Asalong Mouza Operations

1. Mouza ASALONG, J. L. No 183, Police Station Ramgarh, Distt Chittagong Hill Tracts having an area of 5.34. sq. miles, appears to be claimed by India as part of Tripura State. This is the tract of land falling between the Feni River and the Asalong Khal. According to India’s claim, the boundary between Tripura State (India) and Chittagong Hill Tracts (Pak) should run along the Asalong Khal and not along the Feni river as shown on various maps and defined in boundary notifications. They hold the view that the Asalong Khal is actually the Feni River, and ought to have been shown as such on the maps prepared from time to time. The claim advanced by India is very recent. Had they raised the issue earlier, it would have been referred for decision to the Bagge Tribunal, which was set up in December 1949 to decide the boundary disputes between Pak and India.

2.(a) The earliest reference regarding the Asalong dispute is traceable in letter No. 3929 the 26th December, 1930, from the officer in charge No. 12 Party, Survey of India. In this letter, the officer in charge No. 12 Party reported that he had met the Political Agent and Diwan Shashan of Tripura State at Comilla, and drawn up a list of the boundary disputes raised by them. In this list the dispute No. 10 was “Source of the Feni River” described as follows:
“Here the Tripura State claim the boundary to be the ridge east of the Asalong River instead of previous boundary, a new claim, which they should at once take up with the Collector of Rangmati, and have the matter settled, if possible by 1932-33, so that we will know which line we are to survey”.

(b) The survey of topographical sheet No. 79 M/15 was taken up by the Survey of India in the field season 1933-34. Lieut C A K Wilson, Officer in Charge No. 12 Party, Survey of India, in his letter No. 719-23/40-J-5 dated the 17th April, 1934 to the Director, Eastern Circle, Survey of India, stated as follows in the second para of his letter:
“As I pointed out to the Minister, the course of the Feni and its source will be rigorously surveyed by us along with all other stream in the area. The question of deciding which of the several streams among Asalong is to be accepted as the headwater of the Feni cannot be decided by us. Actually it spears that the Asalong, a tributary of the Feni, is probably the correct headwater of the river. There are other considerations, ethical and historical affecting the location of the boundary in this neighbourhood”

It also appears from the above letter of Lieut C A M Wilson that at the time of the topographical survey, “the SDO Amarpur, arrived from Tripura State with books and documents from which he proposed to produce evidence not all of a topographical nature, that the boundary should run along the Taindong stream, which is a tributary of the Feni that flows the whole of its length in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. He was apparently sent only to investigate and discuss and had not been empowered to make any decision on behalf or the State”.

(c) The topographical sheet No. 79 M/15 Surveyed in 1933-34, was duly published in 1935. The topographical map showed the area between the Feni River and the Asalong Khal, which is covered by Asalong Mouza, as disputed, by a remark to that effect entered across that area. One point here needs particular attention. Whereas, the name of the Feni River, above its junction with the Asalong Khal, in the topographical map is “Feni River” the Asalong has been named as the Asalong Chhard, which brings out clearly the difference between the main river and its tributary. 

(d) There was some correspondence between the Tripura Darbar and the Resident on the one hand, and the Resident and the Government of Bengal on the other. The latest letter in this connection, before the partition, appears to be No. B.11-12/37 dated the 14th July 1945, from the Secretary to the Hon’ble the Resident for the Eastern states, to the Secretary to the Government. of Bengal. (Revenue Department.) The relevant para 3 of this letter reads as follows:
“If, however, the Government. of Bengal dispute the Tripura Government’s contention that the Asalong is the headstream of the Feni River, it is suggested that a joint inquiry be held in the near future, officer to determine the source and midstream of the Feni River above the point where the present river is mutually accepted as the Feni River. The Tripura Government have already accepted the principle that should the Survey Officers of the provincial govts and of the State be unable to come to a mutually acceptable decision, they are prepared to accept as binding the award of an arbitrator, who the Resident suggests should be an officer of the Survey of India. This Residency would be glad to know at an early date whether the Govt. of Bengal are agreeable to this joint inquiry and are prepared to accept the award of an Arbitrator should this course be necessary”.
There does not appear to be any further reply to the above letter from the Government of Bengal. Thus no joint inquiry appears to have been held, nor the matter referred to an arbitrator. The area is disputed at the time of the publication of the map in 1935.

3. The latest notifications, which describes the boundaries of Chittagong Hill Tracts district is Notification No. 121 P.O. dated the 1st May, 1900. The relevant portion of this notification reads as follows:
“Speak and on by the boundary as shown on the maps of Hill-Tippera and Chittagong by J.H.O’ Donel, Esq Revenue Surveyor, to and along the Feni River as far as the village of Ramghar, vide Bengal Government. Notification dated the 23rd June, 1874”.
This notification of the 1st May 1960, was issued with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, and was thus binding on Tripura State as well.
The boundary is described in terms of the map of J.H.O’ Donel. This is map of J.H.O’ Donel prepared in 1862-63, shows the Asalong Khal as quite distinct from the Feni River. Since the notification describes the boundary along the Feni river as shown on the map of J.H.O’ Donel, there can be no ground to confuse the Asalong Khal with the Feni River. The former is just a tributary of the latter. Moreover, the map of J.H.O’ Donel, was prepared under the authority of the Government of India, as the Revenue Surveys at that time were carried out by the Survey of India.
There is another notification No. 1946 P.D. dated the 14th July 1916, issued by the Government. of Bengal. This notification described the eastern boundary between Tripura State and Chittagong Hill Tracts along the Feni River is concerned, this notification also described it in the same terms as the notifications of 1874 and 1900.
It is seen from para 2 above that the discussions and correspondence between the Tripura Darbar and Government of Bengal channelled through the Resident for Eastern States, up to the date of partition were merely in the form of suggestions and counter-suggestions. Which without the concurrence of the Governor General in Council had no legal value. The notification of the map of J.H.O’ Donel still remains the only authentic document to interpret the boundary.

4.(i) Revenue Survey maps of Chittagong Hill Tracts and Tripura, prepared by J.H.O’ Donel in 1862-63, scale 1” = 1 mile. This map clearly shows the Feni River as quite distinct from the Asalong Khal. The Asalong Khal and Asalong Mouza between the Feni River and the Asalong Khal have been shown completely as part of Chittagong Hill Tracts District.
(ii) All maps prepared by the Survey of India up to the year 1933, showed the Asalong Khal and the Asalong Mouza falling completely in Chittagong Hill Tracts. This area on these maps was never marked as disputed. The latest of the maps of this series in sheet No. 79 M, scale 1” = 4 miles, 1911 edition (corrected up to 1915).
(iii) The administration Report of Tripura State issued in 1933, has been illustrated by a map of Tripura State on scale 1” = 16 Miles. This map does not show the Asalong Area as part of Tripura State.

(iv) There is a map, printed in the Survey of India Offices in 1924, on scale 1” = 4 miles, bearing the title “TRIPURA STATE WITH ZAMINDARIES IN BENGAL”.
This map, as the title shows, has evidently been prepared for the Maharaja of Tripura State, to show his sovereign territory outside Bengal and his Zamindaries in Bengal. Even this map does not include the Asalong area in Tripura. Feni River is shown in its proper position and this entire river is shown outside Tripura State.

Extracts from Official War Diary East Pakistan Refiles
Sequence of Events
ASALONG OPERATIONS

01. 25 Sept 62 – Our patrol from advance post in SQ 0177 (FLOWERBED) in area 
ASALONG MOUZA spotted a large party of Indian troops at 1600 hours. 
Indian troops broke contact and disappeared into the thick jungle. The EPR 
patrol combed the area and located the Indian troops between FLOWERBED 
position and the patrolling Staging Post SPACECRAFT in SQ 9874.

02. 26 Sept 62 – Commander, SYLHET Sector lodged a strong protest to SP
AGARTALA. The only force then available in CHITTAGONG of a platoon
strength under Subedar Major BASHIR AHMED dispatched from 11 Wing HQ 
CHITTAGONG to Operational area. 

03. 27 Sept 62 – Strong protest was lodged by Director General, EPR to 
Commander 181 Infantry Brigade, SHILLONG. Rifle Company
and Support Platoon ex Independent Wing, MYMENSINGH
under command of Major Q I A SIDDIQUI, Commander 
11 Wing, accompanied by Captain QURESHI, Assistant Wing
Commander, Independent Wing was dispatched to operational area.

04. 27 Sept 62 – 11 Wing reported that the Indians opened fire on FLOWERBED
position in area ASALONG on night 26/27 Sept from 2250 hours –
0135 hours. Indians used Small Arms and 2” Mortars. Own troops
returned fire. No casualties reported.

05. 27 Sept 62 – Indians opened fire at 1700 hours and continued heavy firing upto 
1740 hours. Own positions returned fire. Reports of further reinforcement strengthening of Indian positions in the area and of movement of Indian 
reinforcements from SAB RUM towns JALAIA. Platoon reinforcement under 
Subedar Major BASHIR AHMED reported moving forward between MAHALCHARI 
and PANCHARI BAZAR.

06. 28 Sept 62 – Enemy positions reported initially as follows:-
a. 1000 yards SOUTH WEST of FLOWERBED position in ASALONG area. 
b. Approximately 1500 yards WEST of FLOWERBED in ASALONG area.
c. Approximately 2400 yards NORTH of FLOWERBED in INDIAN territory.

07. 29 Sept 62 – Report received that enemy resorted to heavy small arms and mortar fire 
on own positions during night 28/29 Sept. Own troops returned fire
from 0300 to 0500 hours on 29 Sept. No casualties reported.

08. 29 Sept 62 – One Company ex HQ Wing under Command of Lt Col A M SEHGAL
accompanied by Captain NAEEM left for CHITTAGONG for Operational area. 
Platoon reinforcement under Subedar Major BASHIR AHMED reached TAINDUNG.

09. 30 Sept 62 – Subedar Major BASHIR AHMED occupied patrol base SPACECRAFT
with platoon less a section. Also reinforced FLOWERBED with one section.

10. 30 Sept 62 – On night 29/30 Sept heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire was brought 
on FLOWERBED position by enemy troops. No casualties reported. 
11. 30 Sept 62 A Company 6 FF with 3” mortar platoon and machine gun
platoon moved from CHITTAGONG in support of EPR troops in Operational area. 

12. 01 Oct 62 – During night 30 Sept/01 Oct enemy engaged own newly occupied
position SPACECRAFT by heavy concentration of mortar and small arms fire.

13. 01 Oct 62 – Enemy positions reported approximately 4 Companies in area 
ASALONG. One Company at JALAIA with mortar positions
and mortar positions at SARAJAIBARI. Movement of enemy
reinforcements observed across the FENI River in JALAIA area.

14. 01 Oct 62 – The 2nd reinforcement of one Company EPR under Major SIDDIQUI
had reached TAINDUNG afternoon of 30 Sept 62. Progress of third
reinforcement (Company HQ Wing) reported between MAHESHCHARI
and PANCHARI BAZAR. 

15. 01 Oct 62 – FLOWERBED position reinforced to Company strength by Major 
SIDDIQUI. SPACECRAFT position also reinforced by another 
Section. DINAJPUR Sector warned to have one rifle company ready
to move to Operational area. Move on further orders. 

16. 02 Oct 62 – Normal exchange of fire took place between enemy positions and 
own positions during night 1/2 Oct 62, patrolling by own troops 
continued. Reply to protest lodged by DG EPR at serial 4 above
received from Sector Commander, TRIPURA.

17. 02 Oct 62 – Fourth Company reinforcement ex Reserve Wing, DACCA, sent
from CHITTAGONG. Own patrols drew heavy enemy fire. 

18. 03 Oct 62 – Patrolling carried out by own troops in ASALONG area. Heavy 
firing at our positions on night 2/3 Oct 62. No casualties were reported.

19. 03 Oct 62 – At 1700 hours on 3 Oct 62 Company HQ Wing, DACCA reached
TAINDONG. Lt Col A M SEHGAL assumed Operational command
in the area at 1700 hours.

20. 04 Oct 62 – Extensive patrolling continued during night 3/4 Oct 62 and heavy
exchange of fire took place between enemy and own positions. No
casualties reported.

21. 04 Oct 62 – Meeting between district officials TRIPURA and CHITTAGONG
HILL TRACTS/CHITTAGONG districts, including Sector
Commanders from both sides, took place at SABRUM at 
1500 hours. The meeting ended inconclusively.

22. 05 Oct 62 – Enemy engaged our positions with rifles/automatic/mortars fire 
from area JALAIA and also from their positions in area ASALONG
during night 4/5 Oct 62. They fired one hundred 3” mortar bombs
and over 4,000 rounds of small arms. Own troops returned fire.
Exchange of fire continued throughout the night intermittently.
Own troops destroyed one enemy bunker. Casualties not known.

23. 06 Oct 62 – Enemy and own positions reported as follows:-

a. ENEMY 
(1) JALAIA area – Two companies – 6 x MMGs – 4 x 3 inch mortar.
(2) SARBAJAIBARI – Two companies – 6 x MMGs – 2 x 3 inch mortar.
(3) ASALONG MOUZA – Approximately – 8 x MMGs 
(4) Companies

b. OWN
(1) FLOWERBED position – One company.
(2) SPACECRAFT position – One company.
(3) Area EAST of SPACECRAFT position – One company.
and SOUTH WEST of FLOWERBED position.
(4) Remaining troops TAINDUNG.

24. 07 Oct 62 – Heavy small arms fire was resorted to from Indian locations between1500
to 1515 hours. Own troops did not return fire. Enemy again opened
fire at 1700 hours with 3” mortars located at JALAIA and also with heavy
rifle/automatic fire from all other positions located in ASALONG area.
Own troops returned effective mortar and small arms fire. Own fire 
believed to have caused casualties on the enemy. Enemy casualties were
observed being carried by the Indians. Own casualties, one slightly wounded.

25. 07 Oct 62 – Exchange of fire took place throughout night 6/7 Oct. Enemy
mortar fire mostly from JALAIA position.

26. 07 Oct 62 – Report received confirming approximately one enemy battalion
supported by approximately 8 machine guns and some mortars in area 
ASALONG. This position also supported by machine guns and mortars
in area ASALONG. This position also supported by machine guns and 
mortars from across FENI River. Also reported one enemy battalion 
strength across River FENI as immediate reserve. Enemy position comprises 
of strong bunkers in area ASALONG as well as strong positions at JALAIA
and SARBAJAI BARI. Own deployment of troops as follows:-

a. Two companies under Captain QURESHI in area SQ 0178 and SQ 0177, with four MMGs and 2 MMGs.
b. One company in area SQ 9974 with 2 x 3” mortar and 2 x MMGs.
c. One company in SQ 9872.
d. 5 x 3” mortars including 3 from 6 FF in area SQ 0076.
e. Company 6 FF less platoon in SQ 0176 as reserve.
f. Platoon 6 FF employed for local protection of Operation HQ at TAINDUNG.

27. 08 Oct 62 – Own fighting patrols engaged known enemy positions with automatic
fire during night 7/8 Oct 62. Enemy returned fire with small arms and
mortar at our patrols. No casualties reported. Extensive recee of enemy
positions carried out with a view to finding suitable approaches to enemy
bunkers in ASALONG area.

28. 09 Oct 62 – Second company of 6 FF left CHITTAGONG for Operational area.

29. 09 Oct 62 – Fighting patrols against enemy locations and raids carried out to 
which the enemy reacted with heavy mortar and automatic fire. 
Own troops made further advances. It is estimated that a number of casualties
have been inflicted on the enemy. Own casualties, one slightly wounded.
A source report believed that until 6 Oct 62 the Indians suffered the 
following casualties during operations in area ASALONG:-

a. Killed – 9
b. Wounded – 22. The wounded were reported to be in Army Hospital
at KUNJABAN (AGARTALA)

30. 10 Oct 62 – During exchange of firing on night 9/10 Oct, 2 own casualties occurred.
One of these casualties was from 6 FF Support Platoon. All casualties
of minor nature.

31. 11 Oct 62 – Fourth company ex 7 Wing RAJSHAHI under Captain BOKHARI left
CHITTAGONG for Operational area. Heavy exchange of fire took place
between enemy and own positions during night 10/11 Oct. Enemy fire 
was mainly directed at our forward positions in area FLOWERBED.
Another forward platoon position was established close to defences. 
On 10 Oct enemy fired 104 3” mortars. Enemy mortar fire observed 
coming from 8 new positions in SARBAJAIBARI. One enemy Observation 
Post engaged by own light machine gun fire causing two casualties of which
one reported killed. Enemy returned heavy mortar fire as a result of casualties 
inflicted on them. A direct mortar hit on one of our forward position, 
caused following casualties:-

a. Killed 3
b. Wounded 8

One of the 8 wounded succumbed to injuries and two more shell shock
cases have also been reported. Total casualties so far during operations
are killed 4, wounded 12.

32. 11 Oct 62 – Own mortar firing intensified and caused heavy casualties on enemy.
One enemy bunker engaged by own troops with LIRAT and destroyed.
Enemy reported suffered over 20 casualties. Another enemy bunker blasted 
by own fire killing 3. Own 2” mortar fire engaged enemy supply route 
behind enemy positions killing 2. Tracer fire from own small arms and
automatics directed at a thatched hut in enemy area and set it on fire. 

33. 12 Oct 62 – Own troops made further advances from 3 directions to within 300 yards
of enemy bunkers. Own mortars continued to engage enemy positions
throughout the day. Enemy losses due to constant and accurate small arms
and mortar fire by own troops reported heavy.

34. 13 Oct 62 – Own troops engaged enemy bunkers destroying two bunkers with two 
Machine Guns, ammunition and personnel. Few enemy dead lying on
the ground were NOT retrieved due to continuous small arms fire by 
own troops. These were taken away after last light 13 Oct 62. It was also 
reported that the enemy was shifting some stores on the other side of the
FENI River because of own effective mortar fire. 

35. 13 Oct 62 – Throughout night 12/13 Oct own mortars carried out continuous 
harassing fire on enemy positions to prevent:-

a. Further reinforcements.
b. Repairs of damaged enemy bunkers.
c. To demoralize enemy.

Further progress made in closing in on enemy positions. 
One casualty reported from 3” mortar action.

36. 14 Oct 62 – Enemy position at JALAIA reported further reinforced. Two more
enemy bunkers were destroyed by own troops. Enemy believed to
have suffered approximately 30 casualties.

37. 15 Oct 62 – Meeting between District Officials and Sector Commanders 
TRIPURA and CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS and CHITTAGONG
and SYLHET Sector was held at CHITTAGONG.
The meeting brought about the following agreement:-

a. Ceasefire – 1900 hours 16 Oct. b. Withdrawal by both sides from area ASALONG and by the 
Indians from JALAIA within 10 days. ie, 17 Oct – 27 Oct 62.

38. 15 Oct 62 – Own troops destroyed two more bunkers and inflicted further casualties
on enemy. Some enemy huts with stores were destroyed. Patrolling was
vigorously carried out throughout the day.

39. 16 Oct 62 – Both sides comparatively quiet, although intermittent exchange of
mortar and small arms fire took place. At 1900 hours ceasefire was effected.

DAILY PERSONAL DIARY OF SECTOR COMMANDER EPR, SYLHET SECTOR LT COL A M SEHGAL

SYLHET

26 Sept 62

0710 Hrs: Received message regarding ASALONG from Maj SIDDIQUI, Wing Commander 11 Wing, EPR CHITTAGONG.

0730 Hrs: Informed GSO-2, HQ EPR DACCA regarding situation. 

0800 Hrs: Maj Siddiqui informed that 1000 yds SW of Siddiqui Camp, Indian and own patrol clashed and hand to hand fight occurred, Wing Comd ordered to destroy the enemy and occupy MAHBUB Camp. Gave instructions for Sub Maj BASHIR AHMAD and one platoon to go to ASALONG tomorrow.

0930 Hrs: Informed GSO-2, HQ EPR DACCA. Requested for one Coy from MYMENSINGH.

1030 Hrs: Ordered ejection of enemy from the area by force, Sub SADIQ to go to CHITTAGONG.

1200 Hrs: Report of no action from ASALONG.

1300 Hrs: Ordered to provide Platoon Comd. One Coy from MYMENSINGH arrived from 
CHITTAGONG.

1800 Hrs: SITREP. No news. Platoon Comd expected to put in attack at night.

SYLHET

27 Sept 62

0700 Hrs: Report received regarding exchange of fire.

0900 Hrs: No news other than reported. Ordered Maj SIDDIQUI and one Coy Comd from MYMENSINGH to proceed to ASALONG.
1100 Hrs: G-2 informed ADG on way to CHITTAGONG, I am to accompany him, wants to receive DG at airport.

1245 Hrs: ADG Col ZAHID arrived. Discussed situation. Discussed YELLOW BOUND, YELLOW BOUND to pend.

1700 Hrs: ADG departed for DACCA, went to see off DG and Col ZAHID.

1945 Hrs: Proceeded by train to CHITTAGONG.

CHITTAGONG

28 Sept 62

0700 Hrs: Arrived by train from SYLHET went through the SITREP.
No news from Sub Maj BASHIR AHMAD. SIDDIQUI left yesterday with Capt QURESHI for RANGAMATI at 1100 Hrs. Organized the office. HQ EPR DACCA informed about situation. Operation Order drafted.

1100 Hrs: Informed G-2 that I should go to TAINDANG.

1200 Hrs: G-2 informed regarding DG’s arrival at CHITTAGONG.

1300 Hrs: Busy doing various things. DC RANGAMATI asked to arrange boats etc.

CHITTAGONG

29 Sept 62

0700 Hrs: Company from DACCA (HQ Wing) arrived 117 all ranks. Met them at railway station.

0830 Hrs: Came back to office.

0915 Hrs: DG arrived with Capt NAEEM, Col ZAHID, Col BAIG. Met with Col HAQ NAWAZ, 
Maj KHALIQ, Maj YASIN and Col SHAIKH.

1000 Hrs: Briefing of 14 Div officers by DG.

1100 Hrs: to 1200 Hrs Discussed Situation with DG and NAEEM’s task.

1200 Hrs: DG inspected Coy. 

1215 Hrs: Coy left for RANGAMATI.

1240 Hrs: I and Capt NAEEM left for RANGAMATI.

1500 Hrs: I and Capt NAEEM arrived in RANGAMATI and met DC.

1530 Hrs: Coy arrived.

1700 Hrs: Loading of launches. Proceeded to NANIARCHAR.

1830 Hrs: Arrived NANIARCHAR.

2030 Hrs: Coy arrived, ordered check to be made and food cooked. Gave plan for the next day. 

30 Sept 62

0730 Hrs: Left NANIARCHAR for MAHESHCHARI by launch and reached by 1100 Hrs. No boats.
No men! Got boats towing from MAHAL CHARI.

Left MAHESHCHARI by 1500/1600 hrs., reached 3 miles short of KAMILCHARI, crossing RAPID at 1900/2000 hrs. Stopped further crossing in view of the accident. Anchored, stayed might.

Subedar MISRI KHAN again disobeyed and left the main body and came up, was sent back. Some men are not given dinner, Subedar most disinterested and irresponsible. Passed away the time with NAEEM.

People hospitable, River shallow, difficult going. Do not know what is happening at the front. I, who am responsible for conducting operations, am out of touch! Can’t help. Did not have sleep due to worry about my men. It is difficult to say something sitting in Company office but most difficult to execute on the ground against adverse circumstances. Only means of transport are boats or faster march on foot. I have trust in God, that He with his blessings will make my mission successful. Boys are cheerful.

1 Oct 62

0600 Hrs: Left 3 miles short of MAHESH CHARI and arrived at 0900 hrs. The main body has not arrived yet. Met OC Police Station and Chairman and arranged some Coolies. Last boat arrived at KHAGSA CHAR at 1400 hrs. I and Capt NAEEM arrived at about 1030 hrs. It started raining, unloading of boats was done in rain. Men had their meals. We started at 1600 hrs. for PANCHAR in pouring rain, men carrying their beddings due to shortage of Coolies. We halted after 1 hr. 20 minutes, came 2 1/2 miles. We started at 1740 hrs. and reached a nullah at about 1800 hrs., 50-ft wide, steep banks, no tracks. We crossed, slip- ping, rolling, walking and jogging. I nearly got washed away, helped by troops. Current very fast. At about 1900 hrs. came across another nullah, stopped. Impossible to cross due to darkness. There is no place to stay. Troops are tired but cheerful, willing and enthusiastic. No complain of body-aches and no chatting, we found the cook but all huddled up from 1 Platoon. Halted there. Raining, some mud, suggested move, and some ankle deep, passed night, moved at 0600 hrs. No rain, Sun is shining unbearably and humid. Cooks deserted us, then managed to get some coolies. Moved, slow crossing stream after streams, water chest deep, knee deep and mud. Move continues. NAEEM wants I should eat. He is worried about me. I am worried about him. Both going on with troops. We arrived at BHAI BAHEN CHAR at 0900 hrs. We are six miles short of PANCHARI. Men washed, I and NAEEM cleaned. We are starting at 1200 hrs. Insha Allah for PANCHARI. We did start at 1205 hrs. and reached PANCHARI at 1530 hrs. Covered a distance of 6 miles in about 3 hrs. What a slow speed. The sun with its brightness brought in humidity and intense heat. It was necessary to give more bath to the men. Just before we started, NAEEM was telling me how he got a ducking. On our way to BHAI BHEN CHAR we came across a broken bridge. Instead of wading through water he started walking on one of the beams of the bridge. Another sepoy followed him on it. The timber being rotten collapsed and both fell into neck deep water, NAEEM managed to save himself. I remember having seen this and I also wanted to walk across the beam but thought better of it. I think some time youth does give a man a little ducking, whereas an old man like myself could not afford to chance it.

On arrival at PAN CHARI I had a good bath but was very tired rather extremely. 
I should say all of us were, however, cheerful. Got up very early at about 0300 hrs. One dog was barking at night underneath my room. Kept awake. At 0600 hrs. I was given a cup of tea. It is very misty today. I intend to start of within next one hour. Insha Allah.

Started at 0730 hrs. and crossed CHEVERKHEL, the entire route is hilly, steep climbs and steep tops with nullah and KHAB, to cross over with a bamboo only with or without support. Very soon bright sun became unbearable. My right leg giving trouble on account of the fall I had in the nullah. I am carrying on. I hate climbing and more so moving down hills, slippery with no footholds. No shade for miles at places. Trees are scanty in the area. Going is slow. No tracks, you have to judge. At places there were no bridges, you just wade through the water and mud and struggle. At places track is the course of the ring stream, you just go through water, Capt. NAEEM is bringing DACCA Coy. I stopped to investigate civilians fleeing away. Met NAEEM with DACCA Company Coy. I started with them after lunch. NAEEM stopped to interrogate civilians, reached 1700 hrs. Enemy opened up full blast reception for me I suppose! 167 Mortar shells were fired by the enemy. Dead tired, troops reached at 1530 hrs. Met Siddiqui, Mehmood and two Doctors. Was not feeling well. Had a dream. Slept but enemy kept firing throughout the night no respite God help me to keep the enemy out.

4 Oct 62

Did not sleep well at night due to enemy action. Got up, shaved and established Operations Room. Had conference of officers at 0900 hrs. There was no plan, every thing haphazard, very difficult to trace the enemy. Appreciated the SUTRAHI information given by officers present. Ordered readjustment and redeployment of troops to stop further encroachment of enemy and his further penetration. Gave out orders regarding aggressive action Outline Plan. All officers were living at TANDANG. Ordered them to move to new locations Capt. QURESHI SIDDIQ Camp, Maj SIDDIQUI with reserve company and Sub DEWAN ALI to MAHBOOB camp. Area of responsibility was given and alert signs given. Administration and logistics explained to SM BASHIR AHMED to be incharge of Training Camp. Officers to go out for recce. Spoken to DDG Chittagong on wireless set. Recced area for helicopter landing, hospital etc. Re-organization of the camp. De-briefed officers. Enemy mortar fire at night again.

5 Oct 62

Spoken to DG. Received orders for eviction of Indians. Spoken to DDG, received detailed orders for eviction. Both emphasised action and fire information, with DUD bombs, nothing can be done. Have written a comprehensive report to DG. Received letter from BANO (wife) a very welcome thing greatly relieved and had a very happy and pleasant moment. Did not take lunch, too busy. Held a conference with officers for raid. Recce by them by this evening, action on tonight, night 5/6 Oct. Met Magistrate NOOR AHMAD. Ordered construction of hospital to BASHIR. Told signal JCO to organize SIGNAL CENTRE. Ordered SM BASHIR AHMED to organize ration and ammunition accounting and its procedure of issue. SM to be incharge of the defence of TINDANG area. Relief of companies in forward area discussed with him. I have to do everything. No staff. Pity we are most ill-equipped, ill-armed, ill-organized and not at all in a position to undertake an attack of a nature organised normally by regular troops. Action with what? I agree we must evict enemy. DACCA people are anxious, we in this place are more anxious. My prayers are to God Almighty that He may grant me wisdom and strength in life to accomplish this task. Amin. Officers are a bit reluctant to undertake the task. Reaction of normal human beings when faced against heavy odds. God help us.

6 Oct 62

Last night it had been a comparatively quiet night. I had to myself order recce for raids. Worked in the office and studied situation afresh. Discussed plans with Major Siddiqui and Capt. MAHMUD. Apparently none wishes to gamble against very heavy odds. Officers left for their positions. While they were going Jemadar BAZID KHAN and Hav BHAWAL of No. 1 Wing came who had gone for recce. I heard their arrival. They had already been told to go back and matter was finished till I decided to call them. I debriefed them and found that there was an opportunity for raid which could not be lost. We at once got together and I last went through all what he had seen and immediately decided that he should lead a raid. I discussed the plan. I ordered Capt. MAHMUD to detail his LIRAT firer Naik JAN of Mymensingh Company to go with him. Plan was to go in a party of four, fix LIRAT on a bamboo and an LMG to go with him and then both weapons to open simultaneously. I proceeded to SIDDIQUI Camp to supervise the execution of plan. After stopping at SIDDIQUI HQ near new BOP (Border Outpost) we went to SIDDIQUI Camp, NAEEM with the party left at about 1630 hrs. We decided to leave the place. Time was 1700 hrs. Men were taking meals. As we had crossed a few yards, Jemadar BAZID party carried out mission. The enemy opened with all weapons and we were caught amongst the first fire of war in my life. I did not feel very apprehensive about myself but others did. On our way back we had the bullets flying all round. Reached SIDDIQUI HQ and NAEEM came back, en route we saw 6 FF. I was glad to see Mortar ammunition. At about 2000 hrs. Jem BAZID KHAN, a very brave soldier deserves commendation. A good job done. 7 enemies blown. Source informed complete case. Wish SIDDIQUI had pushed forward. Thank God for success.

7 Oct 62

Held a conference of all Commanders. Reallotted mission and task. All preparations for tonight to be completed by 1300 hrs. I hope God through his infinite mercy will enable us to accomplish our mission. Insha Allah. Thank God I have now medical cover. I was worried due to lack of it. No letters received from anyone. Hope I get today. As a result of recce carried out I discovered we were far too away from enemy. Consequently, I ordered Capt. QURESHI to push forward his company with one platoon along right bank of FENI River facing JALAIA in order to forestall any enemy counterattack and sent two platoons, on left rear of enemy and one on left flank. This he has to carry out after midnight. Terrible mist after 2330 hrs. Throughout the night enemy carried out harassing tasks.

8 Oct 62

Spoke to DG on set. DG approved my plan and appreciation and endorsed me to go ahead. I carried out reassessment of my resources and found I am still terribly short of 3 inch Mortar ammunition, Ordered NAEEM and DUTTA to carry out good and proper recce of layout of defence and location of MAHBOOB area, I held a conference of Coy Commanders, QURESHI, SIDDIQUI, Maj DUTTA, NAEEM and supporting Arms Commanders at 1130 hrs. Jem BAZID and Jem SAIDULLAH also attended, wanted to ascertain correct situation of enemy ground. Ordered BAZID to move forward and occupy feature close to the enemy. This he had to do by last light. Gave general Outline Plan. Recce to be carried out for that. Recce report from NAEEM and DUTTA confirmed my fears. BAZID was pushed forward. Troops are asking for rest, I have no reserve to do so. Asked earlier, DG to send two more companies and Mortar ammunition, I hope I get it, SIDDIQUI stayed on after lunch. He is a bit worried, MAHMUD is doing well but needs a bit prodding, NAEEM is not out to take any chances whatsoever. How can I convince them that you fight battles by taking chances. Enemy does not shower flowers but bullets and bombs. All are in good shape. We had first casualty of battle. An OR from Mymensingh Company got slightly wounded in the back but he resumed duty. Planned harassing Mortar fire on enemy. I am not yet sure about correctness of own position. Have detailed intelligence personnel and QAYUM to do so, HANNAN arrived from Chittagong.

9 Oct 62

Enemy kept harassing by Mortar and small arms fire. We kept harassing him. What a game! I am off to recce MAHBOOB area. I saw Subedar DEWAN ALI, Sub MAQBOOL, Jem HASHMAT, Jem ATAUL HAQ. Maj SIDDIQUI arrived and he met me at the Camp. I have not seen most disorganized, disinterested people, unprofessional in every sense, devoid of any sense of urgency, completely oblivious of the task in hand. Only devoted to their personal safety. All positions centred around their own bunkers. All tactical features left out for enemy to occupy. Worst was Sub MAQBOOL. Sub DEWAN ALI next to use- less. Told Sub DEWAN ALI to submit resignation. Deployed platoons and Company HQ, Met Jem BAZID and a special reinforcement and planned his platoon action. One Platoon Hav GHULAM RASUL put under his command Platoon Jem ABDUL HAQ, Jem HASH MAT to reinforce him. Two 3” Mortar and one Machine Gun given to him. Arrived back in HQ. Discussed plan here. Went forward to FLOWERBED, held ‘O’ Group conference with QURESHI, SIDDIQUI, Mortar Platoon Commander, Sub MISRI KHAN and Capt. SAMAD, RMO (Doctor), QURESHI wanted more time. Fixed 1930 hrs. on 11 Oct for action, allotted 300 rounds Mortar ammunition and six Machine Gun for his support. He has six platoons for the task. Gave his 3.5 Rocket Launcher of army and asked him to use LIRAT (anti tank weapon). Diversion from MISRI KHAN platoon for ZIA factor to be planned. Let us hope Capt. QURESHI keeps to the schedule. NAEEM informs me DG wanted to speak when I can. Spoke to DG at about 1245 hrs. DG emphasised plastering of enemy position. Mortar ammunition position is not happy at all. I am doing my best.

10 Oct 62

Throughout the night enemy and own action continued by Mortar, Machine Gun and Small Arms. This was terrific night. BAZID was to operate last night. DDG arrived about 1130 hrs. He did it very well. Discussed situation with him. Maj SIDDIQUI, Capt. QURESHI and Capt. NAEEM with one voice expressed concern regarding assault on positions. Capt. QURESHI again showed reservations. Own troops not trained for operation-DDG. My reaction was that some of these officers needed change having been long under constant fire. Essential, that new outlook be enforced. I agree we are not trained for assault but surely we can occupy certain enemy positions vacated by him. At about 1800 hrs. I felt apprehensive about SPACECRAFT and GHAZI, Jem BAZID and Hav GHULAM RASUL action, I arranged for additional medical support at about 1000 hrs. I sent two NCOs from 6FF Mortar. A Coy to SPACECRAFT to act as observers. We are in a difficult position for evacuation of casual- ties should these occur. At 1715 I heard enemy Mortar shelling at SPACECRAFT area. I felt apprehension. Enemy had been shelling continuously. At 1800 hrs. Hav MULTAN SHAH of FF came and informed about casualty. A direct Mortar hit injured Hav GHULAM RASUL, Sep JALIL, KHALIQ and MOHABAT. They died in the service of country, nine others were wounded. I went to ADS with DDG, it was a tragic sight to see young soldiers having had such a beating. I arranged a graveyard for them, medical treatment. NAEEM was to revive troops in the area. Evacuation very difficult. One Sepoy was on DI list. It is tragic for a commander to know that evacuation facilities are non-existent. Two enemy OP were killed.

11 Oct 62

Finished office work at 0200 hrs. I ordered a repeat action. Enemy was pounded for the first time thoroughly. He was made miserable. Went to see wounded cannot leave HQ. I want to go forward to see men but not possible. Fresh enemy positions and reinforcements noticed along River FENI. One bunker with twenty enemies blown. One house with men put on fire and blasted. I understand enemy had company on track up to his position. Today about 26 enemies were killed, he had his lesson. I ordered the pressure to be kept on the enemy. NAEEM and SIDDIQUI came. NAEEM broke down. Ordered evacuation of Jem BAZID platoon back. MAQBUL troops to go up. Position abandoned to be kept under own fire. QURESHI doing well. Discussed all programmes with SIDDIQUI. It is difficult to make them to do what I want. They want to play safe. QURESHI for the third time postponed the attack. It could have been successful when we had surprise. Now, only course left is to pin the enemy position and hope to off balance him. I am hopeful for the successful outcome inspite of officer’s pessimism. I have trust and faith on God. I am sure, Insha Allah we will be successful. DDG left at about 0730 hrs. this morning. His visit was most welcome. SIDDIQUI and NAEEM went away, poor boy, he is feeling for the love of troops. He does not understand what war means. Casualties have to occur on both sides. I am not well. No letter from BANO. I am very hard worked. No one will realizes. Mentally, physical- ly and spiritually I am praying to God for success and safety of troops.

12 Oct 62 

Helicopter being arranged for evacuation of casualties. MAQSOOD came at 1700 hrs. Maj DUTTA, Maj SIDDIQUI came at about 1130 hrs. Throughout the day I had been pressing Capt QURESHI to act against the enemy. Our direct hits and bunker bursting operations seems to have unnerved the enemy, he has been inactive. His losses have been great. We should have pressed home the advantage. Kept pressing for action of own Mortars and automatic, kept inactive too. Why? God knows my instructions to Capt QURESHI were again ignored by him. He requested his relief of company be postponed. I expected he will act. I waited, waited and waited nothing happened. Decided to go to FDLs myself but SIDDIQUI came at 1130 hrs. Went through the situation with him. He assured me that QURESHI having got the relief of his company postponed, is going for enemy. No news, 
no action! 

Allotted lavish ammunition of 3” Mortar. No action. BLAZE front was quiet but he reports very active, I do not know why (NAEEM) does not like action. Sent for QURESHI. He had sent an ambiguous message which showed his reluctance. This man has spoilt my plan. I suppose, I should not get angry. It will lead me nowhere. Got together these officers and I again thoroughly explained my plan. QURESHI assured compliance. Enemy inactive. I want to know his intentions but QURESHI’S inactivity leads me nowhere. Fourth time has NOT acted. Let me see what he does now. NAEEM has been given a mission but I doubt he will do. He has very few troops, QURESHI wants more. Why? I do not know. More troops more casualties. I fear at FLOWERBED. He reported blowing up a bunker and setting fire to a hut. But enemy will repair if QURESHI does not occupy these. More tasks prepared and given. Officers spoil Mortar tasks also by stopping to fire. DUTTA came. He has started giving credit for achievement to his men only. Most ridiculous. Worked till late night. DG expected tomorrow.

13 Oct 62

Arrangement for Helicopter fell through. I am most disappointed. I have evacuated four serious cases. ANWAR HUSSAIN and ZAHIR ALAM are in much more serious condition. I have to do something for them. I feel helpless. I hope to God they survive the ordeal of journey if I send them up. Inspected ADS and surrounding area. Went through own ammunition and store requirement which I had signalled yesterday once again. DG arrived at 1130 hrs. Maj SAQI, Lt Col ALI, Capt. KHAWAJA also arrived with him. KHAWAJA to relieve NAEEM. Good for NAEEM to go. He is upset. Had long discussion over all aspects. DG very pleased. Sent a very good message complimenting me and EPR to GOC. Also sent a good message to the Chief Secretary. Went to see SIDDIQUI and his HQ. Visited ADS. DG met practically everyone. Came back a bit late and got busy in office. Did planning a bit, explained to others and went to bed late. An enemy bunker destroyed, again a good day. I believe enemy casualties very high. Another FF Coy arrived. 

14 Oct 62

Got up early and started my work. Night was not very peaceful. Enemy kept at us. Went with DG to SPACECRAFT. NAEEM had sent a message to come down but I refused. Met Capt. IQBAL BEG and Lt RAOUF of FF who area protecting left flank. A jolly good crowd. All willing workers ready to help. Went to SPACECRAFT. Put KHAWAJA incharge, then brought NAEEM back, DG met practically everyone. Listened to Jem BAZID KHAN about his exploits and came back. Officers came at 1450 hrs. DG arrived and called for suggestions. NAEEM again showed his nervousness. After conference I found SIDDIQUI and MAHMUD huddled together with SAQI. It was late and I had to send them personally. SAQI did not like. People do not understand.
At about 1900 hrs. a great ruckus was heard. An enemy recce patrol was sighted which penetrated into our defences. Spent a busy time. Put FF Coy on alert and sent them for patrol. After a long time I got the real story. There was no temper. Ordered HQ to ‘stand-to’ and dealt with the situation. At about 2340 hrs. enemy fired 10 Mortars and 64 shells, all at once. It created a din worst so far. Had discussion with Maj SAQI, NAEEM and BOKHARI who had arrived earlier. DG was very calm and cool. I sat down after dinner to work. Coughed throughout the night. Worked late, was disturbed twice at night between 0400 – 0600 hrs. I had no sleep whatsoever. ZAHID was disturbed also. I was miserable throughout the night. Another enemy bunker with 20 men destroyed. Our one man wounded today. Col TAREEN arrived at 1900 hrs. and was not helpful. He does not understand anything about operations. He is just stubborn. 

15 Oct 62

Got up very early, went through the SITREP. DG was nearby. Exchanged some note with him. Said good bye to him. TAREEN came and had discussion with me. He left at 0700 hrs. He still does not understand my difficulties. Got BOKHARI and sent him up to MAHMUD, NAEEM went away with DG. BOKHARI went away and returned with SID DIQUI at about 1130 hrs. Discussed with DUTTA regarding recces. Discussed with Signal JCO, telephone and wireless set-up. Mortar ammunition short. Another enemy bunker went up and caused casualties. Discussed with WILAYAT various aspects. Received message from DDG regarding possibilities of truce with Indians. The message was to give first blow and save own men. I do not know what he meant. Sent a message to clarify. SIDDIQUI and BOKHARI left about 1600 hrs. Enemy was quiet. Have put some mortars on his position.

16 Oct 62

At 0830 hrs. received the news of pending ceasefire. Spoke to SHIRAZI on set who informed me that ceasefire effective 16 Oct at 1900 hrs. Indians fired two green very lights first, to say we ask for it, we reply by firing two saying we accept. Conference with opposite Commanders to be attended by Maj SIDDIQUI at 0800 hrs. with BLUE Flag. Ordered a conference of all officers and JCOs including FF officers. Held a conference at 1040 hrs. Middle of conference DG called me and was very kind. Gave instructions for withdrawal and readjustments. Had chat with all. All happy. First time since I have come here had 1/2 hr. afternoon nap. Got up and started the arrangements for concentration of troops here.
Waited for 1900 hrs. Maj SIDDIQUI went forward along with QURESHI and BOKHARI. DUTTA came and I discussed points concerning his departure. At 1900 hrs. sent green very lights fired by Indians. Own were fired by Maj SIDDIQUI in return the ceasefire. I ordered general ceasefire to all, I am thankful to God Almighty for having afforded me opportunity to see this thing through successfully. I bowed my head down and prayed humbly. My feelings are a bit peculiar. I do not like personally such fruitless, aimless actions but we were forced by Indians into it. On our side 4 lost lives and 6 wounded. May God bless them.

17 Oct 62

I got up at 0630 hrs., sent SIDDIQUI to meet Indian representative at 0900 hrs. I proceeded to SPACECRAFT myself. Met JCOs and men. Met Capt. KHAWAJA, as to where Maj SIDDIQUI was in conference with Maj AUTA SINGH of 6 AR at MR 977735. Went through ASALONG jungle, same Indian defences, confirmed my appreciation and got to FLOWERBED. Came back, spoke to DG on set and slept. Received congratulatory message from GOC 14 Div. Gave BARA KHANA to FF and spoke to Jawans at 1700 hrs. Thereafter, we came back to area. Maj SIDDIQUI met Indians in peace, May God give solace to their families. May God grant all of us strength to protect our country well and proper, Amin. Thank you God. 

18 Oct 62

Went to forward areas to look and see. Same Indian dispositions. Pulled back Capt. QURESHI. Briefed KHAWAJA and BOKHARI thoroughly regarding withdrawal and blowing of blinds, spent time in office. Maj SIDDIQUI off handedness, something wrong with him. He probably wishes to go to Chittagong. Pulling out started, friends have left. Spoke to CHAND. It was great to hear him. A letter from CHAND and BANO. Good! CHAND propounding strategy sound and good, BANO worried about me. Wrote a letter to both and to SHAHNAZ. 

19 Oct 62

Spent time briefing all officers and JCOs. Capt. QURESHI appointed Camp Commandant. Magistrate NUR AHMED came. Spoke to him regarding local affairs. Spoke to DACCA, sent a message regarding own move. Wrote a letter to BANO.

20 Oct 62

Siddiqui again gloomy, sent him to CHITTAGONG. Boring. Saw men playing, spoke to DACCA. Arranged for move. DG approved my plan. Arranged for ceremonial parade. Boring! Boring!! Wrote letter to BANO, I am unwell.

21 Oct 62

Wrote letter to PAPU. Nothing today. One is never satisfied, one complains about work and also complains about idleness. Human failing. All officers taking easy.

22 Oct 62

Nothing of importance except chatting with officers.

OP ‘KICK OFF’

Note by Brig Mohammad Ahmed, MC DG EPR

1. The INDIAN border troops committed aggression by crossing River FENI, the international boundary and entering PAKISTAN territory of area ASALONG on 25 Sep 62. At approximately 1500 hrs. on 25 Sep 62 an EPR patrol on routine duty spotted and surprised a large body of INDIAN troops in ASALONG MOUZA. The INDIANS who had no intentions of revealing their presence in ASALONG area and who, if it had not been spotted by the EPR patrol would have taken our advance post in the area, were forced to change their plans and, consequently, broke contact with our patrol and withdrew into the thick jungle within ASALONG MOUZA.

2. The patrol immediately reported the incident to the Comd of the advance post Jem ATAUR RAHMAN, which was passed on to the Comd at TAINDUNG BOP, Sub DEWAN ALI. The Comd of the advance post, who had only ten men with him, was ordered to hold the post at all costs in their present location. Or by tactical manoeuvring in and around the area, and to take suitable measures to engage the enemy in case they were fired upon or attacked.

3. In the meantime an immediate re-inforcement of approximately two sections was sent from TAINDUNG and by the morning of 26 Sep 62 the post had been re-inforced to a platoon strength under Jem ATAUR RAHMAN. 

4. The INDIANS opened fire on our post for the first time at 2255 hrs. ON 26 Sep 62 with 2” Mortars. Own troops returned fire. And the exchange of firing continued till 0135 hrs. on 27 Sep. No casualties were sustained by our tps.

5. The only immediate re-inforcements available at 11 Wing HQ of another platoon under Sub Major BASHIR AHMED were despatched on the morning of 26 Sep from CHITTAGONG. At about the same time reports were received of further re-inforcement of the INDIANS into the ASALONG area. 

6. The platoon re-inforcement despatched from CHITTAGONG on 26 Sep covered a distance of approximately 115 miles under most adverse and difficult conditions as follows:-

a. CHITTAGONG RANGAMATI. By transport. Distance 54 miles.

b. RANGAMATI MAHESHARI. By launch up to CHINGRI KHAL. Distance 27 miles. 

c. MAHESHARI PANCHARI BAZAR. The rations, ammunition and equiptment were taken in country craft under most trying conditions wherein boats had to be pushed over long distances due to stretches of shallow water. The troops marched along the bank over a distance of 30 miles.

d. PANCHARI BAZAR TAINDONG. A distance of 14 miles mostly up-hill through extremely thick jungle under very adverse and rough ‘going’. All stores, ammunition and equiptment had to be carried by the personnel of the platoon. From TAINDONG the distance to the post covered approximately 3 miles. 

7. The above described extended line of communications with varied modes of movement overland and river hazards seriously impaired the progress of this vital re-inforcement and delayed its much required early arrival in the operational area. This platoon did not reach TAINDONG till the late evening of 29 Sept.

8. On 27 Sep a further re-inforcement of one company including Sp Pl ex INDEP Wing MYMENSINGH under command of Major SIDDIQI and accompanied by Capt M H QURESHI, left CHITTAGONG for the operational area.
The same problems along the line of communication were faced by this company as well. Only more so as the availability of country craft became acute and carriage of mortar bombs and 3” mors was involved. Inspite of these additional handicaps this company under the leadership of Major Q I A SIDDIQI, Comd 11 Wing, moved as fast as possible and reached TAINDONG by the afternoon of 30 Sept.

9. In comparison, the INDIANS had a clear line of communication, jeepable right up to the INDIAN side and the FENI River. In addition the movement of INDIAN re-inforcements was greatly facilitated by the fact that they were the aggressors and, therefore, the availability of troop re-inforcement, ammunition and other stores, which had been concentrated close at hand prior to 25 Sept, had given them a maximum advantage over our troops.
The INDIANS, therefore, had the initiative to start with till 30 Sept 62, Major Q I A SIDDIQI arrived in the operational area when immediate vigorous patrolling aimed at harassing the enemy began in real earnest and with definite good results. 

10. The firing which had started on the night of 26 Sep continued including mortar and automatic weapons
daily and the INDIANS attempted, by their heavy mortar and automatic weapons firing, to inflict maximum casualties on our troops manning the advance post. The attempt only resulted in imbuing a dogged spirit and the lavish heavy concentration of fire by the INDIANS at this post did not, in any way or at any time, cause undue alarm both to their morale or fighting determination. On the morning of 1 Oct this position was re-inforced up to a company strength.

11. On 29 Sep yet a further re-inforcement of one company with mortars, from DACCA, moved from CHITTAGONG under Lt Col SEHGAL, Comd SYLHET Sector accompanied by Capt. NAEEM. Lt Col SEHGAL took over command of operations in ASALONG area at 1700 hrs. on 3 Oct. On 2 Oct the third Coy from Res Wing, DACCA left CHITTAGONG for the Op area. In the meantime DNJ (Dinajpur) Sector was warned to have one Coy ready to move to CHITTAGONG. On 11 Oct the 4th Coy reinforcement ex 7 Wing, RJS (Rajshahi) under Capt. S M H BOKHARI left CHITTAGONG for the Op area. Two more Officers Capt. WALAYAT 1 AWC Wing and Capt. G M KHAWAJA 4 Wing also left for the Op area on 11 Oct. 

12. The aggressive patrolling started on 1 Oct, was further intensified with the arrival of the Comd ARMED FORCE on 3 Oct 62. Information gathered, as a result of recce patrols, confirmed that the INDIANS had approximately 4 rifle companies well dug-in within a net work of strong, mutually-supported bunkers and their entire defensive area on sound, tactical ground. Any approach to their positions was difficult due to the marshy ground in front of their positions and to their flanks. The task of ‘closing in’ on the enemy began immediately on 5 Oct after careful recces and planning. 

In outline the ‘closing in’ with the enemy involved a process of nibbling away at the enemy defences by a systematic blowing-up and blasting of en-bunkers with LIRATS, BLENDICIDES and by heavy concentration of 3 in Mor HE. This process was carried out magnificently by our troops who, under very heavy concentration of INDIAN Mortar/MG fire, managed to approach on defences from three directions and destroyed a large number of bunkers, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. This process often presented the highest percentage of risk but was carried out by courageous, determined troops under able subordinate Comds. Known approximate casualties inflicted on the enemy throughout the operations, up to the time of ceasefire was affected on 16 Oct at 1900 hrs., were :-

a. Killed 68
b. Wounded Many times more than above figure. The estimated casualties, however, are much more than the above known figures.

13. The operations in the area lasted for 21 days i.e. 25 Sep 16 Oct 62. During this period our troops were subjected to continuous heavy and concentrated Mortar/Automatic fire by the enemy. Our troops withstood the relentless enemy onslaught of thousands of rounds of mortars and Small Arms with great courage, stubbornness and devotion to duty, and displayed the highest example of efficiency and disregard for personal safety. Own casualties that occurred were as follows:-

a. Killed 4 No. Name Village Dist. E/W PAK
(1) 7449 GHULAM Athar JHELUM W. PAK RASUL
(2) 10863 MOHABBAT KHAN Hoon Campbellpur ”
(3) 7091 ABDUL KHALEQUE Noagram Comilla E.PAK
(4) 7095 ABDUL JALIL Ibrahimpur ” ”
b. Wounded -13

14. This is for the first time in the history of EPR that a force of 5 Coys fought as a battalion, a prolonged action against a numerically superior force entrenched in well dug in positions. Our EPR Task Force including Officers JCOs/NCOs/Jawans from all Sectors/ Independent Wing. The example of a whole-hearted team effort set by this EPR Task Force is unique and worthy of the highest praise by all standards.

15. The gallant deeds of the dead and the wounded in the face of the enemy will continue to be a shining example of devotion and courage for the entire EPR force for all times to come. Here I take this opportunity to say how very proud I am of each single Jawan. Officer, JCO and NCO in the force and heartily congratulate them all on their glorious achievements in the defence of the sacred soil of PAKISTAN

16. An ‘Order of the Day’ given by me and the reply from Lt Col A M SEHGAL, the Task Force Comd, are given as Annexure ‘A’. 
Brigadier
Director General
(Mohammad Ahmad)

ANNEXURE ‘A’

(Refers to OP ‘KICK OFF’)
Order of the Day by DG EPR to all rank ASALONG OPERATIONS and
Reply by Task Force Commander Lt Col A M Sehgal 

( . ) ONE ( . ) following ‘Order of the Day’ issued at TAINDUNG by Director General EAST PAKISTAN RIFLES to all ranks in ASALONG Ops area at 142315 hrs ( . ) QUOTE ( . ) it has given me immense pleasure to have been with you during your present Ops ( . ) it is a matter of great satisfaction for me to see the wonderful spirit with which you are shouldering such a great responsibility of defending your country against a numerically much stronger/strength of aggressors who has intruded in our territory ( . ) I am indeed proud to be the head of such a family of fine lot of soldiers of EPR ( . ) you have very glorious past and future is in your hands to make ( . ) go ahead with the enthusiasm and patriotism and God be with you ( . ) clear the enemy from our territory ( . ) I wish you God speed ( . ) UNQUOTE ( . ) TWO ( . ) Lt Col A M SEHGAL, Task Force Comd in ASALONG Ops area sent the following signal to the Director General ( . ) QUOTE ( . ) all ranks present dutiful regards and respects and thank their Director General for an inspiring message ( . ) all ranks express their dutiful thanks for the kind gift of tea and milk and are much touched for the affection ( . ) it was a great honour for us to have their Director General with us who inspite of his multifarious commitments took great pains and trouble to come to see us and our welfare after an ardous and tire-some journey ( . ) all ranks assure him that they will spare no efforts to accomplish mission entrusted to them ( . ) respects ( . ) UNQUOTE

LINES OF COMMUNICATION (L of C) AND ITS EFFECT ON OPERATIONS

Selection of L of C

1. The area of operations was linked to the nearest roadhead, which is RANGAMATI (sq 4495), by an extended and difficult L of C. There were only two possible routes available to the operational area. These are:-

a. CHITTAGONG KARERHAT RAMGARH TABALCHART 
(sq. 7529) (sq. 9437) (sq. 0164)
TAINDUNG Operational area. 
(sq. 0172)
b. CHITTAGONG RANGAMATI MAHALCHARI PANCHARIBAZAR
(sq. 4495) (sq. 3030) (sq. 1273) 
TAINDUNG Operational area.

2. The route at 1 a. above had the following disadvantages:-

a. The katcha track from KARERHAT (sq. 7529) RAMGARH (sq. 9437) to was not capable of withstanding continuous flow of heavy traffic specially during rains.

b. Even if this track was capable of withstanding continuous flow of L of C vehicles, it would have meant passing very close to the border from RAMGARH onwards. 

c. From RAMGARH to TABALCHARI and forward to TAINDUNG no vehicular traffic was possible due to the absence of any road / track communications.

d. If c. above was possible, even then the L of C would have run parallel to the FENI River and would have, therefore, been subject to enemy interference by fire or even ground attack.

3. We, therefore were forced, under the circumstances, to adopt the following route as the L of C to the operational area:

a. CHITTAGONG RANGAMATI. By road.

b. RANGAMATI PANCHARIBAZAR. By launches/ motor boats/ country boats. A jeepable track was subsequently constructed from MAHALCHARI to PANCHARIBAZAR.

c. PANCHARI TAINDUNG. On foot.

Description L of C

4. CHITTAGONG RANGAMATI. Distance 54 miles. This stretch presented no serious problems.

5. RANGAMATI PANCHARIBAZAR. Distance approximately 57 miles.

From RANGAMATI movement of stores, ammunition and personnel was undertaken in launches along the CHINGRI NULLAH either to MAHALCHARI or MAHESHCHARI. The alternative depended on the depth of water flowing in the nullah at the time. After MAHALCHARI movement forward was undertaken during the first week of the operations in country boat. Here again the question of troops travelling in these craft was out of the question as manual and physical labour was required to move them. Besides, shallow water at many points along the River made it even difficult for movement of loaded country boats which had to be pushed by own troops or locals available along the route. This stretch of the L of C presented numerous river i.e. currents, rapids, which constantly threatened and taxed physical endurance.

6. PANCHARIBAZAR TAINDUNG. Distance approximately 14 miles. Stores, ammunition, personnel and weapons had to be carried uphill through dense forest. Elephants were provided subsequently and proved useful in the carriage of rations and other stores. From TAINDUNG the operational area was 2 to 3 miles away.

Effect on Force Build Up

7. On 25th Sept 62, the day ASALONG operations began, the above L of C was not capable nor had the capacity to immediately facilitate movement of large reinforcements or stores, even if such heavy reinforcements or stores were available, mainly because of lack of porters and country boats at required points.

As long as the mode of conveyance was restricted to launches and country boats the estimated arrival of personnel and stores in the operational area from CHITTAGONG could be worked on a basis of 3 4 days. The effect of this time and space factor on operations during the first week can be appreciated as follows:

a. Available in Operational Area 25 Sept 62 1 Platoon
1 X MMG

b. First reinforcement EPR left CHITTAGONG – 26 Sept 62

c. First reinforcement reached TAINDUNG – 29 Sept 62 1 Rifle Coy
1 X MMG

d. Second reinforcement EPR left CHITTAGONG 27 Sept 62. 

e. Second reinforcement EPR reached TAINDUNG – 29 Sept 62 (evening). 2 Rifle Coys
2 X 3 in Mors
4 X MMGs

f. Third reinforcement EPR left CHITTAGONG 29 Sept 62.

g. Third reinforcement EPR reached TAINDUNG – 3 Oct 62. 3 Rifle Coys
2 X 3 in Mors
4 X MMGs

h. Fourth reinforcement 6 FF left CHITTAGONG 3 Oct 62.

j. Fourth reinforcement 6 FF reached TAINDUNG 6 Oct 62. 4 X Rifle Coys
5 X 3 in Mors
6 X MMGs

l. Fifth reinforcement EPR reached TAINDUNG 5 Oct (evening). 5 Rifle Coys
7 X 3 in Mors
8 X MMGs

m. Sixth reinforcement 6 FF left CHITTAGONG 9 Oct 62.

n. Sixth reinforcement 6 FF reached TAINDUNG 13 Oct 62. 6 Rifle Coys
10 X 3” Mors
11 X MMGs

o. Seventh reinforcement EPR CHITTAGONG.

p. Seventh reinforcement EPR reached TAINDUNG 15 Oct 62. 7 Rifle Coys 
12 X 3 in Mors
11 X MMGs

Evacuation of Casualties

8. An Advanced Dressing Station (ADS) was established at TAINDUNG on 6 Oct 62 and one MDS at RANGAMATI on 14 Oct 62 and subsequently moved to MAHALCHARI on 15 Oct 62. Till 6 Oct the L of C functioned with launches and country boats up to PANCHARIBAZAR. After 6 Oct 62 jeeps were used on the newly constructed track from MAHALCHARI to MAHESHCHARI to start off with and then extended up to PANCHARI. The impact of ‘before’ and ‘after’ introduction of jeeps along the L of C on evacuation of casualties, was as follows:

a. Before
(1) Casualties porter -carried from battle position to TAINDUNG Approximately 2 miles.
(2) Casualties porter-carried from TAINDUNG to PANCHARIBAZAR Approximately 14 miles.
(3) Casualties moved by country boat / launch from PANCHARIBAZAR to RANGAMATI Approximately 57 miles.

b. After
(1) No change from a. (1) above
(2) No change from a. (2) above
(3) In jeeps up to MAHALCHARI
(4) In launch up to RANGAMATI

9. It so happened, that no serious casualties occurred till 10 Oct 62. By then the ADS was functioning at TAINDUNG. 
But evacuation from TAINDUNG rearwards to PANCHARI posed a very serious problem.