Historical Overview
The traditional military set ups and doctrines in the Middle east, Central Asia and the Subcontinent were laid out on land based forces and war operations were carried out mainly considering this unilateral land based approach. Many historic warriors like Gangis khan, Taimurlen, the subcontinent Mughals were adopting and depending mainly on land forces for establishing and enhancing their foothold for stretching the empires. Due to this fact, it was possible to conquer the lands due to availability of outnumbered manpower used along with tremendous logistic resources. However, it is also a fact that the nations that got expertise in naval warfare and raised massive ship inventory along with maneuvering capability were able to conquer faster and quicker as compared to land based operations. There are many examples in history like colonial British, French and Portuguese expeditions to get control over Indian subcontinent, etc. Historically, mankind has fought battles on the sea for more than 3,000 years and usage of naval forces with different types of ships were employed by the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Europeans, Ottomans and Arabs.
The Islamic Caliphate, or Arab Empire, became the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean Sea from the 7th to 13th centuries, during what is known as the Islamic Golden Age. One of the most significant inventions in medieval naval warfare was the torpedo, invented in Syria by the Arab inventor Hasan al-Rammah in 1275. His torpedo ran on water with a rocket system filled with explosive gunpowder. It was an effective weapon against ships during that period. The late Middle Ages saw the development of the cogs, caravels and carracks ships capable of surviving the tough conditions of the open ocean, with enough backup systems and crew expertise to make long voyages routine. In addition, they grew from 100 tons to 300 tons displacement, enough to carry cannons as armament and still have space for cargo. One of the largest ships of the time, the Great Harry displaced over 1,500 tons. In 1588, Spanish King Philip II sent his armada to subdue the English fleet of Elizabeth, but Admiral Charles Howard defeated the Armada, marking the rise of prominence of the English Royal Navy. However it was unable to follow up with a decisive blow against the Spanish navy, which remained the most important for another half century. After the war’s end in 1604 the English fleet went through a time of relative neglect and decline. With the creation of the Royal Navy, the English navy began to take shape as a standing navy during the 16th century, and became a regular establishment during 17th century. The Navy grew considerably during the global struggle with France that started in 1690 and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars, a time when the practice of fighting under sail was developed to its highest point.
The military domination of English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and the Ottomans was predominantly due to their powerful naval forces that enabled them to navigate through channels, straits and oceans and utilization of cannon based ships with developed techniques for long elapsed naval voyages. It is also a fact that each powerful nation initially has to go through a transition period for building a strong Navy due to internal struggle as to who should be leading either land forces or the Naval. Many countries have seen such ups and downs including the British until they realized the benefits of the sea power competing with French and Dutch. The invasion of European powers of the subcontinent is an exclusive example for strengthening this argument. The British set up colonies at Calcutta, the French at Pondechary and Portuguese at Goa. The British however were successful defeating the other rivals and sustained their presence that led to the total occupation of the subcontinent. England being very far away from the subcontinent, it was still able to capture huge areas of land would not have been possible without a powerful navy.
Pakistan’s naval history and Challenges
The Pakistan Navy came into existence after the independence of Pakistan from the British in 1947, it is responsible for Pakistan‘s 1100 kilometers (650 mi) of coastline along the Arabian Sea and the defence of important civilian harbors and military bases. The Navy endured a difficult history after independence, only 200 officers and 3000 sailors were inherited by the Pakistan Navy, the most senior being Captain HMS Chouhdri who had little experience in military staffing. The Navy suffered perennial problems with inadequate staff, lack of operational bases, lack of financial support, and poor technological and personnel resources.
It also grew out as the smallest uniform branch that contributed in its lack of importance in federal budgets as well as the problems relating to its institutional infrastructure.
The Army and the Air Force were the dominant forces where the defence problems were based wholly on army and air force point of view. Additional problems relating to the navy were the lack of facilities and maintenance machinery as the only naval dockyard in the subcontinent was located in Bombay in India. To overcome these difficulties, the Navy launched a recruitment program for the young nation, starting in East-Pakistan but this proved to be very difficult to sustain therefore, it was moved back to West Pakistan to concentrate the preferred recruitments for the Western Pakistanis. Furthermore, the Navy’s procurement was greatly determined by its war role and had to struggle for a role for itself throughout its history.
During the first war with India in 1947-48, the Navy saw no action as all as fighting was restricted to land and air combat missions. On operational planning, a destroyer was tasked to oversee the evacuation of emigrants to Pakistan. During the 1965 war, the naval operation in Dwarka had greatly increased the prestige of the Pakistan Navy and it had also alerted Indian Navy commanders to the significant threat posed by the Pakistan Navy, and to its own naval shortcomings. During the 1971 war, the weakness of Pakistan navy eastern command emerged significantly since Eastern Command had no intelligence hence Indian Navy and Indian Air Force were pounding day and night. Also, both Indian and Pakistan navies inflicted losses to each other’s inventory keeping in mind size of Indian navy which managed to launch two naval operations Trident and Python. Infact, the Pakistan Navy lost a countable number of its force in the war of 1971. After this war, Pakistan learnt a sharp lesson in the consequences of disconnecting strategy employed by Indian navy in reality and the Navy had to rebuild from ground and the government came to realize its failure for ignoring the needs of navy at the expense of air force and army.
Despite limited resources and manpower, the Navy performed its task diligently by providing support to inter-services (air force and army) until the war ended. The primary reason for this loss has been attributed to the central command’s failure in defining a role for the Navy, or the military in general, in East Pakistan. Since then the Navy has sought to improve the structure and fleet by putting special emphasis on sub-surface warfare capability as it allows for the most efficient way to deny control of Pakistani sea lanes to an adversary. The navy opted for a modest acquisition program in the form of new Chinese built missile/ torpedo attack craft. Between 1972 and 1980, 12-SLAUGHTER class attack FPBs, 4 HUNAIN class attack craft and 4 HUCHWAN class hydrofoil craft were delivered, followed by an acceptance of 6 ex-US GEARING class vessels.
During the 1980s, the growth of the Pakistan Navy was unpreceded. It virtually doubled its surface fleet from 9-principle surface combatants in 1980 to 16 by 1989, acquiring sophisticated long-range anti-ship missile and enhanced its maritime reconnaissance capabilities. Until recently, Pakistan Navy’s MCM forces would not have been able to deal with serious mine threats with only two ex-USN coastal minesweepers and eight type 312 drones to form its mine Warfare forces. But the acquisition of three new French mine hunters brought about a lot of improvement. The first vessel ex-FNS SAGITTAIRE was commissioned as PNS MUNSIF into Pakistan Navy in 1992. The second vessel PNS MUHAFIZ sailed for Karachi in Mar 96. The third vessel assembled by PN Dockyard was commissioned as PNS MUJAHID in 1997. For replenishment at sea PNS NASR was acquired from Chinese Navy in Aug 87 and another support ship PNS MOAWAIN (Ex HMS POOLSTER) was transferred in Jul 94 from the Dutch Navy. Both the ships have underway replenishment capabilities. Other auxiliary forces include two oil barges and two oil tankers built in Karachi between 1984 and 1992 along with two coastal tankers, two 20 utility craft and one 61 m survey ship.
The submarine force is the main strength of the PN Fleet. The acquisition of an ex-US TENCH class submarine by Pakistan Navy in 1964 was particularly significant, not only because Pakistan became the second country after Indonesia, amongst the Indian Ocean littorals to operate a submarine, but it also brought a new dimension to naval warfare in the Indo-Pakistan context. The submarine actively participated in Indo Pak 1965 war but was lost in 1971 war while deployed on a mine laying operation off the Indian Coast.
Pakistan acquired 4 Daphne and 2 Agosta class submarines from French Navy in early 70s and late 70s respectively. The submarines were modified to fire Harpoon missiles in 1985. To strengthen it further Agosta 90 B submarine projects was undertaken in early 1990s. First of the three submarines PNS/M KHALID commissioned and reached Pakistan in 1999, the second submarine was assembled at PN Dockyard from components made in Cherbourg. The third submarine was built entirely in Pakistan.
In early 2013 Pakistan’s navy took delivery of two 12-ton Bollard Pull Pusher tugs constructed at the KSEW, which handed over the vessels to Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. At that time the navy had on order with KSEW a 15,000-ton capacity tanker – this is an example of the government’s need to develop the country’s indigenous defense manufacturing sector.
There was consideration of 4 modern corvettes to be built alongside with F-22p in Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW). The competitors for modern corvettes may be French DCN Gowind 120, German TKMS MEKO A-100/D, and Turkish Milgem corvettes. The navy also planned to manufacture and procure additional mine hunters, tankers, missile and patrol boats.
Pakistan had a requirement for 4 corvettes and wanted the first ship to be built in Turkey while the rest in Karachi Ship Yards. Turkey and Pakistan were committed to enhancing defence and defence industry ties at the beginning of May 2016. The programs on the table included the Pakistan Army’s interest in the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) T-129 ATAK attack helicopter, the sale of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) Super Mushshak trainers to Turkey, and two Pakistan Navy programs including the upgrading of the Navy’s three Agosta 90B submarines and the possible purchase of four Ada-class (MILGEM) corvettes.
Pakistan naval challenges are enormous in nature due to the fact it was an ignored force for many decades along with absence of role clarity. Pakistan also inherited an arch rival India which has high ambitions to demonstrate her hegemonies in South Asia and beyond and expanding her naval power significantly. Pakistan is building a vast network of road and power infrastructure through OBOR vision with help of China and a reliable powerful navy is essential to sustain the uninterrupted trade activities. In order to meet with these challenges, a number of steps have been taken and there is a great sense of realization amongst the leadership to strengthen naval power. Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is 240,000 Sq. Km, with continental shelf extending a further 50,000 sq. km. The area is rich in fishery, possibly hydrocarbons and seabed resources and Pakistan aspires to leverage the EEZ for socio economic development. It is therefore, in Pakistan’s interest to see that the environment at sea is secure and stable to pursue legitimate interests unimpeded.
Under OBOR Vision which adds new economic and strategic dimensions to the above mentioned challenges, the strengthening ties between Pakistan and China through CPEC is also another dimension because China wants to safeguard its oil supply from Middle East that was passing mainly through the Strait of Malacca which is mainly under Allied influence and can come under naval blockade in case of any high level tensions between US and China. So the geo political importance of CPEC is a critical factor for future Chinese engagement with Maritime security in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean along with Pakistan navy.
To protect CPEC related interests, the Pakistan Navy has raised a special task force for maritime security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Gwadar sea port. The force will be known as Task Force-88. The traditional Command Telescope was handed over to the first commander of the force during a special ceremony recently. TF-88 will be a combination of ships, Fast Attack Craft, aircraft, drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), and surveillance assets. Additionally, marines would be deployed at sea and around Gwadar for security operations as per Naval HQ.
Pakistan is also taking an active part in addressing global security landscape. For this, the Pakistan Navy have played a lead role in the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) and commanded TF-150 four times to monitor/ control drugs and arms smuggling in the North Arabian Sea and deter and deny the use of sea to potential terrorists.
Handling Indian Hegemony
Pakistan was initially focusing on traditional military set ups that were adopted in Central Asia and Subcontinent that were laid out on principal of investing heavily on land based forces. This approach might be correct due to the fact that Pakistan’s land border was very long including both East and West Pakistan. The total cost line was comparatively much shorter and no urgent threat was foreseen from the sea during initial years of 50’s and 60’s (until 1971).
On the other hand, India focused comparatively earlier on development of a strong navy due to her maritime vulnerabilities. Comparing costal lines of both India and Pakistan, it is obvious that Indian coastal line is 7500 km long while Pakistan has to manage only 1100 km long coastal line.
History of the sub-continent dictates, and Indians seem to be learning the lesson that for centuries national strategy was focused on land based approach dealing with threats through the passes in the Hindu Kush and maritime security was ignored almost by all sub continent rulers. The neglect of the seas resulted in loss of sovereignty to traders who arrived on ships from outside the region, and ultimately became its masters, proving the old adage that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has India at its mercy.
Indian Naval thinkers realized this vulnerable status of Indian geography and emphasized on creating a power full navy that would be capable to transform itself from a defensive force to a real-time blue water navy. Further more, India utilizing its Navy as an instrument of foreign policy where the very nature of the domain it operates in and the calibrated presence of force it can bring to maneuver in a given space time/politico-military context, might makes the Indian navy a very effective instrument of her national policy. The main objective of this Indian naval hegemony mind set is to manage Chinese people’s liberation Navy in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea along with allied naval fleet and aggressive approach towards Pakistan for imposing a possible naval blockade in times of war. Also India is seeking for itself a global role and identified the need of a powerful naval force that could maneuver globally for meeting her global ambitions.
Having said above about Indian ambitions of being a blue water navy, the fact still remains that Indian Geography stays the same and the coastal line is so long and complicated that Indian Navy will have tremendous challenges to safe guard this coastal line completely and effectively. In any war time situation, the Indian Navy will not be able to defend its entire coastal line due to its complicated geography and extreme stretch. There are minor straits, creeks, waterways, uninhabited lands, and thickly forests throughout along Indian coast line that could be a strong strategic advantage for rival forces. If we review the Indian map deeply, it seems like a huge creature sunk in water with its head touching surface towards west side along with Pakistan. So practically this huge creature is desperate to come out of this situation and expand towards Central Asia but here the problem for them is the strong Pakistan that prevents them for expansion. This is the God made design that Pakistan had been created to stop this huge creature’s further expansion hence preventing Central and West Asian nations from Indian hegemony ambition. There is a clear mismatch between ambitions and capabilities of the Indian Navy due to its limited material capabilities that have constrained its unrealistic ambition and its options given the stakes others have in the region. Indian defence experts suggest adopting a multilateral, multipronged approach to preserve and enhance its strategic interests and to shape the strategic environment. There are four functional domains in which Indians are facing internal challenges partnering with allied fleet and these are mainly resources, transportation, information and dominion and these are most or least conducive for high seas cooperation.
Although the Indians have formed an alliance with the US to expand in Indian and South China seas, yet Indians are not able to accept any responsibility other than patrolling and providing some logistic support, etc. Rather its role so far is just like a free rider who wished to get benefits from US military gains and in current scenario, seems like the Indian naval establishment is struggling to meet US requirements on all fronts.
The perception of the Indians now is that maritime power often holds the key to enhanced international status, to achieving national objectives and is a means of expanding influence in near and distant waters. Basically this is the same approach adopted by Chinese PLAN recently and even US naval establishment lately. Indian defence experts cite three strands of motivation for the navy’s rise: the determination to escape the Pakistan syndrome to focus on the blue waters; to place faith in naval aviation; and to promote indigenization. These are the points Indians are focusing on for the navy to emerge as a powerful tool of foreign policy.
Although the Indians stress they are focusing on being a blue water Navy but the fact is they still have Pakistan back in their mind, as seen in the conspiracies occurring around Pakistan’s coastal areas mainly supported by Indian defence establishment like Indian submarine espionage efforts recently, supporting separatists elements and intrusion of RAW Spy like Kulbhushan who is an active Navy officer to disrupt CPEC project. In short, Pakistan will remain an active challenge for the Indian navy regardless of their global ambitions.
Pakistan’s coastal line is not that stretched as compared to India’s so it can be managed effectively by deploying enough resources to safeguard its trade interest. The maritime zones that are of greater interest to Pakistan specifically including Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormouz, Bab el mandab, Red sea strait of Aqaba, Mediterranean sea and Indian Ocean in general. It can be worked out if islands in Arabian Sea, Red Sea and Gulf can be effectively used by Pakistan navy if such arrangements can be made possible with related countries.
Pakistan navy has covered a long distance since its creation and has gained significant naval warfare exposure in previous Indo-Pak wars, participating in war drills and leading multi-national task forces. The size of the navy and its specific role amongst the inter services defence beauracracy however is still an area of discussion although many milestones have been achieved in the past few years specially and in past decade generally and CPEC itself dictates a role for Navy. The challenge here for Pakistan Navy is how to change the traditional mind set of defence establishment which is heavily based upon a land based approach. As said before, seeing Pakistan’s land border situation and hostility amongst its immediate neighbors, this approach might prevail for some longer period of time, however, the new paradigm change as a result of CPEC activities and Chinese access to Arabian Sea is the key element to elaborate internally with the establishment for sake of significant resources allocation. One has to keep in mind that the CPEC trade route will be only safe guarded if a power full navy stands behind it. Handling this paradigm shift, Pakistan military establishment must realize the importance of having a multi lateral approach by utilizing and employing tri-services strategy for economical and maritime trade protection purposes.
A country’s status and stature are reflected by its sea power, and without a strong navy, Pakistan cannot aspire to occupy its rightful place in the comity of nations. Sea power is not simply about what it takes to use the sea, it is also the capacity to influence the behavior of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea. Leveraging from sea power requires two components: the means to use the sea as it desires and freedom of doing things that are considered necessary to influence the actions of people on land. The classic constituents of sea power have not changed despite the rapid progression of technology and, when addressed, would eventually make Pakistan not only a naval power but a maritime power if naval role would be clarified and enough resources would be allocated.
From the author’s point of view, some areas to focus on are listed below in order to speed up the rise of Pakistan Naval power that could safeguard EEZ and CPEC related trade activities across the territorial water and maritime dominion of interest.
1. Double the size of Sub marines and destroyers gradually in next 3 to 4 years.
2. Double the Naval budget from current Rs:100 B to 200 B
3. Develop strategy for employing helicopter carriers which seem to be feasible instead of acquiring traditional carrier with fighter jets. This will help boosting operational capabilities.
4. Acquire Nuclear subs for maintaining longer operational sustainability
5. Modernization of shipyards and destroyers manufucartring via Joint ventures
6. Effective local repair capabilities in-house for maritime inventory
7. Modernization of second strike capability utilizing Sub marines.
8. Massive improvement in naval aviation for supporting longer maritime operations
9. Agreements with friendly nations for using strategic islands in Arabian/Indian Seas
10. Pakistan navy should adopt long term strategy to take shape as a powerful standing navy during next decade, and must effort to become a regular establishment. The maritime challenges in next coming years emphasize Pakistani defence establishment to acknowledge greater naval role for protecting long term strategic and economical interests of Pakistan.
