Contemporary geopolitical attributes of South Asia are unambiguously designing a new outlook of the region in which incompatible national standings cemented in various points of disagreements between India and Pakistan are going to draw a new future of the region. The inflexible national standings of both states have dragged the region towards nuclearization where India initially attempted to subscribe New Delhi as a member of de jure nuclear weapons group of five states following the Chinese entry. The unending effects of nuclear domino transferred from China to India overwhelmingly sparked a nuclear race in South Asia where Pakistan was forced to accept the deterring functions of nuclear weapons in response to Indian pugnacious strategic planning. A nuclearized South Asian subcontinent in the presence of Indo–Pak antagonism triggered debate in the international community and the proponents of global counter-proliferation initiatives and the advocates of international arms control efforts focused on the worrisome future scenarios of New Delhi–Islamabad conflicts in the existence of their nuclear armed capabilities.
Beijing, Moscow, and Washington have always tried to define the new paths of Indo– Pakistan rivalry that can help them in achieving their own vested interests and protecting their role in South Asian politics. The four decades long period of US–USSR confrontation surrounded the newly independent South Asia in the post-world war II era when the global wave of decolonization prevented the British colonial rule and created Pakistan parallel to independent India. The violent partition of the subcontinent started an endless Indo – Pak enmity, the superpowers were quick to fill the power vacuum caused by the British partition plan. Capitalist forces of Washington coupled with communist forces of Moscow jumped into newly the independent South Asia and attempted to announce the region as their close periphery. The intense period of Cold War under for global dominance between the USA and USSR augmented the Indo–Pak hostility and tried to convert the region as a battlefield against each other instead of preventing the conflicting nature of New Delhi–Islamabad bilateral relations and declaring South Asia a peaceful region. The end of the Cold War with the dismantlement of the Soviet Union put paid to the communist expansionary policy and terminated the bipolarity of world politics. The post-cold war unipolar world left the US as the sole superpower to manage conflicts between nations and implement counter-proliferation campaign across the globe. Within a decade, the Indian nuclear explosion by the Vajpayee government marked a stigmatic question mark on South Asian directions of American global non-proliferation campaign. The nuclearized Indo–Pak antagonism further complicated the regional security environment when Indo–US strategic partnership reached its zenith and representatives from both sides concluded a civil nuclear deal.
The Indo–US Civil Nuclear Deal (or commonly known as Indo–US Nuclear Deal) referred to a nuclear cooperating agreement between Washington and New Delhi negotiated by Manmohan–Bush in 2005 under section 123 of United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954. No doubt, India agreed to separate its non–peaceful nuclear facilities from peaceful nuclear reactors and agreed to put its peaceful nuclear facilities under international nuclear safeguards established by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but the American strategic assistance in improving Indian nuclear capabilities is an stark reality which will cause serious consequences in the existing Indo–Pak nuclear arms competition. The deal recognized India as a so-called responsible but de facto nuclear weapon state with strong record of non-proliferation without becoming a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In order to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons parallel to the promotion of peaceful projection of nuclear technology, the NPT was finalized in 1968 and opened for signature two years later in 1970. Indian peaceful nuclear explosion “Smiling Buddha” underestimated the international efforts for the creation of global non-proliferation regime under NPT in 1974. Instead of actively upholding and supporting the international non-proliferation regime, India became the first to criticize and underestimate the performance of NPT by covertly continuing its nuclear activities. Later, nuclear development of New Delhi did not only fracture global efforts for non-proliferation, it also forced neighbouring states to follow suit. In contrast to its vicious record of nuclear developments, Washington viewed New Delhi as a responsible nuclear state which possesses substantial potential for advancing its nuclear program through finalizing a civilian nuclear agreement with US.
By signing the civil nuclear deal, the leading major themes of American South Asian policy generally, and its India version specifically have maintained an altered account of values according to the changing dynamics of international strategic culture in which the larger foreign policy context of Washington views New Delhi as an American client. A client which will not only assist White House in strengthening its role in world politics while countering the emergence of anti–American powers, it will also counterweight the role of challenging any rising powers against US. As America sees the Asian continent as a centre of world politics and gravitational point of international relations after the demise of Soviet supported communist forces and the end of forty years long conflict, the search for new allies and friends regardless of their role in the regional and extra-regional affairs diverted American foreign policy decision makers towards India. Historically, the reluctant friendly ties and unspoken diplomatic bilateral ties were based on Kennedy–Nehru meetings during the Indo–China border clash over Tibet. The covert operations of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) roughly marked India as a potential American client. Further defence relations significantly augmented the thinly constructed strategic relations between them because of US alliance with Pakistan in opposition to Soviet supporting relations with India.
The ambition for becoming strong strategic partners resulted in inconsistent Indo–US interaction during the cold war. But the end of US–USSR global competition permitted both New Delhi and Washington to improve their bilateral strategic bounds. Moreover, the geostrategic nature of the nuclear deal offered by US is an endeavour to declare India as a long term American friend and a larger recipient of Washington’s strategic benefits in South Asia. The bilateral ties between both nations have made India the main beneficiary of American strategic supplies under a greater patron–client framework. By protecting its core geostrategic and economic interests, the state authorities from New Delhi preferred to become an energetic US client. The broader perspective of strategic venture of both states will undeniably grant India a prestigious global status by ending nuclear apartheid against India. The efforts of providing India membership of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and giving it an exception nuclear status is a milestone development. The recent nuclear deal on military and defence relations cannot be separately evaluated from long American efforts of incorporating India in Washington’s grand political, economic and strategic plan for Asia. In other words, the unusual growth of Indo–US strategic relations could not analytically be comprehended without surveying the Pak–US relations.
The aforementioned circumstances have caused a sense of insecurity in Islamabad’s strategic calculation and hampered the conventional parameters of Pakistan’s foreign policy which was mainly constructed on pro–west policy. Pakistan’s proclamation of accepting the USA as a close friend immediately after its independence was negatively viewed by the Soviet Union and turned Moscow towards New Delhi. Pakistan’s scarification of Soviet support was not highly regarded by Washington, because the White House was ambitious about involving India in its grand anti–Soviet plan instead of cautiously estimating its impact on Islamabad. Pakistan’s joining of both defence pacts Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were landmark dimensions of Pak–US alliance, but CIA’s role in Tibetan war of 1962 and the aftermaths of Indo–China border dispute disappointed Pakistan. The American grand cold war strategy endeavoured to expand security, political, and economic ties with India and Pakistan simultaneously which would enable Washington to defeat the Soviet Union. By keeping Islamabad and New Delhi active in anti–Soviet mission of US served American vested interests, but tense US– USSR clash left both superpowers in a stringent competition while applying their bilateral designs in South Asia politics.
The American systole–diastole policy responses to the changing South Asian strategic affairs embraced a sudden change in the post–nuclearized subcontinent. Working more with the client and preferring them over allies perplexed the American role in South Asia strategic environment. The de-facto nuclear status of both India and Pakistan has raised several unanswered questions and jeopardized the scope of international non-proliferation regime exclusively. Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in the presence of dichotomous security milieu due to the overwhelming wave of stability/ instability debate with reference to the South Asian nuclear deterrence has endangered the regional security environment. The frequent disturbances over the Line of Control (LoC), a furious bilateral blame game, and consistently adopting hostile standing at different regional and global multilateral platforms by New Delhi and Islamabad have witnessed the zenith of Indo–Pak enduring violent competition. Instead of generating avenues for enhancing cooperation and increasing role of potential podiums for creating diplomatic avenues, the existence of nuclear weapons has underestimated the conventional wisdom and complicated the interaction of two nuclear neighbours.
The apparent directions of American South Asian policy reflect the White House’s balanced approach for averting threats of war and generating the forces of economic cooperation along with replacing the trust-deficit patterns with the potential paths for economic growth which could ultimately guarantee a more prosperous and less hostile environment in South Asia. The sceptical attributes caused by highly visible difference between theoretical foundations of White House’s drafted policy for India and Pakistan and the contrasting ways of its implementation have given rise to serious answerless queries.
In future, crafting of appropriate policy responses according to the changing strategic culture of South Asia required the US to create opportunities for averting probable scenarios of future crisis which could lead both rivals towards a nuclear ladder. The escalation of any future conflict will never prevent the decision makers from both sides to reject deterrence stability. Moreover, the larger American strategic support to its South Asian ally for counterbalancing emerging challenges to US global dominance has complicated the Beijing–New Delhi–Islamabad strategic scenario. The future of South Asian strategic environment will outline an unavoidable Indo–Pak conflict parallel to an inescapable Sino–US confrontation. The probable scenarios of future clashes between both South Asian nuclear rivals will place both China and US in opposite directions. Chinese diplomatic support against American strategic backup to India certainly defines the strategic culture of South Asia. The all weather friendly ties between Beijing and Islamabad are consistently expanding in economic, strategic and political spheres to equally multidimensional strategic bounds between Moscow and New Delhi. The rising Indo–Pak hostility will never let the extra–regional superpower to stay away from South Asian politics of an enduring Islamabad–New Delhi rivalry. The intensified support from both global powers will encourage both states to remain actively involved in eternal antagonism.
Indo–US strategic partnership and Washington’s effort for upholding New Delhi’s role at various multilateral fora has left Pakistan uncertain. Pakistan, a frontline state in US-led war on terror and a major non–NATO ally has become vulnerable in the regional politics of South Asia which is heavily affected by India’s bellicose attitude. New Delhi’s belligerence for territorially adjoining nations has become a South Asian nightmare under American strategic backup. Moreover, the Indian regional attitude is consistently undermining Pakistan’s desires for maintaining strategic balance in the region, and its efforts for preserving the thinly available chances for durable peace. Meanwhile, the conflict–ridden South Asia separate from power politics of the superpowers is merely a utopian idea, because the American influential role in antagonistic Indo–Pak politics cannot be averted permanently.
The inevitable role of outsiders has always remained a reality in the history of Indo–Pak conflicts. A stable strategic environment in South Asia is heavily dependent on the American role which reflects dichotic standards. The ongoing US South Asian policy views the nuclear programs of both India and Pakistan differently. India, the first violator of turning its peacefully acquired nuclear technology into non-peaceful directions has become a close strategic client of US in contrast to Pakistan which is constantly becoming a victim of American strategic dichotomy. The civil nuclear deal with a non-member of NPT and an initiator of the arms race in the South Asian region has challenged the illegitimate non-proliferation versions of American foreign policy. Therefore, a revision of Washington’s international non-proliferation campaign and its directions towards Indo–Pak nuclearization has become an indisputable fact and an irrefutable reality. The South Asian version of US non-proliferation efforts has triggered a new debate over its destabilizing impact of regional strategic environment in South Asia. The continuation of such imperfect approach by the White House should lead to the leading architectures of American foreign policy to review their non-proliferation attitude towards New Delhi and Islamabad. Instead of preferring Washington’s strategic bilateralism with India, the American strategic community needs to adopt a balanced policy for maintaining South Asian strategic equilibrium instead of cracking its very foundations. In this way, the present discriminatory difference inherited in American South Asia policy between its ally (Pakistan) and strategic partner (India) will result in long term disastrous consequences.
