Nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles were a hallmark of the Cold War period as most of the Asian and European countries were awash with them during that span. The period soon after the abrupt ending of the World War II till the breakup of the USSR (1947–1991) witnesses some dramatic changes in the warfare techniques and technologies. The mighty power of conventional warfare declined owing to the fire and brimstone at the nuclear-weapon-hit cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the nuclear weapons reasoned out a war within few days that had been lasting for six years. The Kafkaesque and capacity of nuclear weapons was a boon for the nuclear weapon industry: within the next two decades the four other veto-wielding states mastered the nuclear weapons technology. The US and the USSR initiated deployment of nuclear weapons keeping in view their security needs. The prime states for nuclear-weapon deployment were the NATO and Warsaw Pact partners that had completely aligned their security interests and requirements with that of the US and the USSR respectively. The world was under the darkest nuclear clouds ever during the Cold War time as a nuclear war in two non-nuclear states could be fought with the deployed nuclear weapons of the USA and the USSR unleashing spine-chilling results.
The Cold War span of almost 44 years can be divided into two equal periods based on factual observations: Arms Expansion (1947–69) and Arms Control (1969–91). A brief description of both periods is as follows:
(1) Arms Expansion Period (1947-69):
The Arms Expansion period primarily depicts two major wars, deployment of nuclear and conventional weapons in allied states by the two super powers, exponential surge in international tensions and kicking off new military strategies besides giving birth to new terminologies. Displaying might had been the prime feature of arms expansion period. This period started with the Berlin Blockade in 1947 and ended with President Nixon’s announcement of US troops withdrawal from Vietnam in 1969. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1972 was the ne plus ultra of this period when the USSR threatened the American mainland by placing medium-range nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba just 145 kilometers from Florida. The world has never attained such nuclear brink after 1945. The arms expansion period enlists two major wars, that is, the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Vietnam War that formally ended in 1975. Both wars were fundamental in defining the military strategies for the future as new terminologies were coined after devising military strategies and capacities in line with the experiences of the wars. Consequently, the warfare jargon added Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, First Strike, Second Strike Capacity, Nuclear Parity, Escalation and some other terms that had never been known before that time. During this period two major military doctrines were adopted by the US governments: Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response.
i. Massive Retaliation
The theory of Massive Retaliation was based on US truculent experience of the Korean War. The unpopularity of the war coupled with the demoralization of US military compelled President Eisenhower to introduce the concept of Massive Retaliation simply any aggression by the Soviet Union in Europe or elsewhere would be dealt with enormous nuclear onslaught on the Soviet homeland1. This policy stonewalls the options of the diplomatic path and conventional warfare as defeating the Soviet Union, decisively, became the primordial policy parameter for the US soon after the Korean War.
ii. Flexible Response
President John F. Kennedy, successor to President Eisenhower, introduced the “Flexible Response” doctrine in contrast to the doctrine of massive retaliation. Flexible Response2 strategy emphasizes the need of systematic and gradual response to an aggression keeping in view all the available defensive and offensive options, even diplomatic ones, rather than stepping directly to the use of nuclear weapons as stated by the massive retaliation doctrine. In other words, flexible response strategy is the ability to respond the external aggression over the spectrum of war fighting options not limited to nuclear war only. Till-date Flexible Response has been the war-fighting strategy of the US evinced from its response to the Gulf War of 1991 as Operation Desert Shield, War against Terrorism started officially in 2001 as Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Iraq War of 2003. The biggest upshot of Flexible Response strategy is US-USSR bilateral agreement called Intermediate – Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF, which eliminated a wide range of nuclear-capable missiles thereby averting nuclear debacle from Europe as well as Asia.
(2) Arms Control Period
Arms Control primarily comprises two major types: Quantitative and Qualitative. The former deals with limiting the number of troops, warheads and missiles whereas the latter plenary prohibits the entire category of particular weapons or missiles3. The arms control chronicle is rife with quantitative as well as qualitative arms control agreements between the USA and the USSR. President Richard Nixon (1969–74) entered the White House during the climax of the Vietnam War. In his first year he announced the phased pull out of US troops from Vietnam and initiating the first episode of arms limitation talks with the USSR called as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, SALT-I. A period of decadent between the two superpowers is said to be started as soon as President Nixon arrived the White House. SALT-1 was concluded in 1972 along with Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and SALT-II negotiations commenced in the same year. The limitations in number of long and intercontinental missiles were taken into account with the signing of SALT-II in 1979. The negotiations would continue then on medium and intermediate range nuclear forces in 1979 followed by negotiations on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, which began in 1982. In a nutshell the second half of the Cold War period was fundamentally a period of arms control between the USA and the USSR.
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, INF, Treaty
(1) Historical Perspective
As explicated the strategy of Flexible Response accrued the need for INF treaty. The US and its NATO allies realized that the Soviet Union and Warsaw pact had numerical superiority if a conventional war was fought between them and the US-led NATO alliance might face shellacking. In response to this Achilles Heel, the concept of Escalation appeared in the nuclear war theory. US strategists defined escalation as resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons if the adversary retains upper hand in conventional arms4. The adversary’s use of nuclear weapons in response might exaggerate the escalation further but that had not been taken into account. The escalation from the US side would only for de-escalating the tension by slowing or stopping the Soviet-led response. This nuclear posture of the US-led alliance coupled with the obligation of extended deterrence and Article V of NATO charter compelled the US and NATO for overseas deployment in Europe. Thousands of shorter-range and non-strategic nuclear weapons were deployed by the US in NATO and its allied states and their placement suggested that NATO would use these weapons early in the conflict; if not used the Warsaw Pact forces would pulverize them well before their use. So the flexible response strategy, in juxtaposition to that of massive retaliation, added the option of the use of battlefield nuclear weapons and placement of intermediate and long range missiles in the allied states to counter the Soviet threat rather than striking the Soviet territory directly from US mainland by nuclear-tipped ICBMs.
The dissemination of shorter and medium range missiles amongst NATO and Warsaw Pact states was rife since the late 1950s. Both the USA and the USSR were deploying their nuclear-capable missiles in the allied territories and were replacing also the de persecute; objects. The USSR’s replacement of SS-4 and SS-5 medium range ballistic missiles with SS-20 (the Soviets used the term medium for intermediate range) led the foundation stone for INF treaty between both the super powers. The USSR would threaten the immediate neighbors in Western Europe with these missiles. The SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems lagged in different perspectives: liquid fueling, inexactitude, long launching time, immobility, non-concealment and carrying only one warhead were the prime drawbacks in these systems. Their replacement, that is, SS-20 was a solid fueled missile with high precision having full mobility and concealment options till its launching besides carrying three warheads. Above all its range 5000 km enabled the USSR to strike most Western European capitals and different targets in Asia5.
The US did not respond seriously to the deployment of SS-20 by the Soviet Union but West German Chancellor Hermit Schmidt warned the threat of these missiles to western interests in a speech in late 1977. The NATO states exhorted the US for countering the new Soviet threat. 1979 President Carter concurred with the NATO-proposed “dual track approach” for countering the threat posed by SS-20. The bi-directional approach encapsulated deployment track and arms control track which could counteract the newly-installed Soviet intermediate range missiles. Both the tracks were intertwined with each other. The real idea was to respond the Soviet missiles with bi-lateral arms limitations agreement through diplomatic moves; should it failed the alternatives was the deployment of countervailing missiles.
i. Deployment Track
The SS-20 missiles undermined the NATO security to such an extent that elimination of these missiles seemed the only viable option to NATO states. Direct elimination was not possible so NATO states were aiming to create a bargaining ground with the Soviet Union which was possible only if the missiles of similar efficiency threatened the Soviet-allied territories. The US-led NATO states announced replacement of their medium-range Pershing-I ballistic missile with more accurate and longer-range Pershing-II (P-II) besides adding new ground-launched cruise missiles; both could carry single nuclear warhead. During the span of three years between 1983 and 1986, deployment of 108 P-II ballistic missiles and 464 cruise missiles was agreed upon in the territories of five European partners: West Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Cruise missiles were planned to be deployed in all the five states whereas West Germany would house ballistic missiles also.
The NATO states adroitly created a bargaining ground but at the expense of hue and cry across Europe. The governments in the five states, where new systems were required to be installed, faced colossal public protests and criticism from the opposition parties. The Netherlands and Belgium called for going ahead with the arms control track; the Dutch parliament even delayed the deployment from 1986 till 1988 and linked it also with the increase in number of SS-20 by the USSR from the number deployed on 1 June 1984. Nevertheless, the five states agreed on deployment of new systems despite severe opposition and extensive debate6.
ii. Arms Control Track
The cardinal objectives of the negotiations between the USA and the USSR for limiting the intermediate range nuclear forces, INF, were framed by NATO states7. They came up with four core principles that were completely followed by the US side till the conclusion of the treaty which are:
(a) Nature of negotiations would be bilateral between the two super powers
(b) Limitations on INF systems of one superpower were to be equally accompanied by the limitations on that of the other;
(c) Limitations should have the status of de jure equality on INF systems of both superpowers;
(d) Limitations must be followed by a robust verification mechanism.
First Phase (1981-83): Period of Mutual Intransigence
Formal negotiations on the INF limitations began in November 1981 in Geneva during the first year of President Reagan in the White House. President Reagan spent full year in the White House pondering possible US approaches for the INF limitations and he suggested “zero-zero proposal” just before the beginning of negotiations. The zero-zero proposal aims at no deployment of US Perishing-II ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles in return of complete elimination of USSR’s SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles. The US-USSR delegations met six times during the first two inconclusive years of negotiations (1981-83) exchanging different INF limitations proposals8. Some of them are:
1. In February 1982, the US delegation proposed ban on all INF missiles globally and suggested constrains on shorter-range missiles also ranging 500-1000 km. The proposal was turned down by the Soviet delegation.
2. The USSR proposed the upper limit of 600 INF missiles and aircrafts, intended for use, in Europe till 1985 and the number be truncated to half by 1990. The USSR counted the French and British systems on part of the USA thereby preventing the deployments of P-II ballistic and cruise missiles from the US side. The US rejected the proposal by declaring its deployments inevitable in Europe if the Soviet SS-20s are not eliminated.
3. In mid-1982s an informal suggestion from the US side appeared: the US would deploy its planned cruise missile only and not Pershing-II. The launcher level would be fixed at 75 each side. This would have favored the US over Russia by a margin of 25%. Each US GLCM launcher could carry 4 GLCMs whereas the Soviet SS-20 had the capacity of three warheads per launcher. Resultantly the equation was in favor of US having the capability of 75 more warheads than the USSR (US GLCM= 75*4=300; USSR SS-20= 75*3=225). The formula received a broadside even from the US side as its Department of Defense was not comfortable over inhibiting US ballistic missiles while Soviet missiles remain deployed. Moscow too down played the formula so it was not discussed in formal negotiations.
4. In early 1983 the USA proposed a plan other than zero-zero option and suggested a maximum limit of 450 INF missile warheads globally. The Soviet Union replied by calling for no US INF missile deployment in Europe and taken into account the French and British nuclear forces. The proposal received the same fate as received by its predecessors.
The first announced deployments of P-IIs and GLCMs in Europe in the late-1983 so enraged the USSR that it abandoned the INF negotiations and also terminated the talks on START-I. It became evident from the two years of negotiations that both superpowers were utterly unmatched in their objectives apropos the INF missiles and reluctance in giving even mild concession to the opponent. The negotiations started in 1981 almost two years before the planned deployment of US Pershing-II missiles in 1983 and a via media should have been chalked out for fending off their deployment. Had the two superpowers aligned themselves with each other even on a single parameter, the deployments would not have taken place and negotiations would have faced a smooth sailing rather suspension.
Second Phase (1985-87): Triumph of Reagan’s Viewpoint
Upon Ronald Reagan’s re-election by the end of 1984, US Secretary of State George Shultz met with the Soviet foreign minister in Geneva in January 1985. A broad category of dialogue called “Nuclear and Space Talks” was agreed upon between both the superpowers encompassing INF negotiations, START discussions and resolving missile defense and space issues. The INF negotiations resumed in March 1985; both superpowers de-linked the other issues envisioned in the Nuclear and Space Talks. Mikhael Gorbachev was Soviet General Secretary since the inception of the second round of INF talks between the USA and the USSR and the concessions, he gave to the US during the negotiations were unimaginable. President Reagan fortified his stance of “zero-zero” by transforming it into “double-zero” & elimination of intermediate range, INF, as well as short range missiles9. The idea was shrugged off as it seemed unimpressive for the USSR at that time.
The turnaround in the Soviet’s long-held stance emerged when Gorbachev announced detachment of British and French nuclear systems from that of the US. Previously the USSR had coupled the independent nuclear systems of these two European states with the US nuclear systems in Europe. Therefore, the cumulative warhead figure required to counter the Soviet threat in Europe entailed less US missiles and warheads a posture unacceptable to the USA and was one of the major causes of suspension of the first phase of negotiations. This malleable posture of the USSR germinated the seeds for conclusion of agreement between Washington and Moscow apropos INF missiles. In continuation of its new ductile posture, the USSR agreed in mid-1986 for limiting the warheads to that of 100 each side in Europe without considering the British and French nuclear systems but offered placement of US GLCMs only and not the P-IIs.
The Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik summit in 1986 was a success story for President Reagan as Gorbachev agreed on Reagan’s almost six-year-old “zero-zero” plan but specific to Europe only. Gorbachev proposed zero-zero for INF missiles in Europe whereas the USSR and the USA would retain 100 INF missile launchers in Asia and the USA respectively. But breakthrough happened in the spring of 1987 when Gorbachev announced Soviet willingness on “global zero-zero” for intermediate as well as shorter range missiles thereby accepting the “double-zero” proposal of President Reagan. The decision of including shorter range missiles was warmly welcomed by European states which were the prime targets of shorter-range missiles deployed by the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets also successfully dickered over the elimination of their SS-23 missiles with the Pershing -IA missiles in West Germany10.
Momentous Outcome: INF Treaty Signed
US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhael Gorbachev signed far and away the best bilateral qualitative arms control treaty called “Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, INF, Treaty on 8th December, 1987 on the eve of the latter’s visit to the White House. The treaty nodded the elimination of entire available stock of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear as well as conventional armed ground-launched ballistic missiles, GLBMs, and ground-launched cruise missiles, GLCMs, along with their associated launchers for an indefinite period. The Article II comprehensively glosses some important definitions pertaining to missiles. For instance, the Article II (1) defines the GLBM as a ground launched ballistic missile that is a weapon delivery vehicle having ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path; subsequently the GLCM has been defined as ground launched, unmanned and self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The launchers were described both as fixed launchers or mobile-land based transporter erector-launchers for both ballistic as well as cruise missiles. The intermediate range and shorter range have been spanned from 1000 to 5500 kilometers and 500-1000 kilometers respectively11.
The INF treaty engulfed a wide range of missiles to be deep-sixed, that is, having range from 500 to 5500 kilometers (300-3400 miles) leaving behind only the option of ICBMs (above 5500 kms). The treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988 and in an asymmetrical manner cumulatively 2692 missiles were destroyed within a span of 3 years (May 1991) in consistence with the Article IV 2(b). The USSR destroyed 1846 missiles whereas the USA eliminated 846 missiles: the former’s stockpile was more than double to that of the latter. The Article III explicated the types of missiles to be encapsulated by the INF-treaty for elimination12. In the INF category Pershing-II and BGM-109G from the US side whereas SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 from the Soviet side were agreed for elimination; whereas in the shorter-range the USA agreed for elimination of Pershing 1A and the USSR concurred the same for its SS-12 and SS-23.
The INF treaty was the first bilateral treaty of its kind between the USA and the USSR that enshrined the most comprehensive and intrusive verification mechanism. Heretofore verification had been performed under National Technical Means, NTM, adopting satellites and sensing capabilities only. But the verification mechanism under the INF Treaty enlisted site inspection of selected missile assembly facilities, storage centers, deployment zones and areas, troubleshooting facilities and elimination sites also. Though & any-time anywhere permission was not allowed in either of the states; the sites to be inspected were designated in the treaty and 20 short notice inspections were allowed at the designated facilities. The site inspections continued for the next decade till May 2001 in order to check and contain, if any, preparation of new systems prohibited under the INF treaty is underway13. A Special Verification Mechanism, SVC, was created also in the treaty for dispute settlement, resolving the compliance related matters and suggestions for making the treaty more viable and effective.
The INF treaty was a momentous deal between the USSR and the USA that non-linearly spiraled down the number of deployed and planned nuclear missiles from the globe, not least Asia and Europe. It deterred the nuclear clouds and started a new era of bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow. The East-West deterioration in diplomatic relations and war tension at that time could only be staved off by an effective arms control regime and the INF treaty did the required in a palmary way. Though it was a triumph for President Reagan whose “zero-zero” turned “double zero” proposal was consented by the USSR but credit goes to Mikhael Gorbachev as the concessions he gave soon after the resumption of negotiations in 1985 were unthinkable. His concession of detaching the British and French arsenal from that of US, a pre-requisite set by the USA, solidified the base for negotiations whereas his Europe-specific zero-zero precipitated the negotiations further towards the global “double zero.” Strategic Experts fully agree that if any of the three predecessors of Gorbachev, that is, Brezhnev, Andropov or Chernenko had been in power, the INF treaty would have never been concluded.
INF Treaty in Deep Water
After the first 15 smooth sailing years till 2006, thrust and parry has occurred between the USA and Russia over the INF treaty under different pretexts. The two sides have accused each other for preparing INF based missiles or related systems thereby violating various provisions of treaty. But the strongest wording has come from President Trump who categorically announced on October 20 that the US would withdraw anytime from the INF treaty referring violations from Russia and non-membership of China in the INF treaty. In a campaign rally in Elko Nevada President Trump said: “Russia has violated the agreement and they have been violating it for many years but we are not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and prepare weapons that are prohibited. We will have to develop those weapons unless Russia comes to us and China comes to us and pledge none of us develop those weapons. But if both Russia and China are doing it and we are adhering to the agreement that’s unacceptable14. President Trump’s 20 October announcement was followed by Russia’s visit of his National Security Advisor John Bolton where he conveyed the US angst and reservations over INF non-compliance from the Russian side that would engender accord’s termination. It is widely believed that President Trump has been cajoled by his National Security Advisor John Bolton, a staunch-critic of INF treaty and New START. John Bolton in a 2014 Op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal called for the US for development and deployment of ground-based INF-range missiles not only to counter the Russian threat but to respond appropriately to thousands of such missiles deployed by China.
The Trump administration’s linking of Russia and China as a joint threat to the US can be traced from the Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, released by the Pentagon in February this year. The NPR-2018 introduced a phrase “The Return of Great Power Competition” accusing Russia and China of hegemonic ambitions and asymmetrical military development in order to counter the US military capabilities. The report conveyed infraction of 1987 INF Treaty, Open Skies Treaty of 2002 and 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on the part of Russia thereby adding that the current postures of Russia and China would eventuate Cold War-like tensions and assertiveness among the USA, Russia and China15. Though US strategists define Russia and China as a joint threat to US security and interests but a careful study reveals that the threat perception from both Russia and China differs to an enormous extent and requires different remedial measures.
US-Russia INF Rift Accusations and Discord only
US-Russia rivalry stems out from the Cold War; despite the end of the war and disintegration of the USSR the mutual animosity continues to-date primarily due to geo-political reasons. During the last seven decades since the inception of the Cold War in 1947 the US-Russia arms control arena includes a fugacious period of relative calm, that is, 1991-2001. President Bush re-ignited the bilateral tensions by pulling the US out of ABM treaty in 2002 and announced installation of missile defense interceptors in Poland and radars in Czech Republic. President Putin replied by threatening his country’s pull out from the INF treaty in order to deploy missiles to attack the sites. Since then, the INF treaty has come into severe castigation from both sides.
Nevertheless the US-installed Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense interceptor in Poland and Romania constitutes Russia’s gravamen over INF violations by the US. Russian government has threatened deployment of INF range missiles to counter the threat posed by the Aegis Ashore system. Russia argues that the launchers in the Aegis Ashore missile systems are INF non-compliant as they could launch cruise missiles. Russia has indicated for retaliation by deploying the INF non-compliant systems from its side also if the Aegis Ashore systems go operational. Russia has also relayed severe concerns over the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, that is, drones by the USA that carry precision guided weapons to attack the targets besides flying up to 5500 kilometers. According to the Russian interpretation the drones used by the USA falls under the definition of “ground launched cruise missile” defined in the INF treaty as they retain the properties of being unmanned, use of aerodynamic lift during the flight and are self-propelled. The USA concurs on the feature of aerodynamic flight of drones only and argues that drones are not unmanned; they are piloted at remote sites by pilots. On the other hand, drones are self-contained, rather than self-propelled, as they act like an aircraft by taking off and touching down like an aircraft. Above all, the cruise missiles are destroyed after delivering the payload whereas drones return to their bases after delivering the payloads at required targets16.
Russia is increasingly irked over the bilateral nature of the INF treaty. In 2007 Russia, with the support of the USA, submitted a proposal in the United Nation for converting the bilateral nature INF treaty to multilateral by directing the adherence of INF treaty to the states possessing the intermediate range and shorter-range missiles. But the proposal could not be materialized further in the UN17. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates writes in his memoirs that his counterpart Sergei Ivanov once said him that the USA and Russia were the only two states that cannot deploy intermediate-range missiles and Russian administration was mulling for withdrawal in order to counter Iran, Pakistan and China18. Similarly, Anatoly Antonov, the incumbent Russian Deputy Minister of Defense once said in an interview in August 2014, “Nowadays almost 30 countries have INF-range missiles in their arsenals and majority of them are in close proximity to Russia19.”
The US, on the other hand, has been accusing Russia of non-compliance since 2014. The annual compliance reports generated by the Foggy Bottom under the topic Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments during the last five years i.e., 2014 2018 highlight non-compliance of INF treaty on the part of Russia. In its first two reports only INF violation was stated without any exposition of related facts whereas for the first time, in the third consecutive report, preparation of GLCM by Russia with the INF range was described. The accusations are based primarily on highly sensitive and crucial intelligence reports. The matter was taken by the Obama administration but it did not threaten abrogating the INF treaty unlike the Trump administration. After the release of two more compliance reports it has come to the fore that the suspected Russian 9M729 cruise missile is a sore point in the US-Russia INF relations and is utterly unacceptable to the US and its NATO allies. The NATO terms the said cruise missile as SSC-8 having a range of 2000 kilometers, falling in the category of INF missiles. Russia officially belittles the joint US-NATO accusations and has denied the preparation, flight testing or possession of any such missile. The range of Russia’s RS-26 ground-based ballistic missile is also of concern for the US but some analysts suggest that its range falls in the category of ICBMs; therefore, the US does not mention this in its yearly compliance reports.
Though the INF violations have been traded from both sides continually during the last five years along with reservations on the bilateral nature of the treaty but it’s for the first time that probable withdrawal from the treaty has been announced by President of the USA. President Trump’s 20th October announcement of scrapping the treaty is entirely different from previous acrid nuncupative falling-out’s as he can undo the treaty any time owing to the grievances he and his administration conveyed. But it goes without saying that his decision to scuttle the treaty would have catastrophic consequences not for the US or Russia but for Europe and Asia also. The abolition of INF treaty would directly place entire Europe between the INF-missiles of the USA and Russia directed towards each other. However European states will be extremely reluctant over the deployment of US INF missiles on their territories as they would be subsequently countered by the Russian missiles thereby threatening the denizens of that particular country. Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that the U.S. plan to withdraw from the treaty could lead to a new arms race and said that any nation that hosts U.S. intermediate-range missiles would put its own territory under the threat of a possible counterstrike20. Moreover, Europe would not support the expansion of arms as it will spoil the relative peace in European states to a greater extent. They also remember the public protests against the deployment of Pershing II in the year 1983 in reply to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s.
Nonetheless after President Trump’s announcement, mixed response has emerged from European states. British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson issued statement in favor of the US by putting onus on Russia. He commented “We of course want to see this treaty continue to stand but it does require two parties to be committed to it and at the moment you have one party ignoring it. It is Russia that is in breach and it is Russia that needs to get its house in order21.” The EU warned of a new arms race if the treaty is abolished. Its Foreign Policy chief stated in a statement “The INF contributed to the end of the Cold War by verifiably eliminating 3000 missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads and it constitutes a pillar of European security architecture22.”
NATO has also issued its statement in complete alignment with the British stance. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenburg viewed “No arms control agreement is effective if it is respected by one side only23” referring indirectly to violations by Russia. Germany would be the least biddable state when it comes to US withdrawal of INF treaty and consequent deployment of INF range missiles. German Foreign Minister Heiko Mass has said that abolishing the treaty would have many negative consequences24.
Strategic experts believe that the US withdrawal from the INF treaty at this stage would place the US on receiving end in two major aspects: Firstly, the US would be blamed for the demise of treaty and consequent arms race in Europe and Asia. The infraction from Russian side is equated by infraction from the US side also; so there exists equilibrium between the two states in terms of INF violations. Unilateral abrogation of treaty from the US side means life time blame on US shoulders for scrapping the treaty and re-starting arms race. Secondly, but more importantly, if US accusation about Russian possession of SSC-8 missiles is not specious then Russia would deploy these missiles soon after the demise of treaty. The US has no relevant missiles to counter them as the Russian accusation on the US are on missile defense interceptors and drones which are overtly deployed and used by the USA. It also indicates that Russia’s intelligence is yet to receive credible information anent preparation or retention of INF missiles by the USA. Therefore, if the US covert missile and warheads stock is completely free of INF-range missiles, then Russia’s deployment of SSC-8 missiles would severely undercut the US strategic position in Europe and Asia.
US-China Rivalry A Battle of Superiority in East Asia
The theory of Return of Great Power Competition as envisaged in the NPR-2018 stipulates China as a major rival alongside with Russia because of the latter’s assertive posture on issues pertaining to the South China Sea, SCS, and its refusal to accept the decision of Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal apropos the SCS in July 2016. It’s perspicuous that China’s tumescent economy and expanding military potential have raised alarms in Washington besides solidifying its position in East Asia. China’s growing influence coupled with the inability of the US and its allies in the region to counter the Asian giant is considered to be the prime mover behind President Trump’s probable withdrawal from the INF treaty. Since the second tenure of Obama administration, the US has been at loggerheads with China over major issues and the situation has exacerbated during the Trump administration. President Trump has time and again vituperated President Obama for being lenient on China and even allowing glabrous path to INF treaty.
President Trump’s appointment of Admiral (R) Harry Harris as US ambassador to South Korea in July 2018 is an indication of aggressive posture from the US in near future. Harry Harris also served as the commander of one of the most crucial US military establishments Indo-Pacific Command PACOM. It surrounds the territory of three major US adversaries, that is, Russia, China and North Korea besides including some major US partners and allies like Australia, South Korea, Japan and India. PACOM is also responsible for mandatory obligations under US defense treaties with the Philippines, ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US defense treaty) and US-Japan treaty of 1954. Last but not least, more than 35% of US trade is in this region25. The region is home to more than half of the world’s population and 55% of the global gross product comes from this region. Keeping in view the bare bones of the Indo-Pacific region as glossed above and their importance to US interests, the worth of commander PACOM can easily be gauged. Harry Harris, an ardent opponent of China’s growing military power and US second fiddle in the region, described China as a key challenge to US interests in a statement before the House Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture last year. He explicated the much-improved capabilities of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in ground, air and naval forces. While giving his statement about PLA Rocket Force, PLARF, he said PLARF controls the largest and most diverse force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. This fact is significant because the US has no comparable capability due to our adherence to INF treaty with Russia; approximately 95% of the PLARF’s missiles would violate the INF treaty if China was a signator26.
China’s missile capabilities in East Asia communicate whys and wherefores of President Trump’s probable withdrawal from the INF treaty. It’s as clear as crystal that curbing China’s military and economic expansion is the prime target of the US but torpedoing the INF treaty for handling China would be a faux pas. Rather its violation would pose new challenges for the USA. The biggest of them would be the deployment of INF missiles. The INF treaty bans only the ground-based missiles and if the US starts their development followed by their deployment then where would they be deployed? As explained earlier the pacific region is home to US allies and partners but inviting ground-based US missiles targeted against China and its interests would be the most daring decision having inexplicable repercussions for the state offering its land for deployment of INF missiles. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand are the defense partners of the US; it enjoys excellent relations with India, Singapore and New Zealand and growing warmth with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Mongolia but all of them flat-out know the grave consequences of deploying US missiles, targeted towards China, on their territories. A sane mind would boil down the deployment area for US INF missiles in the Pacific region to Guam only and tearing up the INF treaty for placing China-directed ground-based missiles in Guam would be the most execrable decision yet to be made by the Trump administration.
INF Termination Relapse of the Cold War Era
The INF treaty has given fantastic results as extinction of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles, up to the range of 5500 kilometers, from the stock of the USA and Russia has taken place within a very short span of time. Though the treaty does not include air-launched and sea-launched missiles therefore significant expansion has taken place in air and sea domain. One of the major reasons for the ground-specific INF nature was the accuracy of these missiles as compared to that of the sea and air launched in 1980s. Nevertheless, during the last three decades high precision has been attained in both air and sea launched missiles. The critics of President Trump’s announcement regarding probable INF withdrawal argue that withdrawal would serve no benefit for the US as it could counter both Russia and China with its air and sea-based missiles. In East Asia there is a vast seascape rather than landscape and the US air and sea-based missiles could tackle the targets within the INF range by its air and sea-launched missiles easily. The advocates of INF withdrawal fictitiously state that by deploying ground-based missiles in East Asia, the US would flexibly counter the growing military power and expansion of China in the region as air and sea-based missiles are highly vulnerable to attack. But as explained the deployment of INF missiles in East Asia would be a mammoth challenge. In other words, a country offering its territory for placing US INF missiles would be announcing a direct war against China. The same stands valid for the NATO-allies in Europe against Russia; they would be extremely reluctant in offering their territories owing to being countered by Russia as well as public protests similar to that of 1983. Resultantly deeper fissures might appear in NATO alliance on the issue of deployment.
The veteran politicians and office holders during the era of Cold War realize the role and effectiveness of INF treaty in the arms control arena and the repercussions of scrapping this landmark bilateral accord. Mikhael Gorbachev, the alive signatory of INF treaty, has called President Trump’s announcement as very strange and reckless. In an interview with the Interfax news agency, he said Do they really not understand in Washington what this can lead to? All agreements aimed at nuclear disarmament and limiting nuclear weapons must be preserved27. Though there exist a blend of both critics and advocates of US withdrawal from INF treaty in US congress but the number of critics excels that of the advocates.
The Trump administration should take into account another bigger fact before scrapping the INF treaty that era of the Cold War is over and there is no more Warsaw Pact. Arms expansion in 1960s and 70s took place due to burgeoning threat in Europe: the US allies were threatened by the Warsaw Pact and the latter had numerical superiority in weapons and warheads over the former. This no longer exists now. In the 21st century the European countries are littered with peace and prosperity; Warsaw Pact is no more; the USSR-turned Russia is not that powerful; and last but not least some of the Warsaw Pact adversaries have cordial relations with the US now. So, the post-Cold War dynamics suggests a stronger position of the US against Russia in Europe then why is the need of installing land-based INF missiles in Europe if threat perception in the continent has declined to a substantial level? Categorically China in East Asia seems the prime target of the US and would be the more compelling factor than Russia if the US formally pulls out of the INF treaty. Despites dust-ups there exists strategic equilibrium among the USA, Russia and China which would be drastically hampered if INF treaty is ruined. Deployment of INF missiles in Europe and Asia would revive the Cold War-like circumstance in both the continents and new Warsaw Pact-like alliances would probably be formed under the stewardship of China and Russia. Consequently, arms expansion would take place and new doctrines alike that of the Cold War’s Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response would emerge in the warfare dictionaries. Therefore, a complete reversal of circumstances and happenings would take place if the INF treaty is terminated.
Undoing the INF treaty would be as baleful as death. The US must resolve all its INF-related disputes with Russia through the Special Verification Mechanism which has been described as the stellar dispute settling platform, ever devised, rather than exported pulling out from the treaty. Unlike the USA, Russia would not take responsibility of shredding this landmark agreement. The disputes can be tackled easily if President Trump softens his stance and starts negotiations with Russia on suspected INF violations from both sides. Gorbachev-like resilience and alignment to opponent’s viewpoint, that stoked conclusion of INF Treaty, is required as a lubricant at this stage for survival of this momentous accord; but this time it has to come from Washington and not Moscow. On the other hand, it’s translucent from the geography and geopolitics of East Asia that China is a dominant power which cannot be subjugated by making defense treaties with its opponents, devising aggressive defense postures, placing trade barriers and embargoes etc. Any US-led endeavor aimed at undercutting China’s superior position would not only be counterproductive for the US but result in zippo except devastation in the region. Washington must accept the existing strategic equilibrium and strategic standing of Beijing and Moscow and refrain from perturbing the equation to slightest level.
Multilateral Outreach of INF Treaty A Pipe Dream
The bilateral nature of the INF treaty has been irksome for the USA and Russia but gumption suggests that it cannot be converted into multilateral even trilateral only. At least ten other countries have INF-banned missiles that include: China, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Syria. None of them will adhere to the INF treaty owing to security reasons in their regions. These missiles play an important role in maintaining equipoise state between Pakistan and India, China and India, North Korea and South Korea, Iran and Israel, and Saudi Arabia and Iran. Therefore, none of them will relinquish its INF-based missiles. Expecting simultaneous signatures from all these on INF range is as impossible as getting blood out of a stone. The bilateral disputes among these states will never allow them to adhere themselves on the provisions of the INF treaty. The issues between these states cannot be resolved easily and if the roseate assumption of resolution of disputes between them is taken then there exists a trust deficit which will hinder them from being the signatory to the INF treaty. Simply the stretching out of the treaty towards INF possessing states is like squaring the circle.
Conclusion: Scrapping Humanity not INF alone
President Trump’s scornful attitude towards the international accords has accrued the demise of three major multilateral agreements: Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, Paris Climate Accord and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA; he has laid down the framework for scuttling the fourth agreement, that is, the INF Treaty. Contrary to the three agreements torn up by President Trump, the INF treaty is of bilateral nature but its effects have been observed in entire Europe. The treaty has been the cornerstone of international arms control regime besides playing pivotal role in precipitating the conclusion of the Cold War and inception of arms-free era in Europe. Its demise would reverse the entire scenario but in favor of none. The US-incited demise of the INF treaty would usher a new world riddled with INF-barred missiles as unqualified expansion of ballistic and cruise missiles would take place. The world has attained peace after losing millions of lives during the 20th century and abolishing the INF treaty means doing away with the Pyrrhic victory of peace.
The biggest victim of ripping up the INF treaty would be the New START treaty a quantitative bilateral agreement between the USA and Russia apropos strategic offensive nuclear forces that is set to expire in 2021. The Trump administration has been disinclined about renewal of New START but is yet to announce any policy over this issue. Tearing up the INF treaty means completely uprooting the renewal chances for the New START. And if New START is not renewed coupled with the demise of INF treaty, the world would receive a major setback by a reverse gear of almost five decades to 1972 when there was no quantitative or qualitative arms control agreement between both superpowers and Europe was littered with missiles tipped with nuclear and conventional warheads. This time China is also involved like third leg of tripod, the wrath would not be limited to Europe only but Asia would also face Europe-like crisis. A slight miscalculation or misjudgment from either side is enough for unleashing unprecedented havoc; and only President Trump can explicate the word unprecedented as he commonly uses the phrase the world has never witnessed before during his meetings and media talks. Therefore, it’s not about scrapping the INF treaty only, it’s about scrapping the history, scrapping the arms control and scrapping the peace. Suffice it to say it’s all about scrapping the human progression.
References
1 David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics Published by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lan, London EC4P4EE, p. 306.
2 Ibid, p. 191-192.
3 Ibid, p. 28.
4 Ibid, p. 169-170.
5 Avis Bohlen, William Burns, Steven Pifer, John Woodworth, The Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned Brookings Arms Control Series, Paper 9, December 2012, p. 6-7.
6 Amy. F. Woolf, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service, www.crs.gov, R43832, October 29, 2018, p. 11-12.
7 Bohlen, p. 9.
8 Ibid, p. 10.
9 Paul K. Kerr, Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements Congressional Research Service, www.crs.gov.pk, RL 33865, May 11, 2015, p. 7.
10 Bohlen, p. 11-12.
11 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, US Department of State, http: www.state.gov
12 Ibid
13 Woolf, p. 13.
14 Kingston Reif, Trump to Withdraw US from the INF Treaty Arms Control Today, November 1, 2018.
15 Nuclear Posture Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, February 2018.
16 Woolf, p. 26-27.
17 U.S. Department of State, Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, NY, October 25, 2007.
18 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of A Secretary at War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.
19 Woolf, P. 23.
20 Reif, p. 2.
21 Julian Borger and Andrew Roth, EU warns Trump of Nuclear Arms Race Risk after INF withdrawal move, The Guardian, 23rd October, 2018.
22 NATO Urges Russia to Honor INF Treaty amid US Threat to withdraw, http://www.refrl.org
23 Ibid
24 Reif, p. 2.
25 Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension, Oxford University Press, Second Impression 2009, p. 6.
26 Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris JR., US Navy Commander US Pacific Command before the House Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Posture, 26th April 2017.
27 Andrew Kramer, Gorbachev Calls Trump’s Nuclear Treaty Withdrawal Not the work of a Great Mind, Interview with Interfax agency, www.nytimes.com
