Abstract
Large scale armored offensive with air support proved to be very effective throughout the history of armored assaults. Fast attacks spearheaded by well designed and well deployed main battle tanks cause the attacker to succeed on many occasions due to their firepower and ability to strike with surprise. On the other hand, the anti-armor defense had also been trialed and perfected and successfully executed throughout previous battles. It was in 2004 when India, fascinated by numerical armor superiority declared her intentions to rage a limited war against Pakistan and gain strategic operational area to clear self-proclaimed terrorist hideouts.
Pakistan responded with full show of military might and declared the use of tactical nuclear weapons against armor offensive. The declaration of tactical nuclear weapons under the doctrine to strike first will lead Pakistan to global isolation and requires immense resources which may prove to be detrimental to the dwindling economy of Pakistan. Also this move indirectly proves inability of the Pakistan army to halt any large scale armor offensive. In this regards, a thorough literature review has been presented and a brief study has been conducted to understand the strengths and weaknesses of both the nations with the emphasis to develop a carefully crafted Pakistan Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) having ability to conduct anti-armor operations. The MAGTF is essentially a combined arms organization under a single and able commander, possessing all the necessary air and ground assets to defend against large scale armor conflicts.
1. Introduction
The rivalry between India and Pakistan dates back to 1947 when they took their independent status from the then British Empire. This rivalry previously ignited two full scale wars (1965 & 1971) and one limited war (Kargil war). The ever hostile relations between Pakistan and India pushed them to acquire nuclear weapons to protect their territorial and political interests.
The announced military policy and doctrine of both nations was of defensive nature until 2004 when Indian armed forces declared a limited warfare doctrine. India developed its Limited War doctrine in the wake of the Kargil War. The doctrine per se is for conventional war, but embedded in it are the tenets of Limited War (Ahmed 2012). The understanding is that whether a war is ‘Limited’ or ‘Total’ would depend on political aims of the conflict and their strategic and operational translation. Since political aims can reasonably only be limited in the nuclear age, the doctrine can be taken as being a Limited War doctrine (Joshi 2013). Before that (1981-2001) Indian army was following Sundarji Doctrine which was purely as defensive doctrine with limited offensive power. According to Sundarji doctrine, the holding Corps close to international border would keep a check on the advance by Pakistani military and the strike corps would reinforce the holding corps for potential counter-offensive. However, the limitation of the Sundarji doctrine was exposed on 13 December 2001 when India initiated Operation Parakram which involved the mass mobilization of strike corps. It took the Indian strike corps three weeks to get to the international border, during which time Pakistan was able to counter-mobilize and allow for intervening powers to become an intermediary to the conflict. By the time the Indian strike corps reached the border region, India’s political justification for military action had been significantly reduced. The results of this operation prompted Indian forces to modify the aging military doctrine and increase the capacity of strike group in terms of mobilization, logistics and fire power (Ladwig III 2008, Khan 2012).
In response to India’s Pakistan specific military doctrine, the authorities of Pakistan developed their counter-strategy and responded with tactical nuclear weapons. The aim was to lower the Indian self proclaimed Pakistani nuclear threshold and engage the advancing enemy armor with short range Nasr missile systems. The move by the Pakistan armed forces in the name of Nasr missile system with tactical nuclear capability though meets the minimal credible nuclear deterrence of Pakistan and Pakistan’s defensive doctrine but it lacks the geo-political aspect and operational realities. The move by Pakistan to start a nuclear war first will definitely favor India to gain global sympathies and isolate Pakistan. The move also reveals weakness of Pakistan military capability to defend their lines against mass mobilization of enemy armor attack. Moreover, this strategy requires immense resources which may prove to be troublesome for the economy of an under developed country like Pakistan. One study recommends military restructuring to counter limited war i.e. India’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) and employ new technologies to overcome this new threat. But the study does not comprehensively throw light on the re-structuring and other technical aspects of this kind of warfare (Abdullah 2012).
In this study, we attempt to present the possible counter-strategies which should have been deployed in response to CSD. This article discusses the operational viability of CSD, previous armor conflicts involving fast moving tanks and infantry units, the concept of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), available weapons systems and platform to effectively repel armored assault and future weapons systems to counter anti-tank and high speed attack. The discussion will be concluded with defensive strategies and recommendations.
2. CSD and its operational viability
The intense limited high speed armored assault that Indian army called Cold Start Doctrine took its roots from middle of the First word war (WWI) when British Empire first introduced tracked fire power protected by thick metal (Liebenberg 2014). CSD has also been thought of blitzkrieg (lightening strike) tactic used by Germans in Second World War (WWII). The cold start from its very formulation is a strategic and technical blunder which is the likely reason for the reversal of the Indian army from this doctrine. These kinds of tactics by the enemy armored columns are deployed to gain tactical operational depth from the defending force and cannot be used to gain strategic operational depth. But as far the overall war strategy is concerned (not small battles), the tactical gain by the armored offensive can also fulfill the overall political aims of Indian military strategy.
As far as the operational viability is concerned, the fast moving armor attack can be categorized in four forms of maneuvers i.e. (1) penetration, (2) envelopment, (3) turning movement, (4) frontal attack and (5) infiltration. In the subsequent sections, we will discuss these maneuvers one by one which can be employed by Indian armored battle groups along with the viability of each form of maneuver (Sidran and Segre).
2.1 Penetration: is a form of maneuver adopted by the offending force when the flanks of defending force are not easily assessable or well prepared. In this maneuver, the offensive is been launched with full force to any weak point on the front line of defence or attempt was made to make a weak point by overwhelming fire power and sheer numbers. The purpose of this tactical move is to rupture enemy defences on a narrow front and thereby create both assailable flanks and access to the rear. Figure 1 is showing the schematic diagram of this kind of attack.
The maneuver starting from initial rupture by overwhelming force and rolling up the flanks until the rear position of defensive force has been achieved require precise information of depth of the defending forces through precise reconnaissance and thorough study of battle field. Usually for these kinds of attacks the attacking force should be three to four times more than the defenders alongwith complete air superiority and close air support.
2.2 Envelopment: is the tactical maneuver by the offensive forces which allows the attacker to avoid direct frontal engagement with the defending force where defender’s fire is more effective and/ or easy to move. In this maneuver the attacker engages the defender through supporting attacks from the front and simultaneously moves the main force to the flanks. This kind of tactic is more lethal and effective provided the assessable flanks are discovered and/or created. This maneuver has proved to be very effective and a favourite move by the German army practiced throughout the WWII. Figure 2 is showing the envelopment maneuver.
This maneuver requires two to three times strong attacking force compared to the defenders with high mobility, firepower and the discovery and/or creation of easy to take flanks. Surprise is the key for these kinds of attacks. Complete air superiority is not needed for this tactical maneuver to gain the tactical depth but to hold the territorial gains, complete air superiority is must. Normally the commander possesses anti-aircraft batteries with mobile infantry to hold the territory.
2.3 Turning manoeuvre: is the type of envelopment in which the attacker denies frontal engagement entirely, instead he tries to locate and cease a key terrain deep inside the rear of the defender and along with his communication lines. Fearing the major threat from the rear, the defender may thus turn out of his well dug-in defensive positions and forced to attack rearward. For this maneuver to be effective, the attacking force should be large and lethal enough to pose major threat to the defender. The attacker should also look for his supply line with highly accurate reconnaissance and anti-aircraft means. This Turning maneuver enables the attacking unite to occupy deep tactical operational area. For this maneuver to be executed accurately, the attacking force must be three times strong with accurate reconnaissance and air superiority. Without air support, the risks of complete annihilation of Turning force through air attack are high. Also for this maneuver to be successful the Turning unit must attack something that the enemy will fight to save as deception. Figure 3 is showing the schematic of the Turning maneuver.
2.4 Frontal attack: is the most direct approach of the attack in which attacker tried to engage the defenders in direct frontal engagement on a broader line of attack. For this kind of attack, the attacking force should be five times bigger in number and the attack should be fast with overwhelming fire power through direct and indirect fire. This type of attack also force the defender to spread on a wider line of defence which effectively reduce the ability of defending force to concentrate fire at any given point in space and time. The main objective of this maneuver is to push the defenders through their communication lines and gain territory. Close air support and anti-aircraft means are highly required for this kind of attack
2.5 Infiltration: is a covert action performed by the part of the main attacking force to get to the rear of the defenders undetected and/ or without fighting through well prepared defences. Infiltration in the realm of fast moving armour attacks is rarely possible. It can be practiced in the middle of war to cease any discovered or created opportunity.
The Indian military due to lack of reconnaissance means and lack of air superiority over Pakistan cannot perform any kind of attack maneuver without heavy losses but due to higher numbers in terms of armored vehicles, infantry personnel, artillery and well equipped air force, India has the ability to gain initial tactical operational depths and the heavy material losses and causalities can be justified by offsetting time and territorial gains. On the other hand, the attacking Indian army lacks the ability to hold the tactical operational areas as the tactical depths are unable to remove army reserve. And due to lack of air superiority, the armored company will be unable to hold against counter attack. It should be kept in mind that an inch of territorial gain and 24 hrs. of hold by the Indian army will be a success according to very definition of CSD. Under this success, the Indian Govt can announce the destruction of self-proclaimed terrorist hideouts within Pakistani territory and it might be possible that the offender’s holding force withdraw the territorial gain before the initiation of counter attack. The CSD has been developed to satisfy the anger and aggression within the nation of India (boosted by Indian politicians for political gains) and not for any strategic objective. It is therefore, necessary for Pakistan army to think of the possible options to counter the high intensity fast and lethal armored ware-fare without the need of launching counter offensive to gain the lost territory.
3. Combat capability and readiness of Pakistan against CSD
To effectively counter the armored attack based on the blitzkrieg tactics, it is important for the defending force to prepare and conceal flank positions so that these flanks could act as shoulders. The air superiority must be achieved at least within the air space of defensive force and the defenders should be robust against shock of fast attack and have the potential to absorb panic at the idea of enemy formations at the rear. Another important thing is the ability of artillery to effectively deliver accurate firepower at any point in space and time. Mobile artillery has proved to be very effective in these kinds of ware fares. The most important ability and may prove to be a decisive one is the effective close air support with tank killing infantry forward teams or operating in security area and main engagement area.
Pakistan possesses effective defensive capability against CSD. The country has a well equipped and well trained armor corps and decent artillery firepower. The Pakistan army also possesses indigenously developed guided anti-amour short and medium range missiles which can be very effective against tanks when used by tank killing teams. The most effective muscle against CSD is the modernization of Pakistan Army Aviation which can operate with ground forces in close air support role. The Pakistan army aviation consisting of variety of ground attack helicopters can prove to be very effective to suppress armor assault. Operation Zarb e Azb has already refined the ability of combined maneuvers of Pakistan ground forces with close air support provided by attack helicopters. As far as combat readiness is concerned, the army aviation can be deployed faster than the launch of enemy offensive at any given space and time but our armored corps and artillery corps are lacking the ability to respond within the desired time. As the place and/or starting point of offensive has always been the choice of attacking commander, it would be very difficult for Pakistan armored corps and artillery corps to move to the new position at given time with effective fire power. Although it can be quoted with confidence that Pakistan has the ability to defend its lines against CSD through counter offensive but it is likely that initially Pakistani forces would have to give up control over the initial line of defense. This is because of numerical advantage of Indian forces in term of troops, armored vehicles and artillery power along with higher numbers of aircrafts and helicopters.
4. Response from Pakistan
Pakistan took the idea of CSD very seriously from the initial announcement by the Indian armed force and presented it as a real threat to the global community on the sovereignty of Pakistan. Although the Indian army denied existence of this kind of doctrine but recent procurement of military hardware by India such as unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms, high caliber artillery, modernization of tanks and indigenous development of light attack helicopters prove otherwise. All these moves clearly verify that India is preparing for high intensify limited armored offensive and the attack can be initiated from anywhere along the mountainous terrain or from the deserts.
4.1 Geo-political response
The geo-political response of Pakistan was very effective and helped in making the world understand that Pakistan needed to modernize her weapons systems to counter the eminent threat by the India. Pakistani experts in different global platforms raised their concerns about CSD and made clear the position of Pakistan.
4.2 Military response
Pakistan military in 2010 had conducted a huge military exercise to test and refine the newly adopted doctrine of offensive defense against CSD (Khan 2011). The Army had also acquired and developed new arsenals & weapons systems such as Nasr missile launcher system capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapon. The Nasr missile system has been developed to lower the nuclear redline of Pakistan nuclear doctrine (self proclaimed nuclear redline by Indian army). It has been claimed that Pakistan has the capability to move the effective offensive power at any time faster than the Indian army and Pakistan is prepared to engage any offense head on i.e. meeting engagements.
5. Literature review
The concept of armored warfare and penetration of defensive barriers by using well protected army groups took their roots from ancient warfare and the tactics have been developed throughout medieval ages to today’s armored war fighting doctrine. The first tank powered by combustion engine was introduced by the British in WWI. Although the early experiences with the tanks were not so successful due to lack of technological advancements and inability of commanders to use this machine in battle field but this invention played much needed role in the final stages of WWI and proved its lethality and impact on the ground (Fuller 1920). The tanks revolutionized the battle fields and changed the concept of static trench warfare to tracked warfare once and for all. Following the British technology of tanks, the German developed their own tanks to counter the threat. It was in November 20, 1917 when the first tank offensive was staged by the British against German lines. It was the first time when tanks meet with tanks turret to turret in the battle of Cambrai 1917 (McNab 2012). And it was the first time when tanks led the offensive and proved their might as spearhead of mechanized offensive which eventually led to final push towards Germany.
After WWI it were the German who studied and refined the concept of armored vehicles. German military took the lessons from WWI very seriously and developed armored war fighting doctrine where tanks hold the special place as an offensive weapon. Realizing the abilities of tanks, an immense improvement had been witnessed in the German tank design in the form of speed, protection and fire power (Everett and Irvin). Other than tank design, Germans were the first to realize the need of combined military operations using artillery and air force as supporting battle groups (echelons) (Overy 2005). Throughout the WWII tanks and armored vehicles have been deployed in immense numbers from axis forces and allied forces. It was the WWII which forced the battle groups to develop offensive and defensive tactics with the use of tanks. Various events demonstrated offensive capabilities of mechanized armored forces and also an effective defense against tanks. This sets the bases that tanks which were once the symbol of invincibility can be halted with excellent coordination and updated information of battle field.
The basic reason of success for German’s armored offensive was their ability to effectively coordinate combined arms. In the battle of Poland and throughout French campaign, the Luftwaffe provided effective close air support. Although early German tanks were not a match to French counterparts but excellent tactics and combined coordinated offensive marked the overwhelming victory of the German military and the effectiveness of their Blitzkrieg tactic (Rossino 2003). Close air support also proved very effective in operation Barbarossa initiated by Germans against Soviet Union. It was in battle of Brody (1941) which witnessed the victory of 800 Axis tanks against 3500 Russian T-34 tanks. The battle lasted four days with resounding German victory and large scale Russian retreat. A series of Luftwaffe aerial attacks knocked out more than 200 Russian tanks. Other than close air support, tactical tank maneuvers by the Germans were very effective and proved devastating for Russian armored units (Zaloga 1993). The second desert campaign initiated by Africa Corp lead by Erwin Rommel also known as Desert fox (nickname given by British) witnessed the tactical know how of German army for armor deployment in offensive posture. The swift sweep throughout the Libyan Desert by the German Africa Corp was halted at El Alamein (November 1942) by Commonwealth forces lead by Bernard Law Montgomery. Rommel demonstrated excellent show of offensive power of tanks. Also during final stages of Battle of El Alamein, Rommel crafted an excellent defensive posture using tanks and anti-tank guns. In the early battle of Tunisia (February 1943), Erwin Rommel proved the effectiveness of tanks in a defensive posture against tanks (Macksey 1997).
Another excellent defense against rapid advance of armored forces was conducted by the Russian forces in the Battle of Kursk where Russians held their lines and destroyed the might of German SS brigade (Glantz and House 1999). Though the battle was won due to superior number of tanks and infantry fielded by the Russians, the war marked the success story of defense against enemy armored thrust. The Battle of Arracourt and Battle of Bulge also witnessed victory against mechanized armored forces due to air superiority and good coordination of air force, infantry and tanks. At the time of these two battles in 1944, Germany lost complete air support which was the decisive factor in these battle fields (Drew II , Eckersley 2001).
The battle of Chawinda fought between Pakistan and India also witnessed excellent show of defense against numerically superior armored forces. Pakistani forces displayed an effective show of combined arms and with close air support and superior tactics, out maneuvered the superior enemy (Dvorsky 2015). In another battle, the numerically inferior defensive forces slowed down much superior enemy to the point when the reinforcements arrived. In the battle fought between Syria and Israel for Golan Height (1973), Syrian forces attacked Israel from the line of control (the ceasefire line in 1967) with 1400 tanks. On the other hand, Israeli forces could field only 150 tanks. The defenders displayed a brilliant show of Guerrilla tactics and managed to slow down the massive thrust of tanks without air support until reinforcements arrived. Syrian forces although superior in number were unable to press on to the final objectives and dug in. This defensive maneuver without anti-aircraft means proved damaging to the Syrians and finally the Syrian forces had to retreat (Herzog and Schofield 1975, Dunstan 2013).
During cold war when NATO analyzers concluded that putting tank against tank was impossible for the NATO forces against Soviet Union. At that time Soviet union had the ability to put 53,000 tanks against NATO forces which were more than double the numbers compared to NATO armored forces (Cope 1988). Fearing massive armored offensive and short of funds, the NATO forces developed anti-tank weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles which could be launched by soldiers and armored vehicles and air-crafts (Luttwak 2001). An excellent display of anti-tank guided weapons was witnessed in second Arab-Israel war (1973) fought in Saini desert. Egyptian forces in an attempt to retake the lost territory (1967 war) attacked the Israeli forces and in a matter of minutes they established their foothold on the other side of river. Israeli forces launched a counter attack using tanks but they met with disaster there when they come up against light infantry equipped with Russian anti-tank guided missiles (Handel 1977). The use of anti-tank weapons such as unguided shoulder rocket launchers, anti-tank artillery guns and tank destroyers had also been used throughout WWII with excellent results. The German tank destroyers and 88mm anti-tank gun (modified anti-aircraft gun) proved to be the most effective weapons against tanks in WWII. In another armored conflict between NATO and Iraqi forces (Gulf war 1991), the technological advantage and complete air superiority enable NATO forces to defeat numerically superior Republican guards. In the Gulf war, anti-tank guided missiles mounted on wheeled chassis were widely used against Iraqi forces with close air support (Perry 1991).
From the lessons of past armored conflicts, a new strategy to defend against armored offensives has been developed i.e. the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF led by one commander should have all the means to catch the enemy armor off guard using air force, infantry, armored vehicles, artillery and/ or combination of arms.
6. MAGTF and anti-armor operations
The MAGTF by definition is a principle organization for the conduct of all missions across the range of military operations. It is a balanced combined arms force with organic ground aviation and sustainment elements. The beauty of MAGTF is that, it has no fixed operational structure. The flexible construct of air and ground assets under single commander can easily put any enemy in dilemma (Corps 2001). In the case of Pakistan, I will discuss the anti-armor posture of MAGTF in line with the cold start doctrine. The Pakistan MAGTF force should assume anti-armor posture as rule and not as exception.
MAGTF as mentioned above is based on the integration of air and ground assets and has all the necessary means to take the enemy by surprise. As air-ground team, it should present the enemy with a dilemma. As an example, the armor offensive against ground forces requires that the attacker mass his armor to punch through the defenses. This massing of armor may present a lucrative target for air assets deployed for close air support. To avoid being attacked by aircrafts, the attacker may seek to operate in forests and build up areas, however this type of situation is ideal for dismounted infantry.
A classic success story of MAGTF was witnessed in Operation Desert Storm (1991) when a task force Shepherd was under attack at observation post (OP) 4 by approximately 35 Iraqi tanks spear heading the mechanized infantry near Kuwait border. The medium sized task force was out-numbered against the Iraqi offensive as they had no tank at their disposal. Instead, it was a combined arms force and due to effective integration of air and ground assets, they managed to repel the armor offensive. The task force used anti tank guided missiles and chain guns mounted on light armor vehicles which gave them high mobility and ability to quickly switch positions. The close air support provided by AH-1 cobra helicopter, A-10, F-15 and F-16 fighter aircrafts ensured effective concentration of fire power which blunted the Iraqi attack (Entessar 1997, Johnson, Grissom, and Oliker 2008).
The development of MAGTF with anti-armor posture as a first rule is the need of the Pakistan army to counter the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. The MAGTF should be light enough to quickly move to any place and heavy enough to halt a major armor push. The adoption of MAGTF in Pakistan military with the objective to “destroy the enemy armor and retain the territory” needs a careful plan and keen observation of enemy strength. As it is well known that the tank is the best weapon of choice against a tank, but present economic position of Pakistan restricts the gain in numerical superiority and putting tanks against tanks would consume much of the percentage of Pakistani armor corps in defensive role. So, it is of interest to Pakistan to develop a carefully crafted MAGTF with all the necessary air and ground assets and/or freedom to call them. In the preceding section, a hypothetical battle ground with best tactical operations and procedures will be narrated.
6.1 Hypothetical deployment of MAGTF against possible cold start
It is of utmost importance that the MAGTF possesses all the necessary anti-armor weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles, anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, battle tanks, fixed wing and rotary wing air assets and mechanized infantry with tank killer teams. In principle, the armor offense starts with supporting artillery fire. Tanks spearhead the attack with mechanized infantry as second echelon and regular infantry maybe as third echelon to hold the territorial gains. Air support would be called upon normally while the tanks advance to soften the defenses and take out potential artillery positions and anti tank assets. The attacking commander may include vehicle mounted anti-aircraft batteries to defend its forces against possible air strikes. In case war erupts between India and Pakistan the Indian forces may choose any attacking maneuver as discussed above but the most likely attack would be a frontal spread out attack or mass pronged attack from multiple positions due to India’s numerical superiority and lack of reconnaissance ability. The MAGTF due to its high mobility and ability to concentrate fire power can easily adjust to any attacking maneuver. Normally the MAGTF divide the battle field in four fighting zones/areas i.e. (1) security area, (2) forward edge of battle area (FEBA), (3) Main engagement area and (4) rear area. Figure 4 is showing the division of battle area with best suited maneuvers. The forces in security area should have long range anti-tank guided weapons systems along with tank destroyers and the freedom to call close air support. The main objective of forces in security area should be to deploy delay tactics and use full fire power to force the attacking commander to assume that he is up against main battle formation and deploy his attacking posture prematurely.
The security forces must not decisively engage the enemy until inevitable and disengage when the attacking force reveal its attacking posture to avoid unnecessary causalities. And stay there to engage rear enemy echelons with the priority to engage and destroy anti-aircraft batteries to clear the way for effective air strikes. The security forces should also be equipped with at least shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons. The forces in FEBA must engage the enemy armor and fix them (took causalities and disengage only to be engaged by the forces in main engagement area if causalities are mounting high) using positional and mobile defense at the same time using anti-tank guided weapons, anti-tank guns and tank destroyers along with close air support. The premature deployment of offensive posture of attackers will reveal their intentions and weak points which must be exploited by the MAGTF forces detained for FEBA. At the same time the enemy has been engaged in FEBA, a tank force which should consist of Al-Khalid (expensive tank) and Al-Zarar (relatively inexpensive tank) tanks must assume offensive posture in the form of Turning maneuver (already discussed above) along with self propelled howitzers and close air support. Al-Zarar tanks should be utilized to engage the enemy in turning maneuver while the main attack should be conducted by Al-Khalid tanks and avoid deceptive engagements. This Turning maneuver would envelope the attackers which can then be destroyed in main engagement area. It is of importance to MAGTF to overlap the FEBA and main battle area as Pakistan possesses low tactical depth as her urban areas are very close to international borders. After the successful Turning maneuver, the regular Pakistan army may launch an offensive attack at the same point for territorial gains. The rear guard should also possess sufficient fire power to engage mechanized infantry and any tanks if main battle area has been breached.
It is worth mentioning that Pakistan should develop tracked and wheeled tank destroyers as these machines, due to their turret-less guns are used as fix defensive positions with the ability to quickly move to another position. This machine is very inexpensive compared to tanks. The other benefit is its turret-less construction which enables the designer to mount big and powerful guns to engage the tank well ahead of effective range. Its high preparedness, rate of fire, survivability and inexpensive nature & easy adoption ability makes it a best weapon for MAGTF for anti-tank defense. Tank from its very nature is an offensive weapon. MAGTF must consider proper deployment of tanks and tank destroyers (Rummler 2005).
7. Modern anti-tank weapons development
Anti-tank weapons have earned a great interest in the scientific community due to their wide spread use and high demand. The following subsections are dedicated to the modern anti-tank weapons systems.
7.1 Smart artillery
Artillery possesses a special place in anti-armor defense role for its ability to provide indirect and direct (using anti-tank guns) fire. During WWII, the effective use of artillery played a vital role against advancing armor columns. In the modern world of war-fare, where tanks have the ability to move at high speed, conventional artillery with unguided ammunition is losing its ground. Therefore, guided artillery rounds have been developed which possess the ability to track the target and adjust their trajectory (Gozard, Cathala, and Latger 2006, Fesenko 2003). Initial developments in the field of guided artillery ammunition required that the target should be illuminated through laser by infantry personal, the round track the signals and adjust its trajectory. This technology although very effective and workable requires a soldier to track and illuminate target until the round hit it. This approach would leave the soldier vulnerable to enemy fire and consume vital time. Another development was the fire and forget artillery round which has the ability to identify, track and adjust the trajectory without the need of illumination. In principle, the fire and forget round possesses its own infrared sensors and millimeter wave radar to identify and track the target. A round fired in a general direction of target and once in effective range starts scanning the area and identifies the target, tracks it and adjusts its trajectory according to target motion. A recent development in the field of smart fire and forget anti-tank artillery ammunition is the concept of “submunition”. Single artillery round possesses generally two submunitions (bomblet) and a single bomblet has its own identification and tracking system. An artillery round fired in a general direction of target and a delay fuse allows the bomblets to come out from the main case and start target acquisition. The velocity of bomblets has been reduced using parachutes. Once the target has been acquired beneath it, it detonates its explosive payload. This creates a high-velocity explosively formed projectile which strikes the target vehicle from above, where the amour is weak, for maximum effect. This kind of round can also be fired using multi barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with additional bomblets. One MBRL system can launch high rate of this kind of ammunition.
7.2 Air launched cluster bomb
Air launched cluster bomb is the bigger form of artillery submunition with the exception that it can be launched from air against massed armor (Cardoen 1988). The bomb case possesses more than 100 anti-tank bomblets which can be guided or unguided. After launch, the delay fuse cause the bomblets to scatter around an area with a preset or maybe random pattern and rains down on the armor columns. This type of weapon proved very effective against Iraqi forces (2003). Air launched and/or land based cluster weapons can also be utilized to lay mines in the way of advancing tanks. While these anti-tank land mines cannot completely destroy the tanks but these weapons can render the tank immobile by destroying the tracks. Immobile tanks can be easily targeted by any anti-tank weapon.
Conclusion
The armor threat to Pakistan is eminent due to prevailing destabilization of sub-continent and Kashmir issue. The declaration of limited war on LoC or possibly on international borders further endorses the intentions of neighboring country India. In this regard, the threat of tactical nuclear strikes is weak and it also shows the inability of Pakistan army in conventional war-fare. Furthermore, this move would not be appreciated by global community. In this study, I presented some structural changes and suggested adoption of new tactics in the realm of conventional war-fare. It is necessary for Pakistan army to develop her own MAGTF and carefully craft its rule as anti-armor defense. The MAGTF must possess all the necessary air and ground assets to put the enemy in dilemma and it should be capable enough to fight against large armor offense.
Recommendations
1. Pakistan should develop a corps sized MAGTF which should possess all the necessary air ground assets under single commander. Or at least all or half of the existing corps should have a separate brigade sized MAGTF which should be independent in its operations under one commander.
2. The best option in the kind of situation, where defending force lack numerical advantage is to develop the ability to strike pre-emptively when the attacker is trying to assemble his attacking force. Pakistan Govt. and/or military leadership must issue a statement to reserve the right for spoiling attack if mass movement has been observed close to borders.
3. Pakistan should develop both the tracked and wheeled tank destroyers for economy and should not put tank against tank until inevitable.
4. A combination of powerful and accurate turret-less anti tank gun and smart MBRL system mounted on tank chassis would prove to be an effective weapon of choice against tank offensive. The system can also be utilized as support weapon for attacking forces.
5. Pakistan should develop smart artillery ammunition and cluster weapons.
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