them on the latest situation.

On the 8th of September, the primary task performed by Army Aviation was collection of vital information and briefings at HQ 15 Division, 6 Armoured Division and HQ 1 Corps. These proved very critical in the situation’s assessment and formulation of the future plans of these formations. There was not much activity in the way of adjustment of arty fire. This was basically so because the units of 4 Corps Arty kept shuttling between Pasrur and Narowal, in response to the confusing picture at Jassar and the following conflicting orders.

The actions of 24 Brigade Group on the 8th of September were, most appropriately, carried out by 25 Cavalry through pure coincidence, either by fate or by chance it seemed, and were most salutary. None on the ground could make any estimation of the strength of the enemy attack. But HQ 15 Division was acutely aware that it was the major enemy attack. The line of thrust of the likely offensive in this Sector was clearly perceived as the route Charwa-Chobara-Phillaurah- Chawinda. Major General Yahya on the 6th of September had clearly defined this appreciation to me well in advance. Since the morning of the 8th of September, Colonel S.G. Mehdi was unambiguously emphasising this direction of the enemy thrust. While Mehdi had correctly identified this threat; but the unhinging of the defences, by the ill-perceived orders to dispatch 24 Brigade Group o Jassar on the 7th of September, were clearly showing on his face.

Typically, I knew him as a man, fully composed, confident, overbearing and assertive, but the hassle and the confusion of the day before had clearly unnerved him. The gravity of the situation was such that most others would also have panicked. Brigadier Ismail, the G.O.C. 15 Div, was only a passenger there; Colonel Mehdi was calling all the shots. This hapless turning of events left him somewhat dazed, uncertain and confused. It was only after I had completed my aerial recce of the area and gave the briefing to him he could recompose himself. But he was never the same again. He had built up a very prominent and influential image of his professional prowess. Many people later described this as a farce and a cover for his real self. I had known him as our Adjutant, my company commander at PMA and later as BM of the Infantry Brigade at Peshawar. I had a very high perception of him; considering him to be a brave, intelligent, innovative man and in particular, someone who was well versed in Military History. I will not condemn him as most others did, but in my estimation, he was not the same man that I had known all these years.

Towards the afternoon of 8th of September, Major General Tikka Khan had taken over the Command of 15 Division. I had just walked out of the dugout Bunker of HQ 15 Division that I met Major General Tikka Khan, as he was arriving towards the Bunker. I went back with him into the Bunker, where he was met by Brigadier Ismail and Colonel Mehdi. He told them that he had come just to have the briefing about the situation on the ground. Colonel Mehdi gave him the entire rundown of the situation as it was. And after having listened to everything, Major General Tikka Khan announced that he had taken over the Command of 15 Division under instructions from Corps HQ and GHQ. He accepted both Brigadier Ismail and Colonel Mehdi as part of 15 Division, not showing any acrimony towards them.

In fact, it was Colonel Mehdi’s actions on the 9th of September that was the first time Major General Tikka Khan was upset with either of them. The dugout positions of 15 Division HQ, had been accurately located by the enemy guns. They were bringing down intense fire of their guns at that position. Colonel Mehdi started strongly suggesting that HQ 15 Division should be moved back across the MRL canal, towards Sambrial. Major General Tikka Khan very firmly told Colonel Mehdi not to suggest this ever again, maintaining that HQ 15 Division will stay in Sialkot with the troops regardless of the shelling. The next episode that took place was that Major (Later Major General) Bokhari arrived in HQ 15 Division with his Cobra Company. This was the only unit with the newly acquired antitank missiles. Soon after they arrived in the area, orders to dispatch the Company to 6 Armoured Division, which was now facing the main enemy Armour thrust, were given to HQ 15 Division. Colonel Mehdi called Major Bokhari and briefed him to report to HQ 6 Armoured Division along with his Cobra Company.

I arrived in HQ 15 Division, towards the afternoon of the 9″ of September, and saw that there was complete confusion regarding the whereabouts of this Company. Someone just suggested that the Grid Reference of the location of HQ 6 Armoured Division given by Colonel Mehdi was wrong. It was also inferred that the location he gave to Major Bokhari was now in enemy hands, which made matters a lot worse than they would have normally been.

Colonel Mehdi picked up the telephone and called up someone. He asked him, “Do you remember the briefing that I had given to Major Bokhari?” and then proceeded further to ask, “Do you recall the Grid Reference given by me at which Major Bokhari was ordered to report.” He then held the receiver in his hand and started waving it. While so doing, he asked everyone around, “Listen to what is being said on the phone.” Suddenly Major General Tikka lost his patience. He angrily shouted, “Mehdi I have had enough of your dramatics. Shut up and get out.” It stunned everyone; I had never seen Major General Tikka, in such temper and mood. And this was the story of how the very promising career of Colonel Mehdi came to a rather abrupt end. After the war, he was posted as Station Commander in Karachi and on one of my visits there, I met him at the Airport where he asked me to accompany him to his office. He placed before me the ACR that Major General Tikka Khan had given him.

I read it very carefully. It was damning and damaging. He was extremely emotional. He asked me whether I would go as far as to call him a coward, to which I answered in the negative. I was a privy to all the relevant episodes of HQ 15 Division, right from the 6″ of September to the day when he was removed as Colonel Staff, and knew that there had been no act of cowardice on his part. Undoubtedly, the circumstances, the events, the misreporting of HQ 115 Brigade, had all clouded his mind and judgment. I will not pass any judgment beyond this. The position at HQ 6 Armoured Division and HQ 1 Corps that I visited in the evening was equally not very re-assuring. This I can say with most emphasis for HQ 1 Corps.

I had seen the battle rage the whole day. The aerial view gave me an excellent picture of the operations conducted. In summing up, I may say that at first observation, the intensity of the enemy attack was easily not discernible. I could observe two clear columns of the enemy thrust; the one on the axis of Charwa-Chobara-Phillaurah- Chawinda had clearly outpaced the column which was protecting its left flank.

Although I could not clearly make out the strength, it was clear that it was a major attack. At that time I had not observed the enemy column that was pressing itself to secure the right flank of the main strike force. I had graphically given all these details at HQ 15 Division, 6 Armoured Division, and HQ 1 Corps. The whole day I kept observing these operations carefully and very closely, and I have already described all the action.
By the morning of the 9th of September, it had become crystal clear to all that the attack on the 8th of September was the full-fledged Indian attack and was their major offensive. The complete picture became absolutely clear, and I vividly had it registered in my mind with all its details. This was their best attempt and chance at trying to achieve a quick breakthrough. It was a miracle that 25 Cavalry had all by itself, handled and thwarted it.

I can now reconstruct all the details in all clarity. The attack plan had clearly emerged; it envisaged the operations to be launched by three Infantry Divisions and one Armoured Division. 6 Mountain Division and 26 Infantry Division were to secure a bridgehead, and through it, the 1st Armoured Division was to launch the main thrust at 0600 Hours on 8th Sept. The planned attack was along three Axes.

The Red Route, the Blue Route and the Green Route. 16 Cavalry Group, which was the unit of General J.N. Chaudhry, was advancing on route Pind Bhago- Charwa-Chobara-Phillaurah (Red Route). The flanks of this formation were covered by 17 Horse Group on the left (Blue Route) and 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade Group, on the right (Green Route). 14 Division was asked if in position, to capture Zafarwal. With the availability of this information, the picture of the previous day’s battle, as I had observed from the air, became clear and established.

It was in complete conformity with what I had seen, assessed and reported, with all additional details now added to it. The two columns that I had been observing were the charge of 16 Cavalry and 17 Horse. The pace of 16 Cavalry on Red Route had outstripped that of 17 Horse on Blue Route and was moving along way ahead of the formations on both their flanks. There was no sign of 14 Divisions movements towards Zafarwal. The Green Route on which 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade Group was moving, was too far away from the area that I kept flying the entire day and as such I could not see this element and its movement.

It keeps emerging before my eyes again and again, and I cannot help but repeat myself. I was privileged to watch all this action with my own eyes. I cannot forget the delay imposed earlier by our Air Force on the advancing enemy Armoured columns. This was a crucial one hour gained. My reaction then was that it was the divine hand of Allah (SWT) that guided and caused it. Even so, I knew that it was the will of the people on the ground that accomplished it. I have gone into all details, and I would suffice it to conclude that this was one of our finest moment of the war.

The events on the 8th of September had confirmed and driven home to all, that the attack was launched with the full weight of all the Indian troops available in this sector. The direction and may be the magnitude of the assault had already clearly been assessed and perceived. The appreciations made earlier had determined and defined it.

What was not understood then and even to-day, as to why no thorough and detailed plans were made to meet this threat. 15 Division was stretched from Sialkot-Jassar, but the corridor of Charwa-Chobara-Phillaurah-Chawinda was the most sensitive area. 24 Brigade Group was responsible for this, but why no proper fortified and elaborate defensive positions were planned and prepared for it? Equally important was that the fallback positions should also have been developed. Chawinda-Zafarwal and Badiana were our natural pivotal points. They had to be also thoroughly planned, fortified and ready to provide stable alternative positions for the Infantry to hold.

When I landed at Phillaurah on the morning of the 8th of September, I met Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik and Lieutenant Colonel Nisar, who were standing in the open next to their command jeep near the School building. They had no prepared bunkers. But surely the whole defences should have been prepared, fully fortified and appropriately mined. When I visited Chawinda, Zafarwal, Badiana and Rakh Baba Bhure Shah, it was much worse. The defences had been hurriedly prepared and that too after the arrival of 6 Armoured Division in the area.

This was the responsibility of 15 Division, and they had absolutely failed in that. Had this been done properly before the war, these solid pivots would have proved to be vital focal points for the Infantry to firmly man and hold. The tank forces would have thus retained complete freedom to manoeuvre and consequently, could have been used whenever and wherever they were required. It struck me then; it had been fairly evident before too, that 15 Division had been inept and ill prepared for their tasks. The bunkers and well-prepared positions in and around Sialkot proved very useful. Why the same preparation was not extended to this significant ground? Whatever blunders had been made. Fortunately, they got covered up by the gallant troops on the ground.

On the morning of 9th September 1965, everyone was aware of the fact that the attack of enemy | Armoured Division attack had been blunted. Though they had failed, they were now regrouping and planning their next move. We had enough time to do our own planning and preparations for their new offensive. Though HQ 1 Corps had moved 6 Armoured Division in this area and they had arrived during the night of the T at September in their battle locations, still they were given no plans or orders. They were just vaguely assigned the role of destroying enemy penetrations East of MRL canal.

The location of our landing strip at the Sialkot Polo Grounds had so far remained peaceful. After the hectic activity on the 6th, 7th & 8th September 1965, we could finally rest and sleep. Across the road was the location of 8 Medium Regt. The Adjutant of the Regiment was Captain Aslam (Later Colonel). Being an Army pilot, he and the other pilots of the squadron were in regular liaison with each other. This became rather ominous. As the hostilities broke out throughout the Sialkot sector since early September 8, the guns of 8 Medium Regiment became very active.

In retaliation, it started attracting enemy Counter Bombardment from the night of the 8th of September. Since only a thin road divided the Aviation positions from medium gun location, the strip began receiving a fair degree of the enemy fire. Though the trenches had been dug and the aircraft were well dispersed, but the first taste of the enemy fire provoked hasty, panicky and may even be described as somewhat comical reactions. The trenches had been earmarked for different personnel, but in haste, when the pilots and the other crews ran to take cover, the principle of first come first serve prevailed.

Everyone was desperately rushing to the nearest trench. Major Nazir, the 2 I/C, ran obliviously towards one he had earmarked for himself. On approaching it, he instinctively took a leap in the air to quickly jump into it. As his thick frame was still in the air and was about to fall inside, he noticed that it was already occupied.

Rather than falling in the trench over the occupants and crushing their bones, he balanced himself on either side of it and hoist himself upright. The two occupants thanked their lucky stars; they had evaded both the enemy shelling and their own 2 I/C dropping over them. Remarkably, this incident lightened the tension from the first real battlefield indoctrination of 1 Army Aviation Squadron.

On the morning of September 9, 1965, I asked the permission of GOC 15 Division to move the squadron to Sambrial. It was foolhardy to expose the aircraft and the crews to hostile enemy fire, and the GOC readily approved. While the squadron moved to Sambrial on the 9″ of September, the tempo of war stepped up. The focus and the intensity of the enemy attack had clearly shifted to the Phillaurah and Chawinda area.

Thus a part of the flight composed of Capt Lateef (known as Lateef Bhai, who later became a Major General in Bangladesh) and a few other pilots, remained to support 15 Division, and the rest of the squadron became more directly involved to support 6 Armoured Division. Captain Lateef maintained his dedication to support 15 Division, while the other pilots kept rotating. 15 Division was full of praise for the Army Aviation efforts and initiated the Citation for the award of SJ to Captain Lateef. I kept my routine of liaison with HQ 15 Division regularly and daily.

The area of responsibility between 15 Division and 6 Armoured Division were assigned, and the inter-division boundaries were defined. 24 Brigade Group came in responsibility of 6 Armoured Division and was placed under their command. Some additional troops as 14(P) Brigade were also promised, and 4 Corps Artillery was to provide Artillery support to the total area of operations of 6 Armoured Division. This was between Chawinda-Pasrur.

24 Brigade kept their defensive positions at Phillaurah-Gadgor. These were further strengthened by employing 9 FF, with under command ACT, in area Phillaurah-Deg Nedi, with at least a platoon at Zafarwal. Guides Cavalry was in area Badiana, extending towards SIALKOT. 22 Lancers was West of Badiana, with their Reconnaissance Troops operating North of Badiana.

The Squadron less than one flight were now primarily focusing the area of operations of 6 Armoured Division. The pilots were fully involved and remained abreast of the activities and operations of 6 Armoured Division. I too kept a very close contact with Headquarters 6 Armoured Division and some of its units. The visits to Headquarters 1 Corps were also regular. Realising the folly of keeping Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana in Command of the only and the most important Command of 1 Corps in the Army, General Headquarters hurriedly dispatched Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, as the Deputy Corps Commander.

He was Commandant Staff College, Quetta, and because of the war, all courses had been canceled, and the officers were posted to different units and formations. He was being an intellectual and an officer who had a good grasp of the Military Strategy and Tactics. One felt that he will provide saner judgement at HQ 1 Corps, but I soon realized that it was not to be.

All these activities and regular liaison of Army Aviation officers with units and formations provided a clear and authentic picture of the battle at all critical levels of command. This proved to be the most useful link developed and was a key in dissemination of the timely, accurate and vital information as seen and observed by the airborne eyes. It also helped in streamlining of wireless links for the direction of the artillery fire and in directing the strikes of our Air Force on to the lucrative enemy targets.

It was also a great help in all decision making. With the arrival of the Deputy Corps Commander, some planning and assessment of the situation became visible at that level. Earlier it appeared that Corps Headquarters was just a mere formality; a Command only on paper where there was no visible sign of any collection and collation of battlefield information, analysing it and then making any operational plans to further guide and control the course of the battle. Leave that alone, I was horrified to see that at that level of Command there were no channels for seeking and evaluating essential battlefield information even. What to talk of knowing the information of the location and strength of the Enemy Forces, at that level the policy makers were not even in the knowledge of the dispositions of their own troops on the ground.

Major General Yaqub made out some difference in the thinking and planning at that level of Command, but he too was handicapped as he too never could get any authentic battlefield information; an element without which no understanding could be developed to come out with any final plans of action. Army Aviation appeared to be their only link, channel and source of any authentic information. And that too was not available to them all the time and when the urgency so demanded. He made some efforts of his own to plan his own ideas and assessments of the situation and develop his plans and orders to meet the situation and the threats as perceived by him. Some thoughts of his thinking and planning he reduced in writing and issued as part of his perceptions and options. The same are attached as at Annexure-1317.

The entire planning for the defence of this vital and most sensitive sector had been done by Major General Yahya Khan when he was Commanding 15 Division at Sialkot. As he told me on the morning of the 6th of September, that he had done the reconnaissance of the entire area on foot; and the significance of that statement was unraveling itself. It was a well-conceived plan for which Phillarauh was the pivot on the enemy’s most likely route of attack.

It was around this pivot that our defence was laid. The force provided was equally well balanced. The primary defences at Phillaurah-Gadgor were held by 24 Brigade Group. 9 FF had given additional strength and flank protection to 24 Brigade. With 6 Armoured Division, there was a powerful force available to launch any counterattacks against enemy outflanking manoeuvres. Sialkot and Jassar Bridge had also been held in some strength.

The troops of 6 Armoured Division were now also providing stable pivots at Badiana and Rakh Baba Bhure Shah. 11 Cavalry was held in reserve at Pasrur. This gave a lot of flexibility in choices to 6 Armoured Division, to react to any enemy offensive plans. But for the unhinging of these defences, for the ill- conceived counter attack at Jassar Bridge and the move of 24 Brigade Group to undertake that, this was a professional plan of layout of our Defences in the area.

These views were adequately strengthened and clearly proven, when enemy attacks were successfully repulsed on September 9th and 10th, 1965. Since 24 Brigade Group had been deeply involved and committed, in all the grim fighting as of the 7th of September onwards, the plans at Corps Headquarters were now being made for their relief.
Early on the morning of the 10th day of September, again a powerful enemy attack was launched against Gadgor from the direction of Rurki Kalan, Jahr, Chobara and Josagh Kotli. This attack again was with the strength of an Armoured Regiment and fully supported by all available Artillery, Infantry and Air. By 1030 Hours, this attack was repulsed by 24 Brigade and 25 Cavalry. The whole day, all enemy repeated efforts to form up his Armour and Infantry at Bahadurpur, Chobara area, to mount any further attacks, were effectively broken up through concentrated and efficient Artillery fire.

When I visited Corps HQ on the evening of the 8th of September, I had given the detailed and the graphic picture of the entire day’s battle as I had seen and experienced with my own eyes. It was clearly conveyed that it was the major enemy attack. No one knew the details of the other Indian formations in this operation, but the presence of the Indian 1 Armoured Division was clearly established and was now indisputable.

The earlier capture of the documents from the enemy DR on the 5th of September, which were flown over by us to GHQ, had also indicated enemy 1 Armoured Division in the area. This was perhaps ignored at GHQ and may be at the level of Corps HQ as well. But Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, in his “Memoirs” clearly states that they had clearly perceived this likely enemy attack and all their defence plans specifically catered for this contingency: 6 Armoured Division was placed there for that end and purpose.

Headquarters 1 Corps was seized with the planning of their operations based on this information. What input they received from HQ 15 Division and 6 Armoured Division, I am not aware of the day of 9th September was relatively quiet. The enemy was licking his wounds inflicted by PAF and 25 Cavalry the previous day. The 4 Corps Artillery was now fully deployed. It covered the entire front, stretching from Badiana to Deg Nadi (Zafarwal) and beyond. Any enemy attack or move would immediately attract the hostile fire of nearly 90 guns, field, medium and heavy calibre. On the evening of 9th September, 24 Brigade Group positions were attacked by enemy tanks and infantry. Own Infantry held its ground, and the tanks of 25 Cavalry broke up the enemy attack.

The well-directed fire of all the guns available in the area, by the Army Aviators, provided excellent support. Since the terrain was flat, the ground observers had a very limited field of view. This is where Army Aviator’s usefulness proved very critical. With his bird’s-eye view of the battlefield, the airborne eyes kept the entire area of the operations under their surveillance. Any movement of the enemy immediately received due attention and the total concentration of all guns in range; which pounded them. This was to become the routine of all the Army Aviators flying in the area from dawn to dusk. From all accounts, a large majority of the Artillery shoots were adjusted by Army Aviators. Though some dispute it, but those familiar with the ground, will bear testimony to the fact that the ground observer hardly, at most positions, had only a very limited range of observation and had no knowledge or idea of any enemy concentrations and moves in the depth.

These were only picked, located and targeted under the vigilant eyes of the aerial observer. I need not dwell in any controversy, as almost all had acknowledged and praised our role. The 10th of September was again a relatively quiet day. An enemy attack on 24 Brigade positions was repulsed by 25 Cavalry. This operation was supported by all our guns within range. Army Aviators again came in handy in support. During the day’s operations, about seven enemy tanks were destroyed. Though these operations on the 9th and 10th of September had remained confined to the battle location of 24 Brigade Group and were entirely handled by them exclusively. But the Headquarters at Corps and 6 Armoured Division also had the benefit of following these. They kept studying and analysing the operations conducted by the enemy the whole of the 9th of September. By the morning of the 10th of September 1965, HQ 1 Corps had made up a plan.

Since 24 Brigade Group had seen an uninterrupted action from the evening of the 7th of September onwards, the plans at Corps Headquarters were now being drawn for their relief. At 1100 Hours on the 10th of September, the GOC of the 6 Armoured Division was called to Corps HQ. A concept of operations, as developed by Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the Deputy Corps Commander, was presented to the GOC. It is mentioned that it was developed considering the latest GHQ and Corps Intelligence estimates of the enemy’s strength and intentions.

There are no details given. All the information that could be gathered, assessed and plans made on, was provided by the ground troops who had done all the fighting on the 8th and 9th of September, this was supplemented and further substantiated as seen, observed and communicated by us from the air. One thing was absolutely clear, that the attack on the 8th of September was led by the Enemy | Armoured Division and supported by two Indian Infantry Divisions. This was sufficiently substantiated and confirmed through the capture of the operational orders recovered from one of the enemy tanks destroyed on the evening of the 8th of September.

Why this factor did not come in the cognizance and reckoning, while this review was being carried out, is beyond any of my descriptions and understandings. Only even recently, when I was discussing my draft account of 1965 War with Lieutenant General (Retd) Yaqub, he still sincerely believed that he was not aware of the presence of the Indian 1 Armoured Division in this area on the 9th September. That just shows the lack of accurate and authentic information availability at that level. Even the previous fiascos of Jassar Bridge were clear pointers to this discrepancy and failing.

Enemy attacks at Phillaurah-Gadgor defensive positions had been successfully defeated on the 8th and 9th of September. Even on the 10th of September, their attack had been repulsed by 10:30 Hours. Was it not clear that the enemy was trying to either reduce our position in this area or would develop a plan to outmaneuver our defences? They could not launch any major offensive without neutralising or reducing these positions. Our options were equally clear! We could either hold Phillaurah-Gadgor as focal positions and use our Armour and other Motorized Infantry available to provide strength to these posts if they so needed.

These could be utilised in the traditional role to attack enemy formations in their flank if they attempted to outmaneuver or bypass these positions. The other option was to hold Phillarauh-Gadgor as a thin line of defence and prepare the central defensive positions around the strong nodal points at Chawinda-Badiana and possibly Zafarwal.

The plan that was developed was neither here nor there. According to the plan, 24 Brigade Group was to pull out of these areas, and 9 FF already covering the track Phillaurah-Zafarwal, and 11 Cavalry were to relieve them and take over the defence of this pivotal area. 11 Cavalry had already seen operations in Chamb Sector and had depleted strength of tanks. The details of these plans are shown as Annexure 1418. These are in Major General Yaqub’s own hand written transcription.

The most important aspect of such an operation is always the time and space factor. The essential element being that the relieving troops must have enough time to familiarise themselves with the ground and topographic surroundings. They must get enough daylight hours to plan and prepare their defences. Staff College, Quetta, lays down enough emphasis on this aspect in all its teachings, exercises and sand model discussions. But despite his being the Commandant of the very same college, it is inexplicable how Major General Yaqub had missed this aspect. I suppose teaching is one thing, but the practical implementation of these plans is a different ball game altogether.

GOC 6 Armoured Division was called to Corps HQ at 1000 hours, where the plans were given to him. Without the GOC 6 Armoured Division returning to his Headquarters, the plans were passed to Deputy Division Commander to implement. He called Second—in-Command 9 FF and CO 11 Cavalry to the Divisional Headquarters and at 1400 hours they, too, were given the orders. The Deputy Corps Commander visited the 6 Armoured Division HQ in the afternoon to discuss the details of the current/ future plans.

The most obvious question that arises here is in regard to the location and involvement of both the Corps Commander and the GOC of the 6 Armoured Division, and the reason for the lack of their presence in the formulation of these plans. Unfortunately, no light has been thrown by any quarters on this important issue. The only logical explanation is that GHQ and other higher ups were fully cognizant of the mistakes they had made in placing such people in Command. They were now trying to rectify this by imposing a Deputy Corps Commander and a Deputy GOC in 6 Armoured Division, positions that had been unheard of before.

Through activating them, the standard command was now being by-passed, and this new chain was being given all the authority to act. Leaving this academic discussion apart, the plan, as envisaged and more so, as it was implemented, is the most sordid and morbid chapter of the operations in Sialkot Sector. The relieving units were given the orders in the afternoon. The CO 11 Cavalry was present, but the CO 9 FF was asked to stay back with the unit, and he sent his 2 I/C. It is rather strange logic that the person who was to assume the overall command of these sensitive positions was relayed orders through his 2 I/C.

If he had been present himself, it is possible that he would have pointed out the recklessness of these ill-timed orders. The 2 I/C reached the CO 9 FF at 1530 hours, and all the plans regarding the movements of 9 FF and 11 Cavalry were put into action. It is reported that CO 11 Cavalry contacted HQ 6 Armoured Division late at night on the telephone network of HQ 24 Brigade. It is also presumed that CO 9 FF was also present there.

These discussions took place in the presence of Commander of the 24 Brigade. Incidentally, he had no prior information of this relief in line operation, he only learned about it through CO of the 11 Cavalry when he arrived there. The 9 FF/11 Cavalry expressed their concern that it might prove too weak for the task given. It is believed that a suggestion by Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik was made, that 24 Brigade Group should stay in their positions and that 9 FF/11 Cavalry Group should further re-enforce them for the night. If the next day the situation remained calm, the relief operations could easily be carried out properly during the daylight available. This was completely ignored and dismissed. In fact, it was the most logical course!

The records also state that what was significant was the state of mind of the two CO’s. Accusations or maybe inferences are being made, that there were non- revelation, if not actual concealments, of happenings which became known later. Basically, these were ill planned orders. What chance and opportunity was given for it to be implemented? Was it not crystal clear that it was an impossible task? 24 Brigade Gp was being made to pull out simultaneously with 9 FF/11 Cavalry Group arriving in the area. All this was happening in the middle of the night. What is beyond any logic or reasoning is that how conveniently the whole blame is being shifted to the state of minds of the two CO’s and that they were not forthcoming with the actual happenings on the ground? If the two CO’s did not give the details, did the Deputy Division Commander and the relevant staff of HQ 6 Armoured Division ask them how satisfactorily the relief in line operations were being carried out?

The blame game is now going on, but it was crystal clear where the fault lies. I did not know all the details of this entire plan. But in the evening of 11th Sept, I got the news that Major (Later Brigadier) Muzaffar Malik had been severely injured and was admitted in CMH, Sialkot. Later that day I got to visit him. He was in extreme pain, and upon seeing me, he could only mumble the words, “You people hurt too much.” I could not understand the meaning behind this. When I met him subsequently, he was in much better condition and explained that he was trying to tell me he had been hit by an artillery shell. He revealed that the complete relief in line operation was conducted on the roadside as the 11 Cavalry (which was coming in) and 25 Cavalry (which was moving out) met while crossing each other on the road during the middle of the night. He further told me that CO of the 25 Cavalry gave a very brief account of the operations on the 8th of September in particular, and the subsequent operations on the 9th and 10th of September.

It was also mentioned, to the disbelief of incoming officers, that it had been stated that it was the entire enemy | Armoured Division attack. “Are you trying to suggest that your unit single-handedly battled the whole Armoured Division and pushed them back to the area from where they had debouched on the morning of the 8th of September,” was the response that they got from CO and 2 I/C 11 Cavalry. And they subsequently laughed it away, not taking serious note of this looming threat.

This reflects how casually the relief in line operation was carried on the night of the 10″ of September and what information was provided to the relieving troops! Rather than put the blame squarely at those, primarily the HQ 1 Corps mainly and Deputy Division Commander and Staff of HQ 6 Armoured Division partially, who handled this fiasco, the buck was passed down to the two CO” involved.

When the enemy started its well-conducted attack on the 11th of September, we were in total disarray. They contained our positions from the front and outmaneuvered them with two Armoured Regiments from the left. To complicate the matters further, CO 1 SP was killed, and the CO and 2IC 11 Cavalry were both injured by enemy artillery shelling. They had all been standing in the open near the Phillaurah Rest House. Surely, the planners should have given them some time to familiarise with the area and prepare the defence plan with proper fortified positions.

In Muzaffar Malik’s own words, “At first light on the 11th of September, I went on top of a close by school building and took out my binoculars to have a first look at the area of our operations with my own eyes. Just as I was observing and taking my view of the ground, I was shocked. I saw an enormous pile of dust caused by the movement of the mass of the enemy armour which was advancing towards our location.”

He immediately came down to brief his CO, Lieutenant Colonel Aziz and Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rahman, CO 1 SP, about the impending Indian attack. CO 1 SP immediately got busy bringing down the fire of his guns on these advancing enemy armour formations. An artillery shell fell in the location where they were standing in the open. Lieutenant Colonel Rahman achieved “Shahadat” on the spot. Both the CO and 2 I/C of 11 Cavalry were seriously injured and were evacuated.

This fiasco, which was already in the offing, because of the most absurd relief in line plans made by the Deputy Corps Commander and the Deputy GOC 6 Armoured Division, it now took another unfortunate turn. The sudden removal of the other key elements involved in the command of the operations in the area further compounded the situation. The plan of the Indian Attack at Phillarauh is attached at Annexure-1519.

No one knew about this impending disastrous plan as it was prepared and executed during the night of the 10th of September. I, too, could not sense it when the debacle took place on the next morning. At this stage when the events had overtaken it, GOC 6 Armoured Division took over the command himself, rather than to allow his Deputy Division Commander to continue with this responsibility.

Major General Abrar ordered Guides Cavalry to charge towards the West of Phillaurah to relieve the pressure on 11 Cavalry and 9 FF. Earlier CO 9 FF, Lieutenant Colonel Majid made frantic calls to CO Guides Cavalry to extricate them from this predicament they had got stuck in. The CO of Guides Cavalry immediately got his resources put together and gave orders for the attack in the general direction of Bhagowal.

A Squadron was tasked to attack North East with Chahr as its objective, with B Squadron instructed to coordinate their attack with them. They were to move on the right flank of -A Squadron and attack Libbe. C Squadron, which was equipped with M36B2, was placed on the reserve. It was a conventional attack with two Squadrons up. Here, the Squadron would also have employed maybe one or two troops ahead. Lieutenant Colonel Gulistan Janjua suddenly realised the gravity of the situation.

From different accounts, he knew the enemy | Armoured Division in the area and realised that if he were to attack in this formation, he hardly would have six to twelve tanks in front, and they would attack the full Armoured Division. He had to rethink and recalculate, so he called off the previous orders.

He gave the new orders on the Regimental wireless net: “The Regiment to form line abreast formation along the railway line and on orders, to start the attack at full speed with all guns ablaze. The direction of the attack to be Bhagowal, with inter Squadron boundary line Libbe inclusive to-B Squadron.” He then allowed a little time to all the tanks to regroup and realign at the Railway Line. Finally, he ordered the attack, with the slogan of ““Nara-a-Takbir Allah- o-Akbar.”

Simultaneously all 44 Tanks of Guides Cavalry bust out of their positions and went charging along with the tank of their CO. It was the most spectacular sight. They went charging at full blast, attacking the whole of the Indian 1 Armoured Division, which had by now consolidated their positions in the area. Attached as Annexure-1620.

I was privileged to see this action from the air. Words are hard to find for an apt description of this charge of most gallant proportions. It reminded me of the Charge of the Light Brigade, “Thundered and volleyed rolled the six hundred!” Of course, the six hundred were replaced by forty-four tanks and, fearlessly, they moved at top speed, knowing that it was the whole of 1 Armoured Division of the Indian Army that they were attacking.

This Guides Cavalry attack was launched around 1130 hours. B Squadron met stiff resistance as 17 Horse, and 4 Hudson’s Horse had already taken up firm positions in the area Phillaurah-Gadgor. A mere thousand yards short of its objective Libbe, the Squadron Commander Major Abbasi and his Second in Command both embraced “Shaadat.”

A Squadron had hit the enemy tank formations on their flanks. A tough tank-to- tank fight ensued. After inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy armoured formations, which comprised 17 Horse and 4 Horse and with 16 Cavalry in reserve, Guides Cavalry captured Chahr by 1400 Hours. This bold attack by the Guides Cavalry could not extricate our troops from being overrun at Phillaurah-Gadgor. However, having hit the flanks and the depth positions of the attacking enemy 1 Armoured Division, it unhinged their offensive partially.

The Regiment minus A Squadron had hit the enemy reserve Regiment 16 Lancers, in Bhagowal. The tank crews were sitting, relaxing and enjoying their cups of tea when this lightning fast attack struck and dazed them. A panic seemed to have suddenly gripped them.

The enemy in the running back left their tanks abandoned in the area. According to CO Guides Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel (Later Brigadier) Gulistan Janjua, they tried to start these Centurion tanks, but since they were not familiar with these, they failed in that. He said they made a mistake in that they did not destroy these. However, Major (Later Lieutenant General) Fazl-i Haq got enough time to empty the tanks of their entire stocks of liquor stacked.

If only one could reenact the scenes from the 11th of September, under a different scenario and more logical dispositions of our troops? Some suggest that rather than this haphazard relief operation being launched; 11 Cavalry and 9 FF should have strengthened those positions of 24 Brigade Group, which they had already held. In that eventuality, the enemy | Armoured Division attack would have been met with a much more organized, resolute and planned manner. It is easy to envisage that the fate of this attack would have been much worse than just the limited success achieved by our troops on 11th of September.

That day, the action of Guides Cavalry destroyed twenty-one tanks of the enemy, against their own loss of six Pattons. 11 Cavalry had much higher losses. They had seven Pattons and nine M36B2 taken out in the day’s action. The total losses for the day were:-

A. Our own: 22 (including thirteen Patton-s, and nine M36B2)
B. Enemy: 30-45 (including because of the action of PAF)

By the evening even 25 Cavalry was again rushed to extricate 9FF and 11 Cavalry from the area of Phillaurah. L-19s had been flying in the area, fully keeping abreast with the situation on the ground. They kept providing very timely and useful information about the development of the enemy attack, the location of their tanks, its approximate strength and the direction of their movement. Army Aviators were operating on the wireless nets of artillery units of 1 Corps Artillery and the other available units of Artillery of 6 Armoured Division. This was useful for quick adjustment of Artillery fire.

However, there was no direct contact with our Armour and infantry units. This was a mistake. The information to our fighting units had to be relayed through the artillery nets. Sometimes it caused confusion. Queries and counter queries were being raised, which contributed to the delays. But by far, most of the accounts provided by the Army Aviators proved accurate and timely.

It was clearly appreciated that this entire operation had only partially blunted the strength of the enemy attack at Phillaurah, but he still had his teeth in and with fresh regrouping could launch further attacks in pursuit of attaining his tactical objectives in this area of operation. GOC 6 Armoured Division was of the view that he must first consolidate his position at Chawinda before he could take any offensive action, however, limited it may be. With these thoughts, General Abrar then flew to HQ 1 Corps and formed his future plans.

On September 12th & 13th, 1965, the news at Zafarwal and the surrounding areas was conflicting. There are so many different and contradictory accounts of the situation recorded in the war diaries of different units, and even in the official history of the war compiled by Major General Shaukat Reza, where he questions the ability of the aerial Observer to even pick 10-15 enemy tanks moving towards Zafarwal. It is the account of the Army Aviators, of the picture as they perceived, which is being recorded.

There is enough evidence for its credibility. Although there may be some gaps, some assessments and deductions drawn, not completely without fault, and possibly some mistakes made in the reporting of the actual information, but by and far, the main events and their description provided from the eyewitness accounts of the Army Aviators are considered accurate and authentic and have been chronicled. On the 12th of September, I sent Captain (Later Major General) Niazi for the surveillance of the general area of Zafarwal.

Army Aviator noticed some enemy movement towards Zafarwal. He made an estimate of some 10-15 tanks and some infantry. This information was passed on to the 6 Armoured Division. They reacted, and Zafarwal was occupied during night-time on the 12th of September by 4 FF and a squadron of 32 TDU. On the morning of the 13th September, the enemy attacked the Zafarwal Sector.

A Squadron of 32 TDU (Shermans) vacated their positions and started to withdraw. The pilot of L-19 operating in the area, Captain Niazi, was told on the wireless net to give the message to the squadron to immediately return to Zafarwal. He was told that in the face of the enemy attack, our Infantry positions were holding ground and the situation was turning in our favour. It was emphasized to him he must forcefully tell the squadron to move back to Zafarwal urgently in support of 4 FF. The pilot flew over the tanks, moving towards Dhamtal. By his gestures, he kept indicating to them to return to Zafarwal, but there was no response forthcoming. He wrote a message and dropped it. The message was picked up, even so, they kept moving towards Dhamtal. Realising the seriousness of the situation, the pilot landed the aircraft on the road, in front of the withdrawing tanks. A Risaldar was in command of the Squadron at that time. Captain Niazi personally explained the position to him and emphatically ordered him to return to Zafarwal.

The tanks were thus successfully sent back and later participated in the defence of Zafarwal against an enemy incursion which was defeated and broken up. It was learned later that the Squadron Commander of 32 TDU, Major Masud, had been spotted hiding in a nearby sugar cane crop in civilian dress. For this disgraceful and despicable act of cowardice, Major Masud was Court-Martialled.

Whatever the controversy of the events and the contradictory news and battlefield reports, the Army Aviator did ensure the timely return of the tanks to these vital positions. Although other versions stand at variance about some of the details of the operation, the role of Army Aviator landing on the road and sending the tanks back to Zafarwal remains undisputed in the history.

With the routing of the positions of 11 Cavalry and 9 FF and the losing of ground at Gadgor and Phillaurah, the railway line from Chawinda, which passes through Rakh Baba Bhuhre Shah and Badiana, became the pivot of our defences. It was decided that this line must be held firmly and with full force. The line of attack of the Indian offensive apparently centered itself in that direction. The main achievement was that the enemy Armoured Division was not allowed to develop any momentum of their attack. The spirited fight and defiance displayed by our own armour on the ground, comprising Guides Cavalry, 19 Lancers and 25 Cavalry, kept the enemy armoured columns engaged in the fierce tank to tank battle and held at bay. These efforts were supported by the aerial observers, who kept all the movements of enemy columns under their vigil, and whenever they would present a vulnerable target, it was brought under the full pounding of all the guns available.

Every time they tried to develop any manoeuvre, they suffered the wrath of all the artillery guns within range. Under the intense fire of our guns, enemy tanks would disperse and bury themselves in the mud houses for their camouflage. The same practice would follow whenever our Air Force pounded them. In this, the ACT sets carried in the L- 19 were proving to be very helpful. The aerial observers were most efficiently directing our aircraft onto the enemy tanks.

Despite all the confusion of the intense battle on the ground, the close range engagements of our tanks, in tank-to-tank battle, there isn’t a single case where our aircraft attacked any of our own tanks as of mistaken identity. This does reflect the professionalism of our air force pilots. But the Army Aviators did prove very useful in guiding our own pilots. The knowledge of the ground, the exact location of the enemy armour and the full familiarity of our positions significantly helped them in meeting this role.

Army Aviators attempted to keep the formations fully briefed about all details of the development of the battlefield on the ground. Regularly visits were made to all the formation Headquarters. Some liaison was made even at the unit level, though the frequencies of visits at that level were not as much as was desirable efforts were made to keep everyone informed. A very significant event happened on September 14, 1965. I had sent Captain Niazi to Zafarwal Sector, which came under attack in the early hours of the 13th of September. It was expected that the enemy may mount another attack in that area. Captain Niazi was told to keep a watchful eye. The pilot was gone for nearly four hours, nearly exhausting the endurance of the aircraft.

This was causing a lot of anxiety at Adamke Strip. Suddenly the L-19 appeared, and everyone felt very relieved. I was very upset with the pilot for having pushed his luck with the endurance of the aircraft. When questioned truly to his style, Captain Niazi started describing the details of the sortie.

As always in his own innocent style, he explained that while he was flying over Zafarwal; he saw no enemy activity in the area and so he got bored. He decided to travel north of our positions at Deg Nadi. The sun was rising from the east and by the time he had reached there, looking at some distance, he was noticing very flashy reflections of the rays of the sun. This was over a relatively large area.

This greatly intrigued him, and he kept flying in that direction. He crossed the International Boundary, west of Deg Nadi. Getting nearer to these reflections, he saw a huge concentration of enemy vehicles, some four miles to the west of Samba. His estimate was some 2000-3000 vehicles. He further said that while returning, he had passed this information on the artillery net.

This account evoked the attention of everyone present there. Gauging the importance of this news, I immediately flew to HQ | Corps. I conveyed this information directly to Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana, strongly suggesting to him he should personally himself call and request the Air Headquarters for an air strike. He did this very promptly.

The Air Headquarters was reluctant to accept the authenticity of the news, but under insistence from the Corps Commander two fighter reconnaissance aircraft were sent. Arriving overhead, they confirmed this news. On the air, they requested for all available aircraft to be diverted for a strike in this area. The target was very lucrative and needed immediate attention. Our air force kept pounding them with all weapons available, including the napalm bombs, the whole of September 14,1965, including at night.

It was generally known towards the end of the night on the 14th of September that our air force had taken a hefty toll of the enemy concentrations in their locations to the west of Samba. The full implications of action came to be known only a few days later when some prisoners were captured from the area of Chawinda. They identified themselves as part of enemy’s 14 Division.

The description of the attack of our Air Force as given by them, on their concentration area near Samba and the poundings received on the afternoon and night of the 14th of September was very graphic and telling. They narrated the extent of destruction caused to them by our Air Force. This important re- enforcement of the enemy 14 Division, whose arrival in the area had already been delayed, had now ceased to effectively exist as a formation. In all the operations after the 14th of September, this formation saw only a piecemeal employment. They had no independent or any critical role assigned to them. The state of their morale was very low. The pounding that they had received had left them dazed. Indian 14 Infantry Division was so badly decimated that they ceased to exist as a fighting formation.

The operational orders captured from the enemy tank of 16 Cavalry on the evening of the 8th of September, gave full details of the concentration of forces and their plan of attack in the Sialkot sector. The task given to 14 Infantry Division was, “If in position will capture Zafarwal by the 8th of September and after that, advance to Chawinda to take over from 1 Armoured Division.” This formation did not take part in the operation on September 8 as their arrival was delayed.

The operational order of enemy 1 Armoured Brigade OO No.3 captured later, also does not mention their 14 Infantry Division (Annexure 17). The prisoners belonging to this formation who were captured around September 17/18, 1965, in the Chawinda area21, completed this missing link and clue. What happened to the 14 Infantry Division? The details are already covered and now fully fitted in the description.

From the captured enemy Armoured Brigade OO No. 3, which was signed on September 13,1965, at 1315 Hours, the main attack of the Indian Armoured Division was planned to be launched sometime on or after the 14th of September. Attached as Annexure-1722. Events on the ground confirm the same. It is clear that the attack did not proceed as planned. The fierce tank battles started from September 15, 1965, onwards. The climax was on the 16th of September. From the air, the Army Aviators operating in the area, from dawn to dusk, had a very clear bird’s-eye view of the battlefield. This was all being reported very promptly and professionally to all the Headquarters.

The enemy armoured formations could not develop the momentum of their attack. No doubt, our own tanks had played the central role. The fight put up by our own tank crews blunted a determined enemy attack. This battle was very ably assisted by the Army Aviators. The effective concentration of all available guns, on the attacking enemy armour columns, was both pinching and hurting to them. This, coupled with the accurate direction of our own Airforce through the ACT sets in the aircraft, highlighted the humble contribution that the unarmed L-19 aircraft made.

The effects were telling. From the early morning of the 16th of September, the L-19 planes were observing the three key enemy columns of attack. One column was directed towards Chawinda, the center column was making its thrust between Chawinda and Rakh Baba Bhuhre Shah and the third enemy column was leading its attack towards Badiana. Army Aviators kept regularly informing the details of this operation to all the relevant formations and units. I kept the area under observation since first light and estimated the strength of the enemy along each axis as one armoured regiment.

During the visits to 15 Division and 6 Armoured Division, I apprised the GOC’s of the direction and the strength of the enemy attack. In my estimation and one which I had communicated to the GOC 6 Armoured Division, this was, supposedly, a full-fledged attack by the enemy Armoured Division. This estimation was endorsed by the GOC, and, later proved to be correct. The seriousness of this determined enemy major offensive was vividly emphasized to all I briefed.

On the ground too, as the pressure of the chief enemy armoured thrust built, it was fully realised that this was the most critical moment of the battle in this sector. But this time we were fully ready and prepared for it. On the evening of September 16, 1965, I went to HQ 1 Corps. While I was briefing Commander 1 Corps, Lieutenant General Rana and Major General Yaqub, the Deputy Corps Commander, on the details of this main enemy attack, a query was raised. I was asked about the troops we had on the ground specifically opposing against each of these columns. I was again shocked and was in total disbelief! The battle had raged in the area since the 8th of September, and even now, 8 days into the war, they did not have any clue about the dispositions of our own troops. It was maddening to realise that Corps HQ, till now had no proper channels of information and efficient communication links with its formations. Leave alone that, it was also clear, that there was no system of collection and assessment of battlefield intelligence at the levels of Corps HQ.

I had expected nothing better from Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana, but I believed that Major General Yaqub had much better professional acumen. He was an armour officer, was till recently the commandant at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, had seen the battle in Africa in World War- II and was considered an excellent professional officer. It later proved his competence was of rather theoretic and academic nature and had little command experience. I was disappointed in him. I explained to them that 25 Cavalry was at Chawinda, Guides Cavalry was between Chawinda and Rakh Baba Bhuhre Shah, and 19 Lancers was in the area of Badiana.

On hearing this, Major General Yaqub very confidently remarked that if there is a regiment of ours against a regiment of the enemy, there would be no breakthrough. Sharing this realistic and reasonable appraisal of the situation, as it obtained on the evening of September 16, 1965, I inquired if we had any plans of our own.

The response I received was in the affirmative; counter offensive plans were being planned. Colonel Farman Ali (Later Major General) was acting as Colonel GS, and he was handling this task. In my meeting with him, he did explain that he was working on different options.

On the morning of September 17, 1965, the L-19 aircraft flying in the area clearly could observe that the heat and the ferocity of the battle that had raged and developed throughout the previous day, had died down very considerably. I visited HQ 6 Armoured Division in the early morning of the same day. I met with GOC, Major General Abrar, as per the routine. The feeling of the grimness that the battle had brought with it had changed, and there was a relative calmness prevailing.

The beaming faces of the GOC and the staff said it all. The GOC explained that in his opinion the most severe enemy attack had been blunted. The enemy had suffered massive tank casualties. Our own tank losses were also high, but much less than compared to the enemy. GOC 6 Armoured Division had the habit of monitoring the enemy Armoured Division’s wireless net.

He mentioned that early in the morning; he had heard a blanket call on that net. It was just addressing all the tanks, which had survived the bitter tank action from the 16″ of September, to withdraw individually taking cover in sugarcane crops. The enemy | Armoured Division had ceased to exist as a formation and even sub-formations. The gravity of the bitter truth had dawned on them.

The seriousness of the situation demanded the extrication of the tanks, who had survived the previous day’s intense tank battle, and thus these panicky orders. GOC 6 Armoured Division was equally seized with the situation. He started forming up some counteroffensive plans in his mind. His own capability was also rather limited, as his units were on much-depleted tank strengths because of the prolonged battles. At this stage, Major General Abrar was firmly of the opinion that he could undertake only limited counter-attack plans. He felt that any major initiative could come only at the level of HQ | Corps.

Seeing the situation, I flew to HQ 1 Corps. In my briefing, all the details of the accounts as perceived by the Army Aviators and my assessment were conveyed. The might of the Indian Army had been completely mauled down. I also conveyed the views of General Abrar, in that he felt that he could only carry out limited offensive and that any major counterattack plan could come only at the level of the Corps.

They had the newly regrouped 1 Armoured Division and 18 Infantry Division available to them in the area. It was very strongly suggested to them that they must firm up their own counterattack plans. Both the Corps Commander and the Deputy Corps Commander were clearly in agreement.

They said that they were working on those. Colonel Farman Ali was also present, as he had been earlier tasked to complete different options and plans. I suggested to General Yaqub that he should fly out with me to the area to have a close look at the battlefield to make his own mind and plans.

It would give him a bird’s-eye view as on a sand model. In reply, he said, “There is no need for that. You have given a comprehensive briefing, and I have a rational idea now.” Colonel Farman later flew in a helicopter, with Captain (Later Brigadier) Ali Jawahar, the pilot, to have a detailed look and carry out the required recce to finalise the different possible plans of counterattack.

I flew back to HQ 6 Armoured Division in the afternoon of September 17. As I arrived there, General Abrar was very pleased to see me. This he always was. It was so because he was expectantly waiting for all the latest news of the battlefield. This time, without waiting for any briefing from me, he congratulated me. He told me that the enemy had paid the best compliment to the Army Aviators. He said that while monitoring the Indian Armoured Division net, he just heard a call for close air support. The targets being mentioned specifically for their Air Force were Patton Tanks and L-19 Aircraft. It was very flattering. Over the last 10 days of battle, the enemy was clearly explaining its frustrations. The lethality of the Patton tanks was being equated with the effectiveness of the support that the L-19’s were providing.

The Army Aviator had undoubtedly played a role. The accurate and timely adjustments of the artillery fire support by the Air OP had made its pinch felt on the enemy. So equally was the devastating effect of the direction of our aircraft attack through the airborne ACT in the L-19 aircraft. To this openly manifested performance, the enemy minds must also had perceived the vital role of providing the true and graphic description of the real-time view of the battlefield by the Army Aviators. The pivotal role played by Army Aviation had been clearly driven home in the enemy’s mind and hence their reaction.

Sure enough, when the Indian Air Force came in close support; they started targeting the Patton tanks and L-19 Aircraft. Out of all the fixed wing planes and helicopters flying in the area, they picked up Captain Niazi’s aircraft. Along with Captain Akhtar Mahmud, he was on a mission with their ACT set, to direct our own Air Force to their relevant targets being picked by the Army Aviators. They were flying a little higher than the other aircraft and helicopters in the area. Having spotted this plane, the attacking aircraft dived towards him and opened up with all his guns.

The bullets went through all the length of its fuselage and hit it at several places. Luckily, no injury was caused to the pilot and the crew manning the ACT set. His rudder control was damaged. The aileron too was hit, and it was only partially functional. I was also in the air at that time, and when I heard this account of the attack and damage on the wireless, I told Captain Niazi to proceed to Sialkot strip and land there, since it was bigger and had more space available for his forced and uncontrolled landing.

I too followed him there. The aircraft crash landed at the old polo ground. Since it did not have much directional control, it swerved and swung on landing and was severely damaged. But the pilot, Captain Niazi and the rear observer, Captain Akhtar Mahmud, manning the ACT, were both safe.

The storm that had gathered since September 8, 1965, with the launching of the Indian attack on Pakistan, had peaked itself and attained its maximum intensity on the 15th and 16th of September. This was weathered so bravely on the ground. Barring a few fiascoes‘s at Jassar Bridge, the relief in line operations of 24 Brigade Group at Phillaurah by 11 Cavalry and 9 FF during night of the 10th of September, the drama and the confusion at Zafarwal; the performance of the units was most commendable and admirable. It was an overall team effort. The tanks, the infantry and the guns had all played their part with utmost devotion, fierceness and utmost bravery.

Our Air Force had provided the ground troops with excellent support and kept the skies relatively clear of enemy aircraft intruding in for attacks. In this, the Army Aviation had too thoroughly blended itself and played their part equally well. Informed judgment and the crucial events all bear testimony to this. The key observation was that so far we only kept reacting to the enemy moves and his attack plan. We met all thrusts and advance of the enemy frontally. In the tank battles, we made no classic use of the mobility of the armour and kept plugging it frontally. The classic manoeuvre of 25 Cavalry on the 8th of September, which was also developed accidentally and rather as a part of any plan, was all forgotten and never imbibed in all subsequent actions. It was a pity, but brought out the lack of adequate experience of handling armoured formations at our higher echelons of command.

The bird’s-eye view of the battlefield that the Army Aviators had the benefit of having, coupled with the focused attention and general information about how the battles had gone so far; had clearly and strongly suggested that it was the time that we plan our own attack to wrest the initiative from the enemy.

These views were strongly recommended by the Army Aviators, during all visits and meetings at different headquarters. 15 Division and 6 Armoured Division had remained too deeply committed and embroiled in an intense battle with the enemy formations. They did not have the capability at their levels for any significant initiative. This had to come at the level of the Corps HQ.

This description of the situation as it permeated till the morning of September 17, 1965, is crucial. On this day not only had the storm died out, but a very grim situation developed for the enemy forces that had made their limited penetration. The enemy had amassed 3 Infantry Divisions; namely 6 Mountain Division, 26 and 14 Division plus their pride, the 1 Armoured Division. They secured the firm base and launched their attack on the 8th of September. By the morning of September 17th, 1965, they could only make small inroads.

The maximum penetration made was when Butur Dograndi was captured by the leading tanks of 17 Horse. The full weight of this momentum of all these formations put together, gained a depth of 10-12 Miles only. This was blunted and petered out by the evening of September 16, when the Indian attack had made its most determined push. This attack was coming along three separate axes and had the enemy 17 Horse in the lead along the central axis. It was bravely being led by Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore. To further encourage him, he was continually coaxed and egged on by repeated messages on the Indian 1 Armoured Division net. These messages were actively exhorting him to advance fearlessly. He had been referred to as Tiger.

The repeated message was, “Tiger, you capture Milestone 5, and Param Vir Chakra will be on your feet.” This was the most determined attack. But it was equally being met by even more committed and determined troops on the ground. The leading tank of the CO had by passed Buttur Dograndi and was gradually proceeding towards Milestone 5 on Chawinda- Pasrur Road.

He came so close and yet so far. At this stage, his tank was hit and destroyed. Lieutenant Colonel Tarapore was injured. Indian accounts suggest that he was killed later when a shell landed near him as he was having some tea in the open. He did receive Param Vir Chakra, but it had to be a posthumous award.

The credit for this successful knocking out of the tank was being claimed by all three units in the area. It was the gun position of 1 SP Artillery Regiment, and the second-in- command Major Rashid was bravely handling this situation by resorting to direct firing of the guns on the advancing enemy armour. He was awarded Sitara-e-Jurrat for this brave action.

The unit was laying the claim that the tank was destroyed by their direct engagement. 3 FF was also in the area and was busy in blazing away their recoilless rifles at these oncoming enemy tanks. They too maintained that it was their fire that hit this doomed tank. And this also was the claim of 25 Cavalry who were battling this advancing armour column during the entire days fighting. Regardless, as to where the credit lay, the outstanding achievement was that all the troops had held their positions bravely.

They had fought with utmost courage the whole day and had denied the enemy the capture of their prized objective. Incidentally, 3 FF had earlier borne the initial brunt of the Indian attack on the September 8, and having been routed still had the determination to form into a Battalion again and take their place back at the Phillarauh- Gadgor defensive complex by the same evening and fought there bravely all along till relieved.

And again in their new location at Chawinda, the fate had them again brave the brunt of the main enemy attack on September 16 and later their final Infantary attack on the September 18th, where even hand to hand battle took place; they did it manfully, with utmost valour and overall was a magnificent performance. The credit for this would go to their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Siddique, and the officers and men under his command. Despite the high casualties suffered, they never wilted under attack and gave a most commendable account of their courage and fighting qualities. This feat must be recorded and acknowledged.

The horizons had cleared from the 17th of September onwards. The push so made by the enemy was clearly proving very vulnerable. The advance had been blunted and brought to a grinding halt, and its flanks were now open to our further counter attacks. The most significant transformation was in the mind of General Abrar Hussain. He gave orders on the night of the 17th of September, for a limited offensive on the 18th September. The area up to Jessoran was cleared.
Out of sheer desperation, Indians again launched their last attack on September 18. It was an infantry attack which was absolutely mauled. Where their tanks with full support of Infantry had failed in the severe fighting on 16th and 18th September, how they hoped that the Infantry attack alone will succeed is beyond all description? It was a suicidal attack and reflects the insane minds of some of their Commanders!

The next morning saw hundreds of dead bodies littering the place. The remaining were captured. To provide the much-needed guts to the attacking Indian Troops, they had been given generous stocks of Rum. Some soldiers were drunk, and many others were still carrying their stocks on them.

The critical level of Command which could take a bolder and decisive action was HQ | Corps. Some units of our 1 Armoured Division, which had arrived earlier from Khem Kharan sector, were made part of a regrouped | Armoured Division and was at Pasrur. Major General Yaqub was placed in Command. Another Infantry Division, 18 Division, under the command of Major General Nasir, was also positioned in the area for this planned counterattack. Some operational plans were being chalked out by Colonel Farman Ali.

Again, the advice of Army Aviation was a valuable input in these plans. While the enemy had made a small advance and a bulge up to Chawinda, we were holding a firm base at Zafarwal. This had rendered the Left enemy flank very vulnerable to any attack from the direction of Deg Nadi, near Zafarwal. Army Aviators while flying around were clearly viewing this typical sand model description and fully projecting this in all the routine visits and briefings to HQ 1 Corps. The enemy was desperately trying to disengage and extricate its remnants of the Armoured Formations from this area. The tanks had been given the orders to withdraw individually, taking cover in Sugar Cane crops.

The Army Aviators emphasised that the time to counterattack was now; any delay and time wasted will enable the enemy to extricate himself and regroup. This was the advice and the message. Colonel Farman Ali, Colonel GS, 1 Corps, made several plans.

The plan that was formally approved was given the Code Name of “Operation Wind Up.” Major General (Retd) Farman Ali had confirmed this to me only a few years ago and had promised to give me a copy of that. But unfortunately, he expired. Why it was never executed was a mystery, then and remains so to-day. Brigadier Z.A. Khan in his book, “The Way It Was,” some years later and through hindsight, writes in his book, “1 Corps now with 1 Armoured Division, less 5 Armoured Brigade, under its command, planned to recapture Phillaurah, Chobara and Maharajke.

No plan to cut the Pathankot-Samba-Jammu road by advancing North from Zafarwal was made, which would have the same effect as the capture of Akhnur.” Was not this being advocated by the Army Aviators after the events of on the 17th of September and beyond? A cease-fire came on the 23rd of September, but our plan of counteroffensive was not executed. No one has explained any reasons for this. One has heard some muffled excuses; shortage of ammunition is being mentioned as one of those.

None of the unit Commanders in the area ever suggested so. Was it due to some serious failings of the qualities of head and heart at some critical levels of Command? Or was there any other compelling circumstances? At least no one in operations was aware of it. I will summarize on this in conclusion. The Army Aviation was fully integrated with the operations of 12 Division, 7 Division, 15 Division, 6 Armoured Division and HQ 1 Corps. It is unfortunate that no attempt was made to provide the same level of support and integration of the Army Aviation effort in the Lahore and Kasur Sectors and above all the main strike force. Only a limited support was provided, but it never got fully integrated.

There is no plausible explanation that justifies not having eyes in the sky when you plan to launch a major offensive in Khem Kharan, especially when you consider that Command and Control through ground channels could become problematic.

In the earlier planning, when 7 Division with 1 Armoured Division under command, were to be launched as the principal strike force; to ensure the success of this thrust, bring about coordination in command and through that keep the momentum of attack, my Squadron was placed under their command. We carried out all the required liaison and limited reconnaissance.

We were entirely committed to this force. We remained deployed in May/June at Balloki and waited in the wings for the force to be launched. Before the time came for the launching of this formidable force, it was split.

The question is why? Why was the launching of the 1 Armoured Division, which was the major thrust, undertaken through ambiguous arrangements of a coordinated effort with 11 Division in Kasur area? This remains a mystery too!