It was in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), predecessor of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was born. Over the next few decades, several intelligence agencies were tasked with handling different shades of intelligence. The National Security Act of 1947 established CIA that remains the preeminent intelligence agency.
Acting on the recommendations of a commission of senior officials headed by George Brownell, President Harry Truman established the National Security Agency (NSA) in October 1952 to fulfill the need for a single entity to be responsible for the signals intelligence. NSA was placed within the Department of Defense (DoD) and took control of signals intelligence responsibilities of the CIA and other military elements. In August 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara created the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to consolidate and to coordinate the production of intelligence analysis by each of the military services and to serve as the principal source of intelligence support to the Secretary.
The preponderance of U.S. intelligence agencies is within the Department of Defense. Each branch including the army, navy, airforce, Marines and Coast Guard has its own intelligence agency. The National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geo-spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the offices which carry out specialized reconnaissance activities, the joint intelligence centers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commands are all subordinate, directly or indirectly, to the Secretary of Defense. Together these agencies spend 85 percent of the total U.S. intelligence funds and employ 85 percent of intelligence personnel. Nearly two-thirds of all DoD intelligence personnel are active-duty military.
On the civilian side, the Departments of Justice (FBI), State (Bureau of Intelligence & Research), Treasury, Energy and Homeland Security have their own intelligence set up. The major focus of CIA is human intelligence primarily external threats, FBI is domestic intelligence primarily related to crime and terrorism, NSA signal intelligence, DIA military intelligence, NGA imagery and NRO space-based intelligence collection.
1970s was a bad time for CIA. In 1975 and 1976, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller Commission, Church Committee of the Senate, Pike Committee of the House and Murphy Commission (three-year study which included an examination of the organization and performance of the intelligence community) looked at the intelligence community. In the summer of 1975, President Ford ordered the implementation of 20 of the 30 recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission. This included measures to provide improved internal supervision of CIA activities, additional restrictions on CIA’s domestic activities, a ban on mail openings, end to wiretaps, abuse of tax information, and the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
Ford did not agree to public disclosure of the intelligence budget and establishment of congressional oversight committee. However, with Congress holding the purse strings, it tried to assert itself. The Senate acted first in May 1976, creating the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). The House followed suit a year later, creating the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Both committees were made responsible for authorizing expenditures for intelligence activities (although the Senate was limited to “national” intelligence, whereas the House mandate included both “national” and “tactical” intelligence activities).
Contrary to popular belief, intelligence agencies are not runaway trains but are heavily regulated agencies. Over time, several intelligence oversight layers were put in place. The President’s Oversight Board keeps an eye on intelligence agencies. CIA’s Office of General Council (OGC) started with only two lawyers and by the time of Carter’s presidency, it increased from nine to eighteen and during the Reagan administration, OGC consisted of fifty lawyers. Now over 120 lawyers work for OGC to ensure that the agency is following every oversight requirement. After every controversy and Congressional investigation, the agency goes on a ‘attorney hiring binge’. Now, lawyers are embedded in every department of the agency watching every action of operatives.
Counter Terrorist Center (CTC) alone has nine lawyers. There is a saying among operatives that ‘to cover your ass, get a lawyer’s name on your cable’. CIA also has its own Office of Inspector General (OIG) that keeps an eye on the agency. NSA has its own General Council Office and an independent inspector general. In addition to its own compliance officers, NSA regularly reports to compliance offices of DoD, ODNI and Department of Justice. A large segment of the manpower of intelligence agencies is tasked only to comply with these oversights that requires sizeable number of resources and time. Director of Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) also served as head of intelligence community as Director Central Intelligence (DCI).
In the last five decades there have been many proposals to streamline intelligence and improve coordination by strengthening the role of DCI. In 1992, an amendment to The National Security Act of 1947 specified the role of DCI as head of intelligence
community and principal advisor to the President. He was also made responsible for coordination and his authority was augmented by requiring the Secretary of Defense to consult him in appointment of heads of intelligence agencies controlled by DoD. In 1975, a study group commissioned by CIA recommended separating DCI from CIA. In 1991, Chairman of the Senate and House intelligence committees (Boren – McCurdy Legislation) advocated restructuring of the Intelligence Community and creation of a Director of National Intelligence.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a more critical view of American intelligence agencies took shape. A commission headed by former Congressman Lee Hamilton and former governor Tom Kean unveiled their report in the summer of 2004. One of the policy recommendations of the commission was the creation of a post of Director National Intelligence (DNI). He was to have the twin task of overseeing national intelligence centers regarding specific subjects of interest and to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.
Senate and House of Representative had different views about the proposed legislation while DoD tried to cover its own flank. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, with the help of Congressman Duncan Hunter tried to consolidate Pentagon’s position in view of efforts to create a new intelligence czar controlling all intelligence agencies. In March 2003, House Armed Services Committee created the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) without input from the House
Intelligence Committee. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with increased use of Special Operations required intelligence collection and coordination in war theatres. A new post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities was created, and an old Afghan hand, Michael Vickers, was appointed to run this new set up.
Debate in the Congress about the new post of DNI as head of intelligence community continued and finally the Senate passed the bill on October 6 and the House on October 16. The two chambers were not able to reconcile and it looked as if the bill was dead on arrival and new Congress had to start over again in January. A careful insertion of one word ‘abrogate’ watered down the position of DNI but also saved the bill. The House agreed to pass the bill with the insertion of Section 1018 that stipulated that the authority granted to DNI ‘respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government”.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established Office of Director National Intelligence (ODNI) to coordinate the activities of sixteen agencies; a process that includes setting collection priorities, sharing, integration, collaboration, and supervision. DNI is the principal intelligence advisor to the President. Only ODNI and CIA are independent agencies, all others are elements of different departments.
Each agency tried to keep its independence from ODNI. There were turf battles while the nascent ODNI tried to assert its role. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had expanded the role of DoD in collection of human intelligence in view of ongoing wars in two theatres. This was viewed as encroachment by CIA. In November 2006, the intelligence community got a lucky break when President Bush overhauled his administration. Former DCIA Robert Gates became Secretary of Defense who brought James Clapper as his USD (I) and Michael Hayden took over CIA. In early 2007, Mike McConnell took over as DNI. When Gates was DCIA, Clapper was director DIA and McConnell director NSA. Clapper was put on the staff of DoD and DNI. Good working relations of these individuals decreased the friction. Clapper ceded back human intelligence to CIA and restricted his role to policy and budget. A Reagan era Executive Order (EO) 12333 outlined roles, responsibilities, authorities, and limitations of US intelligence. This EO needed to be updated and during deliberations Gates resisted McConnel’s efforts to strengthen ODNI vis a vis DoD.
The most important role of ODNI is running coordination centers pooling resources from diverse agencies. The list includes National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), Office of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCI&SC) and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
In 2007, the budget for strategic National Intelligence Program (NIP) determined by DNI was $43.5 billion while budget for operationally focused Military Intelligence Program (MIP) determined by the USD(I) was $20 billion. By 2022, the budget for NIP was increased to $65.7 billion and MIP to $24 billion.
The role of intelligence agencies in a democratic society poses a dilemma. The essential elements of democracy are freedom from unnecessary intrusion of the central authority, transparency and accountability. Intelligence agencies operate in secrecy and can be successful only by maintaining secrecy. Democracy ensures not only liberty but also security of its citizens and for the security of its citizens it needs intelligence agencies to detect and thwart the plots of adversaries. To serve a democracy successfully, intelligence agencies must engage in clandestine activities and this process cannot be micromanaged by excessive legislative and bureaucratic restraints. This requires a delicate balance where intelligence agencies conduct operations on the direction of the executive and provide it with legitimacy and protection while internal and external oversight provides accountability. The real strength of an intelligence agency is the trust of the citizens and not the secrecy or its unlimited powers.
There is a saying among intelligence professionals that ‘there are always policy successes but only intelligence failures.’ Executives use intelligence agencies as a shortcut to solve their complex foreign policy problems however when this fails, they blame it on intelligence failure and Congress then jumps in for more oversight and control. President John F. Kennedy ran his campaign on the right side of Richard Nixon as a hawk against Communism. He authorized the Bay of Pigs and after its failure doubled down by authorizing Operation Mongoose, a plan to destabilize the Castro regime that also included assassination. Drowning in the Watergate scandal, President Nixon fired CIA Director Richard Helms and brought in James Schlesinger with an order of ‘get rid of the clowns.’ He fired over one thousand people from Clandestine Service and over five hundred analysts in his seventeen weeks tenure as director. President Carter personally authorized covert actions in Afghanistan, Central America and Iran. President Reagan ordered, that later became known as Iran-Contra scandal, and was very clear about what he was doing. In one of the meetings he said, “if such a story gets out, we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House”. When the story did get out, Reagan threw others under the bus. There is a difference between analysis based on credible information and prophecy. Intelligence agencies are not in the business of prophecies. They collect information, analyze it and present these findings to the executive for policy decisions.
Intelligence agencies can use secrecy to engage in illegal activities and evade accountability and on the other hand, the executive can use the same secrecy to politicize the intelligence. To safeguard against both challenges, several avenues of control and accountability can be used. Civilian control of the organization, inculcation of professional norms, internal organizational accountability processes, proper legislation to define the role of agencies and oversight by the Senate and House intelligence Committees are some of the instruments used in the proper functioning of intelligence agencies in a democracy.
John Prados has accurately summarized the role of intelligence that these activities are “acceptable so long as they proceed under proper legal statute, authority, management, accountability, and within moral boundaries.”
“Access to secret intelligence is one of the more potent aphrodisiacs of power”. -David Stafford
Selected Readings
1. Michael V. Hayden. Playing to the Edge (New York: Penguin Press), 2016
2. James R. Clapper. Facts and Fears (New York: Viking), 2018
3. Chris Whipple. The Spy Masters: How the CIA directors shape history and the future (New York: Scribner), 2020
4. John Prados. The Ghosts of Langley (New York: The New Press), 2017
5. Tim Weiner. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday), 2007
6. Henry Crumpton. The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New York: New York: The Penguin Press), 2012
7. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. A Question of Standing: The History of the CIA (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2022
8. John Rizzo. Company Man: Thirty years if controversy and crisis in the CIA (New York: Scribner), 2014
9. Edward Jay Epstein. How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward Snowden, The Man, and the Theft (New York: Borzoi Books), 2017
10. Florina C. Matei & Carolyn Halladay (Editors). The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies: Processes, Practice, Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner), 2019
11. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of Intelligence. March 01, 1996 https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/report.html Charges of mediocre performance, lapses in management, and loss of direction at the Central Intelligence Agency played a major role in the formation of this Commission headed by Harold Brown.
12. 911 Commission Report https://9-11commission.gov/report/
13. For history of US intelligence see, The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/int022.html
14. “The Organizational Arrangements for the Intelligence Community” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/html/int009.html
