The Indo-Chinese border known as Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been quiescent for decades. In late 1990s, both countries improved infrastructure near LAC raising suspicions on both sides. There were minor skirmishes along LAC and both sides changed the posture by allocating more resources for that theatre.
India’s posture has been defensive along LAC due to its political decision of keeping quiet on the Chinese front and limitations of terrain. In 2010, the first attempt was made to enhance defensive capability by raising two divisions. 56th division in Nagaland and 71st in Assam to further enhance defense posture in Arunachal Pradesh where two divisions were already deployed. Three additional brigades (infantry, armored & artillery each) were also raised to cover other areas of LAC. In 2013, India sanctioned the raising of XVII Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) to add an offensive component. It was an ambitious plan with a price tag of over $3 billion. First 59th division was raised under Eastern Command in Panagarh with a plan of raising a second division in Pathankot.
The project was doomed to fail for several reasons. There was no commitment from the political authority. The government was kicking the can for a while. Fully aware of Navy and Air Force resistance to accept a large chunk of defense budget going to the new Corps at their expense, the government sent the matter to Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) for more deliberations. It was hoping that the food fight among three services would take the burden of decision for a while. Government approved it hastily in the aftermath of May 2013 Depsang crisis to deflect criticism chiefly from army partisans that it was gambling on national security. The exorbitant cost of over $3 billion was unrealistic and Indian political authorities who tightly hold the purse strings of defense budget were hesitant from the start. Even within the army, it was not thoroughly evaluated by looking closely at strategic, tactical, operational and financial aspects.
The government had given the nod with the understanding that funds for MSC would come from the existing defense budget and not from additional funding. In 2017-18 the government stopped funding of the project citing financial constraints, this put the raising of second division of the corps at Pathankot in cold storage. Army had to trim budgets of other projects to fund the new MSC and used its reserves to equip the new formation. This invariably resulted in a shortfall in War Wastage Reserves (WWR).
Inside the army several flaws were found with the concept and many raised their concerns. These included the formation being too large and unwieldy raising concerns about operational control during actual combat conditions. Other concerns were that existing infrastructure along the difficult terrain of LAC was not adequate for launching an offensive Corp.
In the meantime, the Integrated Battle Group (IBG) concept had taken shape in the Indian army. It was a formation larger than a brigade but smaller than a division consisting of all arms under a single command. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has already incorporated the Combined Arms Brigade (CAB) concept. PLA has undertaken major reforms of the higher command structure and operational doctrines. CAB is to play a major role in operations.
In the meantime, the Integrated Battle Group (IBG) concept had taken shape in the Indian army. It was a formation larger than a brigade but smaller than a division consisting of all arms under a single command. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has already incorporated the Combined Arms Brigade (CAB) concept. PLA has undertaken major reforms of the higher command structure and operational doctrines. CAB is to play a major role in operations.
The Indian army’s major focus has been Pakistan. In the context of nuclearization of South Asia, it feels comfortable that it has more than adequate resources to fight a limited war with Pakistan. The main operational plan of Indian army has been what is called ‘10 (I) scales’; an intense battle along Line of Control (LOC) or international border with shallow thrusts lasting about ten days. The IBG concept is introduced first in Western Command deployed against Pakistan and the IX Corps is designated as experimental formation for this concept. Now, with increased emphasis on offensive capability along LAC against China, the same concept is introduced in MSC.
Chinese assertiveness along LAC is a warning signal to India. The goal is to make Indian security establishment re-think in case they are considering to be a major peg in US-led effort to contain China. If India is not thinking to become a frontline state to contain China then this needs to be clearly communicated to China in a sustained diplomatic engagement This coupled with confidence building measures along LAC and defusing local tensions will pay dividend in the long run. In the absence of such efforts, India will be increasing the costs without getting the desired benefits. After the recent clashes in Ladakh, India is keeping a large number of forces at high altitudes in winter months thereby skyrocketing the costs even of the existent force structure.
In the current format, MSC will not make any major change in strategic or operational environment. It is too weak to make a credible deterrent effect on China. If it is placed too close to LAC to be operationally viable, it will be viewed as too provocative by China. If it is kept at current location, it is too far to have an impact during a crisis along LAC. The current force structure and location cannot cover all three eastern (Arunachal Pradesh), middle (Uttar Khand & Himachal Pradesh) and western (Kashmir & Ladakh) sectors of LAC.
The only redeeming factor could be to change a large un-wielding force into an IBGs formation. First step is to further refine the IBG concept with true integration and jointless. The Air Force has a major role to play in this and money saved could be used to upgrade Air Force assets. Rotating fully equipped and well trained IBGs from connecting nodes can provide a credible force for the kind of limited action envisaged along LAC. But even this is a costly proposition.
Increased militarization of LAC will increase defense costs for both China and India and affecting economic growth. In view of the larger Chinese economy and defense budget, India will always be playing the catch-up game. It will be ironic if India gets caught in the same vicious cycle that its smaller neighbor Pakistan found itself in. Every country needs its armed forces to defend its borders, but the true art is playing a fine hand of political and diplomatic maneuvers to maintain peace. The money saved from a shopping spree of expensive toys for boys to wage war are instead used for education, health and social uplift of the countrymen. The most profound comment was made by P. J. O’Rourke while watching missile firing during an exercise stating that “This is the right way to waste money”.
