Abstract
The 2019 Trump’s Missile Defence Review is a controversial and dangerous document for strategic stability. In this review India is mentioned as key element of US strategy in Asia pacific region and claims that some commitment between the two countries regarding ABM already exist. Through its defence review, the US is trying to reorganize traditional strategic stability order comfortable for Washington to orchestrate an environment suitable to its strategic interests. Dire consequences would erupt in case of misbalancing the existing parity in the world though Asian region would face the direct heat of Trump’s MDR. The future is going to witness deployment of new additional US ABM in Asian countries along with deployment of intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles. Defense systems like Aegis Ashore are capable of universal launchers which at the same time can be used for offensive posturing allowing intermediate range cruise missiles to be deployed to cast out opponent’s defenses. That will dramatically affect relations among dominant nations including those of the Asian nations that fit well in the global defense shield of the United States. It is therefore very important to decode and understand the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) of the Trump administration. To decode the overall premise and threat spectrum of the MDR, this paper has used deductive method of inquiry and adopted qualitative analysis to unfold 21st century security environment.
Introduction
The geostrategic interests of nations particularly the dominant ones have orchestrated a security environment that is not conducive for global peace and security. Under the prevailing structures of security dilemma, it is difficult to code ones security with that of insecurity of the other. This is an illusion of 21st century power politics that has not only defined but also fed the discourse of national security. Politics among nations and their inclination towards amassing power has ignited a chain reaction of arms race that has set aside their commitments and legal obligations promised to ensure global peace and stability. Somehow the key players of the 21st century power politics who are the very bidders of security on one hand but also the receivers of insecurity on the other hand. Their cycle of reciprocating each other’s actions has taken out the variable of peace their national security That is they are now the greatest victims of their own security construct. leading bidder among many is United States of America that has over the period of time invested enormous resources to maintain technological monopoly with that of developing policy guidelines.
The important elements of United States’ security politics gets from her policy documents like National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Missile Defense Review Of above policy papers are in line with the dictum of protecting US citizens, its territory and culture. For example, the 2017 NSS states, “our fundamental responsibility is to protect The American people, the homeland, and the American way of life. “this not only highlights the objective of US but also identifies enemies out there in the world who are supposedly threatening the so-called objectives of US. That needs a robust response and therefore missile defense becomes the key component of United States national security with that of her defense strategy. As a policy contribution, the missile defense plays a vital role to deter the opponent and help assure defense of the partner nations along with allies. In continuation of the policy, the objectives of the missile defense upholds the mandate to strengthen US diplomacy, minimize missile threats to its sovereignty, maximizes its strategic response in case of fail of deterrence, hedges and decode the uncertainties under unpredictable times, ensures strategic posturing against regional cum global military operations with that of freedom of actions among the US partner and allied nations.
The 2019 MDR of the Trump’s regime is compatible with the United States NSS, NDS and NPR that pro-guidelines vides basic to Department of Defense (DoD), which include input on policy, strategy and capability levels. In fact, these guidelines help the DoD to streamline its defense programs and to develop counter measures against the perceived missile threats emanating out of adversary’s security measures. The US perceptions of the adversary’s security measures include developments on the fronts of ballistic, cruise and security, missiles. The US most conveniently classifies her adversaries as “rogue states and revisionist powers”. The last MDR was done in 2010 and thereafter the US national security spectrum has evolved into a new environment which has demanded fresh outlook on the threat perceptions. That is why the 2019 MDR not only recognizes the changes that have occurred but also highlights the importance of new trends in the security environment of the 21st century that would predominantly define the future of national security.
In continuation to the recognition of security, the 2019 MDR upholds the responsibility of US defense system to mitigate the threats through a concentrated effort to upgrade technological backlog with that of putting high priority demand on the up-gradation of its existing capabilities. This technological improvement focuses capability up-gradation for both homeland and regional defense systems. Without any doubt this would include rigorous efforts in the field of science with that of exploration of new technologies and innovative ideas to provide cost-effective support to US defence system against the perceived missile threats.
One of the highly toned mandates of the MDR is its emphasis on the comprehensive approach towards the US missile defense system to deter missile threats emanating from rogue states and revisionist powers. To achieve that the MDR adopts a way forward to integrate both offensive and defensive capabilities, so that credible deterrence must prevail. It also includes connotation of active defense meant to enhance capabilities of the US to intercept missile flights particularly in its early flight phase. The passive defense is proposed to address the challenges of missile attack. Last but not the least, the 2019 MDR emphasizes on preemptive attacks to neutralize the possible offensive missile threats of the adversary prior to launch during a conflict situation.
Missile Security Environment and the U.S. MDR
The threat spectrum and the so called defense prerequisites have already been described in the National Defense Strategy of 2018, which makes the security environment far more complex and volatile. It states that the security environment is far “more complex and volatile than any we [US] have experienced in recent memory”. Just like the NSS, NPR and the MDR, the US threat spectrum in the NOS have also postulated its national security around potential adversaries who have been continuously investing in missile capabilities. The adversaries are blamed for developing their missile capabilities on three specific domains. The first development is associated with enhancing the existing systems. The second domain is attached to the addition of new arsenals with that of unprecedented missile types. The third category of developing missile capability is associated with an adversary’s potential integration of offensive missiles into operational postures such as their real deployments in military exercises and war gaming scenarios with intention to enhance coercive threats. The 21st century advancements in missile inventories have allowed techno logically advanced nations to evolve ‘multiple independently tar getable reentry vehicles (MIRV)’ and ‘maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV)’ that has given impetus to modernization of ballistic missile systems, so does the threat spectrums. The developments of decoys with that of jamming devices have somehow created potential of engaging missile modernizations as ultimate successful offensive weapons but could not ensure total guarantee against the annihilation.
In view of US defense experts, China and Russia are continuously expanding their missile arsenals with that of development of ballistic and cruise missiles. The hypersonic missile inventory of both Russia and China is of greater concern for the United States, which have superior travel speed and hold unpredictable travel paths thus making Washington’s inventory of defense missiles off the mark. These are some of the important aspects of security threats that US has been apprehensive about and wants to address through 2019 MDR.
Perceived Bidders of Insecurity to US Homeland
The MDR identifies potential ‘rogue states and revisionist powers’ that threaten the very security of United States and puts enormous challenges on its missile defense systems. A brief analysis is given on the potential challengers of insecurity to US homeland.
1. North Korea. One could label the recent US and North Korean leadership summits as a step towards confidence building measures to deescalate hostility if not denuclearization. Though, behind the doors the reality is somehow maintaining the status-quo in North Korean technological advancements, which are geared to achieve credible advancements in the inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This has been the greatest concern for United States national security and if North Korea becomes successful in materializing her intensions to reach US soil through its ICBMs then the threat spectrum of Washington would become prey to politics of Korean Peninsula. The proactive US posture of security con struct would immediately turn into passive and more of defensive nature. Any offensive posturing could in real terms cost the US and its ally’s doomsday annihilation, which under all circumstances would not be acceptable to U.S. Therefore, when it comes to global security environment, North Korea tops the list and puts heavy burden on US missile defense. It is important to highlight that the so-called security threats emanating out of North Korea are disputable. The US intervention and interference in different parts of the world has created challenges to its national inter est. Getting lead from the Middle Eastern fallen nations like Iraq and Libya, how come sovereign nations will surrender to U.S. dictates?
2. Iran. Iran views U.S. influence in the Middle East as the foremost barrier to its goal of becoming the dominant power in that region. One of Iran’s primary tools of coercion and force projection is its missile arsenal, which is characterized by its increasing numbers, as well as advancement in accuracy, range, and lethality. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East and continues the development of technologies applicable to inter-continental range missiles capable of threatening the United States. Its desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM, and progress in its space program could shorten the pathway to an ICBM.
3. Russia. Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threat to its Contemporary revisionist geopolitical ambitions and routinely conducts exercises involving simulated nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the coercive and potential military uses of nuclear weapons, particularly including nuclear-armed, offensive missiles, and has sought to enable s strategy through a comprehensive modernization of its strategic and theater missile arsenals. As counted under the 2010 e START Treaty, Russia is permitted a total of 700 deployed ICBMs, Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers, and 1,550 deployed strategic
nuclear warheads. Russian leaders also claim that Russia possesses a new class of missile, the hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), which maneuver typically travel at velocities greater than Mach 5 in or just above the atmosphere.
4. China. The United States seeks to displace China in the Indo-pacific region and reorder the region to its advantage. Offensive missiles play an increasingly prominent role in China’s military modernization, coercive threats, and efforts to counter U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-pacific. It has deployed 75-100 ICBMs including a new road-mobile system and a new multi-warhead version of its silo-based ICBM. Beijing also now possesses 4 advanced JIN class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), each Capable of carrying 12 new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the CSS-N-14. Consequently, China can now potentially threaten the United States with about 125 nuclear missiles, some capable of employing multiple warheads, and its nuclear power will increase in the coming years. Beijing is also developing advanced technologies, such as MARVs and HGVs.
While the United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the homeland, U.S. active missile defense could outpace existing and potential rogue state offensive missile capabilities. To do so, under the premise of 2019 MDR, the United States will pursue advanced missile defense concepts and technologies for homeland defense.
Features of the MDR
Trump’s MDR is an attempt to outbalance the so-called strategic stability that it has been in pact with Moscow. Trump’s vision of missile interceptors also brings China and North Korean ballistic missile pro gram into equation of MDR. The strategic community of Pakistan is not much convinced with the utility of the idea of MDR with that of neutralizing the so-called ballistic missile in its ‘boost-phase’. It is quite an expensive venture but also vulnerable as the interceptors in outer space are not out of ballistic range.
The efficiency and credibility of MDR idea is of strategic importance. Contrary to its feasibility, the most glaring aspect of MDR is the sustainability of US maneuvers to outcast its traditional rivals. This somehow creates a challenge to global strategic stability and continues to keep Russia, China and North Korea under permanent economic pressure to sustain the arms race. This allows
the US to uphold the Cold War strategy of weaponization that indirectly affected the strength of its rival, the former Soviet Union. Today with modern application of kinetic and non-kinetic means, the US is again maintaining the same economic pressure over its rivals. Some of the important facets of Trump’s vision of MDR involve:
i. It is intended to undermine strategic stability and disrupt longstanding strategic relations hip with Russia and China.
ii. United States commitment not to accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of its missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats will directly concern Russia and China while increasing their security concerns about the future. This would also put enormous pressure on Moscow and Beijing to reciprocate with strategic retaliatory capability thus allowing techno logically advanced and superior US to initiate an offensive war fighting posture.
iii. The MDR’s resolve ‘to test the SM-3 Block llA against an ICBM-class target’ particularly against the Iranian and North Korean ballistic missiles is real which is why the credibility of such advanced technological maneuver would direct impact Moscow and Beijing.
iv. The MDR is the true manifestation of multiple layers of space-based capabilities that involves detection and interception of ballistic missiles with that of before or after launch. More specifically, it includes:
- Developing a defensive layer of space-based sensors (and potentially interceptors) to assist with launch detection and boost-phase intercept.
- Developing a new or modified interceptor for the F-35 that is capable of shooting down missiles in their boost phase.
- Mounting a laser on a drone in order to destroy missiles in their boost phase. US department of Defense has apparently already begun developing a ‘Low-Power Laser Demonstrator ‘ to assist with this mission.
Fueling an Arms Race
i. The 2019 Trump’s Missile Defence Review is a controversial and dangerous document for strategic stability. In this review India is mentioned as a key element of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region and some commitments between the two countries regarding ABM already exist.
ii. Through its defense review, the US is trying to reorganize traditional strategic stability order that would be comfortable for Washington to orchestrate an environment suitable to her strategic interests. Dire consequences would erupt in case of misbalancing the existing parity in the world generally but in the Asian region particularly.
iii. In the future we can witness deployment of new additional US ABM in Asian countries along with deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles. That will dramatically affect relations between neigh boring countries.
iv. American ABM, if deployed in Asia, will most probably cover the range of Pakistani ballistic missiles and will make them useless. In case of India joining the ‘league of nations’ hosting US missiles would cause unacceptable security risks to Pakistan.
v. On the other hand, Trump’s Missile Defence Review includes plans to develop and deploy missile interceptors in Outer Space. This behavior contradicts with international efforts to keep space free of weapons. Pakistan is also actively committed to these obligations.
vi. US withdrawal from INF treaty and absence of readiness to discuss prolongation of START-3, ignition of Missile Defence Review and probability of deployment of arms in Outer Space are regressive and dangerous developments, which should be openly condemned in UN.
vii. Pakistan is a responsible important member of the international community and plays a significant role in UN regarding disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Pakistan should not remain aloof because its national interests are directly involved.
viii Washington ‘s decision to abandon the INF treaty can be openly considered as a multistep strategy of denial of global security system. At the same time the final goal of this strategy is clearly visible weakening its main “enemy countries”. Additionally, the White House is interested in strengthening ties with allies like India and preventing further rise of China.
ix. All these factors will fuel an arms race in Asia and directly influence countries with developed missile potential, including Pakistan.
Implications for Pakistan
The strategic community in Pakistan is not much concerned about the so-called initiation of Trump’s mantra of placing missile interceptors in outer space meant to counter ‘rogue missile states’. Pakistan’s ballistic missiles are meant to deter its arch rival India and do not include extra regional ambitions. That is why the scenario of ‘Extra Regional Forces (ERF)’ war theatre had not been invoked when it comes to encirclement of Pakistan through anti-ballistic missile shields. It is important to understand that the US MDR is an attempt to outcast Pakistan’s deterrent posture vis-a vis Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Security experts could orchestrate a concept of ‘strategic parking’ to create reciprocal offensive defense arrangements helping Pakistan to initiate second strike response. Since the Indian ballistic missile program is advancing with that of equipping its space with ABM systems like S-400; this arrangement of ‘strategic parking’ could be of relevance in case of Indian plans to breach deterrence posture of Pakistan. Contrary to Indian domestic arrangements, when it comes to US parking its missiles in India under global missile defense shield, the so-called ‘strategic parking’ would fail to deny execution of ERF war theatre against Pakistan.
That is why Pakistan should not underestimate the 2019 Trump’s missile Defence Review, which is not only controversial but a dangerous document for strategic stability of South Asia in particular and the world in general. Putting the MDR posture straight, it is important to present facts. For example, in this review India has been mentioned as a key element of US strategy in Asia-Pacific Region that says that the cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region s our strong bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and emerging security relationships ” the others such as India”. On a separate occasion in the MDR, it a so mentions that some commitment between the two countries regarding ABM already exist. It specifically writes that “a number of states in South Asia are developing an advanced and diverse range of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. Within this context, the United States has discussed potential missile defense cooperation with India. This is a natural outgrowth of India’s status as a Major Defense Partner and key element of our Indo-Pacific Strategy”.
This is not the first time when US global aspirations have found shelter in India. The Indo-US strategic partnership is a clear example of Bilateral manifestation between New Delhi and Washington. In fact, he 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has already aligned its language with New Delhi. Interestingly, the 2018 US NPR and Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine both have similar ambiguities when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons. For example, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine states that:
“In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons”.
The United States 2018 NPR states that:
“The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control or warning and attack assessment capabilities”.
Moreover, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine calls upon non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and specifically states that:
“India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers”.
On this second point the U.S. NPR states that:
“The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their non-nuclear proliferation obligations”.
Trump’s 2019 MDR is not a coincidence rather it had categorically included India in its defense portfolio and showed reliance on future role of New Delhi. American ABM, if deployed in Asia, will most probably cover the range of Pakistani ballistic missiles and will make them useless, which is unacceptable for Islamabad in any war gaming scenario. Moreover, Trump’s Missile Defence Review includes plans to develop and deploy missile interceptors in ‘outer space’. This behavior contradicts international efforts to keep space free of weapons. Pakistan is also actively committed to these obligations. Indian ambitions in the outer space with that of its recent missile test without any doubt triggers security anxiety among the strategic stalwarts in Pakistan. Staying away without reciprocating appropriate measures could have harrowing consequences for Pakistan’s national security.
Global Voice and Pakistan’s Policy Pursuits
The question, will Pakistan be able to counter new trends of insecurity erupting out of India joining the US global missile defense posture? The answer is bitter though predicable in a sense that Pakistan’s current ballistic missile program is amateur to address new trends of regional-cum-global missile defense postures. Then what should be the strategy for Pakistan? In fact, the only way forward for Pakistan is to join the ‘league of nations’ that are the so-called target states of the US MDR such as Russia and China. Here the reference to join the league does not mean to end-up into an arms race while procuring advance weapons rather it highlights the importance of giving voice to international norms and binding commitments that exposes US controversial and dangerous military postures against the stability of the world. By joining Chinese and Russian voice Pakistan could handle the evolving security dilemma and without doubt this alliance at a later stage could reciprocate technological procurement of Pakistan as well in case of grave security threats and imbalance of military power.
It is essentially important for Pakistani decision makers to bravely strengthen its stance in international platforms like UN and Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Our diplomatic officials in New York and Geneva should not be afraid to criticize Washington’s irresponsible behavior in a constructive manner. Pakistan will not be alone as China and Russia being responsible stakeholders of international peace and stability are already against US intentions of international forums. In fact both Beijing and Moscow are even more concerned with the deviation of US from its traditional commitments and would most probably be looking for ward to countries like Pakistan to Join their hands to encircle Washington’s dangerous trends.
Conclusion
American ABM, if deployed in Asia, will most probably cover the range of Pakistani ballistic missiles and will make them useless. In case of India joining the ‘league of nations’ hosting US missiles would cause unacceptable security risks to Pakistan. On the other hand, Trump’s Missile Defence Review includes plans to develop and deploy missile interceptors in Outer Space. This behavior contradicts international efforts to keep space free of weapons. Pakistan is also actively committed to these obligations. US withdrawal from INF treaty and absence of readiness to dis cuss prolongation of START-3, ignition of Missile Defence Review and probability of deployment of arms Outer Space are regressive and dangerous developments, which should be openly condemned in UN. Pakistan is a responsible important member of international community and plays significant role in UN regarding disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Pakistan should not remain on the sidelines because its national interests are directly involved. Washington ‘s decision to abandon INF treaty can be considered as a multistep strategy of denial of global security system. At the same time the final goal of this strategy is clearly visible weakening of its main “enemy-countries”. Additionally, the White House is interested in strengthening ties with allies like India and prevention of further rise of China. All these factors fuel arms race in Asia and directly influence countries with developed missile potential, including Pakistan. Pakistan must prepare an alliance of global voice to negate the US penetration into South Asian security spectrum. The successful execution of US MDR with that of involving India into the matrix would have dire consequences not only on Islamabad but on the largest nations on earth, India and China. When it comes to integrity and protection of territorial sovereignty of a nation, it is better to bleed at the front rather bleed at the back.
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