“In Turkey, we have marriage of Islam and democracy. The child of this marriage is secularism. This child gets sick from time to time. The Turkish armed forces are the doctor which saves the child. Depending on how sick the child is, we administer the necessary medicine to make sure the child recuperates”. General Cevik Bir, former Deputy Chief of General Staff of Turkish army.
The Turkish Armed Forces (known by the Turkish initials TSK – Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri) have gone through a dramatic change in the last two years. In July 2016, a faction of TSK tried and failed to bring back TSK on the center stage of Turkey. This failed coup attempt was the result of rapidly deteriorating relations between ruling the Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials AKP – Adalat ve Kalkinma Partisi) and TSK spanning over fifteen years.
TSK assigned itself the role of the guardian of the state and Kemalist tradition. TSK had a key role in making decisions about national security, economy and foreign relations. Supreme Military Council (known by its Turkish initials YAS – Yuksek Askari Shura) was the instrument used for military’s dominance. The civilian bureaucracy and judiciary dominated by the secular elite were junior partners of TSK.
In 1997, TSK forced the removal of Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in what was later called a ‘post-modern coup’. In 2000, AKP came to power and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan gradually increased his power while avoiding direct conflict with the powerful army. There was now conflict between two power centers. AKP didn’t have qualified cadres to control the state bureaucracy. Erdogan made an alliance with cleric Fethullah Gulen, whose organization Hizmet has been focused on excellence in education for three decades. Gulenist sympathizers joined the state bureaucracy, especially police and judiciary. Repeated electoral successes of AKP with control of legislature combined with penetration of state structure by Gulenist sympathizers strengthened the civilian hand. They now felt confident to confront TSK and snatch back some powers.
Gulenist sympathizers in the police and judiciary embarked on an ambitious plan of state restructuring by clipping the wings of TSK. Several former and later serving officers were accused of plotting coups. Hundreds of officers were charged, arrested and prosecuted in two notorious alleged conspiracies, Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer). Later, hundreds of officers including high ranking ones were convicted and sentenced to long prison sentences. TSK was gradually losing its internal cohesion due to emergence of various factions. Senior officers lost the confidence of junior officers for failing to protect the officer corps from real and imagined conspiracies propagated by pro AKP and pro Gulenist media houses and large-scale arrests of officers.
A group of second and third tier TSK officers decided to strike before Erdogan further clipped TSK wings in upcoming August 2016 YAS meeting. Elements from major army formations, special forces, army headquarters, air force and helicopter pilots and naval officers were involved in the coup attempt. The TSK senior brass was not in the loop. Headquarter of coup plotters was at Akinci air force base.
On 15 July afternoon, a helicopter pilot Osman Karaca went to MIT headquarters to warn about an impending coup. MIT chief Hakan Fidan informed head of military police and later army chief General Hulusi Akar. General Akar issued orders banning military flights over Turkish air space and prohibited movement of armored vehicles. This upset the original coup launch time of 3 am on July 16 and the coup plotters moved the time to 8:30 pm July 15. This proved to be a fatal error as the streets were bustling and Erdogan was able to rally his supporters. Major General Mehmet Disli of strategic planning branch at General headquarters went to Akar’s office informing him that a coup was in motion and asking him to take charge. When an angry Akar refused, he was arrested and flown to Akinci air base.
Coup plotters bombed Turkish parliament building and police headquarters. Erdogan made the courageous move of flying back to Istanbul and asking his supporters to come out on the streets. Protestors confronted soldiers on the streets. The coup attempt failed in a few hours and government forces quickly restored order. Erdogan on landing at Istanbul airport declared that ‘if we accept that everything happens for a reason, then this uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be the reason to cleanse our army’. He truly cleansed the armed forces by sacking and arresting thousands of officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). Almost half of flag rank officers of Turkish army, air force and navy were sacked.
Deeply suspicious of the army, Erdogan closed all military colleges and academies and transferred several military institutions, including hospitals and business interests of TSK to civilian control. To counter military’s coercive power, he has strengthened police special forces, paramilitary forces and civilian intelligence. In Syria, during recent operations against Syrian Kurds, the army was used only initially especially tanks but later police special forces and Gendarmerie were deployed on Syrian territory. Erdogan has also expanded the role of private security contractors to fill the security gap. He hired retired Brigadier Adnan Tanriverdi as his military advisor. Adnan was retired in 1997 on suspicion of having Islamist leanings. In 2012, he started a private security firm, SADAT.
In the aftermath of the coup, Erdogan had two choices. A transparent trial of accused officers and strict punishments or using failed coup attempt to silence all opposition. Unfortunately, he embarked on the later course with large scale sacking and arrest of not only army personnel but civilian bureaucracy, police and judiciary. In addition, all opposition including Gulenist sympathizers and Kurds are on the receiving end. Hundreds of academics were sacked and many journalists have been arrested and large media houses taken over by the government. This has divided Turkey right in the middle, half of Turkey hates while the other half loves Erdogan. This is a recipe for long term instability and in this environment, it is inevitable that this polarization will affect TSK. It will take more than a decade to restructure TSK on professional grounds while at the same time keep it under civilian control.
This article is based on author’s talk at The Democracy Forum in London on 19 March 2018.
