Involvement of the Military in politics or running the state is not considered appropriate for democracy. However it is common phenomena in developing countries, where democracy has not taken root due to lack of sincere and capable political leadership or unnecessary involvement of the military in politics. Rule and governance are an art which any Tom, Dick or Harry having plenty of money to get elected cannot perform. Such people take politics as a business to spend money to make more money. The result is a crisis and the military as an organized body has to undertake the responsibility for which they neither have training nor knowledge. However due to their administrative control and initial sincerity of purpose, the situation gets stabilized, thereafter instead of handing over the reins of power to whom it belongs, they continue their involvement overtly or covertly. After some time, they also create a mess and have to leave with more trash than when they took over. The cycle keeps repeating. Neither the politicians learn from their mistakes nor the military, because it is taboo to discuss this subject pragmatically, mere condemnation is closing eyes to reality.
There is a need to take “Milpolitik” as a discipline, so that the politicians and the military learn to function in their own spheres. However if the military intervention becomes inevitable then both should understand strengths and limitations of each other and keep military involvement to the minimum to make their smooth exit possible. Time has proved that the constitution and law does not deter the military not to intervene once the existence of a state is threatened. Military involvement in politics under ideal conditions is like a poison, but under adverse conditions it acts like an antidote to political disease. Like the poison kills but once used carefully in small quantities under prescription of a specialist doctor, the pharmacists converted the poison into medicine to save lives. Prolonged use of such medicine which has poisonous contents is not advised as it will be counterproductive putting the life of the patient in danger. Similarly, the military involvement in political affairs be avoided but if unavoidable then must be within limits and safeguards from negative fallout to the state, system and the important institution people love from the core of their hearts. The military not only defends the state and citizens from foreign aggression but also internally from terrorists and during Hybrid Warfare. Thus, the military must be kept strong and professional to undertake its primary mission without any hindrance or diversion. Any effort to weaken the military on political grounds will be a recipe for doom like Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and many African countries.
This is the first time that the term “Milpolitik” is being used to introduce this new discipline among the academics, students and public. It should benefit the politicians and the military with positive results. The scientific approach in understanding each other would reduce tension, restore confidence and strengthen all institutions and pillars of state.
The word Milpolitik has been coined from German Militärpolitik , for Military in Politics.
According to Encyclopedia Britannica; Realpolitik Political Philosophy, is “The realpolitik, politics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean “real” in the English sense but rather connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to things as they are. Realpolitik thus suggests a pragmatic, no-nonsense view and a disregard for ethical considerations. In diplomacy it is often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest.”
Term Realpolitik is from German real ‘realistic, practical, actual’, and Politik ‘politics’, refers to enacting or engaging in diplomatic or political policies based primarily on considerations of given circumstances and factors, rather than strictly binding itself to explicit ideological notions or moral and ethical premises. In this respect, it shares aspects of its philosophical approach with those of realism and pragmatism. It is often simply referred to as “pragmatism” in politics, e.g. “pursuing pragmatic policies” or “realistic policies”.
Hence here “Milpolitik” combines the meaning of Military in Politics and “Realpolitik”, a pragmatic approach.
Prevalent Environments
The present messy situation has shattered the confidence of people in the system, the top Political, Civil and Military institutions and leadership. A repeat of 1971 performance in any major National Crisis cannot be ruled out. The fiasco in strategic planning & conduct was the reason for the doom, while at the tactical level even the enemy was forced to appreciate and admire the resilience, heroism, devotion & sacrifices of the Pakistan Army.
Now is the era of multi-faceted Hybrid War; weakening or controlling the political & economic power can best serve the heinous designs of the enemy. The USSR’s Nuclear arsenal could not save it from disintegration. The Russia-Ukraine conflict remains conventional, though Russia is a big nuclear power. It is up to the Nation to avert the impending catastrophe or keep watching as spectators!
Independence was gained, the state of Pakistan was established with its two wings East and West Pakistan in 1947, one thousand miles apart. This was only possible after a lot of struggle and sacrifices but just after 24 years, East Pakistan was lost, due to negligence and incompetence of leadership. Many studies have been conducted, books and articles written during the half century of this debacle. Justice Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report is comprehensive but remained classified for long, however some of its contents are now publicly available, which throws light on what went wrong. The lessons of 71 war must always be kept in view if Pakistan has to survive and progress, we should not forget blunders committed in the past, not to repeat it again. History is ruthless and the nations which do not learn lessons from the past perish and become history. Allah says:
“God does not change the condition of a people’s lot, unless they change what is in their hearts”. (Quran; 13:11)
The debacle of East Pakistan did not develop overnight. Separation of Pakistan involves various factors, like involvement of foreign hands, economic disparity, geographical and socio-cultural differences. There is a long list of Causes of Separation of East Pakistan, some are:
1. The Geographical and Socio-Cultural Differences
2. Economic Causes
3. Education and Hindu Domination
4. The Language issues
5. Disparity in Development, Planning
6. Disparity in Civil Services and Armed Forces.
7. Differences over Constitution Making
8. Rise of Regional Bengali Parties.
9. Effects of the 1970 Cyclone
10. Results of 1970 Elections.
11. Not capitalizing on Ideology of Pakistan
However, here the focus is on the role played by the military in this tragedy and how it is related to the crisis in 2022. Information below about conduct of war has been taken from the Pakistan Army official website, War History section.
Brief War History 1971 Indo-Pak War
With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of Pak history. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25/26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with weapons were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines planes, over-flying about 5000 miles nonstop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 – the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army.[1]
By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistics and medical support.
Indian Concentration of Force Superiority
Indian Army: India’s immoral covert armed intervention had failed; by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000 troops) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 (Mukti Bahni Terrorists) trained and equipped by Indian Army. The Pakistan Army had 55000 Army troops. [Ratio, 450000:55000 / 450:55]
(If the logistic personnel are excluded, the actual Pak Army fighting force facing the enemies was around 34000 troops. Indian Chief FM Manekshaw admitted that One Pakistani Soldier was faced with 50 Indians soldiers.)
Indian Navy: The Indian Navy’s one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/frigates, two submarines and three landing crafts, against Pak Navy’s four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft supported them.
Indian Air Force: Eleven Indian Air Force squadrons – 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 – from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant Number 14 squadron of F-86 Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka. [Ratio 11:1]
21 November, on Eid day, when Pak fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full-scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan.
Indian Divisions attacked Pak brigade positions; brigades attacked Pak battalion, company and platoon positions, supported by their armour, artillery and air force.
Till 16 December 1971 Indians could not capture except one Town, not defended not to strategic reasons
When most of Pak defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons.
For the Pakistani soldiers, this was their finest hour fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed when an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmad, Sitara-i-Jurat of 31 Baloch replied in a message wrapped around a bullet which read, “I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight.”
Similarly, 4 Frontier Force, under 205 Brigade (Brigadier Tajammul Malik), held out at Hilli for 19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawal on 11 December, after getting outflanked.
Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir units all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigades (Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Sitara-i-Jurat) held at bay an Indian division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at Khulna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command.
West Pakistan: On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971, India attacked with the main effort against the Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our number 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. Number 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Mohammad Ahmed, Sitara-i-Jurat) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration of Pak minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by Indian armour.
Jammu and Kashmir: In Jammu and Kashmir, Chamb, Lahore, Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory, with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support.
For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force, this conflict was their finest hour fighting against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country raged with full fury.
Cease-Fire: Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan, India asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of “Jehad”.
On 4 December 1971 , the United States moved a draft resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China were introduced calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies, their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the cease-fire had been perfidiously converted to surrender. ”I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading – which read Instrument of ‘Surrender” writes Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian, Eastern Army. (Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation).
Also read:
• “Blood over Different Shades of Green” Book by Ikram Sehgal, Bettina Robotka- Reviewed by Haider Mehdi
• “A Summary Assessment of the 1971 Military Debacle” by Kaiser Tufail
How many PoWs ?
Pak Army had a Headquarter Eastern Command and two infantry divisions and some ad hoc arrangements. Army uniform personnel: 55,692, Paramilitary 16,354, Police 5,296, Navy 1000 and PAF 800, total uniformed: 79,676, moreover some of their East Pakistani collaborators and civilians making a total of approximately 93,000 prisoners of war.
FM Sam Manekshaw Indian Army Chief
In an interview with BBC, FM Sam Manekshaw was asked did you win the 1971 war because Pakistan Army was incompetent? Manekshaw replied no, instead he said that the Pakistan Army deployed in East Pakistan fought gallantly.
He also added that circumstances were not in favour of the Pakistan Army as they were 1000 miles away from their bases. Also, the number of Indian soldiers deployed to fight East Pakistan surpassed the number of Pakistani soldiers in East Pakistan, each Pakistani soldier was facing at least 50 Indian soldiers.
Lieutenant-General Yaqub Khan Opposed Military Action
In 1969, Lieutenant-General Yaqub Khan was posted to East Pakistan as the commander of Eastern Command in Dacca by President Yahya Khan and helped evaluate the command rotation of the Eastern military.: Soon, he was appointed as Governor of East Pakistan where he began learning the Bengali language and became accustomed to Bengali culture.: He was highly respected by the East Pakistani military officers due to his stance and professionalism and was said to be very well liked and respected in the East.[9]
He was known to be an unusual military officer who knew very well about “limits of force”, and did not believe in the use of brute force to settle political disputes. In 1969–71, he worked together with Admiral Ahsan in advising the Yahya administration in an effort to resolve the situation and strictly restricted the proposal of usage of military force in the province.
At the cabinet meeting, he was often fierce and strictly resisted the usage of military option but was respected in the military due to his understanding of Bengali issues and whose colleagues often labeled him as “Bingos.” In 1970, he notably coordinated the relief operations when the disastrous cyclone had hit the state and gained prestige for his efforts in the country.
In 1971, he participated in the area contingency and fact-finding mission, which was known as the Ahsan–Yaqub Mission, to resolve the political deadlock between East Pakistan and Pakistan as both men argued that “military measures would not change the political situations”.
Yaqub Resigns: In March 1971, he became aware of the rumors of a military action against East Pakistanis and delivered desperate military signals to President Yahya Khan in Islamabad to not use military solution as he feared Indian intervention. After the resignation of Admiral Ahsan, he was ordered to use military force against the civil agitation led by the Awami League but refused to take this order and tendered his resignation to be posted back to Pakistan. His resignation came in the light of resisting the military orders and fiercely maintained to President Yahya that “military solution was not acceptable”.
Commenting on the situation, Yaqub maintained that: “[President] Yahya was also keen to impose the “open sword” martial law to roll back the situation as it was in 1969.” He lodged a strong protest against the military solution and maintained that the “central government had failed to listen to the voices of their co-citizens in the East.” To many authors, Yaqub Khan had become a “conscientious objector” in the military.
He was posted back to Pakistan, joined the Army GHQ staff and participated in the winter war against India in 1971 without commanding an assignment and retired from the military after the war, also in 1971.
Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report
The Hamoodur Rahman Commission (otherwise known as War Enquiry Commission), was a judicial inquiry commission that assessed Pakistan’s political–military involvement in East-Pakistan from 1947 to 1971.The commission was set up on 26 December 1971 by the Government of Pakistan and chaired under Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman. Constituted “to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the atrocities and 1971 war”, including the “circumstances in which the Commander of the Eastern Military Command, surrendered the Eastern contingent forces under his command laid down their arms.”
The commission’s final report was very lengthy and provided an analysis based on extensive interviews and testimonies. Its primary conclusion was very critical of the role of Pakistan’s military interference, the misconduct of politicians as well as the intelligence failures of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which permitted the infiltration of Indian agents all along the borders of East Pakistan. Originally, there were 12 copies of the report. These were all destroyed; except the one that was handed over to the Government who disallowed its publication at the time. In 2000, parts of the commission report were leaked to Indian and Pakistani newspapers.
The full report was thought to be declassified by the government in 2000, along with other reports concerning the year 1971. However, it was reported that the supplementary report based on testimonies of POWs was published, and the key portion of the report concerning the political and military issues remained classified and marked as “Top Secret.”
The main findings of Hamood ur Rehman report are:
1. The report accused the army generals of what it called a “premature surrender” and said the military’s continued involvement in running the government after 1958 was one reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers.
2. The report maintained that: “Even responsible service officers have asserted before us that because of corruption resulting from such involvement, the lust for wine and women and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had lost not only their will to fight but also their professional competence.”
3. The report said Pakistan’s military ruler at the time, General Yahya Khan, who stepped down after Pakistan’s defeat in December 1971, “permitted and even instigated” the surrender, and it recommended that he be publicly tried along with other senior military colleagues.
4. The report accused General Yahya Khan of being a womanizer and an alcoholic. According to the report “Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s demand for punishment where it is deserved but would also ensure against any recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war”.
Recommendations
Many insightful recommendations were made by the commission as it recommends:
1. To hold the public trial for the President General Yahya Khan, also the Commander-in-Chief and the chief martial law administrator of both East and Pakistan in western side.
2. The Commission found suitable for field Courts-martial for Lieutenant-General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan, Lieutenant-General SSGM Prizada and Major-General Khudadad Khan, and Major-General A. O. Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force.
3. Five additional Lieutenant-Generals and three Brigadier-Generals were recommended to be tried for willful neglect of duty. These were Lieutenant-Generals included A.A.K. Nazi, Mohammad Jamshed, M. Rahim Khan, Irshad Ahmad Khan, B.M. Mustafa and Brigadier-Generals G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, Mohammad Hayat and Mohammad Aslam Niazi.
4. According to the Commission General Mustafa’s offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area (Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.
5. In the supplementary report section in “Higher Direction of War act” of the HRC report, it strongly called for the establishment of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) mechanism with headquartered in MoD. Per the act, the JCSC composed of a chairman, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of Army Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff. It was mandated to have a collective responsibility of national defence and mechanism of plans based on joint objectives.
6. The chairmanship was to be rotated between each inter-services, irrespective of the personal ranks in each service. The commission also stressed for the need of stronger deterrence of the country against the foreign intrusions and makes more thoughtful recommendations about the defense of the country as a whole.
7. The Commission called for restoring the rule of law according to the Constitution and establishing the writ of government through the Constitution.
8. In the end, the commission opined in the report that the nation would learn the necessary lessons from these tragic events and that effective and early action will be taken in the light of the conclusions reached.
The recommendations were only partially implemented, no trial was held, no one punished for breaking the country. Hence Military top continues to indulge in political affairs, two martial laws of about ten years each and thereafter the army chiefs acting as King Makers through political engineering continue and will continue for how long? nobody knows. This was cited as the main reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers.
India has never accepted the existence of Pakistan from its heart and from day one has been trying to undo Pakistan. It illegally annexed Muslim ruled state of Hyderabad, Junahgarh and Kashmir, which was partly liberated by Kashmiris but most of it remains under Indian occupation, waiting for freedom under, United Nations Security Council Resolution instructed the Commission to go to the subcontinent and help the governments of India and Pakistan restore peace and order to the region and prepare for a plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir. It remains a far cry, while India is taking all measures to merge Kashmir. The Kashmir L of C remains hot with intermittent exchange of fire and clashes.
India exploited weaknesses in East Pakistan and managed its separation of Eastern in 1971, but the Indian leadership especially the BJP rule in India has its objective to eliminate the traces of Muslims in Indian and destroy Pakistan. They are taking all illegal, inhuman measures to achieve this objective.
On the other hand, USA and Israel have their own agenda and plans for Balkanization of the Middle East and Pakistan, to establish Israeli hegemony in the region by making it an international power. Breaking up of Middle East and Pakistan into pieces is one of their objectives for which infamous Bernard Lewis is in place. It is not rigid, renewed and readjusted according to the changing ground situation. [Details were published in DJ] India is very eager to enhance its agenda through playing some role in such plans, Chahbahar, use of Iranian soil for terrorists activities in Pakistan through Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav is the living proof. Indian support to the Baloch terrorists and undermining CPEC is linked to same objective.
Lessons
The nations who don’t learn lessons from history become history. The Pak Army War History web portal mentions: “Flawed national and operational strategy proved to be disastrous for Pakistan, both politically and militarily power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management, and higher direction of war in which Pakistan had been found wanting in 1971.
The conduct of war at lower i.e. brigade and below was exemplary, setting many heroic examples of valor even appreciated by the enemy commanders. The Indian could not capture till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons.
1. No army can win a war against its own people turn hostile [64 Million Bengalis] supported by many times hostile enemies with a distance of thousand miles between two parts. USSR and US defeat in Afghanistan are recent examples. East Pakistan required a political not military solution.
2. The present political situation in Pakistan indicates that no lessons have been learned by the political and military leadership from the past. The military’s continued involvement in running the government after 1958 was one reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers in 1971. A large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had lost not only their will to fight but also their professional competence. There have been two military takeovers and rule for about two decades, yet their involvement in political engineering, manipulation and playing as King Maker is considered vital. Eradication of Corruption of the political elite is not their priority, which has ruined this country. The fruit of their continued political involvement with no positive tangible results in the form of a stable political system, justice and accountability will be as devastating as in the past.
3. The direct or indirect military involvement, the glaring example is the extension of Army Chief’s tenure, which results in demoralization and loss of able commanders. This is due to weakness of politicians. Military must be fully isolated from civil affairs, which is only possible by putting a stable political system in place in consultation with all the stakeholders.
4. Why do martial laws fail?
Ikram Sehgal, the renowned defence and political analyst in his article ”Why martial laws go horribly wrong” quoted his earlier article of June 29, 1995, ‘Why do martial laws fail?’ He writes:
“Martial laws fail because the initiators of all extra-constitutional rule ride into town on tanks with the lofty aim of saving the country, relying on that platonic national purpose to make themselves credible. They soon adjust the aim to more material (and less patriotic) reasons of self-perpetuation. The original aim remains publicly the same, and becomes an exercise in self-delusion.
This diversion of aim means that one individual or group is simply replaced by another (or others), instead of being a transition mechanism that provides for and facilitates the process of the democratic system being repaired and renovated to reflect the real genius and aspirations of the people.
Martial laws fail because the armed forces get themselves involved in mundane, routine bureaucratic duties that they are not supposed to be involved in.
Martial laws fail because those who impose martial laws do not have correct knowledge about the working of the state or the individuals who run it, and soon surround themselves with sycophants who are usually holdovers from previous governments.” When he imposed his form of martial law in 1999, Musharraf had no intention of heeding this advice rendered in print as far back as 1995. One doubts any future military dictator will; power is a great aphrodisiac.
By the time Musharraf exited, the army’s name was in mud within the country, and outside. Where once the uniform was worn with pride, it became a target of public anger and scorn. (striking resemblance to present, look at Army image building campaign in the media to calm down angry public) Rumor had it that somehow the army’s image had to be reinstated in public eyes.
Why is Corrupt Political Leadership Installed by the Military?
Instructors in army schools of learning are called ‘Directing Staff’ (DS). Students plan out various alternatives; the ‘plan’ the instructors prefer is called the “DS solution”. To bring the army back from the dumps, the DS solution was to have a predictably corrupt political leader in place against whom all the collective public venom would be directed, and this would deflect public anger away from the army. The calculated risk was that he would not change, but if he did, even that would be counted as a plus. Zardari helped considerably by his recent Nero-like presidential jaunt to London and Paris while the country drowned. This confirmed him as easily the most hated person ever in Pakistan’s history. He couldn’t care less; such revulsion has never really bothered him.
The army’s success in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, achieved through great sacrifice in blood by all ranks, was a major turnaround for the army’s image. The massive flood relief effort is acting as a force-multiplier bonus to bring the army back to its pedestal in public eyes. With both positive and negative lessons learnt from the 1999 Pakistan and 2006 Bangladesh military interventions, a refined ‘Pakistan model’ must still remain the route of last resort.
Uniformed personnel have no business running the government (or for that matter businesses); they must support the honest and capable in governance. Martial laws with platonic intentions end up perpetuating individual rule, as happened in Musharraf’s case, and can go wrong, horribly, horribly wrong.
Readers may draw parallels with present mess.
5. Milpolitik, Hybrid Politics (denied by the military but ground realities prove otherwise) but as it exists, is more harmful, because it enables the military establishment to evade responsibility. Enjoying Power without responsibility and acting as kingmaker to shuffle, reshuffle the civilian governments like a musical chair game will take us nowhere. This must end, the military should provide stability to the political system and fully concentrate toward the new security challenges before another catastrophe.
6. George Washington (1732–1799) was an American military officer, statesman, and Founding Father who served as the first president of the United States from 1789 to 1797. Appointed by the Continental Congress as commander of the Continental Army, Washington led the Patriot forces to victory in the American Revolutionary War and served as the president of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which created the Constitution of the United States and the American federal government. Washington has been called the “Father of the Nation” for his manifold leadership in the formative days of the country. He never thought of martial law but constitution was his gift to the nation.
7. General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) was a French army officer and statesman who led Free France against Nazi Germany in World War II and chaired the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946 in order to restore democracy in France. In 1958, he came out of retirement when appointed President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) by President René Coty. He rewrote the Constitution of France and founded the Fifth Republic after approval by referendum. He was elected President of France later that year, a position to which he was reelected in 1965 and held until his resignation in 1969. He did not go for martial law.
8. Martial Law is for the defence forces, not for civil rule, which requires a constitution.
9. The Ideology of Pakistan/ Two Nation Theory cannot be relegated or replaced, it must always be the basis of any system in Pakistan. Strict adherence to the “Ahkam-Al-Quran is the only way for survival and progress for Pakistan to root out moral degradation and corruption.
10. The Law of Quran on “Rise and fall of Nations” must be kept in view.
“If you turn away, He will replace you with another nation; they will not be you”.(Quran 47:38)
11. Corruption
The corrupt leaders justify corruption by saying that, “corruption is necessary for development and progress, if we stop corruption the economy will come to stand still” This immoral logic is not supported by ground realities. If we look at the world ranking in Corruption Index, the countries with least corruption would not be among the developed and rich top ten countries; Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands. Luxembourg and Germany. Pakistan is at 140th along with Myanmar, Mauritania while South Sunad is 180 being the most corrupt country. According to the logic of Pakistani corrupt leaders South Sudan should be among most developed countries.
Pakistan is an Islamic State, where the law of Quran and Sunnah stands supreme, and according to Quran corruption, bribery is prohibited. Had there been some benefit Allah would have allowed it, which is not the case.
“Do not misappropriate one another’s property unjustly, nor bribe the judges, in order to misappropriate a part of other people’s property, sinfully and knowingly. (Quran 2:188).
How can they make Haram (prohibited) as Halal (permissible)? This is only the prerogative of God, anyone doing it is indulging in Shirk (polytheism) or Kufr.,
“Say, “Did you note how GOD sends down to you all kinds of provisions, then you render some of them unlawful, and some lawful?” Say, “Did GOD give you permission to do this? Or, do you fabricate lies and attribute them to GOD?”(10:59)
Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah said:
Corruption is a curse in India and amongst Muslims, especially the so called educated and intelligentsia. Unfortunately, it is this class that is selfish and morally and intellectually corrupt. No doubt this disease is common, but amongst this particular class of Muslims it is rampant. [M.A. Jinnah, to Ispahani, 6 May 1945]
Corruption is not a problem for ruling circles (political and military). The corrupt people have been installed to power, says deposed PM, it would have been better to drop an atomic bomb on Pakistan. Accountability would have been stronger if eight or ten people had been convicted but the NAB and the judiciary are under their control.
Chairman NAB (National Accountability Bureau) Justice (Retd) Javed Iqbal has said that corruption is the main reason why we are in trouble. If steps are not taken to eradicate corruption, Kashkool (begging bowl) will remain in hand. There is no doubt that corruption and looting are rampant in the country. Corrupt elements and thieves would have ended corruption by now if they had obeyed the sermons and admonitions but they only understand the language of punishment. That is why the NAB has been set up under the constitution and law of the country, whose main function is to crack down on corrupt elements and bring them to justice and recover the looted money wealth property. It is the responsibility of the Chairman NAB to recover the money looted from the corrupt elements. All the loyalties of NAB are with the state of Pakistan. The state is weakening due to corruption. The money should be returned but also steps should be taken to eradicate corruption. It is the responsibility of NAB to immediately approach the court on the cases of persons who have looted billions of rupees and caused damage to the national exchequer.
Military supporting corrupt politicians undermine their position.
Patriotic Pakistanis do not want their respected Armed Forces to stand on the wrong side of history Army tops should just stand for the Right (Haqq), people have high expectations and hopes, don’t disappoint them!
“Our mission is only to convey the message clearly” (Quran:36:17)
12. Getting out of Quagmire
Rationalisation of powers of Legislative, Executive, Judiciary, Military and Media, through reforms is the need of the hour to create a balance. Because in Pakistani environments any pillar with more powers tends to misuse it and undermine the role of other pillars of state. Checks and balances in each are required. Self accountability is not effective, it is mostly used to white wash and coverup blaming others.
The office of President can be made potent to play such a role. Presently he should immediately constitute and call a meeting of Guardian Council of Elders (Think Tank, not constitutional amendment required), comprising highly respected, non-controversial statesmen, intellectuals, retired, senior politicians, civil & military officers, Judges, lawyers, journalists, economists, writers, professors, social scientists, religious scholars and experts from other fields and segments of society (around 50 people). It should be such a balanced forum, that no one should be able to point fingers. This Group should discuss, debate the current situation, find possible solutions, the unanimous recommendations (with additional points if anyone be annexed) be forwarded to the PM, and opposition leader (real). Chief Justice, COAS and other top people, and be published in the media. [Later efforts can be made to make it a permanent constitutional forum with authority and responsibility for mega crisis management, less than Iranian Guardian Council of clerics] This will exert pressure on all important institutions and people to wake up and resolve the national crisis in the best national interest alone.
References: https://SalaamOne.com/71war
1. https://pakistanarmy.gov.pk/War-History.php
2. Rise and fall of Nations – Law of Quran قرآن کا قانون عروج و زوال اقوام
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_Army_order_of_battle,_December_1971
6. When Russia Stunned US & UK Naval Forces And Helped India Win The 1971 War
7. Opinion: Russia’s defining moment in the Indo-Pak War 1971
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971
9. Manekshaw 18 minutes: https://youtu.be/IzlM7gM9Cks.
10. The National Service : 31 FF
12. “Quran Commands”/ Ahkam-Al-Quran/ احکام القرآن / https://bit.ly/AhkamAlQuraan
13. Operation Searchlight – Wikipedia
14. Hamoodur Rahman Commission – Wikipedia
15. Yahya Khan | president of Pakistan – Encyclopedia Britannica
16. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Armed_Forces#General_staff
17. Why Electoral Reforms in Pakistan?
18. https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih /
19. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardianship_of_the_Islamic_Jurist
20. https://www.eurasiareview.com/25072014-pakistan-military-element-national-power-analysis/
21. https://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/national-power-elements-evaluation-and-limitations/48489
https://docs.google.com/document/d/16mdH6LPtU2iWMl8rHnbhWhyy19Zl5W1pxHTRr3xk1UM/edit?usp=sharing
