Franklin Roosevelt, the 32nd US President, received a hortative as well as admonishing letter from the all-time greatest Physicist Albert Einstein on October 11, 1939 signaling him of the possibility of Nazi Germany preparing a nuclear bomb soon. “A single such bomb if carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory” an excerpt taken from that letter. President Roosevelt replied: “we will not allow the Nazi’s to blow us up.” Resultantly he ordered the commencement of the “Manhattan Project” which developed the world’s first nuclear weapon successfully tested by the US in the wee hours of July 16th, 1945 in Alamogordo, New Mexico. Just three weeks later President Truman, successor to President Roosevelt, authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities of Japan on 6th and 9th August. The blood-curdling outcome of two nuclear weapons abruptly ended the six-year long Second World War. But nine years later in 1954 Einstein said: “I made one great mistake in my life when I signed the letter to President Roosevelt recommending that atom bombs be made.”1
Here arises the sixty-four million dollar question: “Why did Einstein call his achievement a faux pas? The answer can be deciphered from one of his famous quotes: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”2 Einstein realized that the US will not be the sole possessor of the ghastly invention of the Manhattan Project; the technological know-how and expertise could not be inhibited and other countries would also opt for acquiring the nuclear weapons. Proliferation with perdition, evinced from the catastrophic consequences at the nuclear weapon-afflicted Japanese cities, compelled Einstein to think otherwise and declare his advice, effort and invention a huge mistake. The technologically sophisticated nuclear weapons were prepared by four other states within the two decades of the US-detonation: the USSR (August 1949), Britain (October 1952), France (February 1960) and China (October 1964). The era after 1970 added some more members to the nuclear club: India (1974), South Africa (1982), Pakistan (1998), and North Korea (2006). Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is the world’s worst-kept secret but factual details are not known owing to its policy of nuclear opacity but it is believed that it had possessed nuclear weapons in the decade between China’s and India’s detonations, i.e. (1964–74).
The gut-wrenching scenes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after being hit with nuclear weapons coupled with their unparalleled destructive power had double-edged effects. The nuclear weapons became a symbol of pride and prestige by dint of insuperable deterrence offered and unimaginable devastation wreaked by them. But opponents started calling for their abolition soon after end of World War II: The UN General Assembly in its first resolution in 1946 called for elimination of nuclear weapons and for control of atomic energy to ensure it was used for peaceful purposes only. Every US government since early 1960s has also remained equally concerned about the expansion of nuclear technology and curbing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states. Retaining the existing number of nuclear-weapon states, as of 1965, to 5 veto-wielding powers only has been the biggest foreign policy objective of the US. President John. F. Kennedy (1961-63) once predicted that there would be 15-25 nuclear weapon states in 1970s. But it’s the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which falsified President Kennedy’s prediction by its landslide achievement in non-proliferation parameter only as the nuclear club is capped to single digit (9) even after 55 years of his assassination.
Non Proliferation Treaty—bargaining for maintaining the nuclear status quo
The suspected metastasis of nuclear weapons was a matter of immense concern and containing the membership of nuclear club became the national security objective of the US government. After attainment of nuclear-weapon capability by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council a bi-directional bargain between them and rest of the world happened. The five recognized nuclear powers offered surrender of their nuclear weapons in exchange of no quest for preparation/acquisition of nuclear weapons from rest of the world. Additionally the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology was declared “inalienable” for every state with special reference to the needs of the developing world. Thus a brief treaty comprising as many as 11 articles christened “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commonly abbreviated as NPT” was opened up for signatures exactly five decades ago on 1st July 1968. It was enforced on 5th March 1970. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council signed the treaty qua “Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWSs) and the remaining states signed as “Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State (non-NWSs).” An impermeable barrier was erected between the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states by fixating the cutoff date for nuclear explosions: Only those states were declared de jure nuclear weapon states that had detonated nuclear weapon prior to 1st January 1967, that is, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The treaty remains reticent apropos countries detonating the nuclear weapon after the mentioned date. Therefore two terminologies “nuclear haves” and “nuclear have-nots” came into being for the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states respectively. One of the peculiar features of this treaty is its immutability in terms of amendments: Not a single article has been amended during the last 50 years because of the veto power allocated to the nuclear weapon states under Para 2 Article VIII of the treaty: An amendment must be approved by all the nuclear-weapon states failing that the amendment cannot be enforced. The US’ conflict of interest with Russia and China has headed off the possibility of amendments in the treaty.
During its five-decade long lop-sided successful odyssey, the NPT has proved to be a highly-subscribed treaty with more than 98% of countries adhering themselves to its provisions: As of to-date its membership includes 185 non-NWSs and 5 NWSs. From the four outliers India, Pakistan and Israel have not signed the treaty since inception whereas North Korea relinquished its membership in 2003. These four deviant states are nuclear-capable thereby elevating the actual number of nuclear-weapon states to 9. In current scenario they cannot sign the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state owing to detonation of nuclear weapon after the cutoff date described in the Para 3 Article IX of NPT. On the other hand they will never sign the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon state by dismantling their nuclear infrastructure. South Africa is the only state which signed the treaty in 1991 after disarming itself from the nukes whereas after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its three subsequent states Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had nuclear weapons on their territories. They all signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states after giving up their nuclear weapons.
Three legs of NPT
The entire non-proliferation treaty rests on three legs which are often called the pillars of NPT: Non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article I & II jointly cover the non-proliferation parameter. Article I conveys the undertaking by the NWSs for not transferring any material/technology to non-NWSs conducive for the preparation of nuclear weapons whereas Article II is the reciprocal undertaking by the non-NWSs for not receiving any such related-related human and logistical assistance helpful for preparation of nuclear explosive device. Article IV permits the indiscriminate use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for all the parties to NPT and allows the transfer of equipments, materials and related technological information. The article describes the right to peaceful uses of energy as “an inalienable right of all the states.” The resolve of complete disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states has been covered in the Article VI. Except for the implementation in disarmament-provision (Article VI) the NPT has given stellar results. However during the last three decades the frailness in different articles of the treaty has paved the way for clandestine nuclear weapons programs run by some states prominent being North Korea, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria and South Korea.
North Korea is the only state having manufactured the entire nuclear weapon infrastructure during its bout as the member of NPT amply due to vagueness in NPT provisions. Iran has also redoubtable nuclear infrastructure which could help the country attaining the status of de facto nuclear weapon state but under JCPOA it limited its nuclear program. Iraq’s and Syria’s reactors were torpedoed by Israel’s preventive strikes in 1981 and 2007 respectively. Iraq’s hidden nuclear program was unmasked in 1991 also. Libya relinquished its nascent nuclear program in 2003 and shipped out the related equipments. South Korea ended its pursuit for nuclear weapons after diplomatic settlement as the country is secured by the US’ nukes under the extended deterrence policy. The security ambitions of these states coupled with the weaknesses in the provisions of NPT and “dual-use” nature of nuclear materials offered them a hidden path to preparation of nuclear weapons. But largely the 2 non-proliferation provisions along with the Article VII concerning regional agreements for creation of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones have curbed the non-proliferation to a marvelous extent: No non-nuclear-weapon country to NPT has prepared nuclear weapons thereby expressing unshakable resolve to the non-proliferation regime.
However the NWSs have proved themselves dearly reluctant in cessation of arms race and achieving the goal of disarmament as agreed by them under Article VI. Rather they have attempted to legitimize their status as nuclear-weapon-states. The NWSs have focused on non-proliferation only and their common standpoint is that NPT is a treaty for non-proliferation and not for disarmament as per its nomenclature. The lukewarm response of NWSs towards their disarmament commitment is a sore point between them and non-NWSs. The disagreement between both the parties is transpicuous from the fact that almost half of the quinquennial NPT Review Conferences (Revcons) are bereft of final document which is required to be prepared with nemine contradicente all-or-nothing approach. The embittered relations between the NWSs and non-NWSs have deleterious effects on the future of NPT.
Shortcomings in the NPT
NPT, being called as the cornerstone of non-proliferation regime, is lousy with certain insurmountable flaws that have accrued covert nuclear weapons programs during the last three decades. Besides the unattainable touchstone for amending the treaty provisions has contributed negatively in resolving the outstanding issues. The treaty is embedded with certain loopholes both in the non-proliferation and disarmament arenas which are classified as below:
A. Non-proliferation Allurers
1. Achievement of Nuclear Latency;
2. Nuclear Renaissance with Complex Technology;
3. Dearth of Proliferation-Curbing Mechanism;
B. Disarmament – A Tempting Subterfuge
Article VI – Riddled with Vagueness;
REVCONs – Facing Disgrace only;
1. Achievement of Nuclear Latency
The enrichment and reprocessing processes occupy the cardinal positions in the front end and back end of nuclear fuel cycle respectively. The commonly used Light Water Reactors, LWRs, are fed with fuel, enriched in U-235 isotope, in both of its manifestations: Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor. The interpretation of Article IV of NPT conveys peaceful uses of nuclear energy as “an irrefutable claim” of every state; means any state may opt for independent nuclear power projects for coping with the needs of energy. Enrichment is an ineluctable step in the front end of nuclear fuel cycle i.e. preparing fuel for the nuclear power reactor. Typically the LWRs require uranium enriched up to 3.67% in U-235 isotope which falls in the category of Low Enriched Uranium, LEU. On the other hand some research reactors, like Bushehr Reactor in Iran, use fuel enriched up to 20% in U-235 which is the upper limit of LEU range.
Uranium enrichment within the LEU range for power generation and research purposes by any state cannot be questioned keeping in view the Article IV of NPT. Here lies the fundamental flaw: If a country attains 20% U-235 enrichment capacity for peaceful uses only it can easily upgrade its facilities for the production of weapon-grade fuel enriched up to 93% in U-235. The prominent example of this scenario is Iran having 20% enrichment capacity for its Bushehr Research Reactor before the JCPOA limitations and a break out time of 1 year to preparation of nuclear weapon. Thus the Article IV offers nuclear latency the states can fulfill the needs for peaceful uses of nuclear energy from installing the essential nuclear infrastructure which also provides underlying foundation for preparing the weapon-usable fuel. The successful capacity to enrich uranium up to the LEU range entices the states for adopting the option of nuclear weapons.
The option for preparing weapon-grade fuel is implicit on both the ends of the nuclear fuel cycle. The back end of nuclear fuel cycle again provides a sound opportunity for achieving the weapon-grade fuel but this time plutonium-based. After spending life in nuclear reactor core, the highly radioactive, hot and disastrous fuel is placed in spent fuel pools for years to reduce the radiation levels but its safe disposal is a matter of grave concern yet. The option of reprocessing in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle makes the path easier. The Plutonium-239 isotope, formed due to fuel irradiation, can be separated from the uranium isotopes by reprocessing process. After separation Pu-239, a highly fissile material, can easily be used for preparation of nuclear weapons. The plutonium path to preparation of nuclear weapon is considered more byzantine owing to the involvement of both ends of nuclear fuel cycle especially the complex process of reprocessing. The two discussed steps of fuel cycle, that is, enrichment and reprocessing, are completely in sync with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy concept but the “dual-use” nature of nuclear materials paces them under the cloud on their probable use.
Cajoling Withdrawal Clause
Making matters worse, the withdrawal clause “Article X” further aggravates the scenario. As per this article, any state can withdraw the treaty if its supreme national interests are grievously threatened. This means that a state can develop the entire nuclear infrastructure for peaceful purposes within the scope of NPT and if it desires for preparation of nuclear weapons it may simply relinquish the NPT under the garb of national security threats and advance its nuclear weapons program. NPT withdrawal accrues suspension of IAEA safeguards also thereby allowing untrammeled path to preparation of nuclear weapons. North Korea is an archetype of this case. It acceded to NPT in December 1985, it gave withdrawal notice in 1993 but it finally withdrew in January 2003. Though the NPT does not allow surreptitious nuclear activities but the “dual-use” nature of nuclear materials allures the states for kicking off hidden nuclear activities while simultaneously maintaining the membership of NPT.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1887 holistically addresses the safeguards issue in the wake of withdrawal from the NPT. The said article calls for a conditional nuclear export “in the case of lapse of IAEA safeguards the supplier states possess the right to require the return of exported nuclear materials to the recipient state along with the special nuclear materials produced through the use of such materials or equipments.” The article 1887 also calls for continuation of IAEA safeguards in the form of redundant or back-up safeguards in the case of termination of safeguards agreement on the nuclear materials exported prior to the termination. But this resolution handles the export parameter only when a nation withdraws from the NPT; the issue of autochthonous nuclear facilities and materials remain untouched however. The IAEA addressed this issue by recommending facility-specific safeguards agreement on enrichment and reprocessing facilities which would remain in force if a state withdraws from NPT. The non-NWSs would not concur on such a proposal as their option to preparation of nuclear weapons would not only require NPT withdrawal but infraction of safeguards agreement also.
Cold-Blooded Negligence
It seems that the framers of NPT have deliberately ignored the issue of enrichment despite categorically knowing the offshoots of expanded enrichment programs. The Article IV should have been spelled out by inseparably linking the allowed percentage of fuel enrichment with the number of centrifuges installed for obtaining uranium fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors. The cumulative Mega/ Giga Watts electric capacity of power plants was required to be equated with the number of installed centrifuges along with their ratings or Separative Work Units (SWU) produced per year for obtaining the requisite level of fuel enrichment. For instance a 1 Giga/ 1000 Mega Watts electric light water nuclear power reactor requires about 100,000 kg-SWU of separative work to produce from natural uranium one year’s fuel supply of 20 tons of uranium enriched to 4 percent uranium-235. This could be provided by 10,000 centrifuges each with rating of 20 kg-SWU/year, operating for six months3. If such calculations had been encapsulated in the treaty, it would have severely restricted the expansion of centrifuge cascades beyond the 3.67% enriched fuel capacity as LWRs operate proficiently at this level. Apropos the 20% enriched fuel required in some research reactors had the IAEA been bounded for arranging the requisite fuel for the research reactors, needing more than 5% enriched fuel, the individual states would not have even thought for reaching the apogee of LEU fuel, that is, 20% as climbing to the weapon-grade level i.e. 93% is relatively easier from this stage.
The ideal example of such restrictions is JCPOA, the nuclear deal of Iran and the six world powers. JCPOA capped the enrichment level to 3.67% with a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz enrichment facility and directed for phasing out the remaining centrifuges under the supervision of IAEA. Whereas for (19.75%) enriched fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, TRR, Iran was directed to seek commercial contracts with the suppliers for purchase of fuel. And in the other case if contract was not concluded the E3/EU+3 was held responsible for provision of delivering 19.75% enriched Uranium Oxide (U308) to Iran solely for the purpose of fabrication of fuel for TRR in Iran. The maximum amount of 19.75% fuel shipped to Iran was defined as 5 kg and increment was accepted only after verification from the IAEA. In any case, Iran was not allowed to enrich the uranium fuel beyond 3.67%. Such type of exposition regarding nuclear infrastructure in the NPT would have rooted out the probability of expansion in the nuclear programs besides giving remarkable ground to the IAEA for devising verification safeguards in line with the restricted limits. Exceeding the prescribed enrichment limit, say 3.67%, would have revoked IAEA provisions inviting UN sanctions at very early stages and giving away ample time for diplomatic solution of the issue.
Multilateral Control—An Excellent Way Forward
The independent nuclear fuel cycle programs run by the states have received opprobrium because of embedded option of nuclear proliferation whereas the idea of fuel provision from any state or group deepens the polarization between the haves and have-nots in the NPT. The best way forward is the concept of “multi-lateral nuclear fuel cycle” a global arrangement holding responsibility for providing fuel to each and every power and research reactor of the world. In this case no country either NWS or non-NWS would be allowed to retain independent nuclear fuel cycle on its territory; rather an international body shall supervise the preparation and supply of fuel worldwide. This will also require guarantees of uninterrupted fuel supply from a bona fide international authority to all the states relinquishing their fuel cycle programs. The erstwhile Director General IAEA (1997–2009) and author of “The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times” Mohamed Elbaradei is a staunch supporter of multinational fuel banks under an international control. He lauded the IAEA board’s adoption of decision to authorize a low-enriched uranium fuel bank for supply to credible users under the direct command and control of IAEA in December 2010 and called it a baby step towards achieving nuclear disarmament. It goes without saying that multinational fuel bank, if acceded to, will be a coup de grace to nuclear proliferation and it will eventually ensue nuclear disarmament. The IAEA would re-define its tightest safeguards then as no country will be entitled for retaining any step of nuclear fuel cycle and in the absence of nuclear fuel cycle no country could even think of preparing or advancing the nuclear weapons program. The idea of multi-national fuel banks is driven by a prodigious global impetus especially from the non-NWSs but practically it seems like boiling the ocean: The NWSs, not least the USA and Russia, will never surrender their option of nuclear fuel cycle and without their concurrence such a sea change could not be adopted in the existing nuclear set up. Two irreconcilable parameters exist in the concept of multi-national banks: Which country to host the multinational fuel banks set-up? Who would command and control this arrangement?
2. Nuclear Renaissance with Complex Technology
Unlike its other forms, the energy obtained from the nuclear processes has been facing hefty pitfalls. The occurrence of harrowing accidents in the nuclear power plants has watered down the importance of nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and Chernobyl havoc in 1986 drastically curtailed the support in favor of nuclear energy in the last quarter of the 20th century. The 21st century set off with very few countries developing or having programs for development of nuclear power plants. The Fukushima disaster in 2011, one more addition to the list of nuclear debacles, furthered the anti-nuclear rhetoric. Nevertheless the carbon-free posture of nuclear power plants in the current age of global warming, when the states are required to curtail the emissions of carbon dioxide by significant margins, has given renaissance to the nuclear power plants as a viable option for consideration. Every 1000 MWe power plant running on black coal emits 7 million tonnes of carbon dioxide per year and about 9 million tonnes if brown coal is used4. Whereas the nuclear power plants do not spew out carbon dioxide.
A safer design of nuclear power plant offsets the chances of accidents to a greater level. The fact was accepted after the Chernobyl trauma as the reactor design, RBMK with positive void coefficient, could not counteract the human error at the time of accident. The RBMK design was soon discouraged and LWRs were preferred which entail multi-layered safety margins with lesser technological intricacies. However, in the recent years some states, India in particular, have shown interest in installation of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors, LMFBRs, using Pu-239 as core fuel along with U-238 as fuel blanket and molten salt preferably liquid sodium as coolant. LMFBRs pose dual-faced challenges: Regular production of plutonium in the reactor core offers path towards the production of plutonium-based nuclear weapon; the use of Sodium as coolant elevates the chance of nuclear accidents. The name “breeder” transpires from production of more fissile material in the reactor core than consumption. The plutonium fuel in the reactor core burns after fission process and simultaneously the U-238 in blanket is converted into plutonium after absorption of neutrons. Thus the produced plutonium is greater than the utilized plutonium in the case of LMFBRs and it can easily be used for nuclear weapons program. Additionally sodium metal being highly volatile upsurges the probability of nuclear accidents if exposed to water or air. The number of breeder reactors is very low as compared to that of LWRs but 4 out of 5 NWSs except China, besides Germany, Japan and India have been experiencing the use of breeder reactors. The renewed interest in breeder technology for completing the nuclear energy requirements is of utmost concern, nonetheless.
The Article IV of NPT is taciturn about the adoption and use of technology. It just allows the states to use the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes irrespective of the path even without calling for specific safeguards on different nuclear sites. Breeders produce the similar electrical energy as produced by the LWRs but they are highly inclined towards the weapons proliferation. The silence in the Article IV, coupled with Article III which is specific to non-NWS for safeguards on their nuclear sites, has resulted in snowballing vertical proliferation by the NWSs as they had amassed bulk of plutonium from the reactor fuel of breeders. Though the technological complexities have obstructed their growth in the past century but if nuclear renaissance with this technology takes place in future, the non-proliferation and disarmament aspects of the NPT will face a major blow. The deplorable US-India Nuclear deal of 2008 also enshrines construction of breeder reactors paving the way for India to obtain weapon-grade plutonium. India, a non-signatory to NPT having mala fide nuclear intentions with minimal safeguards at its nuclear sites, would exploit the availability of plutonium for weapons production thereby disturbing the strategic equilibrium in the region. The technological sophistication and proliferation-heaven enmeshed in the breeder reactors should have been accosted in the NPT; the breeding technology be allowed to states with comprehensive and stringent safeguard agreements with the IAEA. The quantity of plutonium, entering and exiting the reactor, must be addressed adequately along with the disposal of plutonium. Above all the safeguards must be uniform for all the states either NWSs or non-NWSs without that a concrete check and balance on plutonium cannot be maintained as the existing safeguards outlined in the NPT have allowed unrestrained production of fissile materials in the NWSs.
3. Dearth of Proliferation-Curbing Mechanism
NPT, the bedrock of non-proliferation regime, is incapable of working independently. Rather its two important limbs International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, have pivotal role in curbing nuclear proliferation. IAEA is authorized to detect diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to covert weapons program whereas the NSG guidelines are aimed at inhibiting the use of “dual-use” nuclear items for weapons program. Together they have given fabulous outcome as IAEA had unveiled the masked weapons programs in different states. Upon receiving the IAEA report anent non-compliance or violation of its provisions the UN Security Council imposes sanctions, supported by individual sanctions by the US and the EU. But the states have muddled through the tortuous times of sanctions.
North Korea and Iran are two quintessential examples. The UN sanctions during the period 2002-2012, the US’s bombastic rhetoric and Israel’s threat of preventive strikes could not compel Iran to bow before the international community. The sanctions targeted every sector of Iran with special focus on financial restrictions on banking transactions and import of oil from the Islamic Republic. Iran’s former president Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, was adamant on his country’s nuclear program and conclusion of JCPOA during his tenure was almost inconceivable. It was Hassan Rouhani, a reformist, who replaced Ahmadinejad in July 2013 and after two years the landmark agreement of JCPOA was signed. Similarly the stringent UN sanctions and President Obama’s policy of strategic patience could not yield results and the North Korean nuclear and missile programs flourished with exponential growth during the last year of President Obama’s two-term tenure. The first year of Trump administration was covered with war clouds in the Korean Peninsula and he adopted the policy of “maximum pressure” besides condemning the President Obama’s strategic patience doctrine. Technically speaking there is no basic difference between “strategic patience” and “maximum pressure” as both the doctrines use sanctions as tool for succumbing North Korea and offer rewards in lieu of fulfillment of demands. Though the North Korean leader has agreed for denuclearization and President Trump is boasting for success of his “maximum pressure policy” but in real sense it is the diplomatic triumph of China and a progressive government in South Korea which have resulted in a dramatic turnaround by Kim Jong Un.
The UN Security Council’s sanctions-imposing resolutions have not yielded substantial results in deterring the suspected nuclear activities from the nuclear aspirant states. Moreover the IAEA’s inability to verify the un-announced nuclear sites exacerbates the proliferation problem leaving behind the threatening and grievously counter-productive option of counter-proliferation as the last resort for necessary action. But counter-proliferation may not be invariably successful as like the cases of Iraq and Syria. Had it been fructuous in Iran’s and North Korea’s case, the Bush administration and President Trump would have agreed on preventive strikes in Iran and Bloody Nose strikes in North Korea respectively. The IAEA-NPT-NSG triad needs to strengthen its existing proliferation curbing mechanism beyond imposing the sanctions through UN Security Council only.
B. Disarmament—a Tempting Subterfuge
Disarmament by the 5 nuclear-weapon states of NPT seems a lost cause when their commitments are reviewed under the vague wording of Article-VI of the treaty and conclusion of 9 Revcons with special attention on the relapsed disarmament pledges in the Revcons of 1995 and 2000.
1. Article VI — Riddled with Vagueness
The NPT has produced “zero results” when it comes to implementation of NWSs-specific Article-VI calling for cessation of arms race and ultimate disarmament at an early date. Per adventure the nuclear arsenal of the five NWSs, spearheaded by Russia and the US, has seen a burgeoning growth during the last fifty years. Cumulatively both the rivals retain more than 90% of the world’s available nuclear weapons stock. The nuclear arsenal of the Cold War foes reached ne plus ultra during the peak of the war period in 1970s; though bilateral negotiations for reduction of nuclear warheads have given a good outcome but substantial results are yet to be produced. The other three NWSs i.e. Britain, France and China possess a formidable nuclear weapons inventory and have not shown obsession for scaling it up but they have absolutely blindsided their disarmament commitment as per Article VI. On the larger scale the five nuclear-weapon states have persisted for maintaining the nuclear status quo between them and the non-NWSs in absolute juxtaposition with their disarmament commitment.
Duplicitous Wording
The audacity of the five NWSs against the disarmament parameter is driven by the tergiversation whelmed in the Article VI of the treaty. The framers had astutely chosen such an ambiguous wording which could never be interpreted as “disarmament obligation or commitment” on the part of NWSs if the 47-worded relevant article is examined carefully. The Article VI of NPT reads as follows:
“Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.”5
Concluding this article as “disarmament obligation” would be non sequitur as the in-depth analysis reveals the following five significant gaps where indistinct use of phrases exonerates the five recognized NWSs from implementation of their disarmament pledge.
i. “Each of the parties” means all the signatory NWS and non-NWSs. The inclusion of all states is beyond understanding as disarmament is specific to five nuclear weapon states. The phrase “each of the parties” had been used at that time to take the non-NWSs into confidence for their participation in the disarmament process of the NWSs which was irrelevant and meaningless. It’s the mandate of NWSs only to formulate the modalities for disarmament at their own.
ii. “Undertakes to pursue negotiations” conveys the undertaking for holding negotiations only and not the nuclear disarmament. Even the conclusion, either success or failure of negotiations, has not been expressed. There is no mention of the way forward in the case of failure of negotiations.
iii. “In good faith” implies a good will gesture attempt and not mandatory requirement. Means it is up to a NWS either it is showing its good will gesture for negotiations or not and it cannot be blamed also as the matter is based on mere good will of any NWS.
iv. “At an early date” no time frame for the negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament had been given. Perhaps the framers had given an initial extendable life of 25 years to the treaty but for nuclear disarmament process the use of vague phrase “at an early date” speaks volumes of their hypocrisy and deceitful intentions.
v. “Under strict and effective control” IAEA is the UN’s recognized body for preparing and implementing its safeguards related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The reputable body possesses highly robust verification system as its safeguards are valued by all the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. So why was IAEA ignored from this task and phrase “strict and effective control” was used? Did the framers envision a new international body for verification of disarmament in NWSs? If yes then they should have outlined its skeleton.
If the afore-stated anomalies were taken into account, at least a more-binding article conveying flat out disarmament of NWSs could have been written.
2. REVCONs–Facing Disgrace only
After its enforcement in the year 1970 till to-date, the NPT has been supplemented by a total of nine REVCONs, held after every 5 years for reviewing the implementation status of different articles of NPT along with producing a “FINAL DOCUMENT” outlining future directives for tangible progress. The final document is required to be produced by the unanimous consensus of all the parties. The polarization between the 5 NWSs and non-NWSs and the lofty and hard-nosed attitude of the former, especially the US, have impeded the release of final document in half of the Revcons, the latest being the Revcon-2015. Nonfeasance in implementation of Article VI apropos disarmament from the five NWSs is the major cause of non-NWS’s disaffection with the treaty. Adding insult to the injuries the NWSs have mulishly repudiated the implementation of disarmament provision in the treaty along with the Revcons’ documents.
There were two instances during the nine Revcons when the NWSs had shown flexible attitude towards the disarmament provision and agreed for disarming themselves. The Revcon-1995 and 2000 entail a guideline for disarmament by the NWSs. The 1995 Revcon besides extending the treaty for an indefinite period included a decision “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament” conveying reaffirmation in paragraph 3 by the NWSs for complete disarmament whereas the Para 4 explicated path towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in three major steps: Completion of negotiations on Comprehensive Ban Test Treaty, CTBT; conclusion of universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material; pursuit of reduction in number of nuclear weapons leading to complete disarmament by the NWSs under strict and effective control.
But a major impressive action from the NWSs appeared in the final document of Revcon-2000 when they agreed for disarmament under the famous “Thirteen Steps” for the pragmatic implementation of Article VI of the NPT and paragraph 3 & 4 of Decision # 2 of Revcon 1995. The bare bones of the “Thirteen Steps” are: Early enforcement of CTBT; Negotiating the FMCT; abolishing nuclear weapons; stalling the nuclear weapons testing and agreeing for irreversible nuclear disarmament; placing excessive fissile material under the IAEA’s supervision and reporting the regular progress on nuclear disarmament. The step No. 9 of the Thirteen Steps depicted a comprehensive and phased approach on nuclear disarmament under the following path: Unilateral reduction in nuclear arsenal; transparency regarding nuclear weapons arsenal for supporting complete disarmament; reduction in non-strategic nuclear weapons; operational status of nuclear weapons to be placed on declining path; emaciating the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; and engagement towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Renewed Commitments—A Successful Ruse
The disarmament demand from the non-NWSs got prominence during the last decade of 20th century particularly between the 5th and 6th Revcons in 1995 and 2000 respectively. A bevy of countries led by Mexico and Indonesia were demanding extension in the tenure of NPT subject to practical disarmament steps taken by the NWSs. The non-NWSs had an acerbic experience of rhetorical obeisance only and no tangible step from the NWSs since inception of the treaty. The renewal of a more committed disarmament pledge from the NWSs was a shenanigan opted by the five NWSs keeping in view the need of that hour so that the treaty could be extended for an indefinite period in bargaining with the non-NWSs. Therefore the 1995 and 2000 Revcons’ final documents were laden with disarmament commitments but there outcome was no different than that of the NPT’s Article VI.
The Bush administration had out-and-out declined for implementation on Thirteen Steps and envisaged the modernization of the US nuclear arsenal in the Nuclear Posture Review-2002. It renounced the ratification of CTBT, withdrew the ABM treaty with Russia and abandoned the START III exercise thereby spawning a new era of nuclear arms race with its nemesis Russia. It also showed extreme disrespect to the disarmament commitments of the NWSs under Revcons depicted from the speech of the US’ ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Special Representative for Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Jackie Sander who disgraced the Revcons decision in the 2005 NPT Review Conference as:
“Review Conferences are political exercises meant to underscore or reaffirm existing treaty obligations. However they are not amendment conferences, and any declarations or decisions or other text emanating from them neither supersede, nor re-interpret, nor add on to the explicit legal obligations of all parties under the treaty.”6
The Revcon-2005 ended without any agreement besides a brazen stance from the US against the Article VI of NPT and Revcons decisions. Going ahead with the “Thirteen Steps” was a litmus test for the five NWSs but they all failed in compliance with their commitments. The NWSs, led by the US, got success in adroitly dickering over their renewed and more effective disarmament commitment with that of indefinite extension of the treaty from the non-NWSs. Implementation on any of the steps of the “Thirteen Steps” from any NWS is yet to be started despite lapse of almost two decades thereby scaling up asperity among the non-NWSs towards the NWSs besides adding one more deceit-oriented chapter in the befooling book of pledges from the five permanent members of the US Security Council.
Conclusion—NPT Cementing a Highly Divisive Nuclear World
NPT—a highly equivocal treaty has given contradictory outcomes in two of its objectives: Horizontal proliferation has faced constriction to a substantial level whereas the tumescent vertical proliferation has startled the entire world. Stonewalling coupled with arrogance from the five NWSs, under the stewardship of the US, is the causa causans for such diametrically opposite results. The mulishness of the NWSs has concretely polarized the nuclear world into two disparate groups: An obsequious group of non-nuclear-weapon states confronting five recusant veto-wielding states of the UN Security Council. It goes without saying that NPT has conked out if the parameter of disarmament is taken into consideration as the five recognized NWSs have vindicated themselves from the disarmament obligation. The brevity of NPT and its pristine shape, despite lapse of five decades, have burked the implementation of disarmament article. The treaty cannot ripe further benefits unless its three articles are amended: Article III (Provision of Safeguards), Article VI (Disarmament Clause), and Article VIII (Amendment Procedure) besides a holistic exposition is required in Article IV (Right to Peaceful Uses) and Article X (Withdrawal Option).
The non-proliferation regime is in shambles owing to the justified moaning and groaning of the non-NWSs against the NWSs over non-compliance of the disarmament obligation. It’s an obvious fact that a dichotomous nuclear world between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots has taken an undergirded position. In the light of continual denegation by the NWSs the disarmament experts rightly suggest that disarmament by the NWSs requires another treaty specific to them, but believing any such treaty signed and implemented by them is a pipe dream. The nuclear status quo between the 5 NWSs and non-NWSs will be maintained for an indefinite period besides expansion in the nuclear weapons between the USA and Russia. Surrender of NPT membership by any non-NWS in near future is highly unlikely but the mortification caused by the NWSs will deepen the division between the certified possessors and willful abdicators of nuclear weapons. South Asia, Middle East and Northeast Asia are the three major conflict-riddled regions of the world and are home to the world’s only four non-NPT nuclear-weapon states. There are ample chances of 10th nuclear capable state arising from any of these areas for coping with the regional security threats: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan and South Korea being the potential nuclear aspirants. After the scrapping of JCPOA Iran has threatened its withdrawal from the NPT but Iran’s leadership would probably follow the pre-2013 nuclear policy rather than standing down its NPT membership.
Undoubtedly it was a strife as well as struggle for pride and superiority, attached with the possession of nuclear weapons, between the nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots won by the former. However if this strife turns to battle or war and shifts among the five nuclear-weapon states owing to the different nuclear flashpoints, i.e. Syrian issue, South China Sea, or any other leading to the Third World War, the mankind would be wiped off by the nuclear weapons within hours of the outset of the war. The US-USSR history during the Cold War is littered with many such occasions, prominent being the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the nuclear war seemed imminent. Unfortunately the reigns of two major NWSs are in the hands of impulsive leaders thereby a slight miscalculation or misjudgment can lead to a nuclear war. The entire globe is receiving the nuclear shadow in a manner similar to that of the sun and the moon; but this shadow has obliterating rather than illuminating properties.
References
1 Jonathan Gorodischer, “This Day in Jewish History 1939: Einstein makes his Biggest Mistake” Haaretz, 11th October 2016.
2 Melissa Gillis, “Disarmament: A Basic Guide” United Nations Office of the Disarmament Affairs New York, 2017.
3 Harold A. Fievson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank N. Von Hippel, “Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” The MIT Press, 2014.
4 Ian Hore-Lacy, “Nuclear Electricity” Published by the Uranium Information Centre and the Word Nuclear Association, 2003.
5 Article VI, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”
6 Morten Bremer and Severe Lodgaard, “Nuclear Proliferation and International Security” Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, First Published 2007.
