Preface
Having served as part of the rank and file of the prestigious Pakistan Army, it gives me great elation and satisfaction to see it evolving with the challenges of 21st century. The sacrifices being rendered by the ranks to safeguard the geographical frontiers is beyond doubt – a debt to our future generations.
Being a student of military history, I am confident that this institution would have taken steps to achieve the marvels of heroic deeds of our men for the future learning by the coming generations and also to immortalize the acts of these valiant sons of the soil. As a well-known conclusion or even a fact by now, the nature of conflict of Sub Conventional War (SCW) requires an unconventional approach by the planners for application of military force. This in my view has been aptly exhibited by our leadership all various level. Hence, Alhamdulillah success story of our Army emerged from the adversity in the near neighborhood as against the failed efforts by mightiest of the militaries.
Having been commissioned during the 1965 war in 17 Punjab Haidri and later commanded it in Parachinar/ Jhelum, I always wondered about the Chunj operation fought by the Paltan in a very unconventional manner I thought it important to study it and bring out these aspects for the benefit of coming generations. In the same context, I intend drawing pertinent linkage of such an unconventional approach and the scope of success that can be achieved through brilliance of leadership at the unit and sub unit level. Hence, I have endeavored to take the case study of Char Solah’s action as part of 1948 Kashmir War to draw certain inferences that such facets bring to the field force multipliers. Audacity and ingenuity at battalion level in my view remains a key to success in any type of conflict. With the general information available to me through the operational account of various sub-unit or unit actions in FATA Region since 2003, also seem to satisfy this notion.
With same aspect in mind I am presenting outstanding aspects of leadership coupled with audacity, team work and regimental spirit that led to unprecedented success of Chunj Operations in 1948. My endeavor is to bring out these facets and amplify their relevance and scope for adoption by rank and file of the brave sons of Haidri, so as to come out victors during present and future challenges to come their way. My compilation is based on war accounts and anecdotes shared by various veterans during my long service with them, as well as references from select books and my own knowledge of the area and war accounts. In the end, I also leave certain aspects for our future generations / leaders to ponder, so as not to err and learn from mistakes committed in the past.
I would like to pay special gratitude to Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan (retired) for facilitating my visit to the battle areas for my study. I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Brigadier Rehan Aqil Khan, 17 Punjab Haidri for sharing and assisting in crystallizing the operational details. I am also grateful to the officers, JCOs/men, the locals of the area whom I interviewed and who gave their very candid and frank opinion.
Prelude-Events Leading to the Operation
1. Razmak
After returning from WW-2,4/16 Punjab moved to Razmak, Waziristan. The unit won Razmak Athletics Cup for the second consecutive year, in addition won Horse Show, Brigade Hockey and Wrestling Championships. The birth of Pakistan brought many fateful events in its wake and one of these was the undeclared war in Kashmir. Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan Khan took over the Command from Lieutenant Colonel M K. McLeod in September 1947, who proceeded on one month leave to UK prior to his retirement.
2. Move to Abbottabad
On 3 December 1947, the unit was ordered to move to Abbottabad after operation Curzon. In view of partition Sikhs and Dogras of the unit moved to India. As replacement 3 officers, 6 JCOs and 289 men arrived in January 1948 to join the unit at Abbottabad, which meant more than half the unit were new soldiers. The Unit was visited at Abbottabad by GOC on 16 January 1948 and by the C-in-C on 28 February 1948.
3. Move to Azad Kashmir
The Unit had hardly settled down at Abbottabad at the end of CURZON operation, when on 29th February 1948, it was ordered to move into KASHMIR and tasked to stop the Indian advance from URI down the road to DOMEL. However, the Unit was not allowed to use own troops, but was to make use of Azad Kashmir Troops and the Tribesmen. Unit established Headquarters at Chakothi. The CO adopted an unconventional reorganization and Officers, JCOs and NCOs of the Battalion along with tribesmen were detailed to go to the forward position and defend important points at the same time to carry out raids
4. Kashmir & Chakoti
On reaching Kashmir, the battalion concentrated in Chakoti, a place approximately 13 miles on this side of Uri on Domel – Uri road. Colonel Nausherwan who by now had been given the code name of “Kamal” took over the duties of Sector Commander, while Major Muhammad Akbar Khan took over the officiating command of the battalion. Unit was given the task of stopping the Indian advance along the Uri-Domel Road and also to rehabilitate the refugees pouring into the Azad Kashmir from the occupied area. In addition, it was to train, guide and plan operations for Azad Kashmir troops but the unit was not to engage itself in any operation, a restriction imposed by the government. The Indian Army on the other hand had been brought into Kashmir on RAF aircrafts by the Indians under the command of Lord Mountbatten since October 1947.
5. Raid on Enemy Line of Communications
Towards end of March 1948, Indians steadily started building up in Uri sector and commenced aggressive patrolling. It was evident that the Indians were about to launch their much-advertised summer offensive. The CO decided to hit the enemy line of communication with a view to delaying his offensive preparation and inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy. He picked up Major M Akbar Khan to lead a column of mixed troops (consisting of regular troops of 4/16 Punjab and tribesmen) for the task. The column moved off on 1st April following a very difficult route on the left bank of the river, trailing along snow covered peaks ranging from 8000-10000 feet high. It followed the route Sultan Dakhi- Ghulian Lachhipura and Islamabad. This column stayed out for three weeks, destroyed many bridges and telephone cables, breached Mahura power house putting it out of action and plunging the entire Kashmir valley into darkness for six days.
6. In the 4th week of April 1948, another column consisting of 40 men of own Battalion and a few sappers were to make a right flanking movement was assigned the same objective as that of the first column. The column stayed out for a period of 10 days. During this period our column raided a police station and captured three constables, one sub-Inspector police and some arms and equipment. They also completely destroyed an Indian patrol consisting of two officers, one subedar and 8 Ors, 8 Rifles, 3 Stenguns and 2 binoculars. The Indians became extremely cautions and thus their build up was considerably slowed down. Another column was sent along Uppipain-Dheerkot-Choranda and Chapar Calah. On 9th May 1948, the battalion having been relieved by 1/ 13 FF Rifles (the Cokes) returned to Abbottabad for rest and training.
Introduction
The Indians launched their long-awaited summer offensive, heavy shelling preceding their advance on all sectors. The Azad Forces could not hold them. The enemy had a Brigade group (consisting of five battalions and a reasonably large support and administrative elements). 4/16 Punjab was ordered to immediately move back to Kashmir, this time in Tithwal sector which it did on 24 May 1948. After a forced march of over 30 miles on foot from Muzaffarabad, two companies reached Nauseri under the Second in Command, Major M Akbar Khan while the remaining unit joined later under the CO.
Vehicles could only take the unit up to 35 miles short of Chunj, thereafter, the journey could only be carried out on foot. Loads were ordered to be broken into coolly loads and not mule loads. The personnel’s survival loads were kept up to 20-30 Ibs per man. The Unit lost most of the stuff in an air attack as such resumed the journey on foot. With careful supervision all went very well right up to the front line. Soon unit left for Tithwal along river Kishanganga, this journey was hard and rickety. The track was running along the river bank, as such was as winding as the river mostly going up and climbing down and the current in the river was fast with churning and foaming water. Having traversed about 15 miles and crossed the river twice by cantilever bridges the troops were halted for morning tea and a wash. CO had directed to keep in smaller groups and remain at longer distances to avoid presenting air targets. But the collies had stocked the bundles nicely on a road-side and Indian aircrafts in one of the raids destroyed these; (RAF was in full support of the Indian operation), whereas PAF was not allowed to react. A part of the battalion went without bedding and second pair of clothing. Batches after batches of Azad troops in tatters, with old muzzle loaders and many of them either limping or with wounded hands passed us. From their condition, it appeared that they fought without any support fire or logistics. The initial reconnaissance proved to be very depressing and a complete disappointment. There was no defined front; all villages were deserted and devoid of any life. The Azad Troops and the locals were going back to Muzaffarabad along the track running from Pir Hasimar – Pir Chinasi which was the shortest route and a good mule track.
Indian troops after an easy advance against meek interferences occupied Pir Sahaba Ridge (7302). They had also occupied Pt. 7229 on the right and across the river. This was a formidable position especially with a fast river in between. Colonel Nausherwan carried out reconnaissance, being more concerned about approaches to Indian positions and an hour before dark, he called a conference of all officers (five in all). His appreciation was a very correct and detailed one and after detailed report on enemy strength and intentions (which sounded discouraging) he gave out the state of own troops and his intentions, which were to cause maximum attrition to enemy by disrupting the advance through carefully formed groups under selected Officers/ JCOs and some NCOs. (Story narrated to me by N/Sub (later Hon Captain) Nazar Hussain after the 1965 war that CO adopted a very unconventional method of selecting the groups. CO first selected commanders (Officers, JCOs and some good NCOs), who were then asked to give their preference of men to be under their respective commands. These groups were then given rations and ammo for 7-10 days and given specific objectives/ heights to occupy and cause maximum attrition on advancing Indians. They were to stay till their rations/ammo lasted. Indians were confused about the frontage and their advance halted till the rest of the unit could organize for proper defence of the area. This proved to be very effective.
Enemy had about two battalions in front of our one weak company; the other companies were to follow soon. Enemy guns were active. Any move in the area drew artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire. Main track was however, not manned for some unexplained reasons. Colonel Nausherwan Khan adopted an unconventional approach, based on the initiative at the junior/local level, he would spend days and hours on his independent reconnoitering, he would accompany fighting patrols unannounced. Indians were forced to react to his actions but failed. Unit was successful in deceiving the enemy and effectively halted the enemy advance.
Initial Orders
It was time to take up offensive now. Soon after explaining the situation, CO gave out his “mission” to “O” group, “Battalion will capture Pimple (4207) by 0500 hrs. next morning, with a section each astride the main track.” He later addressed all the troops and explained his plan of action and his selection of the objective, which was to facilitate the later objective of eliminating the Indians from the dominating heights.
Colonel Nausherwan Khan thereafter asked for volunteers for the attack. In response everyone including the sweeper Dardar Masih volunteered. Fire support other than own weapons was not available but the objective was close by and well known to the troops. At the same time, he assigned task to an officer to occupy Pt. 9444 and high ground west of Nauseri with a platoon. Colonel Nausherwan infused confidence in the under command and at the same time demanded initiative and courage from the officers/troops. He said, “draw the enemy towards Muzaffarabad”. After a lot of details, he promised to send reinforcements and rations but no ammunition. As for “Administration Para” of the orders he said, I will start your regular maintenance after three days. It shall chiefly consist of rations and some ammunition; he then concluded, you are permitted to draw and expend as much ammunition as possible captured from the enemy.
Major portion of night was spent in the Nullah before the unit was moved to their respective destinations/ objectives early next morning. While on the way to capture high ground west of Nauseri our right flank, the sections going there detected enemy and engaged with fire. Resultantly the enemy left two killed, lot of rations, a wireless set and a dozen boxes of ammunition. This came handy to the sections later.
Indians opened up with every piece of artillery and machine gun they had but no major damage was done to own troops being night. Attacking troops (2 sections) having captured their objective, established themselves firmly. They caused some casualties to enemy troops who happened to come along the track (on left bank of the river) and then moved to their positions. Sections on the left flank got lost and had to do a lot of walking and hill climbing before reaching Chunj.
Plan devised by Colonel Nausherwan took the enemy by surprise and gave our main body time to get to the respective area. Enemy became very cautious and their advance was checked. This game of hide-and-seek kept on going till evening. Indians were very sensitive and fired at any small move, they however, appeared not to appreciate the effect of plunging fire. The Indians brought lot of artillery fire to these parties. By night fall, the CO was happy that enemy was flank conscious, this was confirmed, when in the next two days Indians started attacking hill tops on both the flanks. If Indians had advanced on the tracks there was nothing to stop them but thanks to Almighty Allah our plan worked well. Same evening rest of the battalion started moving to the area. Next week our front was further strengthened on arrival of own Brigade and the situation was stabilized. In a couple of days, two 3.7 howitzer guns arrived to support the unit with Captain later (Major General) Rao Farman.
The Indians were badly caught, they were under the impression that advances without thorough build up and deliberate attack was impossible. They became hill conscious, height minded and very sensitive. They thought that if out flanked or surrounded by Azad Troops or the tribesmen, they would be cut into pieces. Indians resorted to regular bombing and strafing by Indian/ RAF aircraft, unfortunately Pakistan did not have aircraft to react to them. Our troops by then had been well trained, they not only took evasive action but also fired with Bren guns and were able to hit a few enemy aircrafts. Indians were superior in artillery which consisted of the mountain guns but were not effective. Terrain provided good cover, only Howitzers could be effective. In our stay unit had one wounded from the artillery fire. The offensive task was limited due to lack of artillery, supplies, ammunition and tracks. A mule track was constructed (labor and engineers working round the clock) to bring forward the requisite supplies/ guns so that attacks/ offensive could be undertaken.
In the third week June 1948, 4/16 Punjab Regt was ordered to relieve the battalion in Chunj area to capture Pt. 7229, which was causing maximum damage to any movement on the track along the river below. Battalion moved in three phases (by companies) to the new positions and relieved troops there. A single span rope bridge at Dhani was recently erected by the engineers but it could not be crossed between 1100 – 1800 hours, because of fast winds it would overturn. At night without a lamp, it was also difficult to cross because the person looking down on the water, while crossing the bridge could not maintain his balance. Water flow would create an impression that the bridge was swinging. After a loss of few useful loads and weapons, a guard was established at each end of the bridge to direct the person crossing to look straight in front. Only one man could cross at a time so this took a lot of time but the unit managed to take all men across. However, the worst was confronted, when 3.7 howitzer gun nicknamed Shehzadi was required to join us at Chunj for she could not support the attack from the road side or from rear Nausada area. There was no bridge strong enough to take load of any of the gun pieces, which could not be lifted by less than four men while use of mules was also out of question. Then a British Officer, Major Sloan ex-Engineers accepted the responsibility and himself worked with his Sapper JCOs/ men to construct a bridge fit enough to take the load. The unit shall never forget him for he gave his life on the same hill that the unit captured in Chunj operation, when he again volunteered to clear the mines along Pt. 7229 to facilitate the attacking troops. His body was taken to Abbottabad where he was buried with full military honours.
The breath-taking adventure full of risk to the gun and the carriers took comparatively very short time. Shehzadi was then followed by a lot of ammunition and other things that an operation needs. 70 coolies were employed to haul the gun on the difficult terrain where hardly a track existed. It took them 36 hours to bring it to its firing position at Pt. 9444. The position had already been prepared. Ropes had to be used because due to recoil the gun could jump off the hill side. Gunners did not like the position because they thought it was the worst place to fire a howitzer from but also agreed that it was only place from where a gun could be fired, as directed by Colonel Nausherwan khan.
1 July 1948, GOC held a conference of all COs at Brigade Headquarters where the unit was assigned the task to capture Pt. 7229. CO asked for the requisite for stores/supplies which were granted by GOC, who remarked, “Kamal if you dislodge the enemy from Pt 7229, your name will be written in history in golden words CO passed instructions about the mission to the 2IC. He was confident that by the time he returned to Battalion Headquarters, all troops would have known all approaches leading to enemy positions. On taking over from our sister battalion earlier, Kamal’ orders were clear, he wanted each company’s water point and cookhouse close to it, all tracks and positions improved and reconnaissance down to each man carried out up to enemy position. This was done with three things in mind – knowledge of enemy and approaches, battle inoculation and removing fear of enemy superiority and keeping the troops busy. Just to know the terrain it normally took 9 hours from Dhanni to reach Chunj.
Final Orders and Preparations for Capture of Pt.7229
Kamal gave his initial orders on 2 July 1948 at Chunj. He occupied the same place where eventually Shehzadi was to be placed. Every inch of area ahead could be seen from the spot. Kamal gave a true picture of the prevalent situation and his comparison between the two forces gave everyone the right picture of what we would find between, on and beyond the objective Pt. 7229. The orders contained only important information on which any immediate action was needed and the final orders were to be given after breakfast on July 1948. In actual fact important things like tasks, objectives, routes, timings and fire support were given. Other details were left for the final conference on 6 July. Four days were given to the subordinates for preparations (this was the Major Battle winning Factor, thorough preparation). Thereafter, the reconnaissance by company, platoon, section and specialist platoon (mortar, machine gun etc.) commanders started. Complete wireless silence and secrecy was to be observed. Limited day reconnaissance was allowed, whereas close reconnaissance and observation were done at night. It is surprising that over 50 percent of the troops went as close as 100 yards of the enemy position without being observed or detected, even once.
To save time the same patrol was sent again with specific task and useful information was shared with the concerned commanders. After the orders all officers were told that from 3 July 1948 till end of attack they would be required to come to the officer’s Mess daily at 1000 hours and disperse after lunch. It was intended to discuss the day’s activities and exchange ideas. These meetings were very useful, built confidence, cut down chance of wrong reports and gave opportunity to exchange ideas. Daily patrol activities were given out by each officer and patrol reports became more balanced. Enemy routines became known. Enemy used this time to lay/improve the minefields all around their positions.
In the meantime, as build-up continued Brigade Headquarters remained very supportive. From 2 July 1948, in the afternoon CO could not be seen near Battalion Headquarters (because he would spend night with forward companies).CO could be recognized from his dress, he wore green Shalwar and shirt, a green blanket and a walking stick.
Outline Plan
7 July 1948 – At 0730 hours final orders to the subordinate commanders were issued. These were delivered from same spot as the initial orders for Chunj.
a. Msn 4/16 Punjab will capture Pt. 7229 by 1800 hours 8 July1948.
b. Phase -1 Capture Pt. 6953 by A & B companies and Azad Platoon by 0800 hours.
c. Phase – 2 Capture Pt. 7229 by C & D companies by 1800 hours.
Conduct
7 July 1948 Day was full of activity. All troops were to concentrate at the Battalion Headquarters at 1700 hours, leaving behind a section per company under an NCO to look after the position. A platoon of Azad troops also reported at the Battalion Headquarters comprised of ex-servicemen of Kashmir state. In the evening wireless sets were taken down in a Nullah and netted for the following day. Officers went to the CO to seek permission to move. The CO shook hands with each officer, wished him success and bid him farewell. One of the achievements in the attack was move in complete silence and without any indication to enemy. CO, with the reserve company decided to stay at Battalion Headquarters. The grenade that he normally carried was given to late Havildar Nur Elahi to lob it into enemy bunker interfering in the success of attack.
8 July 1948
a. Move of troops to the FUP went undetected. By 0430 hours, all troops had reached their FUP after passing through a number of staging places. Protection parties deployed in front of the companies saw a lot of movement and some unusual noise in the early hours of the morning. They thought perhaps the enemy had got some warning about impending attack, actually the new unit 3 Madras was in the process of preparing for their stand and were unaware of the attack, were taken by surprise.
b. On reaching FUP, it was noticed that there was no communication whereas 0500 hours was the H-Hour. At exact 0500 hours, CO ordered the Six buglers, who were already near Pt. 9444 to sound the reveille. The buglers sounded a flawless reveille followed by retreat. The echo was heard right up to the Brigade Headquarters, which was followed by the long awaited “Nare-i-Haidri” and with it all wireless sets sprang into life. Enemy was taken by surprise and was in a state of shock, earlier during the night CO had ordered the unit Dispatch Rider to keep his motor cycle started intermittently to give the impression of tanks in the area. All these efforts brought fruitful results in facilitating the attacking troops.
c. The morning sun was just rising when the first wave got into the attack. The first wave did not look to be followed by a second one. It was worrisome. Second wave was delayed for a while by the mines. Company Commander Major Ghulam Rasul, M.C, (C Company) pressed on and himself led the attack shouting at the men to follow him. Except for one well sited MMG on their left flank other weapons were silent. Soon the elements of left forward company could be seen moving up. Hand to hand fighting began. Havildar Nur Elahi rushed to silence a bunker still offering resistance. He was hit by a MMG firing from depth position, in spite of being hit, the NCO crawled forward and let go the grenade. Nur Elahi embraced shahadat.
d. Enemy deserted the defensive position leaving behind 30 dead and 13 were taken prisoners. Confusion and panic overwhelmed them all. With no fire support coming from the depth positions, enemy troops gave up and surrendered. In quick reorganization huge quantities of ammunition, weapons, stores and rations were captured.
e. The company on the right could not advance due to enemy machine guns interfering from Pt. 7229. With this came information of locations of a few enemy bunkers and weapons which were interfering with the advance. These bunkers were cleared through assault and some by the direct hit of artillery fire of Shehzadi. At about 0530 hours, Shehzadi had opened up and with the first round a bunker with an automatic weapon was seen to be blown to pieces. The firing of a howitzer from Pt. 9444 to Pt. 6953 only at 1500 yards range was never heard of. Use of this gun was in itself a very unorthodox way of use of artillery. When the prisoners were brought that evening, they thought that some special explosive had been used.
f. All credit to this marvelous piece of artillery, in spite of its limited ammunition the gun literally commanded the area. During the attack and in spite of enemy air or artillery fire the gun kept on firing. After a number of unsuccessful attacks, Indian air force came again with two aircrafts at about 1600 hours. The enemy showed signs of pulling out at 1730 hours, “B” company advanced forward and stopped a few hundred yards short of Pt. 7229. The consolidation phase had started and arrangements to beat back a counter-attack were being made during the night.
9 July 1948
a. The dawn broke with clear blue sky. C & D companies were concentrated out of the minefield to go for consolidation. Final orders were to be issued at 0800 hours. This was necessitated because no day reconnaissance was carried out by the companies for attack on Pt. 7229. However, around 0600 hours CO’s batman came running and out of breath to the Company Commanders and disclosed that Pt. 7229 was captured by CO and C & D companies were needed immediately. The enemy thought that they were being followed closely as such blew up the bridge. The enemy guns placed across were now silent, probably abandoned and evacuated the following night.
b. The unit asked for permission to cross the river and follow the enemy, which was turned down. However, CO asked Major Akbar his 2IC, to come forward with two platoons (one of which was of Azad troops) and ordered him to cross the river which was done using a rope by 1400 hours. The same night they attacked enemy “Piquet” (north of Tithwal) overlooking both the valleys. Enemy was so demoralized that they abandoned it, same was occupied. But the Division/ Brigade Headquarters ordered this force to withdraw, which was done by 10 July 1948′ without any casualties.
10 July 1948
a. At about 1130 hours Colonel Nausherwan Khan with his batman and a fighting patrol left for Keran about 25 miles upstream in order to assess the situation for any offensive action. They fired at the Indians in the parade ground, managed to hit two men, later returned the next day.
b. Unfortunately, the casualties due to mines increased to over 10 shaheed and 60 wounded, though in the attack itself the unit suffered only two shaheed and 10 wounded. After last light, aggressive firing by artillery and from all forward company LMGs/MMGs from Pt. 7229 towards Pir Sahaba forced the enemy to withdraw the same night. A patrol sent at night returned with a Sikh POW who confirmed that Pir Sahaba was not occupied by Indians.
The Unit occupied Pir Sahaba by morning soon both the sides settled down to occupation of defenses. Battalion remained in the area for more than three months until it was relieved by 8 Punjab Regiment and returned to Abbottabad on 23 November 1948. Chunj operation was over.
Casualties
During their stay in Kashmir the battalion suffered following casualties
| Ser | Category | Shaheed | Wounded |
| a. | Officers | 1 | 1 |
| b. | JCOs | 2 | 6 |
| c. | Soldiers | 37 | 162 |
| d. | NCEs | 1 | – |
| e. | Civilians | 1 | – |
| Total | 42 | 169 |
Honours and Awards
Operations conducted by 4/16 Punjab in its area of responsibility were a true manifestation of valor from all ranks. The battalion won 4 SJs, 9 TJ, and 4 Imtiazi Sanads (IS). Details include: –
Assessment and Lessons Learnt
This battle was a great morale booster for the entire force in Tithwal sector, forcing the enemy to withdraw behind the river. Success can rightly be attributed to the superb leadership of Colonel Nausherwan Khan. The enemy was completely surprised and was never allowed to take initiative throughout the attack denying him superiority in strength and resources. The reasons for the success can be tabulated as under: –
| Ser | Name | Award | |
| a. | Maj Nuhammad Akbar khan | SJ | |
| b. | Maj Ghulam Rasul, MC | SJ | |
| c. | Jem Akbar Hussain Shah | SJ | |
| d. | Jem Sultan Ali | SJ | |
| e. | Lnk Nazar Hussain | TJ | |
| f. | Lnk Muhammad khan | TJ | |
| g. | Sep Muhammad Suleman | TJ | |
| h. | Sep Nazar Hussain | TJ | |
| i. | Nk Muhammad Aslam | TJ | |
| j. | Sep Muhammad Ashraf | TJ | |
| k. | Sep Naik Muhammad | TJ | |
| l. | Sep Sher Muhammad | TJ | |
| m. | Swpr Mangal | TJ | |
| n. | Lt. Col Nausherwan khan | IS | |
| o. | Sub main Muhammad | IS | |
| p. | Sub Muhammad Hussain | IS | |
| q. | Jem Muhammad khan | IS | |
a. Good Information
Reconnaissance carried out at different levels gave an up-to-date picture of terrain, enemy positions, layout of defenses, weapons, approaches and routes; likely places for forming up and feasibility of communications.
b. Improvisation and Ingenuity of Mind
A solitary 3.7 Gun (Shehzadi) placed at Pt. 9444 an impossible place, where the gun had to be tied with ropes surprised the enemy, who never expected direct artillery fire. In order to further confuse the enemy, night before the attack, a motor cycle was kept started to give an indication to the enemy that Tanks had been brought in the area
c. Involvement of Command
All Commanders (down to section level) must know the ground well and right up to the objectives. The troops were shown the area up to the forming up place (FUP); Aggressive day and night patrolling was carried out by junior leaders. CO himself accompanied many Patrols to give confidence to the troops.
d. Surprise
The movements, direction and the place of attack must never be known. More than one approach must be reconnoitered so that if attack failed from one direction it could be launched from the other, without any loss of time.
e. Fire Support
Heavy weapons should give close support and be available for reorganization. In fact, all supporting weapons, less Shehzadi, moved with the Battalion and provided close fire support.
f. Initiative
Company Commanders were given complete freedom to use initiative. CO himself remained close by for guidance
g. Communications
Good communications and supervision by CO being in front provided a lot of flexibility; If enemy stopped one sub-unit at a place another would advance from a different side.
h. Impetus
Once the crust was broken the enemy was not given any respite. Keeping close to the enemy saved unit from air attacks and gun fire.
i. Simplicity of Plan
The plans were easy to understand, and well within the capability of the sub-unit to execute and work.
j. Correct Use of Terrain
After Capture of Chunj it was almost a roll down for our troops, whereas the enemy was forced to fight for heights and fan out towards its flanks thus tying its forces to hill tops, which reduced his counter attacking capability making logistic support of troops difficult.
The after effects of Chunj Operation were felt on both the sides. Heavy weapons and artillery was brought forward. The so-called enemy summer offensive was brought to a grinding halt. No major offensive was taken by the Indians after this battle. Effect of success of Chunj operation on troops as well as the local civilians was immense; it proved that support of locals is necessary to achieve the overall objectives in a well-knit team under an able commander.
The opportunity offered by fall of Pt. 7229 was immediately exploited by the CO by ordering the Second in Command, Major Akbar to pursue the enemy. Unfortunately, this initiative was not appreciated by the high command. The recall of Major Akbar’s troops, who had quickly occupied strong position across the river near Tithwal was met with resentment both by the locals as well as the troops. Later events proved that subsequent attacks to recapture these were not successful after the enemy had strengthened its positions. Limited gains and vast opportunity offered remained a controversial issue for a very long time to come.
If the success at Chunj was followed with a sizable force across the river as done by a small force under Major Akbar, who captured an important piquet across the river near Tithwal, the situation would have been altogether different. Morale of enemy troops was low and a bold action could have easily developed into enemy’s rout, capture of an important area across the river would have been a great asset.
The indications were that large movements towards enemy rear were observed on 9 July 1948 and on morning of 10 July 1948. This situation should have been exploited, which would have had an excellent effect in other sectors as well.
Leadership of Colonel Nausherwan Khan
After the 1965 war, I had plenty of time with men of my platoon to informally discuss the Chunj Operation by our unit in 1948. The Platoon JCO and all the Section Commanders had participated in the 1948 Kashmir war and few of them had moved with the Paltan from Razmak to Abbottabad after the Curzon operation. There were a lot of stories about the legendary CO (later Brigadier) Nausherwan Khan, particularly his unconventional/ motivational methods. Just to quote a story, Havildar Ashraf was a newly inducted recruit with hardly about few weeks of service, when he was ordered to be part of a patrol to get a POW under an officer with about twenty other men. After briefing when the Patrol was about to leave a man dressed in Shalwar Qamiz desired to also accompany the patrol, this was strange. However, the patrol arrived in a defile and laid an ambush. The man in civvies asked all of us to remove the magazines from the rifles/ sten guns. After sometime, an Indian patrol arrived in the defile and as the patrol was getting closer and we were getting panicky, when the man in civvies again ordered us to put on the magazines and open fire. From the enemy patrol directly under fire we captured few POWs along with their equipment. That person was the CO Colonel Nausherwan Khan. There were many other such stories.
Having studied the battle in detail and the unconventional methods adopted by the CO, one is convinced that the success of this operation could not have been possible without the leadership of Col Nausherwan Khan. He was a second-generation officer of the 16 Punjab Regiment group, he knew all the officers, JCOs/men Colonel Nausherwan Khan took over the command of unit from Lieutenant Colonel M K Macleod in September 1947. (It may be interesting to note that Lieutenant Colonel M K Macleod’s father was CO in 3/16 Punjab Regiment, now 15 Punjab Regiment and father of Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan Khan was Subedar Major with Senior Colonel Macleod in the same unit during 1930-33) Lieutenant Colonel Macleod along with his wife visited 17 Punjab at Jhelum in 1988.
Battalion less its Non-Muslims elements was almost half the original strength till January 1948. It moved into Kashmir still under strength, soon the reinforcements consisting of ex-service men and young recruits started pouring in. After Chakothi operations the unit got about three months at Abbottabad, this time was well utilized by Col Nausherwan Khan to train the unit. Unit was moved again to Kashmir for second time to halt Indian offensive this time in Tithwal sector This time it was up against Indian Army, fully trained outfit.
At Abbottabad Colonel Nausherwan Khan concentrated on studying every person under him. Necessary training in minor tactics and handling of weapons was intensified. In addition, anything that appealed to his mind and men’s sentiments were encouraged. The officers were encouraged to remain with their men as much as possible. Nausherwan Khan was a good psychiatrist and would study about the ancestors, the tribe, place and occupation of every NCO and a majority of the men. His reading of the men was rarely wrong
The task was stupendous. The ingenuity and resourcefulness were practiced in the real sense. The enemy was always surprised by his moves/ actions. The junior officers and men were so well-motivated that the barbed wire and mines did not stop them. They were wedded to capture their objectives at any cost. Even dying soldiers like late Havildar Nur Elahi were more interested in accomplishing the task assigned by Colonel Nausherwan Khan than save own life.
During Kashmir operations, in Uri as well as Tithwal sectors Colonel Nausherwan Khan displayed great mastery of strategy and tactics. His appreciation and forecast of enemy reactions were invariably correct. His self-confidence and sincerity of purpose, loyalty to superiors as well as those under command became legendary. People accepted his advice and orders without any hesitation. At times men would say that they saw the CO standing outside their bunker at night.
Colonel Nausherwan Khan was God fearing and extremely kind and sympathetic to his men. When dealing with them he was fair and just but firm, which contributed towards his legendary achievements. His ability to train his officers and men was unique. At times he would fire live rounds over the heads of positions occupied by own troops. While training his men to be good shots he made them aim and fire at the loopholes in enemy bunkers. One of the rarest qualities of Colonel Nausherwan was to stay with the men whose position was most threatened; always preferred to lead from the front exposing himself to danger.
This not only gave him opportunity to observe his men closely but also raised their morale. The troops on their part displayed greater confidence in him. To quote another story, while accompanying a fighting patrol the enemy opened fire on him, a small patrol near Nausada, a jawan ran away and disappeared. The jawan was next day arrested at Muzaffarabad and brought back under escort. Colonel Nausherwan took him to the forward companies and after a day or so he took him on a patrol where he himself was the leader. The patrol was fired at but this Jawan did not desert then. Later he won a decoration for bravery and courage.
Conclusion
After having discussed the Battle of Chunj in detail, few points come to mind, why Pakistan Army was not inducted immediately after the Indian build up in October 1947? We waited almost five months before Pakistan Army was inducted in March 1948 that too only to facilitate the Azad Forces and the Locals/ tribal Lashkar? Pakistan Army was inducted only after the Indian Summer Offensive in May 1948. The NAs had already been liberated by the locals of NAs along with the officers/ JCOs of Gigot Scouts and the Muslim officers of J& K units located in the Area, under the leadership of SM Babar, 2/Lt (later Group Captain) Shah Khan and Major Hasan Khan. Major (later Brig) Aslam Khan and Lt Col Jilani of Pakistan Army along with Political Officers were inducted in NAs much later. (“Liberation of NAs” by Col Sikandar Khan) In order to understand the history of this struggle one needs to study some very informative books about the freedom movement of Jammu and Kashmir, “Kashmir Saga” by the founder President of AJ&K Sardar M Ibrahim khan gives detailed account of the political struggle of the movement. “Atish e Chinar” by Sh Abdullah gives the Indian side of the perspective. I have suggested a few books for additional reading. Few Questions come to mind.
a. The Indians leaders like Nehru and Patel were working on the Kashmiri leaders especially Sh Abdullah much before the Partition plan of 1947, whereas the Muslim League Leaders were not in touch with the Kashmiri leadership?
b. After the Poonch rebellion in August 1947, why the situation was not exploited by the Muslim League leaders and the Leaders of this Movement were left on their own?
c. Sardar Ibrahim Khan in his book “Kashmir Saga claims at page 68 that he arrived in Lahore on 28 August 1947 accompanied by another friend, Mr. B A Hashmi, a friend of the Srinagar meeting, I approached Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Central Minister of Refugee and Rehabilitation with the object of arranging a meeting with Quaid e Azam. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan failed to contact the Quaid e Azam.” The Azad Kashmir Government was set up under Sardar Ibrahim on 24 October 1947.
d. Why the Tribal Lashkars were sent by CM NFWP to Kashmir without due coordination with the Kashmiri leaders who were leading the Independence Movement ever since the Poonch uprising by the Ex-Servicemen?
e. The induction of Tribal Lashkars in October 1947 gave an excuse to India to exploit the situation and send a high-powered delegation under VP Menon on 23/24 October 1947 along with Col (later FM) Manikshaw, who was in MO Dte Indian GHQ and an Air Force Officer to analyze the situation and also force the Maharaja for State’s Accession to India.
f. The Indians called an emergency meeting of the Cabinet on 26 October 1947, which was chaired by the Governor General and attended by Nehru and the Cabinet and all the three Service Chiefs in Delhi, this meeting was briefed by Col Manekshaw, who was in MO Dte GHQ, (“The Origin of a Dispute-Kashmir 1947 by Prem Shankar JHA”) Why Pakistan did not take a similar action?
g. Another Cabinet meeting was held on 27 October 1947 under the GG with all the service Chiefs and the Cabinet members as on 26 October 1947. With the efforts of Nehru and Lord Mountbatten the Maharaja of Kashmir was forced not only to sign the instrument of Accession but also to release Sh Abdullah from jail and appointment as PM of Jammu and Kashmir. Why Government of Pakistan did not take serious action to contact Sh Abdullah or call a similar meeting at the highest level with the Service Chiefs?
h. Why everything was left to the Tribal Lashkars and ill-equipped Ex-service men who were fighting on their own?
i. The Indian Army was air lifted to Srinagar with effect from 26/27 October 1947 and continued the buildup for next five months up to march 1948. During these five months the Indians brought in almost Five Divisions with Artillery, Tanks and heavy weapons, fully prepared to undertake their summer offensive in May/June 1948. Whereas Pakistan Army units ordered to move into Kashmir in March 1948, were asked to stay in the background and only facilitate the local Azad troops without getting in direct contact with the Indian Army till May 1948?
Bibliography
1. 17 Punjab Haidri History.
2. Kashmir Campaign 1947-48.
3. Interviews with retired JCOs and men of 17 Punjab, participated in Chunj Ops.
4. Interviews with locals and retired JCOs of AK Regiment after my visit to Nauseri/Chunj area 1989.
5. Articles/ Papers published.
Suggested Further Reading
1. Kashmir Saga by Sardar Ibrahim the First President of AJK.
2. The Raiders in Kashmir by Major General Akbar Khan.
3. Liberation of Northern Areas by Col Sikandar Khan.
4. Kashmiris fight for their freedom by Yusuf Saraf.
5. The Origins of a Dispute & Kashmir 1947 by Prem Shankar JHA.
6. The Nation that lost its Soul by Sardar Shaukat Hayat.
7. 1947 Before, During and After by Major General Wajahat Hussain.
8. Incomplete Partition by Alastair Lamb chapter 5 and 7.
9. Shamsher O Sana Awal by Col Hasan Khan.
