Abstract
India is known to have been pursuing a long-term three-stage nuclear energy program for many decades which is essentially, at the first stage, planned to build a breed of heavy water power reactors that would generate Plutonium to fuel breeder reactors, and then it would build another breed of advanced heavy water reactor which could use extra oxide fuel especially Thorium. At present, India has not been able to fully implement the second stage. It hasn’t even been able to commission its first prototype fast breeder reactor. The official Indian position has been that eight power reactors and the breeder program are outside the IAEA safeguards as part of India’s strategic stockpile. It is assumed that India will be keeping spent fuel Plutonium produced in these reactors, outside the IAEA Safeguards to be used as part of the second stage which is to fuel the breeder fleet. This was in fact accepted in 2008 as part of IAEA separation plan. Contrary to Indian claims that it would be building 5 to 6 breeder reactors, New Delhi is still not able to commission the first reactor. Therefore this study makes the point that the availability of 16 tons civil Plutonium outside IAEA safeguards could be diverted to weapons use. With ability to reprocess the spent fuel through her four reprocessing plants and inclusion of another one, India would be able to enhance its reprocessing capacity up to 2000 tons until next decade. This issue highlights Indian gambling on her commitments related to separation between civil and military nuclear activities. Pakistan must not become prey to Indian gambling and must expose her lies at appropriate forums particularly NSG with that of presenting Islamabad’s bid to join the export control cartel. Also Islamabad should not hesitate to highlight Indian nuclear ambitions to offset the strategic stability in South Asia. This article has attempted to present holistic viewpoint to understand Indian motivation to join NSG with that of United States extraordinary attempt to construct new security environment in South Asia that it initiated through strategic civil nuclear deal.
Introduction:
Indian nuclear program and its associated developments had played key role in defining Pakistan’s national security. Indian nuclear ambitions and its direct impact on Pakistan’s territorial integrity got impetus in the aftermath of 1974 ‘Smiling Buddha’ nuclear explosion. Primarily, Islamabad has witnessed nuclear program of India as an effort to achieve military superiority over Pakistan, which later on particularly immediately after the overt nuclearization (May 11, 1998) turned into global aspiration of seeking prestige and power. The post-9/11 US tilt towards India and offering her exceptional strategic exposure both in political and military domain took Pakistan by surprise as it was playing a frontline role in the Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT). United States selective diplomatic inclination towards New Delhi with that of deliberate political isolation of Islamabad ignited a whole new scenario in the national security discourse of Pakistan. Pakistan was not only dealing with new dynamics of South Asian strategic stability under nuclear overhang but it had to interface with the reality of acceptance of Indian nuclear program. Most importantly through the so-called Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, the domestic shortage of fuel was amicably resolved without any repercussion on Indian national security.
As mentioned above that the Indian weapons program was facing acute shortage of fuel before the civil cooperation with US. According to estimates, Indian stock of fuel was about to get exhaust until 2007 and thereafter the so-called nuclear program could have zero possibility to sustain. On the other hand few of the Indian un-safeguarded reactors were also not able to acquire fuel from the international market due to tough restrictions of NSG. The domestic consumption of Indian reactors almost needed 400 tons of fuel (uranium) per annum, if they operate at 75% of their capacity. Parallel to that the plutonium based weapon reactors, ‘CIRUS’ and ‘Dhruva’ were also in need of about 30 to 35 tons of uranium per annum. Contrary to requirements, India was only able to produce about 300 tons of uranium a year, which was far less than the stipulated needs. The deal in fact fixed all these vulnerabilities in one go. It not only relaxed Indian civil need by offering special packages and reactors with full swing but also allowed the country to access international market to meet fuel shortage. Thereafter, the restrictions were no more and international uranium market was running to feed Indian reactors. Today, the 300 tons of domestic uranium production is freely available for the Indian weapons program that has drastically increased the nuclear arsenals with that of their military usage. The rest of civil needs are assured as ‘money makes the matters so conveniently easy’. Certainly, power is in wealth, not in norms!
Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal: A New Security Construct of South Asia
On the one side the deal was orchestrating new avenues of strategic relations between US and India, on the other side the region recorded fresh pulse in favor of New Delhi’s international endorsement with an increased power and prestige. More specifically, some of the implications which Pakistan recorded out of this new security construct are mentioned below:
(a) United States while reordering its priorities in South Asia gave a clear signal to regional states that India is now the forefront runner of Washington’s strategic interest. This allowed India to shape US outlook in South Asia and inevitably allowed New Delhi to squeeze and put pressure over smaller states. For Pakistan, this in fact has been one of the fundamental points of resistance to Indian role in the region. So, this reliance and as a result Indian influence in the region was a matter of immense worry for Pakistan. In this aftermath, guarding Pakistan’s regional interest with that of internal stability against the hegemonic ambitions of India got priority in the security spectrum of the country.
(b) The Deal enabled the Indian nuclear program with qualitative and quantitative improvements. Opening space for Indian weapons program while closing all the possibilities for Pakistan accentuated the imbalance in the region. This was considerably going to impact on deterrence stability.
(c) Furthermore, through another bilateral arrangement under ‘Indo-US defense pact’ extension of US cooperation on ‘ballistic missile defense (BMD)’ such as provision of “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)” have altogether pushed Pakistani brinkmanship to reconsider its ‘credible minimum nuclear deterrence’. The Indo-US defense cooperation has been even endorsed in the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) of the United States, which on two occasions mentions India as key ally. MDR also highlights an ongoing defense cooperation between the two nations.
(d) Under the J. Hyde Bill, Indian participation and membership in the ‘Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)’ was seen as an allowance to New Delhi to interdict trading ships of Pakistan.
(e) The wording of 2005 joint statement such as labeling India as “responsible nuclear state” almost recognized the country as a nuclear weapon state. This endorsed a long prevailing notion of ‘Greater India’ that Jawahar Lal Nehru framed in 1950’s with a plea that nuclear weapons are the great source of international power, prestige and pride.
The agreement on civil nuclear cooperation once again allowed India to gain access to US fuel with extension to technology, which earlier it has received from Canada. During 60s it had to violate the agreement but this time the pact had conveniently allowed maintaining separation in its civil and nuclear programs, separately. Not only growing economic needs were addressed but also the burden it had on her nuclear program was eased out through special arrangements. What a coincidence of international politics, once a ‘denounced proliferator’ got special provisions to become ‘legitimate opportunist’. Now, not only India was given de facto posture but also provided a certificate of ‘responsible nuclear state’ while closing eyes on all its history of malfunctioning, theft, breach, and violations. In fact, it was a license for India to disrupt nuclear parity with Pakistan and enhance missile material stockpile with that of accelerating the buildup of nuclear arsenals.
The non-proliferation regime became prey to such an evolving Indo-US strategic nexus, so does the strategic stability of South Asia. The wide ranging implications are even today shattering its impact on regional security as Indian aspirations of ‘Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)’ and ‘Proactive Military Operations (POAs)’ are adamant to its war mongering confidence which it gained through naïve and short-sighted global politics. The same has given impetus to its aspirations to join the export control regime’s prime institutions particularly the NSG. It has already joined the MTCR in June 2016, Wassanar Arrangement in December 2017, and Australia Group in January 2018.
Indian Bid to Join Export Control Cartels:
The driving force behind Indian objectives to join bilateral or multilateral institutions and groups is vested on its history of nuclear program, the basis of its ‘nuclear doctrine’, aspirations behind the civil nuclear cooperation and her ambitions of performing a regional and global power role. In fact, all this is a cocktail of Indian grand ambitions. To better review Indian aspirations, ‘Indo-US nuclear deal’, foundations of which were laid down in 2005 and which was signed in 2006, has to be seen as a precursor or stepping stone for NSG membership.
India applied for membership of NSG in June 2008 and was taken to Group’s fold in September 2008 by granting waiver after marathon parleys. It allowed India not only to ‘access civil nuclear technology’ but also permitted to seek fuel from international market. Such a flexibility and exceptional allowance made India the only country in the world that even without signing NPT became a state which has received an open ended certificate of nuclear commerce with any nation willing to extend the cooperation. It was however a quasi-arrangement without right to full membership and voting rights in the Group’s meetings.
India continued its efforts for full membership by projecting its nuclear credentials. When in November 2009, the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the US; President Obama declared India a “natural allay” and assured full and timely action on Civil Nuclear Agreement signed between both the countries. The move got a decisive boost during President Barack Obama’s visit to India in 2010, where he announced US support for Indian membership in NSG. This opened the process of Indian bid to the export control cartel while setting up an internal “structured dialogue” to discuss and debate the possibility of inclusion. To facilitate the possible Indian inclusion into NSG, the US along with Western partners initiated a rigorous diplomatic process to open membership of New Delhi into several other ‘multilateral export control regimes’. The plan of action initially wanted India to join the “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)” which it has been already given membership in June 2016. Later on in December 2017 it joined the ‘Wassenar Arrangement’ and ‘Australia Group’ in January 2018. Out of four export control regimes, currently India is member of three groups.
It is important to decode Indian thinking for her membership in the NSG. Below are mentioned few of the important aspiring points for India:
(a) Full NSG membership is the next ‘logical step towards global recognition of India’ as a nuclear weapons state.
(b) The NSG membership is long overdue for a country that has ‘clean non-proliferation record’.
(c) India has necessary technological wherewithal to contribute to the NSG functioning. Membership would also help fuel starving country [India] to procure nuclear technology and buy more fuel. Joining the cartel would also give India an exceptional opportunity to learn from the international nuclear industry and benefit from global market.
(d) By letting India in, the NSG would set an example that if a country displays good proliferation behavior, it would be rewarded by membership.
(e) Admitting India to the NSG would be another step in elevating the civil nuclear cooperation that Obama and Modi had envisioned.
Why India Should Not Become Member of NSG:
Regardless of Indian aspirations for the NSG, it is also important to understand, why India should not become a member of the NSG:
(a) India is not a party to NPT. Since India does not subscribe to the dominant forum on the non-proliferation, how can it be admitted to a body based on NPT’s principles?
(b) How will India reconcile its stand on the NPT with core non-proliferation premise of the NSG?
(c) Isn’t ironic that a Group that was created because of India’s breach of an agreement is now considering admitting it as a member?
(d) Admitting India would have implications for the credibility of the NSG as well as global non-proliferation regime.
(e) Around 16 tons of civil plutonium outside IAEA safeguards with that of ambiguous separation program of her reactors puts no legal scrutiny over India rather allows it to misuse the stockpile and reactors for strategic purposes [military program].
(f) For India, ‘membership of NSG is a matter of prestige,’ a significant milestone on the road to great power status. The NSG should not facilitate that by legitimizing a state that has not lived by the rules of the game.
(g) By granting a membership status, the NSG would force Pakistan to take steps to safeguard its interests thereby jeopardizing peace and stability in South Asia. Thus aggravating a situation instead of improving it as is the idea behind the NSG.
(h) The ‘waiver from NSG guidelines was not given as a reward for India’s non-proliferation behavior but, rather, ‘hammered through by Washington’, which sought to establish closer strategic and commercial relations with New Delhi’.
(i) The NSG waiver ‘violates the core bargain of the NPT of giving up the right to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with the development of nuclear energy programs and other benefits of nuclear technology’.
(j) Pakistan’s nuclear program is a direct result of India’s. The waiver and membership would further exacerbate the situation.
What Benefits India May Get, if it joins the NSG:
With the arguments given in preceding paragraphs, it becomes important to outline those prospective significant advantages to India which still make her keen to become a member of the NSG.
(a) Nuclear politics has given few nations quite an influential role in international relations where nuclear commerce being most viable energy option to developing countries has made them ‘rule-adhering-nations’. Due to this factor, the so-called nuclear club has received much attention over the period of time. India being the ‘rule-adhering-nation’ wants to enter into the nuclear club of ‘rule creating nations’. This would allow India to add another star necessary to achieve great power status.
(b) Indian requirement of nuclear fuel and materials for its nuclear program will be met through an assured supply chain by virtue of better access to nuclear trading countries.
(c) Entering into the elite nuclear club would allow Indian access to global market to exploit both export and import avenues. With the passage of time deliberate research and development investment on the nuclear industry could make India a leading exporter of nuclear related materials. Through this, Indian industry would witness innovation and high-tech manufacturing necessary to boost the pace of its economy.
(d) Indian entry into NSG as a full member would give her recognition and legal status in the nuclear regime with greater confidence required to act like an international stakeholder.
(e) The ‘Indo-US nuclear deal’ has already boosted Indian political, military and strategic profile at the global order. Entry into the cartel will be another step into the desired direction.
(f) Indian Nuclear technology may not be termed as very advanced. However, with the membership, it gives her an opportunity and possibility to improve and introduce sophistication in already held technology by way of accessibility to foreign advanced technologies in the field.
(g) If India gets membership, it can block Pakistan’s entry by playing the cardinal of NSG working such as ‘every decision made through consensus’ therefore, not agreeing to grant of membership to Pakistan by India would suffice it to take NSG out of Pakistan’s reach.
(h) Besides global politics, there are definite elements of domestic political mileage which Modi government has been eying on. It can gain much needed domestic applause on the basis of this feat being projected as work of a successful foreign policy.
United States Support for India
The US support to Indian membership is quite evident since the inception of Indo-US Strategic Partnership and can be seen in certain background which would essentially benefit America both in terms of its ‘strategic shift’ to Asia as well as promoting its economy.
(a) Indian membership of the NSG, gives New Delhi a stature which will not only satisfy India in her endeavors to attain a regional and then global power status but it also serves grand US interest in implementing its ‘Pivot to Asia Policy’. One of the pillars of the American strategy is to contain China in her bid to emerge as a ‘global power’.
(b) US nuclear industry is also to benefit from the inclusion of India. Though, it can be argued that the industry was to otherwise benefit in the wake of US-India nuclear deal. But NSG membership gives legality and further expansion in opportunities to do business with India.
Pakistan’s Position on the NSG Membership:
Pakistan’s position on the NSG membership can be summarized as follows:
(a) The NSG should follow a non-discriminatory ‘criteria based approach’ while granting memberships to a non-NPT nations. Such an approach would make the whole exercise transparent and objective devoid of any political or other considerations.
(b) If the NSG follows a country-specific approach, it would cast a shadow on its functioning and tarnish its image.
(c) Pakistan has the necessary credentials to become the member of the NSG. It has over forty years of operating nuclear power plants, has requisite expertise and comprehensive export controls that are in line with the NSG guidelines.
(d) Pakistan needs nuclear power to overcome power shortages. NSG membership would provide her access to the international nuclear market.
Conclusion:
Emphasis on ‘criteria based approach’ and rejection of country specific approach was evident in the public statement given after the July 2018 ‘plenary meeting’ of NSG held in Seoul which stated that “Participating governments reiterated their firm support for the full, complete and effective implementation of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime”. This was in fact a clear indication to India that no exceptional treatment would be available for New Delhi. Grant of NSG Membership to India, while pending Pakistan’s request would be antithetical to the very idea of establishment of the cartel itself. Any such move, wherein an exceptional treatment is administered will have serious regional implications. In the light of preceding arguments, it can be concluded that dependent on the strategic environment, convergences and divergences of NSG member states may shift from one end of the spectrum to the other, therefore, this possible flux leads to emergence of more than one possible scenarios with respect to admission or otherwise of India and Pakistan in the NSG.
