The concept of hybrid warfare presents itself to Defence policy analysts as a new lens through which to understand or anticipate trends in this area of concern. It will be necessary to gradually introduce this concept into mainstream vocabulary and journalistic endeavour. There has been a trend of “conspiracy-alarmism” with regards to current affairs and noticing incidents that pose a threat to the nation. Proper Defence analysis would by nature be very systematic, nuanced and contextualised, to encourage a methodical approach in diagnosing threat situations, and escalating the threat level in an appropriate manner. Alarmism is to be avoided at any cost since paranoia will only blur accurate visibility of the prevailing threat outlook, and thus become a form of self-sabotage. Younger journalists who see “Hybrid Warfare” quickly becoming a hot trend or a catchy buzzword upon which to build recognition should be brought to heel at the outset, being reminded that Defence policy concerns are at stake.
The previous article in this series outlined the background of the concept with references to the various branches of US Special Operations which included Unconventional Warfare as but one strand among many used as part of an offensive, interventionist US foreign policy mechanism. On the defensive side, we saw it being used as a description of guerrilla forces seen in context of the US Global War on Terror, and the disorienting effect of multiple, combined strands of attack used by smaller parties. The Arab Revolt and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire was identified as the major contemporary model, seen as a catalyst for almost a century of instability in the Middle East, with political Islamism and militant, non-state actors armed with rebellious ideals pitted against secular leaders left as proxies to Western powers, giving fuel for the arc of crisis which still continues unabated.
We identified a central formula, comprising of a) foreign superpower, b) developing national govt, and c) mobilised non-state actor as the blueprint for a cycle of “agitation-retaliation-intervention”, which necessitates continuous deployment of force and multiple strands of attack. The key concept was that of a “threat perception spectrum” recommended via a UN study on Hybrid Warfare designed to encourage governments to adopt a multi-pronged, unified approach to protecting their stability as recommended by US General Hoffman/ Mattis in their study on the Joint Operating Environment for 2035. These events and concepts form the terms of reference within which significant capacity must be developed to recognise and accurately identify hybrid threats.
On a more simple level, the hybrid threat framework can provide a more accurate way to make sense of contemporary news which helps speedier comprehension and avoiding the repetition of recurring and obvious questions. Instead of reacting to each incident as a novel phenomenon, we can slowly begin to typify incidents into a string of trends, all taking place within identifiable boundaries, governing which are the policies and agendas of conflicting parties within a spectrum of hybrid activity.
As stated previously, “The complex variances of policy and smaller strands of strategy, along with the politics of the situation in real-time present a much more complex, gray-zone scenario to be tackled by the individual Defence policy thinker than has ever been presented before”. This is how the subject of discussion forces us to reframe and carefully dissect journalistic or political convictions given to contemporary political, military, civil or economic issues, except on matters of universal agreement, such as the status of proscribed organisations or radical non-state actors.
Russia/Ukraine
During the Soviet Era [1923-55] we saw the use of active measures by Moscow to shape the political landscape in Europe. This involved the origins of psy-ops and disinformation, funding of political parties, encouraging protest movements, usage of espionage to steal state secrets and manipulation of media. In the early 2000s, following the colour revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, and growth of foreign investment and strong oil prices, Russia regained the resources it lacked in the 90s and invested them in military and security development. It is held by researchers that the volume and scope of Russian Campaigns are now far more complex, facilitated through internet, cable news, and social media growth. They have added cyber operations and economic warfare to their arsenal of strategic methods to influence foreign governments. Recent events seen as usage of HW would include their involvement in the 2017 European Elections, initiatives in the Baltic States, influence of Central European nations allied with the US, and the Ukraine crisis. The constant in the equation is certainly foreign policy, but the variable is the range of hybrid techniques employed to meet the needs of their agenda.
One method of analysing current affairs through a HW lens is demonstrated through the UN Multinational Capability Report on “Understanding Hybrid Warfare” cited in previous articles. Ukraine’s case is analysed by looking at 1. Vulnerabilities Inherent, 2. Vulnerabilities Inserted by Russia, and 3. Synchronised Attack Package.
| Vulnerabilities Inherent to Ukraine | Vulnerabilities Created by Russia | Synchronized Attack Package |
| Weak macroeconomic fundamentals | Russia continues to support separatists in the eastern Donbas region with special operations forces. Pursues hybrid attack strategy combining media, cyber and economic pressure against the US backed government in Kiev. | Usage of political pressure, leveraging gas supply contracts and loans, influencing President Yanukovych to abandon signing of EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. |
| High levels of foreign debt. | Leveraging power via gas supply and transit contracts between Russia and Ukraine | |
| High Levels of Ukrainian dependency on Russian Gas Loan structuring to induce debt. | ||
The key principle towards defining a hybrid attack strategy using the Russia methodology would be to identify trends indicating use of non-military attack methods to weaken a target without usage of military force. In the US methodology, non-military attacks are for destabilisation, in order to facilitate conventional kinetic offense, and this is where they differ. The principle is identified through Russia’s usage of economic and cyber influencing to encourage Ukrainian acceptance of its policy decisions.
Russia used stealth and ambiguity to induce agreement from Ukraine. It was generally aware of the risks associated with the energy and economic deals with Russia. However, it was unable to correctly grasp how the gas contracts and loan structures were designed to their disadvantage. Moscow was then able to actualise a key agenda, leading to the annexation of Crimea. A key principle in this situation was the escalation and de-escalation of strategy according to need of circumstance.
The Syrian Situation
In this scenario we are looking at usage of hybrid instruments of foreign policy, as well as the hybrid agendas/parties at play, with specific focus on non-state actors. The war against ISIL forms a key case study for the current geopolitical situation, and usage of the hybrid warfare terminology puts it in perspective. The US deployed multiple strands of influence and collaborated with numerous actors, accurately defining it as a hybrid scenario. It began using an economic strand of activity, with the provision of aid to Syrian rebels, followed by training, cash and intelligence provided to certain rebel commanders. A training initiative was launched by the CIA, later cancelled by Trump. The US gained two major pretexts for their involvement in Syria, both a) the emergence of ISIL, and before that, b) the Syrian civil war, in which militia forces were armed and trained to topple the Assad government. The latter in many aspects was seen as the catalyst for ISIL’s emergence. Following provision of aid, the intelligence strand was mobilised, with the commencement of surveillance missions in 2014. By September of that year, military operations commenced against IS, Khorasan Group, and Al-Nusra front in coalition with the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreed to arm anti-ISIL forces in Iraq and Syria, starting with Kurdish militia [YPG].
Terminology of regime change is visible in news related to hybrid strategies. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported for December 2015 a detailed list of weapon types and weights from the Fed-Biz-Ops [Federal Business Opportunities] website for Operation “Timber Sycamore”, involving shipment of 994 tonnes of weapons/ammunition to Syrian rebel groups. The collapsing of a large Sycamore tree serves as a metaphor indicating their intent towards Assad. These shipments were reportedly continuing as of July 2016.
An incident took place in September 2016 involving the accidental attack on a Syrian military base by Allied forces. 2 US A-10 Planes, 2 Danish F-16s, and a UK Reaper drone were involved in what was later described as an “intelligence/navigation mistake”, a mistake costing the lives of 62 soldiers in the Deir-az-Zaur region. The US was banned from carrying out air strikes in the region temporarily by the UN Security Council.
The incident was seen by Russia as a clear example of US HW Strategy, assisting ISIL against the Syrian government. If hybrid war is seen as a method of subtle warfare, influencing the agenda and mentality of the target nation, then an intervention to attack insurgents without permission of the host government can certainly be interpreted as a form of subtle yet offensive HW strategy, designed to disable the target from effective governance. In this case, since we know the US desires regime change in Syria, the assessment is valid.
In the time we live in, reporting of incidents and subsequent responses/ consequences take place on a near constant basis through multiple channels. How many of us can claim that we see events and statements linked as they actually happen, as opposed to how they are presented to us? How many of us deliberately interpret them in isolation and according to our relative role/occupation?
Daring individuals would risk their reputation and business to call out the US government or its Allies for pursuing the ever ambiguous “hybrid warfare strategy” in the Middle East. However, for those of us wishing to maintain diplomatic and commercial ties, it is far easier to accept the narrative presented to us and carry on with the day’s affairs- if they say it is a mistake, then it probably was a mistake, so why worry? The difference now is that we can identify these things and plainly phrase them within military lexicon, rather than raising “conspiracy alert”, you can say “recent events indicate a hybrid strategy is being pursued and impress all your friends at the local members only club.
Concise Sources Used
Russian officials warn of possible military clash with US over Syria. The Guardian. 10 April 2018
Russia says U.S. plans to strike Damascus, pledges military response. Reuters 13 March 2018.
UN Security Council to meet over US Syria Strike. Associated Press. 17 September 2016.
Obama outlines plan to target IS Fighters. Al Jazeera. 11 September 2014.
Obama Says U.S. Will Bomb ISIS in Syria, Train Rebels. Time. Retrieved 23 September 2014.
House approves Obama’s Iraq-Syria military strategy amid Scepticism.
The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 September 2014.
State Department Cable on Assad/Syria https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
UN ACT, Multinational Capability Development Campaign, Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare. MCDC Jan 2017. Cullen Reichborn [NUPI- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs]
