Abstract
On May 29, 2019 Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley Jr., who is the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) claimed that “Russia has likely been secretly carrying out very low-yield nuclear tests to upgrade its nuclear arsenal”. This opens a new pandora box for global security and potentially destabilize strategic stability with direct impact on global nuclear order particularly on moratorium on nuclear testing with that of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).United States trend to deviate from international commitments in the sphere of arms control has given impetus to global insecurity. More recently on April 27, 2019 the US President Donald Trump has signaled to withdraw from the Arms Trade Treaty, which is another global arms control treaty and was negotiated by the United Nations. Barrack Obama in 2013 signed the treaty and showed United States commitment to disallow notorious elements to hold automatic weapons in their hands. Starting from ballistic missiles to automatic weapons, the US trend of deviating from global treaties has logical inclination towards giving impetus to global insecurity. This article makes the point that the United States has created a so-called cluster of revisionist (China & Russia) and rogue states (Iran & North Korea) and uses them to justify its global military objectives. In 2002 and 2019 respectively, the United States came out from the ABM and INF treaties while using Chinese and Russian weapons modernization. This time Washington is trying to justify her plans for new nuclear tests that were already disclosed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and November 2017 annual report of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Just like her previous tendency of escape goat, the US on May 29 tried to fix the Russians in the theater of ‘secret nuclear testing’. The article is qualitative in nature and uses inductive method of inquiry with secondary data necessary to draw objective conclusions. It attempts to find answer, why US is defying her commitments and wants to conduct new nuclear tests? What impact it would have on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime with that of comprehensive test ban treaty?
Introduction
The United States has upheld a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. However, numerous voices have emerged in the recent years urging a resumption of nuclear tests. Among many, the most prominent are the voices of the former Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), Vice Admiral (Retd.) Robert R. Monroe, US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, and US National Security Advisor John R. Bolton. Advocates of nuclear testing argue that the United States must resume explosive, underground nuclear tests to maintain the reliability and knowledge base necessary to sustain the nuclear deterrent. Because the US has not conducted a test in 27 years, supporters contend that the United States is quickly losing the know how necessary to develop new warheads that may be necessary to maintain the deterrent value of the US arsenal in the future. Additionally, supporters of testing argue that the age of the US arsenal is significantly beyond its intended lifespan, and testing is necessary to ensure the reliability of existing warheads.
These issues have no more salient with the Trump administration. As the Trump team has already finalized in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), critical decisions will be made about the requirements of the nuclear arsenal and what the US deterrent will look like over the coming decades. The resumption of testing would be a devastating move for the United States’ nonproliferation goals and is wholly unnecessary to maintain the reliability of the arsenal.
Do US really need to resume nuclear testing?
Calls for testing generally center on three key arguments: the need to develop ‘new’ nuclear weapons, the age of the US arsenal, and perceived knowledge gaps in the nuclear enterprise.
0 First, the United States has no need for truly ‘new’ nuclear capabilities. For clarification purposes, ‘new’ nuclear weapons are what the Obama administration referred to in its 2010 NPR as weapons that did not previously exist and warrant a test. The current nuclear modernization plan is necessary to recapitalize every aspect of the nuclear enterprise and ensure that the U.S. deterrent remains strong. However, that modernization plan comes with a price tag of more than $1 trillion, which would only grow with the addition of new capabilities in the plan, something that would be difficult in the current budget environment. The existing US arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear tipped air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs delivered by fighters and bombers provides a robust deterrent. Advocates for ‘new nuclear weapons are hard pressed to find an actual necessity for these weapons, which may in turn kick off an arms race. Variants of the B-61 gravity bomb, a staple of the US tactical nuclear arsenal, possess a “dial-a-yield” feature that allows for yields below 1 kiloton, removing the need for additional exploration of “very low yield” nuclear weapons through testing. In addition, warheads currently in the United States arsenal could be repurposed for new roles, such as the return of nuclear-tipped sea launched cruise missile with warheads that are currently used for its air-launched counterpart. Doing this would not require nuclear testing.
0 Second, the United States is capable of assuring the reliability of the nuclear stockpile without explosive testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is charged with outlining its efforts to ensure that the arsenal remains effective and safe in its yearly Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP). The NNSA utilizes the national labs and nuclear weapons production facilities to conduct a variety of tests on its nuclear weapons and has undergone life extension programs to ensure that weapons remain reliable outside of their original intended lifespan. Employing technologies such as proton radiography and supercomputing, engineers can model the effects of aging on the nuclear enterprise without the need to conduct underground nuclear tests. The Sigma Complex, Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility, TA-55, and National Ignition Facility are just a few locations where the NNSA gathers data on nuclear weapons, produces new components that can be used in the nuclear arsenal, and certifies the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal. In addition, the National Academy of Sciences have bolstered the NNSA’s statements by agreeing that explosive testing is unnecessary, making the argument that that US could ratify the CTBT without a negative effect on national security. The use of these facilities also resolves the knowledge gap problem, as the physics required to build a nuclear weapon remain understood and are taught to the next generation of scientists working on the issue.
The resumption of nuclear testing is a bad idea. There is no real need for new capabilities and the technologies developed by the NNSA can ensure the reliability of the current US arsenal without explosive tests. The United States should not risk both forfeiting its nonproliferation credibility and setting off a string of nuclear tests that threatens the nuclear order. The consequences of resuming testing would indeed be explosive.
Why United States intends to go for Nuclear Testing?
On Oct. 2, 1992, President George H.W. Bush reluctantly made history with the stroke of a pen. One year after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, Bush signed into law an appropriations bill that placed a similar unprecedented restriction on the United States. Ironically, the president personally opposed this specific measure, but his signature has become one of his lasting legacies. The US nuclear testing moratorium has been upheld by all of Bush’s successors, and remains in effect today.
Year after year, the heads of US nuclear weapons laboratories have assessed that the US stockpile is reliable, and that resuming explosive nuclear testing is unnecessary. In fact, the Stockpile Stewardship program, which “tests” nuclear weapons by other means, including advanced simulations via supercomputers, has provided laboratory scientists with more information about the US stockpile than when explosive tests were regularly occurring.
But today, the Trump administration is indicating that those assessments may not be enough. While the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review included a blanket commitment not to conduct explosive nuclear tests, the Trump administration’s 2018 version of the document argues that the United States “must remain ready to resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges [emphasis added].” Severe technological challenges that could merit a return to testing do not currently exist. Specific geopolitical challenges, a new criterion, are not defined. Does this mean the administration could resume testing if China continues making aggressive moves in the South China Sea? If North Korea tests another missile? If Russian hackers disrupt US government websites? If Iran continues to haunt US strategic allies in the Middle East? Or in context to May 29, 2019 claim of Lt. Gen. Ashley about ‘Russia’s secret nuclear tests’ the time has finally come for US to go nuclear hot.
In November 2017, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) released its annual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the first under the Trump administration. Buried in this 328-page document lies new language that the agency stands ready to conduct a “simple” nuclear test as little as six months after receiving an order. A “simple” test is an explosion underground without full scientific instrumentation to analyze and assess the reliability of a nuclear weapon. As former NNSA administrator Linton Brooks told Kyodo News, such a test would be done not for scientific or security advancement, but to demonstrate “political resolve.” The benefit of such a test, likely at what once was the Nevada Test Site (the home of more than 900 US nuclear tests), largely amounts to nuclear braggadocio at the expense of US national security.
Combined, the two documents suggest that the Trump administration is laying the groundwork to resume explosive nuclear testing at its discretion. History reminds us that this would have catastrophic consequences. Resumed nuclear testing would bring with it not just environmental and health risks, but also the erosion of an important international norm and the likely setting off an international testing race with no benefits for the United States in particular and for the stakeholders of global peace in general.
Consequences of New Nuclear Tests on Global Security
Over the course of nearly 50 years prior to Bush’s signature, the United States conducted over 1,000 explosive nuclear tests (five underwater, approximately 200 in the atmosphere, and about 800 underground), the most of any country on Earth. These tests, particularly the atmospheric explosions, created environmental, social, and health consequences through radiation dispersal and other effects, some of which continue to be evident.
New explosive tests, even if only underground, would also present many dangers. Visitors in high-rise hotels in sprawling Las Vegas, 70 miles south of the test site, would physically feel the ground shake. And since underground tests sometimes leak, the surrounding area may be exposed to radioactive fallout.
The geopolitical consequences would be worse, amounting to a nuclear testing race. In 1961, the Soviet Union caught the world by surprise and broke its pledge with the United States and Great Britain to refrain from testing, conducting well over 100 tests over the next two years. The United States rushed to keep up, also carrying out more than 100 tests, mostly underground, by the end of 1962. France and Great Britain also tested during this time period, and China conducted its first test in 1964.
If the United States were to resume nuclear testing today, a similar international reaction would likely occur. Russia and China, attempting to keep up, would almost certainly resume testing themselves. India and Pakistan, bitter arch-rivals that both reserve the right to resume nuclear testing, would likely see a green light to explode nuclear weapons once more. India may see an opportunity to test new, unproven thermonuclear weapons which it is allegedly pursuing and Pakistan would be compelled to respond, similar to the infamous nuclear tests conducted by both countries in 1998.
In the early 1960s, with nuclear explosions taking place at a rate of roughly every other day, international and domestic pressure brought the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to the negotiating table once again (the Cuban Missile Crisis was also a major factor). What resulted was the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a 1963 agreement still in effect that bans all nuclear explosions, except underground.
It took three more decades, and the end of the Cold War, for a complete international nuclear test ban to appear. The United States was the first of 183 countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which bans ‘all’ explosive nuclear tests anywhere on earth. Only North Korea, a non-signatory, has explosively tested nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
But the United States has not yet ratified the treaty, meaning that it has signaled its intent to follow the treaty but is not legally bound by it. Because the US Senate has yet to provide its advice and consent to ratify, some hawkish voices argue the United States can and should resume explosive nuclear testing. Former Sen. Jon Kyl (a Republican from Arizona), for example, has argued that “the reliability of US nuclear weapons still cannot be guaranteed without testing them.” This is patently untrue, and it ignores the serious geopolitical and health consequences that resumed nuclear testing could cause.
Proponents continue to argue that Trump’s nuclear policies represent continuity with the previous administrations. But Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was very clear: “The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will pursue ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” The Trump administration has abandoned these commitments as the 2018 NPR asserts that “the United States does not support the ratification of the [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] CTBT”. Trump’s NPR also proclaims that the United States will remain ready to “resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges.”
Furthermore, as elaborated above the NPR also seeks “to reduce the time required to design, develop, and initially produce a warhead, from a decision to enter full-scale development.” An annual National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) report released in November 2017 shortens the previous readiness timeline to conduct a “simple [nuclear] test” explosion from 24 to 36 months down to six to 10 months, undermining the global nuclear testing taboo. This shortened timeline means that should the United States decide to conduct a “simple test” explosion, it should be prepared to do so within six to 10 months.
While the NNSA report and the NPR both reaffirm that “there is no current requirement to conduct an underground nuclear test,” the administration’s hasty rejection of CTBT ratification, combined with the NNSA’s revised testing readiness timeline suggests that the Trump administration only wants to reap the benefits of the treaty, including the data from the monitoring system, while leaving the door open to resuming nuclear testing.
Conclusion
The moratorium on nuclear testing is a critical aspect of US nonproliferation strategy, making its continuation an imperative in minimizing the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another keystone international agreement on nuclear nonproliferation. Since the CTBT was negotiated in 1996, the P5 (United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia) have all refrained from testing nuclear weapons, demonstrating their commitment to limit nuclear weapons development and to pursue disarmament over the long-term. While it has not ratified the agreement, the United States provides nearly a quarter of the budget for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which is charged with carrying out the treaty’s mandate and monitoring nuclear tests globally. By not testing nuclear weapons and continuing to reduce the size of its own nuclear arsenal, the United States establishes credibility as a responsible nuclear state that can be leveraged on a variety of issues, such as pressuring North Korea to roll back its nuclear program and coming back to a coalition to enforce the Iran deal.
A resumption of testing would place all of this at risk.
1. First, testing could send a signal that the United States not only intends to develop new warheads but also wants to develop new weapons systems to deliver these warheads. It would lead other nations to expand their arsenals and develop new weapons in response. It would also undermine US efforts in the context of the newly-created Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which at the time of writing has 70 signatories and 23 states ratified. Once 50 nations have ratified or acceded to it, it will enter into force. Resuming testing would worsen the US record on nonproliferation, thereby strengthening the arguments from TPNW advocates that the NPT and CTBT are insufficient to get the P5 nuclear states to make progress on reducing the size of each other nuclear arsenal. It has the potential to make the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear states wider and undermine the progress toward limiting the spread of nuclear weapons that the NPT has made.
2. Second, the United States breaking the testing moratorium would likely result in other states resuming testing. This in turn could destabilize the nuclear order and benefit interested states that would have much more to learn from resuming nuclear tests. Potential states, like Iran, cannot perfect weapon designs without conducting tests, something that is much more likely to occur once the moratorium has been broken, particularly if it is broken by the United States. Countries working on developing new nuclear capabilities within the NPT system, such as China and Russia would be able to do so at a much quicker rate with live tests.
3. Finally, nations outside the CTBT and NPT may feel much less restrained from conducting tests, which could have negative geopolitical effects. North Korea may conduct tests more frequently than it currently does, exacerbating tensions in the region and allowing the authoritarian state to forge ahead in their nuclear program at a faster rate. India and Pakistan, both of which have not tested nuclear weapons since 1998, may also resume tests as a means of demonstrating resolve in a crisis or develop new capabilities, which could elevate tensions to more dangerous levels.
References
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