Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasulallah Pakistan commonly known as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) recently made headlines in Pakistan by staging another round of violent protests. Since its inception, TLP has created a law and order situation in Pakistan almost every year.
A small number of Barelvi low level clerics emerged as a pressure group to prevent the execution of Mumtaz Qadri, a police guard who assassinated the Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer accusing him of blasphemy. In 2015, Khadim Hussain Rizvi announced formation of TLP with aims of implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) and protection of the honor of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). In February 2016, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif assured security to judges and with this guarantee Chief Justice of Pakistan Saqib Nisar rejected Qadri’s appeal and he was executed. TLP staged a protest in Islamabad that was called off after a verbal agreement with the government.
The Army learned a few lessons from the stubborn resistance of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pushtun militant networks based in tribal areas could be tackled with use of extensive firepower and regain the lost territory. Lead was used frequently to put the fear of god in errant non-Punjabi ethnic groups including the Baloch in 1970s and 2000s, Sindhis in the 1980s and Muhajirs in 1990s. Punjabi militant groups based in urban areas of sprawling cities of Punjab are a different animal. It was clear that the army cannot kill itself out of the enormous problem especially in Punjab without risking serious pressure on Punjab dominated security forces.
The Army’s current position is to mainstream these religious groups. In this context, four successive Director Generals of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lieutenant Generals Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Zaheer ul Islam, Rizwan Akhtar and Naveed Mukhtar set in motion efforts to bring religious parties into the electoral politics. Under intense international pressure and changed strategic environment, a lid was placed on militant groups active in Kashmir especially Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and Jama’at ud Dawa (JUD). The leadership was given a handsome severance package and in 2017, these two groups announced participation in the 2018 elections under the name of Milli Muslim League (MML). TLP was also encouraged to enter electoral politics.
In 2017, the Nawaz Sharif government introduced an electoral reform bill that had a few changes in its wording. TLP cried foul claiming that it was an effort to remove anti-Ahmadiyya clauses. In November 2017, it staged a sit-in at Faizabad interchange connecting Rawalpindi and Islamabad that brought the capital to a standstill. The Nawaz Sharif government ended up signing an agreement with TLP accepting their demands and forcing the resignation of the Law Minister. This agreement was facilitated by then Director General of Counterintelligence (CI), Major General Faiz Hamid (later Lieutenant General and DGISI). In an unprecedented move, Faiz Hamid also put his signature on the accord. In another move of bad optics, Director General Rangers Punjab Major General Azhar Naveed Hayat was filmed giving envelopes to some protestors while they were dispersing. He later claimed that money was given to poor protestors as they did not have money for their return journey. These actions severely damaged the army’s reputation and people believed that the TLP protest was actively supported by the army to undermine the Nawaz Sharif government. In the July 2018 elections, TLP did not win even a single National Assembly seat but bagged 2.2 million votes (2 million in Punjab alone). This fact proved the resistance of Nawaz Sharif to allow entry of TLP in electoral politics. He viewed this move as taking away a chunk of his vote bank as both parties fished for voters in the same socio-economic pond.
Many believe that the TLP is simply a tool of the army and is used to undermine troublesome politicians; this is not correct although the army dealt directly with TLP through its intelligence agencies to avoid direct confrontation. The reality is more nuanced and a case example where even puppets at some point come to believe that they can run the show without the puppeteer. In the first three months after Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf’s (PTI) victory, TLP engaged in back-to-back protests. In August 2018 while the PTI government under Imran Khan was in the process of taking over, TLP marched from Lahore to Islamabad to protest the planned anti-Islam caricature competition in Holland. When the government announced that renowned Pakistani-American economist Atif Mian would be included in the Economic Advisory Council, TLP protested as Mian is an Ahmadi. The Government made a hasty retreat. In 2010, a Christian woman Asia Bibi was awarded a death sentence by the lower courts on charges of blasphemy. In October 2018, after assurance from the Army Chief, the Supreme Court overturned Asia Bibi’s death sentence on technical grounds. TLP leaders issued fatwas (religious decrees) of death for the judges and those who defended Asia Bibi and abused Prime Minister Imran Khan. Protestors halted normal life in Islamabad for two months when another humiliating agreement was reached with protestors. The Government promised to allow a review petition of the verdict, put Asia on the Exit Control List (ECL) and released all protesters.
In many cases, senior leaders of TLP publicly abused Army Chiefs. When Mumtaz Qadri was hanged, Khadim Rizvi in a public speech, used filthy language against General Raheel Sharif. Later, TLP leaders accused General Qamar Javed Bajwa of being Ahmadi and called Muslim generals to revolt and remove him. This was a most dangerous and unprecedented move. Khadim Rizvi and Pir Afzal Qadri were booked under terrorism and sedition charges. Pir Afzal later issued a lackluster apology reading from a written document and not even lifting his head suggesting that this exercise was under duress.
Late Khadim Hussain Rizvi took the discussion to a new low with use of abusive and filthy language from the pulpit. He was also an equal opportunity abuser threatening and abusing government functionaries, minorities, other sects and even fellow Barelvi clerics. TLP has weaponised the blasphemy laws and openly engages in hatred and bigotry, the likes of which have not been seen before in Pakistan. It uses social media very effectively to spread its message of hate. After Khadim’s death in 2020, there was a power struggle between founding member Pir Afzal Qadri and Khadim’s young son Saad Rizvi. The custody of the sprawling headquarters, large source of income and lucrative real estate under TLP control were at stake.
A social study of TLP provides interesting insights into this phenomenon. It is a Barelvi phenomenon limited to lower middle class petty traders and the poor in urban areas of Punjab and pockets in Karachi and some rural areas of Punjab. It rallies people around the sharp weapon of blasphemy laws and rides high on the currents created by intense passions. Rural Punjabi of Punjab and Sindh is predominantly of Barelvi persuasion but under the influence of hereditary custodians of major shrines called Pirs. These Pirs are also landlords and are fully entrenched in power structure by joining political forces. One can find them in all mainstream political parties including Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and PTI. This entrenchment dating back to colonial days means that the majority is still under the influence of Pirs and TLP has not been able to make a dent in this power base. In Punjab, TLP support base is made up of small traders and poor segments of the society. In view of the economic crunch and rising unemployment, TLP is using egalitarian slogans to attract more adherents. In Karachi, larger Barelvi outfits including Jamiat-Ulema-Pakistan (JUP) and Sunni Tehreek (ST) have the same social base of small traders and low-level government employees. They have kept separate identities although they jump on the demands of TLP and support a small TLP power base in Karachi to ride the emotions. Political parties and clerics of other denominations have jumped into the fray to embarrass the government and extract concessions making the task of tackling TLP very difficult.
Short term agreements by the government to get immediate relief prevents large scale violence. It is just a matter of time before TLP takes up an issue and starts another round of protests. Lack of resolve and confusion at civilian level means that this problem will fall into the Army’s lap. The most likely course will be to encourage the breakup of TLP into factions. The compliant ones will be encouraged to participate in electoral politics or make alliances with like-minded parties. Another possible option on the table will be to isolate hard-core upper and middle level leaders and then eliminate in due time through target killings. If this option is on the table, then it will be preferable to keep the ban on the party while allowing compliant factions to emerge under a new name. If the ban is removed and TLP is allowed to function under the current setup then the option of extrajudicial killing will be difficult to execute. It is easy to use this tool against a banned outfit. The Government and the Army will also encourage traditional hereditary pirs to put up a front against Saad Rizvi.
The anti-Ahmadiyya sentiments in society in general, backed by retrogressive and discriminatory laws, are the foundation stone and blasphemy laws are staunch pillars. In 2011, a poll conducted by Pew showed that 75 percent of Pakistanis believed that blasphemy laws were essential to protect Islam in Pakistan. It is no surprise that with such a background of support, groups like TLP flourish. Even if TLP is removed from the scene, another brand will emerge in due course. TLP is just a cruder version of bigotry that is on display in the public. This factor alone makes it very difficult to tackle this issue at intellectual, doctrinal and administrative levels. Civilians and uniformed personnel are first guilty of using this for short term gains and now that the genie is out of the bottle, they hesitate to tackle it forcefully, not sure what kind of response it will create. Backlash from the Lal Masjid operation still haunts security managers. Fear factor at all levels is preventing a holistic approach to this complex phenomenon.
In a population of 220 million, any cleric, lay preacher or charlatan can attract 50-100’000 adherents. Every society has its own set of folks holding extremist views. In a diverse society like Pakistan, this can be expected. However, if rules are not clearly demarcated and enforced and such folks are given the license to promote outright hatred, encourage murder, engage in violent protests destroying public and private property, then there are consequences for the society. Such groups pose serious hazards to the social, political, economic, security and even spiritual health of the society.
“If you are desirous of obtaining a great name, of becoming the founder of a sect or establishment, be completely mad; but be sure that your madness corresponds with the turn and temper of your age. Have in your madness reason enough to guide your extravagances, and to not forget to be excessively opinionated and obstinate. It is certainly possible that you may get hanged; but if you escape hanging, you will have altars erected to you”. Voltaire (1698-1778)
