Given the superior performance of the PAF in the 1965 war, it was only natural for Pakistanis to expect a similar repeat in any future conflict. However, to a keen student of military history, it would have been clear that PAF’s sterling performance emanating from decisive leadership and better aircrew training were only partial reasons for the success in 1965. Equally persuasive reasons lay in the failure of IAF to take the initiative at an operational level, as well as several blunders at the tactical level. For instance, not neutralising Sargodha on the morning of 6 September, when the Indian Army had launched an offensive on the Lahore front was a major mistake as three-fourths of the PAF could have been grounded. Similarly, not dispersing their aircraft that lay openly parked on the airfields cost the IAF gravely with 39 aircraft destroyed and another 17 damaged in air raids by PAF, as opposed to the loss of only one PAF aircraft on the ground.
Since the IAF’s shortcomings had more to do with leadership decisions than any training or material shortcomings, these were addressed straightforwardly within the intervening years. The IAF of 1971 was, thus, a far cry from that of 1965. This is not to say that the PAF had slackened any bit; on the contrary, qualitative and quantitative improvements in aircraft, early warning radars and new airfields with hardened shelters continued apace. It is, however, noteworthy that by 1971, the difference in capabilities of the two air forces had narrowed considerably.
In 1971, PAF also found it challenging to live up to its much-hyped image of a mythical force in the eyes of the populace, which was obviously well fed on patriotic stories and songs harking back to the heady days of 1965. Thus, any expectation of the PAF to repeat past wonders in 1971 needed to be tempered with a realistic appraisal of the changes that had come about over the years.
A Critique of PAF’s Operational Plans
The PAF’s Concept of Operations for the 1971 war had clearly underlined all-out air support to the Army’s main offensive in West Pakistan. As a prelude to this support, it was appreciated that some degree of control of the air was necessary, and the PAF was content with being able to prevent any prohibitive IAF interference with Pak Army’s operations. During the critical phase of the main offensive, the enemy airfields serving the concerned land sector were to be kept suppressed. Additionally, air defence in the Northern Sector, including the main sectors of land battles, was to be ensured by mutually supportive bases with sufficient redundancy for providing complete daylight and selective night time patrols, as well as round the clock scrambles.
It is important to note that the air defence of each and every Vulnerable Area and Vulnerable Point had not been called for, as the PAF was cognizant of the limitations of aircraft numbers as well as the radar coverage. Large swathes of the country thus stood compromised and were vulnerable to enemy’s air attacks. The Karachi Port complex, including vital POL stores, stood exposed to seaward attacks against which there was no early warning. Some of the refineries, the Sui gas plant and the rail/road network, particularly at the narrow-waisted centre of the country also lay at the mercy of the IAF because of lack of air cover in the central region. These strategic target sets were immensely critical and a dedicated campaign against them could threaten the very integrity of the country. The PAF hardly had any antidote to these vulnerabilities, except a credulous hope that the Army’s objectives would have been achieved before matters came to a sordid end. Even if the PAF were to attempt air defence operations whose success was questionable, it would have amounted to frittering away the scant resources that had to remain inseparably dedicated to the II Corps offensive.
The Concept of Operations talked about “providing air support for holding actions with the aim of tying down as many of the enemy’s resources as possible, and to achieve a favourable tactical posture in the process.” The overriding priority of the PAF was “to give maximum support to the proposed offensive into India.” It is not difficult to glean from these statements that other than the planned main offensive, the rest were considered routine holding operations. Content with the Army’s assumptions regarding likely enemy courses of action, PAF’s concept was silent about one or more of these holding operations turning into major reverses, requiring PAF’s maximum support, of a magnitude similar to that envisaged for the II Corps’ offensive. In the event, unexpected reverses at Shakargarh and Naya Chor were of exactly such a nature and required the fullest attention of PAF, as the core areas of Punjab and Sind lay threatened. If the main offensive had gone through PAF would have been hard-pressed in supporting it, along with the two operations that were now critical to the integrity of Pakistan. In this regard, we noticed that this is reminiscent of successful online game projects that implement all these principles and mechanisms. A well-thought out contingency brief in the Concept of Operations would have been helpful in such a critical situation.
For want of a dedicated anti-shipping platform and weapon, PAF’s maritime air support capability was limited. A tri-services meeting held in February 1971 at Air HQ apparently settled the issue of air support to the Pakistan Navy, with the PAF agreeing to “engage some targets of importance, subject to availability of air effort, and during day time only.” In reaction to the Indian Navy’s devastating attack against PN ships at sea on the night of 4/5 December, PAF did strike Okha harbour, a coastal Indian facility for small vessels, and put it out of operation in a single strike; it was, however, too little and too late. The PAF also planned a daring, albeit abortive, response against Bombay harbour by B-57s, modified with four F-86 drop tanks carried under the wings. Ruefully, such imaginative tasks should have been considered by Pakistan Navy and PAF jointly, so that initiative could be seized, and the battle taken to the enemy at the outset. Apparently, naval operations and associated air support were not on the highest priority, when the Pakistani response to Indian aggression mainly centred on the capture of territory.
According to the PAF’s official history there was talk of PAF having to fight a war for as long as six months. This, however, does not figure out in the calculation of the war effort, which catered for just about half a month. The incongruity seems to indicate that the Air Staff was being fearful to a fault, as the PAF had the means to fight only a short war. Owing to US sanctions and tight budgets war reserves of all three services were not exactly at the target of 30 days stipulated in the War Directive. These reserves varied over a wide range of 15-45 days, at the planned consumption rates for various weapon systems in each service. Conservation of resources under these constraints is one thing but talk of a six-month long war raises the valid question if a ‘go slow’ was envisaged at some point in time.
Air Effort Generation
The PAF had planned an optimal aircraft Utilisation Rate (UR) of 2.2 sorties per aircraft per day, for an envisaged war of 14 days. This rate was based on an average of 3 daily sorties per aircraft for the first three days of the war, and 2 daily sorties per aircraft for the remaining eleven days. Also, all aircraft types were expected to generate a similar effort. The planned UR was, however, an average figure taking into account the different effort generation capabilities of various aircraft types.
It may also be noted that the planned UR glossed over an important requirement of an increase in effort generation, to cater for enhanced air support requirements during the critical phase of Pak Army’s main offensive. For purposes of comprehensive logistics planning, it was vital to have incorporated a second surge of 3 daily sorties per aircraft, lasting at least three days, if not more.
PAF flew a total of 2,955 sorties from the time India commenced hostilities in East Pakistan on 22 November, till ceasefire on 17 December. Of these, 2,911 sorties were flown in West Pakistan between 3-17 December, while approximately 44 sorties were flown in East Pakistan between 22 November and 5 December. It goes to the credit of the PAF to have managed this air effort generation despite extremely adverse circumstances, foremost of which was critical shortage of spares. The loss of 20% of the Bengali technicians who had been grounded, or had defected to India before the war, was also overcome without any substantial strain. Most reassuring was the fact that air and ground crews maintained their potential, ready to launch in support of a meaningful response to the Indian aggression.
Compared to the three-week long 1965 War in which the PAF flew 2,279 sorties, it flew 23% more during the two weeks of 1971 war.
The total sorties flown during the war were 60% of the planned effort of 4,960 combat sorties. The shortfall is understandable considering the fact that the Army’s main offensive, which was to take up the bulk of air effort for its support, had failed to materialise. PAF was obviously conserving its effort while concentrating on air defence and support to the Army in critical sectors. It would be opportune to clarify here that the PAF did not hold back any part of its fighting force in reserve, as has been imputed occasionally. As an instance, the otherwise reputable writer, Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan, grossly errs when he asserts that, “four squadrons out of 10-½ in West Pakistan were not utilised at all.”
The workhorses of the PAF turned out to be the F-6 and F-86E which were acquired soon after the 1965 war. Each type flew 29% of the total war effort.
The best Utilisation Rate though still a lowly 1.6 daily sorties per aircraft was achieved by Mirage III and F-6, both having been the more recent inductions in the PAF (three and five years old respectively). These figures also contradict criticism in some quarters that the Mirages were not utilised fully, for fear of loss of these prestigious assets.
Aircraft Attrition
The IAF lost a total of 60 aircraft to combat-related causes while flying 6,542 combat sorties, resulting in an attrition rate (loss per 100 sorties) of 0.91%. The PAF lost 27 aircraft while flying 2,955 combat sorties, also resulting in an attrition rate of 0.91%. Although by no means a comprehensive assessment criterion, attrition rate is a reasonably fair indicator of an air force’s and Anti Aircraft Artillery’s (AAA) performance during war. On this basis, both air forces were at par, though this result must be tempered with the truism that IAF flew many more ground attack sorties in a vulnerable air and ground environment. For both air forces, the number of aircraft lost was 9.3% of their respective inventories.
For the IAF, its performance in 1971 was a considerable improvement over the 1965 war, when it got soundly beaten, having an attrition rate of 1.67% versus PAF’s 0.7%.
IAF was at the receiving end of Pak Army’s AAA in a substantial way, with 60% of all IAF aircraft downed by the Army’s guns, while the PAF notched up 30%, mostly during interception of egressing raiders. The preponderant role played by the Pakistan Army’s AAA in the country’s air defence, was one of the reasons that eventually led to the birth of a separate Army Air Defence branch in 1989.[i]
26% of PAF’s aircraft losses were entirely avoidable as slipshod dispersal led to the loss of five aircraft on the ground in Murid in a single IAF raid; two more were lost on the ground in other raids.
Air Defence
PAF invested heavily in air defence, apportioning 62% of the total air effort to this vital mission. Of this effort, 7% of the missions were flown exclusively over the battlefield to cover the troops, albeit without any radar visibility, thus diluting the effect of the effort considerably. The sectorial performance was lop-sided, as the Northern Sector had better concentration of resources both aircraft and radars compared to the Southern Sector. The reason was obvious, for the major land battles, as well as the planned major offensive, were localised in Kashmir and Punjab.
Despite the considerable air defence effort expended in West Pakistan, raiders were intercepted by fighters only after weapon release in the Northern Sector, while none was intercepted in the Southern Sector either before, or after weapon release. In the battle area, a couple of enemy aircraft were intercepted following chance pick-up by the pilots on air support missions. The AAA gunners mostly picked off the raiders as they pulled up and exposed themselves during the vulnerable attack phase.
Deployment of low level radars in the Northern Sector was too far in the rear, and only provided an early warning of about three minutes. This warning time turned out to be insufficient even for aircraft already patrolling in the vicinity. Murid and Chander air bases, for instance, could not be defended effectively because of the limited early warning. Apparently, the locations of three (out of four) AR-1 radars atop hills at Cherat, Kallar Kahar and Kirana, which could provide up to 50% additional pick-up range, were considered a big bonus. This deployment scheme still left the extremely important lines of communications, the forward-located concentration areas of the strategic reserves, and all of the battle areas without any early warning. The PAF stood frustrated nd helpless when IAF started to target the railway network, including trains. Forward deployment of radars, which was not constrained by terrain or any other limitation, could have provided timely warning against raiders coming for most of these targets, as well as PAF installations. Under positive cover of forward positioned radars, the Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) could also have been anchored further ahead to improve the intercept possibilities, but with some risk of being surprised by enemy fighter sweeps. With the Air Staff’s response options overly swaddled in layers of caution and safety, such risk-taking was an improbable prospect. As long as IAF aircraft were being shot down, even though after weapon release, the PAF seemed quite content with the rear deployment of radars.
The coverage pattern and search limitations of most radars had been compromised by the defecting Bengalis, so the IAF had fairly good information to help chart safe routes for ingress. This was also a significant setback to PAF’s already limited air defence coverage.
The deployment of aircraft for air defence in the Northern Sector was generally optimal, except an odd case. In Mianwali, a half-squadron detachment of F-6s deployed solely for air defence could not perform their equally well-suited mission of tactical air support, as Mianwali was too far removed from any of the battlefields. A swap with the relatively longer-ranged F-86s based at Sargodha, would have helped in better utilisation of both types in the air support role, as well as air defence.
In the Southern Sector, a small detachment of 4 F-86E at Talhar was at the complete mercy of any intruder, for the base was only 32 nm from the border, and had no low level early warning. This reality was understood too late, when a scrambling pair was surprised by IAF Hunters, and one of the F-86s was promptly shot down over the airfield. The base had little utility other than emergency recoveries, or some stage-through strike operations.
In East Pakistan, where air defence may have been a futile effort in the overall scheme of things, the PAF’s intrepid band of pilots and air defence controllers kept the IAF fighters at bay for over two days. Once the PAF was grounded with the destruction of the runway at Dacca, Pak Army AAA continued to batter the IAF. The net bag of at least 13 aircraft downed by both arms, under the most adverse circumstances, speaks volumes about the ‘never say die’ spirit with which the air warriors and the gunners were imbued. Sadly, valour alone could add little meaning to the eventual outcome of the war.
Offensive Counter Air
The meagre 10% of the total air effort that went into airfield strikes and a few anti-radar missions, needs to be seen in proper perspective. PAF’s airfield strikes were part of a disruptive counter air campaign, aimed at overburdening the IAF’s effort generation capabilities. It also served the purpose of demonstrating an offensive resolve, while employing the full spectrum of air power. Damage inflicted to the runways was, however, not very substantial, and the airfields were seldom closed for more than one day or night. The main reason was that shallow dive angles during attack dictated by the compulsion of minimising exposure to AAA fire caused only slight penetration of the bombs into the runway surface, which was easily repairable. Especially designed runway attack weapons like the hard-nosed Durandal, which can be delivered in level flight and is rocket-boosted to assist in deeper penetration, did not exist at that time.
With their greater payload and accurate navigation, the B-57 bombers were able to cause significant damage during night strikes. The attacks on Uttarlai and Bhuj were particularly devastating, as both the runways remained under repair for at least one week. The attacks on distant Agra distressful as these might have been for the reposing souls in the nearby Taj Mahal were certainly alarming for the IAF, as PAF had struck unhindered at India’s very heartland.
The more intense phase of Offensive Counter Air campaign was planned to be overlaid with the Army’s main offensive, which never came about; as a result, the effort put in by the PAF appears to be small.
Tactical Air Support
A sizeable 25% of the total air effort went into Tactical Air Support missions which included Close Air Support, Battlefield Air Interdiction and Armed Recce. Since these missions were sometimes logged interchangeably, an accurate textbook breakdown of the sub-divisions has not been possible; the bulk of them were, however, of the classic Close Air Support variety which targeted armour, artillery guns and vehicles. 16% of these missions were flown in the ‘escort’ role, in which ammunition was expended by the escorts if the opportunity arose after sanitising the airspace over the battlefield.
Overall, about two-thirds of the air support effort was considered successful. Main reasons for unsuccessful missions included inability to locate well-camouflaged targets (especially in the wooded areas of Punjab), unfavourable target-weapon compatibility, weapon failures, and poor visibility due to winter haze. Most frustrating for the pilots was to discover ‘no enemy activity’ on arrival at the battle location. This problem was attributed to the inordinate delay from the time the air support request was put in by the Army, till the fighters reached overhead the target area. Equally exasperating was the poor radio communication with the Forward Air Controllers who were to guide the fighters to their targets in the terminal phase of the mission; many a mission was wasted due to faulty radio contact.
In an effort to stay clear of AAA fire, F-86s were configured with general-purpose bombs in most of the missions, which was a rather unconventional way of destroying tanks and armoured vehicles. The choice of weapon was considered a suitable compromise by providing a safe stand-off distance, notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of general area bombing for destroying armour with gravity and wind-prone bombs. On the other hand, using the 2.75” rockets had two pitfalls: firstly, the attack profile entailed approaching the target closer than in a bombing attack, rendering the aircraft more vulnerable to AAA fire; secondly, these rockets were inherently not very accurate, in which case if it missed even by 10-odd feet, the damage to armour by its puny warhead would be negligible. In case of a bomb, even if the hit was not direct, its extensive blast effect could still immobilise a tank by disabling its engine, communications systems, or even the crew if caught with an open hatch. In any case, both the 2.75” FFAR, as well as the more accurate SNEB 68-mm rockets were used by the F-86s in a limited number of missions.[i]
It is quite understandable that a fine balance had to be maintained between the need to conserve aircraft and weapons for Pak Army’s promised main offensive, and the disagreeable possibility of consuming them beforehand. As long as it is appreciated that the PAF responded to most of the requests for tactical air support, the odd choice of weapons should be seen in the context of the need to stay viable for the impending major air support campaign.
The PAF did not treat on-going operations in various sectors as ‘lesser actions of holding formations’, as The Story of Pakistan Air Force – A Saga of Courage and Honour, awkwardly tries to argue in favour of taking the safer approach; nor did the debate about the cost of an airplane versus a tank inhibit any air support, as the official history seems to imply. The fact of the matter was simply a desire to remain a ‘force in being’ for the impending Army offensive, which it considered as its primary task. Even so, it was without any prejudice to the routine air support being called for in various sectors. As an instance, when the situation in Shakargarh Sector needed a helping hand, PAF threw in the F-6s which were the most suitable platforms available. Arrayed with three powerful 30-mm cannon, and on a few occasions with S-5 57-mm rockets as well, these aircraft carried out close-in attacks at low heights, without any consideration of AAA hazards.[i]
When it came to the use of bombs against troop concentrations and ammunition dumps, the F-86s did quite well, and the effort resulted in the desired destruction, as expected.
A motley of bomber, trainer and transport aircraft also chipped in audaciously at twilight and during the night, but generally with unspectacular results. The best that was expected out of them were chance hits, of which there were a few.
Interdiction
These are missions flown to interdict supply of replenishments on rail and road transportation routes beyond the battlefield. Attacks against choke points on the rail and road networks like railway stations are the preferred targets, as their destruction can induce harmful delays in the scheme of things on the battlefield. These targets are much bigger and more visible, compared to the well concealed and camouflaged stockpiles of supplies in the battlefield. Aircraft flying relatively deeper interdiction missions also have the advantage of remaining clear of the surface-to-air defences that infest the active battle area.
Ostensibly, these deeper missions were kept pending for the main offensive phase, and less than one percent of the total air effort a mere 24 sorties went into interdiction beyond the immediate battlefield. Perhaps the desire to stay out of harm’s way, and conserve the assets for the upcoming own Army offensive, led to this course of action. This cautious line of thought was of little help, as it only gave the enemy a freer hand in bolstering the much needed supplies of ammunition and fuel in various battle sectors. A comprehensive ‘near and far’ interdiction campaign, targeting communications nodes serving the enemy’s main and secondary efforts in Shakargarh and the Desert Sectors, should have started at the outset of air operations. Any delay in such a campaign would not have had the desired effects, as the pre-stocked supplies would continue to sustain the enemy’s ground operations for some time.
The highly successful attack on Mukerian Railway Station two days before the war ended, showed the nature and extent of damage that could have been inflicted over the previous two weeks.
Performance of Operations Personnel
The front-line players in PAF’s operations were the pilots and the air defence controllers, who were diligently supported by highly skilled engineers and technicians, logisticians, and air traffic controllers in keeping the aircraft, weapons and radars functional. During the war, as in peacetime, PAF personnel galvanised as a team, which was testimony to a cohesive and well-organised service.
The high standards of training and discipline stood out, and the results were in keeping with the sterling performance of 1965 War. The enthusiastic fighter pilots were seen to be particularly adept in interception and air combat, despite limitations of the airborne and ground radars. The air defence controllers displayed innovative skills in enhancing the situational awareness of the pilots, and were instrumental in the achievement of almost all aerial kills. Functioning as proficient pilot-controller teams, they were able to effect a Kill Exchange Ratio of 1.8:1 in favour of the PAF in interception and air combat missions.[iv] This was not too far behind the Kill Exchange Ratio of 2.1:1 in the 1965 War.
‘Leading from the front’ has never been an overused cliché in the PAF, and is taken very seriously. In the 1971 War, just as in 1965, some of the most difficult and dangerous missions were led by the Squadron Commanders themselves. Four of them had an aerial kill each, which served as perfect examples of heroics for their young sub-ordinates to emulate.
The bomber aircrew deserve special mention as their lumbering platforms were slow and defenceless. Flying deep into enemy territory in the dark of the night against well-defended airfields, they carried out their missions bravely, and with complete resoluteness. Their effort helped PAF maintain round-the-clock pressure on IAF’s effort generation capability.
In a Nutshell
When the war ended in West Pakistan on 17 December, PAF was still ‘in the ring and on its feet’.[v] It had parried the enemy’s blows and had been ever so careful in its offensive responses. It continued to be fixated with remaining viable for providing complete air support to the Army’s all-important battle, which flowed out of the overarching dictum, ‘defence of the East lies in the West’. PAF’s overall performance can be gleaned from the fact that it managed to keep its aircraft attrition rate at par with the IAF. The PAF unmistakably denied a much stronger IAF the distinct possibility of delivering a knock-out punch to it. In the circumstances obtaining this was a commendable achievement. Yet, there were prospects which, if exploited with a measure of audacity, could have inflicted far more damage to the IAF and Indian Army formations, and also reduced losses to the PAF and own army.
The air defence system lacked forward orientation in the Northern Sector, whereby radars could not provide sufficient early warning to CAPs for timely interceptions. This oversight rendered own air bases, ground forces, as well as lines of communications susceptible to unimpeded air attacks. Considering the large IAF effort that went into tactical air support, PAF could have accrued big dividends by being more up front and intercepting the intruders well in time; it is also quite evident that a lucrative opportunity of raising the IAF’s attrition rate to unacceptable levels was missed.
The tactical air support provided by the PAF was adequate and largely met the Army’s demands, but should have also included interdiction beyond the battlefield in earnest, so as to cause a debilitating effect on supplies for the engaged enemy formations.
Maritime air support was not well thought out, and neither service came up with ‘out-of-the-box’ solutions for coping with the difficulties at hand. While the onus of brainstorming lay in large part on the Navy, the PAF could have filled in with an array of options.
End Notes
[1] Till 1989, Anti-Aircraft Artillery was part of the Artillery branch of Pak Army.
[2] A total of 258 rockets of the 2.75”FFAR variety were fired by the F-86s in various battle sectors. Since each LAU-32 rocket launcher had a capacity of seven rockets, it is reckoned that at least 18 sorties were flown with this weapon. Besides this, a total of 152 SNEB 68-mm rockets were also fired by F-86s; up to 18 of these rockets could be carried in each SNEB-155 rocket launcher, which would work out to only four sorties with full load, though fewer rockets may have been actually carried per sortie.
[3] A total of 188 S-5 57-mm rockets were fired by the F-6s, all in Shakargarh Sector; since each ORO-57K rocket launcher had a capacity of eight rockets, at least 12 sorties are likely to have been flown with these rockets.
[4] In other words, PAF shot down 18 IAF aircraft in air combat, against the loss of 10 aircraft.
[5] The author of the Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War eventually brought himself to extend this compliment of sorts to the PAF in the concluding analysis, Chapter-X, ‘The IAF in the West,’ page 449.
