Abstract
In October 2018, US President Donald Trump announced readiness to withdraw from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) of 1987 that has provoked sparkling discussions among international strategic analysts. This research makes the point that Washington believes that both Russian and Chinese factor poses direct threat to its national security along with its allies and should be neutralized through adequate measures. In such conditions the White House has to deploy in Asia Pacific additional sea and air delivery means which requires lots of funding. On the other hand, United States is restricted by INF treaty and cannot take counter measures in this regard. Washington’s motivation and explanation is very similar to what was used in 2002 to justify unilateral withdrawal from ABM treaty. As a result, US was able to accelerate development and deployment elements of its Global ABM system in South Korea, Japan and a number of European countries. Nowadays Washington’s decision to abandon INF treaty can be openly considered as a multistep strategy for denial of global security system. At the same time the final goal of this strategy is clearly visible which is to weaken the reciprocal abilities of presumed enemy-countries. Additionally, the White House is interested in strengthening ties with allies such as India to contain Chinese rise. The study is descriptive in nature and follows deductive method with that of mixed method approach to highlight the challenges surrounding regime failure of global security system.
Introduction
This research makes the point that recent trends of United States slipping away from its bilateral commitments with Russia on global security system create vulnerability for global peace and security. The world at large is going through enormous security challenges, which are different than the so-called security construct of the Cold War. Most of the literature written in the post-Cold War period had given credit to United States for showing restraint towards Soviet military maneuvers. As a result, maturity between the two leaderships prevailed who preferred to end up into bilateral nuclear arms control measures rather than indulging into direct mode of confrontation. The spirit on good grounds even continued in the post-Cold War period and gave impetus to strategic stability. The pace of positivity somehow got deteriorated in the aftermath of 9/11 episode which highlighted security anxiety in the American strategic posturing and invoked trends of turning back to Cold War arms control measures. This became visible when former US President George W. Bush in 2002 withdraw from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which allowed the country to deploy anti-ballistic systems massively in Asia Pacific and Eastern Europe.1
Continuing with the pace of slipping away from global security system, in October 2018, the US President Donald Trump also announced its readiness to withdraw from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) of 1987 that has provoked discussions among international strategic analysts.2 If US really steps back for its obligations vested in the INF treaty which is considered as a fundamental arrangement for global peace the world will face new dangerous challenges. One of the biggest positive trends that emerged out of such treaties was the stability of arms control between United States and former Soviet Union. Though, in 1988 Russia succeeded the former Soviet Union but the consensus required for international peace prevailed. Today, the “Trump Trend” is reflecting Washington’s hasty withdrawing strategy from bilateral strategic agreements that it had signed with Russia. This tendency is not good for international security. It is important to mention that the US had in 2001 already abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Treaty (ABM) of 1972, which was the byproduct of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the first ever consultative arrangement of 1969 between the two Cold War rivals. US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty was referred as mistakes by the Russian leadership.3 This recent intention of declaring withdrawal from INF treaty is not an isolated attempt, it is in fact a continuation of a greater US strategy.
Looking deep into the Trump’s trend towards arms control, one could predict the so-called serial killer kind of tendency in White House, which will not settle-down until it finds its next target. So, the next agreement that falls prey to Trump’s trend of arms control is New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) of 2010. New START benefited both the competitors in limiting the deployment of nuclear warheads to 1,550 along with deployment of over 700 delivery systems.4 The consensus will remain alive until February 2021 but the future prospects of the treaty and its extension seems dark. Regrettable is the fact that these three treaties are the pillars of nuclear stability, which prevented the possibility of nuclear war between the two countries. It took so many years with exceptional efforts to create this legal base to guarantee safety and peace. Trump’s trend of deviating from US commitments towards international peace is about to vanish every singly aspiration towards global security.
Why the Trump administration is deviating from US international commitments? The answer seems quite interesting as Cold War politics of nuclear deployment is under surge with tit for tat tendency. Recent developments surrounding militarization of regions along with nuclear testing and deployment of sophisticated warheads which the US believes Russia and China had indulged in are the violation of the earlier commitments.5 Though, China is not party to INF treaty but still US looks at her nuclear posturing as a threat to its national security particularly of its allies in the Asia Pacific region.6
Nuclear Arms Control Agreements between United States and Russia
The Cold War politics of containment not only advanced the ideological confrontation between two rivals but also prepared their militaries with enhanced abilities to confront each other’s objectives on an extended geography. This made them capable to engage on almost every territory of the world. In return technological sophistication along with modernized armaments had defined the destructive capabilities of the two. This created a point where dooms day mantra of insecurity got birth and both the rivals had to come together to address the strategic vulnerabilities hampering international peace and security. This in fact originated bilateral consultations during the Cold War, which helped the two to end up into mutual agreements on nuclear arms control mechanism. Thereafter, visualizing need for stability and international peace both Washington and Moscow have adopted measures to curtail and minimize bilateral issues of vertical proliferation including decrease in nuclear warheads, missiles and delivery means.
Most of the Cold War arrangements around nuclear arms control were strategic in nature, which included SALT-I and SALT-II of 1969 and 1972, respectively.7 Though, START-I was initiated in 1980s but was materialized in 1991.8 Therefore, START-I, START-II, START-III, SORT, and New START were the arrangements which came into existence in the post-Cold War period. It is significant to mention that the 1987 arrangement of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a non-strategic nuclear arms control agreement, which continued even in the post-Cold War period.9 This has recently came under debate by the United States which it wants to withdraw. The other non-strategic nuclear arms control measure was the Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) of 1991, which was also reciprocated by the then Russian leadership. Therefore, when it comes to identify nuclear restraint or arms control arrangements between the United States and Soviet/Russian leadership, there are two different measures which define the overall consultations and global security system. These are:
i Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Arrangements
ii Non-Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Arrangements
The details of both types of arms control measures are briefly explained below to understand the basic outlet of contemporary trend of slipping away from the global security system by the United States.10
Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Arrangements
As mentioned earlier that both United States and Russia had two separate arrangements of arms control bargain which includes strategic and non-strategic nuclear arms control measures. The strategic nuclear arms control agreements included Cold War arrangements such as SALT-I, SALT-II, and post-Cold War START-I, START-II, START-III, SORT and NEW START.
o SALT I
Begun in November 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced by May 1972 both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited strategic missile defenses to 200 (later 100) interceptors each, and the Interim Agreement, an executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos, not to increase the size of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” and capped the number of SLBM launch tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warhead numbers, leaving both sides free to enlarge their forces by deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber-based forces. The agreement limited the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM launch tubes. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM launch tubes. In June 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty.11
o SALT II
In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, limited U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM and strategic bomber-based nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles (defined as an ICBM silo, a SLBM launch tube, or a heavy bomber) and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. The agreement would have required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S. forces were below the limits and could actually have been increased. However, President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. However on May 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic nuclear forces would be based on the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on a flawed SALT II Treaty.12
o START I
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), first proposed in the early 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and finally signed in July 1991, required the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement’s rules. The agreement required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles which was verified using an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections the regular exchange of information including telemetry and the use of national technical means (i.e. satellites). The agreement’s entry into force was delayed for several years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and ensuing efforts to denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus by returning their nuclear weapons to Russia and making them parties to the NPT and START agreements. START I reductions were completed in December 2001 and the treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.13
o START II
In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a follow-on accord to START I. START II signed in January 1993, called for reducing deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START II would have counted warheads in roughly the same fashion as START I and also like its predecessor would have required the destruction of delivery vehicles but not warheads.14 The agreement’s original implementation deadline was January 2003, ten years after signature, but a 1997 protocol moved this deadline to December 2007 because of the extended delay in ratification. Both the Senate and the Duma approved START II but the treaty did not take effect because the Senate did not ratify the 1997 protocol and several ABM Treaty amendments whose passage the Duma established as a condition for START II entry into force. START II was effectively shelved as a result of the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.
o START III Framework
In March 1997, President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500. Significantly, in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles, START III negotiations were to address the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads. 15 Negotiations were supposed to begin after START II entered into force, which never happened.
o SORT
On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) under which the United States and Russia reduced their strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. The warhead limit took effect and expired on the same day, December 31, 2012. Although the two sides did not agree on specific counting rules the Bush administration asserted that the United States would reduce only warheads deployed on strategic delivery vehicles in active service, i.e. “operationally deployed” warheads, and would not count warheads removed from service and placed in storage or warheads on delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The agreement’s limits are similar to those envisioned for START III but the treaty did not require the destruction of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did or the destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for START III. The treaty was approved by the Senate and Duma and entered into force on June 1, 2003. SORT was replaced by New START on February 5, 2011.
o New START
On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed New START a legally binding, verifiable agreement that limits each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and limits deployed and non-deployed launchers to 800. The treaty-accountable warhead limit is 30 percent lower than the 2,200-upper limit of SORT and the delivery vehicle limit is 50 percent lower than the 1,600 allowed in START I. The treaty has a verification regime that combines elements of START I with new elements tailored to New START. Measures under the treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty also provides for the continued exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data on up to five tests per year) and does not meaningfully limit missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities. The treaty limits take effect seven years after entry into force, and the treaty will be in effect for 10 years or longer if agreed by both parties. The U.S. Senate approved New START on Dec. 22, 2010. The approval process of the Russian parliament (passage by both the State Duma and Federation Council) was completed January 26, 2011. The treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011.
Non-strategic Nuclear Arms Control Arrangements
The ‘non-strategic nuclear arms control measures included 1987 INF Treaty and 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative by the US President George H. W. Bush, which was reciprocated by Mikhail Gorbachev the then Soviet leader. Both United States and Russia entered into 21st century with only two arms control arrangements, which included ABM treaty being the legacy of SALT-1 arrangement and INF treaty being the subsequent verification supplement for START-1 treaty. In 2003 SORT entered into force which was replaced by New Start in 2010. Therefore, the next section of the study would only entail details about AMB, INF, and New Start treaties as part of contemporary nuclear arms control arrangements between United States and Russia. Why these treaties were agreed earlier and what factors impacted on the consensus later on, is the overarching question that will drive the discussion.
o INF Treaty
Signed December 8, 1987, the INF Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, including on-site inspections, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork for verification of the subsequent START I. The INF Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, and the two sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1991, destroying a total of 2,692 missiles. The agreement was multi-lateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union and current active participants in the agreement include the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreement but do not participate in treaty meetings or on-site inspections. The ban on intermediate-range missiles is of unlimited duration.16
Both the United States and Russia have raised concerns about the other sides compliance with the INF Treaty. The United States first charged Russia with developing and testing a ground-launched cruise with a range that meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km in 2014.17 In March 2017, a top U.S. official confirmed press reports that Russia had deployed that system, known as the SSC-8 missile.18
Russia denies that it is breaching the agreement and has raised its own concerns about Washington’s compliance. Moscow is charging that the United States is placing a missile defense launch system in Europe that can also be used to fire cruise missiles, using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and making armed drones that are equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles.19
o Presidential Nuclear Initiative
On September 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would remove almost all U.S. tactical nuclear forces from deployment so that Russia could undertake similar actions, reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation as the Soviet Union dissolved. Specifically, Bush said the United States would eliminate all its nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic missile warheads and remove all nonstrategic nuclear warheads from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated on October 5, pledging to eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear landmines. He also pledged to withdraw all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons from deployment. 20However, significant questions remain about Russian implementation of its pledges, and there is considerable uncertainty about the current state of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces.
Getting Out from ABM Treaty
Established during the Cold War it was an agreement signed between the US and the then Soviet Union. The original treaty allowed each country to set up two ABM systems but they agreed not to set up national ABM systems. This was later reduced to just one ABM system around Moscow and Grand Forks, North Dakota. The treaty said its intention was “to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament”. The two parties, it adds wanted to contribute to the strengthening of trust between states.21 The treaty is based on a doctrine commonly known as MAD or mutual assured destruction. Put simply, this posits that the best way to keep the peace is to leave both sides completely open to a nuclear attack so that no side would dare to attack the other, knowing that it would also be destroyed.
President Bush described MAD like this “Security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations” 22 It was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972 and ratified by the US senate on August 3 1972. It entered into force on October 3 1972. Since then, the treaty has been modified by a series of amendments. Five-year review meetings are held in Geneva. President George W. Bush created room to withdraw from the ABM treaty when he said that “it hampers our ability to keep the peace, to develop defensive weapons necessary to defend America against the true threats of the 21st century”.23 The treaty was dismissed by the Bush administration as being the product of a bipolar, cold-war world of two superpowers. The US visualized its main threat as no longer coming from a nuclear attack from Russia, but missiles from rogue states such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq or accidental missile launches. President Bush had said that deterrence “can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation We must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past.”24
Slipping Away from INF Treaty: Risks and Scenarios
All the three treaties mentioned above limit the opportunities to develop new generation of strategic weapons.
o INF prohibits all types of missiles with range between 500 and 5,500 km.
The question is; Does US really needed weapons between 500 and 5,500 km? Keeping in view recent trends in Trump’s deviation from international commitments, we can assume that the White House believes yes, they are needed. This somehow also identifies the potential targets as well which without any doubt will be Russia and China. So, what now?
1. US possible withdrawal from INF will probably lead to deployment of intermediate range missiles with or without nuclear warheads on American military bases which are located in convenient vicinity to China. It’s not a secret that US enjoy vast number of military bases on the territory of allies. Nukes can be brought back to South Korea and most probably to Japan.
2. South Asian allies are also not excluded. The question is how to convince the leadership of a country to allow deployment. It’s easy for US. They have exceptional experience of creating instability in regions escalating simmering conflicts. All you have to do is to create image of a dangerous neighbor and provide credible assurances that the missiles will prevent bad things from happening. Taking into account complicated relations of India with China and strengthening of US-Indian ties we can even forecast that in future American missiles will be deployed in India.
3. China as by now is free from any international obligations in the sphere of strategic weapons development and due to strong economy is able to produce new generations of sophisticated delivery means with different range scope. Beijing claims its right to defend national interest with modern correspondent systems against external threats such as possible aggression from US and India or application of proxy means to destabilize its grip over Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, etc.
Conclusion
Washington believes that Russian and Chinese factors possess direct threat to its national interest and security of its allies and therefore should be neutralized. On the other hand, United States is restricted by INF treaty and cannot take counter measures in this regard. In such conditions the White House has to deploy in Asia Pacific additional sea and air delivery means which requires lots of funding. Washington’s motivation and explanation is very similar to what was used in 2002 to justify unilateral withdrawal from ABM treaty as a result of which the US became able to accelerate development and deployment elements of its Global ABM system in South Korea, Japan and number of European countries.
Washington’s decision to abandon INF treaty can be openly considered as a multistep strategy of denial of global security system. Though, on December 04, 2018 during a NATO meeting at Brussels, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that they have given 60 days ultimatum to Russian counter parts to comply with the INF treaty or otherwise United States would follow its own discourse of withdrawing from the treaty.25 Issuing the warning from NATO platform has significance for a collective counter response against Russian perceived violations. The United States at the same time will be benefiting from withdrawing strategy to weaken its main “enemy-countries”. Additionally, the White House is interested in strengthening ties with allies such as India to contain Chinese rise.
It is important to mention that India will definitely put efforts to enforce missile program if missile race in South Asia receives more gain from American input. India’s recent membership in MTCR will also push New Delhi to acquire new technologies from new partners in frames of legal cooperation inside MTCR.26 In this scenario it would be also difficult for Islamabad to compete because of economic political and technical issues.
End Notes
1 Wade Boese, “U.S. Withdraws From ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted,” Arms Control Association (July/ August 2002), available online at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_aug02 (accessed on December 12, 2018).
2 Julian Borger and Martin Pangelly, “Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with Russia,” The Guardian (October 21, 2018), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia (accessed on November 11, 2018).
3 Simon Jeffery, “US withdraws from ABM treaty,” The Guardian (December 13, 2001), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/13/usa.russia (accessed on November 10, 2018).
4 Joe Gould, “US lawmakers tangle over nuclear arsenal, Russia treaties,” Military Times (November 30, 2018), available online at: https://www.militarytimes.com/congress/2018/11/30/us-lawmakers-tangle-over-nuclear-arsenal-russia-treaties/ (accessed on December 01, 2018).
5 Julian Borger, “US says it will pull out of INF treaty if Russia does not comply within 60 days,” The Guardian (December 04, 2018), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/04/us-inf-russia-nuclear-treaty-deadline (accessed on December 05, 2018).
6 Tong Zhao, “Why China Is Worried About the End of the INF Treaty,” Carnegie-Tsinghua-Center for Global Policy (November 07, 2018), available online at: https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/11/07/why-china-is-worried-about-end-of-inf-treaty-pub-77669 (accessed on November 12, 2018).
7 L. Jensen, “Negotiating strategic arms control, 1969-1979,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(3), (1984), 535-559.
8 L. Forrow, B.G. Blair, I. Helfand, G. Lewis, T. Postol, V. Sidel, & C. Cassel, “Accidental nuclear war A post-Cold War assessment,” New England Journal of Medicine, 338(18), (1998), 1326-1332.
9 Brian Frederking, Resolving Security Dilemmas: A Constructivist Explanation of the INF Treaty (Routledge, 2018).
10 Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association (June 01, 2017), available online at: https://www.armscontrol.org/print/2556 (accessed on November 20, 2018).
11 “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/ Treaty (SALT) I and II,” Office of the Historian, available online at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt (accessed on December 12, 2018).
12 Ibid.
13 “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).” Federation of American Scientists, available online at: https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/ (accessed on December 13, 2018).
14 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) available online at: https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102887.htm (accessed on December 10, 2018)
15 Daryl Kimball, “The START III Framework at a Glance,” Arms Control Association (January 2003), available online at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start3 (accessed on December 06, 2018).
16 Daryl Kimball, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance,” Arms Control Association (December 14, 2018), available online at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty (accessed on December 18, 2018).
17 Dave Majumdar, “Novator 9M729: The Russian Missile that Broke INF Treaty’s Back?,” The National Interest (December 17, 2017), available online at: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/novator-9m729-the-russian-missile-broke-inf-treatys-back-23547 (accessed on December 10, 2018).
18 “Top U.S. General Says Russia Deployed Banned Missiles To Threaten NATO” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (March 08, 2017), available online at: https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-general-sela-russia-banned-ssc-8-missiles/28358071.html (accessed on December 11, 2018).
19 “INF treaty: Russia ‘will respond’ to new US missiles in Europe,” BBC (October 24, 2018), available online at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45971537 (accessed on December 05, 2018).
20 Susan J. Koch, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992. National Defense University Fort Mcnair DC Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2012.
21 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems” U.S. Department of State-Diplomacy in Action, available online at: https://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16332.htm (accessed on December 01, 2018).
22 “Richard Norton-Taylor and Jane Perrone, the anti-ballistic missile treaty explained,” The Guardian (August 24, 2001), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/24/qanda.usa (accessed on December 10, 2018).
23 “Bush to withdraw from ABM treaty,” The Guardian (August 24, 2001), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/24/usa (accessed on December 04, 2018).
24 Richard Norton-Taylor, “The MADness of President George,” The Guardian (August 01, 2001), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/aug/01/socialsciences.usa (accessed on December 11, 2018).
25 Alex Ward, “Russia isn’t complying with an arms control treaty so the US is threatening to rip it up,” Vox (December 04, 2018), available online at: https://www.vox.com/world/2018/12/4/18126085/inf-treaty-russia-usa-pompeo-trump-putin-missile (accessed on December 06, 2018).
26 Ashna Mishra, “India joins MTCR: 7 things the country stands to gain,” The Economic Times (July 12, 2018), available online at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-joins-mtcr-7-things-the-country-stands-to-gain/articleshow/52934056.cms (accessed on November 30, 2018).
