The tragic incident of 9/11 and the onset of American-sponsored war on terror internationally significantly changed the traditional patterns of world politics. The conventional standards for dealing with the security challenges have become an outdated outfit in the twenty first century. The overwhelming wave of non-traditional security challenges forced states to formulate a multilateral framework of collective efforts for preservation of global peace and stability. The multifaceted face of terrorism and worldwide clandestine network of militancy have shaken the international security environment in which states are struggling to manage their defence. The conventional security walls of nations have fractured resulting in an uncertain environment. Therefore, the chances of peace, stability and development are challenging the transnational nature of security of new world.
In order to overcome the emerging wave of terrorism and its related threats to international community, the Bush administration immediately after the 9/11 attack invited states to join the American-initiated counter terror alliance. Pervez Musharraf, the tenth President of Pakistan, decided to actively become part of the US-led war against terrorism. Islamabad’s efforts to prevent terrorism in South Asia while shaking hands with America pushed the government into challenging situation. A wave of social unrest and economic crisis engulfed the Musharraf administration with to a countrywide wave of terrorist incidents occurring in Pakistan. The siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) was one of the major incidents which revealed the violent face of militancy. An effort to illegally create a self-proclaimed religious system against the legitimate structure of state started the Lal Masjid conflict. The religiously devoted and ideological extremist’s individuals turned militants attempted to underestimated state institutions.
In the presence of various terrorist incidents around the globe, the issue of Lal Masjid became a central point of discussion internationally. Various circles of journalists, academicians and political commentators expressed their views on Islamabad’s counter terror efforts in the shadow of Lal Masjid. Khuram Iqbal, a Pakistani scholar, along with Adam Dolnik, completed his research Negotiating the Siege of the Lal Masjid which is published by Oxford University Press.
The academic opinions of both authors overhaul the incident of Lal Masjid by exclusively emphasizing the role of political authorities and law enforcement agencies in response to the militants of Lal Masjid. Khuram Iqbal has co–authored another study Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero and has completed his doctorate in Policing, Intelligence, and Counterterrorism from Australia and joined National Defence University, Islamabad as an Assistant Professor. He has introduced his research at various national and international platforms. Mr. Iqbal is a member of the Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research (CATR). Adam Dolnik, an international scholar, is an independent consultant specializing in counterterrorism, hostage negotiation, and kidnap response. Dolnik has also expressed his academic potential at countless international forums and is a trained hostage negotiator with practical experience in overseas kidnap management. The academic study of both authors relate to the siege of Lal Masjid or Operation Sunrise (code name).
The book is divided in six chapters coupled with a few pages of introduction and a detailed epilogue in the end. First three chapters introduce the crisis situation in a detailed review, government officials and the behaviour of the Ghazi brothers. The confrontation between the state authorities sparked a ten–days conflict which is chronologically discussed in Chapter three. Chapters four and five focus on the negotiating efforts of the political leadership in resolving the crisis and the final stage of operation which eliminated anti–state elements from the Red Zone of Islamabad. The last chapter, before the epilogue, debates analytically about the nature of the incident, assessment of volatility, analysis of negotiations and the lessons learned by the siege of Lal Masjid. The identification of success and failures provides an interesting account of different arguments in the sixth chapter. In the end, Iqbal and Dolnik present the aftermaths of Operation Sunrise which resulted in serious consequences countrywide. In short, the eight – day siege ended when an armed operation was launched that left horrible consequences and spill over effects which presented a more challenging situation for the government.
The analogous instances such as Israeli embassy in Thailand (1972), the Budyonnovsk hospital (1995), the Moscow theatre (2002) and the Beslan School (2004) reveal the role of main law enforcement institutions and their behaviour in resolving barricade–hostage situation. Therefore, in the age of transnational wave of terrorism and violent militancy, the art of dealing with the barricade or hostage crisis through negotiations has become an essential field. Several authors of diverse nationalities have studied the siege of Lal Masjid, but the recent version of Iqbal and Dolnik objectively elucidates theoretically well–structured and practically applicable lessons from the crisis. Both internationally recognized authors debate the sensitive issue of ideologically motivated religious militancy and their self–proclaimed Islamic principles in the book. A brief account of Lal Masjid operation starts from the genesis of the issue and ends at the aftermaths of the operation reflecting the rich intellect and objectively rational mindsets of Iqbal and Dolnik. The book has positively launched a new debate in intellectual gathering of Pakistan by underlining the issue of immense importance. The hostage– barricade negotiating strategies to minimize the violence by peacefully resolving the situation is an area where scholarly attention in woefully lacking in Pakistan.
The academic account on the siege of Lal Masjid can help the main architectures of counter terror policies. Moreover, it can be helpful for policy makers on internal security situations while dealing with barricades–hostage situations. Fundamentally, it can assist the law enforcement agencies and the people involved in counterterrorism operations. Moreover, the book is an impressive study of crisis management, exclusively the hostage–taking and kidnapping situation which can be an appropriate study to empower the academic skills of students of security, defence, strategic and peace studies. Those studying politics and International Relations will also find this book interesting.
