The One Belt and One Road (OBOR) initiative would lessen the probabilities of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan providing Pakistan a competence to monitor India’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean.
Pakistan plays a significant role in China’s Maritime Silk Route as part of China’s Belt and Road (B & R) initiative. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a vital development project within China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and serves as the crucial link between the maritime ‘road’ and land based ‘belt’ aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India perceives China’s Maritime Silk route passing through South Asia a direct threat to its core strategic interest as it wants to maintain Indian primacy in the Indian Ocean (IO) and Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
The IOR is the coastal area (consisting of islands and states) lying in contact with the IO. It has become a renewed focal point of global economy having substantial avenues for economic activities of Asia, the US and Europe. Therefore, all stakeholders are obliged to secure the Indian Ocean to avoid any miscalculation or misperception among them. China is expected to be the world’s largest oil importing country and India is expected to be the largest coal importing country by 2020, therefore there is an inevitable need of their cooperative efforts to ensure energy security.
India’s leaders have strong aspirations to be a blue water navy or the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean since its inception in 1947. India’s Anit Mukherjee determines Indian Ocean strategy in three categories, one is to establish closer ties with the US and its allies, second is to strengthen its links with Indian Ocean Littoral states (Malaysia) and last is building up its own military power (including the induction of Nuclear capable Submarines in the Indian Ocean). Simultaneously, the enlargement of the People’s Liberation Army‘s Navy (PLAN) in the IOR is primarily due to large economic incentives, China’s developing economy has in the transit of trade and energy supplies through the critical Sea Lines of Communications in the region. China has transported 173.9 million tons of oil from the Middle East to China and 52.4 million tons from Africa to China in 2016. Moreover, China has established its first overseas military base in Djibouti which is considered by India as part of China’s “String of Pearls” strategy and would engulf India. If India is developing its military (three wings: army, navy, air force) to maximize its power, it likewise may avoid feeding its fears related to China’s port development assistance in the IOR.
China is pursuing its own national economic and strategic interests while India perceives that these ports can disrupt the refueling of India’s tankers and warships because of the presence of People’s Liberation Army Navy in the IOR.
The contemporary world is globalized and interdependent where states have to cooperate with each other in every walk of life. Therefore, India’s rhetoric regarding China’s development projects may prove baseless in future. The question arises, if India is the one of the biggest trade partners of China why does it feel it would be engulfed by China? Similarly, India has presuppositions that the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province under China—Pakistan’s joint development project, “China—Pakistan Economic Corridor” will pave the way for the formation of Chinese naval base in Gwadar. Fuelling these fears against China India has launched a nuclear capable submarine in the Indian Ocean. This nuclearization of the Indian Ocean has serious security implications for Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan needs a strategic partner currently in form of “China” in order to monitor India’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Likewise, China can monitor the naval activities of both the US and India through China-Pakistan naval cooperation.
Some recent events such as India-China military standoff on Doklam from 16 June 2017– 28 August 2017 and India-Pakistan’s blame game on the unprovoked firing on the Line of Control region in 2017 and in the beginning of 2018 (left hundreds of people dead and injured), are the destabilizing incidents in the South Asian region. In the backdrop of these insecurities, Pakistan has to maximize its defence.
Most recently, an embryonic formation of an alternative route against China’s B &R by a quad of Australia, India, Japan and the US in order to contain China’s global influence may exacerbate some tensions at the global level. India being part of this quad may pursue its strategic objective against China’s B & R initiative. India considers China’s MSR projects in South Asia as part of its larger strategy of challenging Indian primacy in the Indian Ocean.
New Delhi believes that Chinese aims to deploy Gwadar in the medium to long term as a dual use port would allow the PLA key access into the Indian Ocean as well as bolstering Pakistan’s ability to deter any Indian advantage in the naval realm. The Pakistani port of Gwadar, built, financed and operated by China is located at the confluence of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, providing China access to a key location in the Indian Ocean. The land route between Gwadar and Kashgar in China’s western Xinjiang province connects the ‘road’ and ‘belt’ elements of the CPEC.
In between all these states, Pakistan being an important part of China’s Belt and Road initiative can maximize it maritime security at its best. In this context, the Pakistan Navy is likely to buy eight more diesel-electric attack submarines from China in the near future that can be equipped with nuclear weapons. These are scheduled for delivery in 2028 to maximize Pakistan’s maritime security as a defensive measure. It may be a direct response to India’s August 2016 deployment of its first nuclear submarine, the Arihant. A second, even more advanced Indian nuclear submarine, the Arighat began sea trials last November and four more boats are scheduled to join the fleet by 2025. That will give India a “nuclear triad,” which means the country will have the ability to deliver a nuclear strike by land-based missiles, by warplanes, and by submarines. The submarine is the key component and is considered to be the most “survivable” in the event of a devastating first strike by an enemy and thus able to deliver a retaliatory second strike.
Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China will counter balance India’s military might being part of B & R initiative specifically in the oceanic zone. Both China and Pakistan will be able to monitor India’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean so that any attempt by India to get an advantage in the IO can be counterbalanced. If, supposedly, that advantage will go unnoticed, there would be more chance of the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean by India.
In the theology of nuclear deterrence, the point of this unholy trinity is to make nuclear war unwinnable and, therefore pointless. When it comes to India and Pakistan, by contrast, the new generation of nuclear submarines may increase the risk of a devastating war between the two longstanding enemies.
