Earlier in year 2015 the security of Gwadar port was entrusted to the Pakistan Navy. The task has since been conscientiously executed via an agile and efficient Marine battalion of the Navy.
Sited roughly 635 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranian border by road, Pakistan’s strategic port of Gwadar constitutes what may be called the “bedrock” of CPEC. It is the “foundation” on which will rest the future of this gigantic collaborative commercial enterprise. Now fully functional with three multipurpose berths, each 200 meters long Gwadar port has been dredged to 14.5 meters. It can take ships of over 50,000 dwt. The port has potential for over 88 berths and is planned to be dredged further to over 18 meters after which it will be able to accommodate ships between 100,000 to 200,000 dwt.
The government to government CPEC agreements have created bright prospects for optimum utilization of Gwadar port. The mammoth project will harness the benefits accruing out of regional trade connectivity of western China, CARs and Afghanistan with this port. To connect the port to the highway network, “Gwadar port Eastbay Expressway” project was agreed for funding under CPEC. The project was approved by ECNEC at an estimated cost of Rs.14 billion. The “Expressway” will connect Gwadar port with the Makran Coastal Highway, a distance of 18.9km. A double track rail link along the “Expressway” is also part of the project. In addition, a “Free Zone” spread over an area 9.23 Sq. km adjacent and north-west of the port is also being established. The likely economic benefits that Gwadar can produce are tremendous. An estimated revenue of US$ 40 billion and generation of two million jobs could be an enormous impetus for Pakistan’s economy as an emerging market.
By now however, external actors inimical to CPEC have come out openly with their malevolence. India is doing what it may take to ensure that CPEC does not happen. As part of the Modi-Doval doctrine, India has violated the ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control (LoC) 103 times during the past one year and 58 times following the Uri incident. In early November, the Indian Navy conducted a major exercise in the North Arabian Sea along the coast of Gujrat, just next to Karachi. Code named ‘Paschim Leher’ (Western Wave), the nine day long exercise involved over 40 Warships, Naval Aircraft, top Fighters from Indian Air Force, as well as Indian Coast Guard units. Proactive operations (PAOs) and defensive operations were exercised as were various other contingencies conducted off the coasts of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa and Karnataka.
The current situation in the North Arabian Sea and South Asia is extraordinary and unsettling. All channels of communications between India and Pakistan including media, track II diplomacy, etc. are blocked. This upping the ante by India is meant to keep Pakistan nailed down along the eastern border, the North Arabian Sea and Gwadar so that India can press on with the proxy war it now pursues openly inside Pakistan. This is particularly true for FATA and Balochistan. With security and intelligence apparatus drawing thin, prospects of CPEC blooming could whittle down.
Compounding matters for Pakistan is the “Logistic Sharing Agreement” (LSA) between the U.S. and India, a legacy of the Obama administration. LSA allows for reciprocal use of domestic bases for military logistics supply and refueling. Having previously acquired a large tract of land, India is meanwhile hastening construction of its first overseas military base on the Indian Ocean Island of Seychelles. A tri-services command (ANC) was earlier set up at Andaman Nicobar chain of Islands lying close to the Strait of Malacca. India’s first nuclear submarine, INS Arihant is fully operational and integrated in the country’s nuclear command and control structure. The submarine can accommodate 12 locally manufactured 700km range Sagarika (K-15) ballistic missiles that can each carry a 1000 kg nuclear warhead. Operationalisation of Arihant also marks completion of nuclear triad by India.
India is clearly moving from being a ‘secular’ to an ‘extremist’ state. It is capitalizing on the emerging global order where the U.S. and the west have a newfound strategic interest in New Delhi. The stunning victory of Trump is being widely hailed in India, especially by extreme right wing populist parties. Just what kind of policy the incoming U.S President is likely to formulate for Indo-Pacific region and South Asia is uncertain but one thing is guaranteed – Trump and his recent cabinet pick of proven anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Islam will embrace India even tighter, strategically, diplomatically and militarily. During election rallies, time after time, President elect declared his policy on India as America’s “best friend”. Trump has personal business stakes in India too which are likely to guide his foreign policy objectives. He has been repeating his mantra of blocking China’s economic rise and his recent declaration on repealing the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) has elicited a strong reaction from Beijing. A “trade war” between the U.S. and China is already underway, even before Trump has entered the White House.
Being the hub of global and regional trade activity, significance of Indian Ocean, or Indo-Pacific, as the current nomenclature refers, will rise further in the international politics. It is here that the global and regional actors would play out the “Great Game” of the twenty first century. Overtly, this power politics will be decisively advanced and wielded in sea power, firming up of naval alliances, diplomacy as well as naval brinkmanship, already gaining rapid currency.
The current volume of Pakistan’s annual sea borne trade is around 62.14 million tonnes. According to reliable estimates, Pakistan import of crude oil and oil products in year 2013 was estimated at 372,800 bbl/day. In 2015, Pakistan imported a total of 5.9m tonnes of fuel oil and 6.4m tonnes in 2014. In 2016, its fuel oil imports totalled 1.6m tonnes by March, according to authoritative data. With commercial activity picking momentum, CPEC is anticipated to substantially increase the volume of sea trade to and from Gwadar. The port, allied facilities and the trade plying on the sea lines emanating and terminating at Gwadar will all require resolute protection against the threats and challenges piling up in the western Indian Ocean and coastal regions of Pakistan.
From March 2015, the size of maritime area now under Pakistan’s jurisdiction stands at 290,000sq km. This area is second only to the country’s largest province Balochistan. Despite paucity of resources, manpower shortages and surviving only on a 10-11 percent slice from the defence budget, the Pakistan Navy has emerged as a formidable sentinel of the sea frontiers. This has been particularly true over the past 15 years or so and the navy’s Marine battalion continues to provide impregnable security cover to Gwadar port. To Pakistan navy’s accomplishments is now added the recent detection and foiling an attempt by the Indian submarine to sneak into waters close to Pakistan’s coast. Possibly on reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission, the submarine was spotted by air elements of Pakistan Navy and later tracked out. Interestingly, the detection of Indian submarine and its subsequent chase by Pakistan Navy coincided with the Chinese container ship which set sail from Gwadar on November 14.
Following the submarine incident, this scribe had an informal discussion with Vice Admiral Ahmad Tasnim, a senior naval war veteran whose submarine (PNS HANGOR) sank the Indian Naval Frigate, INS Khukri during the 1971 war. Following retirement and from 1992 until 1994, the Admiral served as Chairman Karachi Port Trust (KPT). Much against the common perception, it was in 1992 during the first tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that the earliest feasibility study of CPEC route was undertaken by KPT pursuant to a Federal Government directive. It was subsequently discussed by the former Chairman with Chinese and Central Asian officials but with a change of government the project was mothballed.
When asked why land strategy has anchored the military thinking process in Pakistan much at the peril of ignoring sea frontiers and naval matters, the Admiral’s response was illuminating: “There are primarily two historical reasons. First is the fact that all invasions to conquer the sub-continent came via the land route; land battles were the decisive factor. Secondly, there were no major sea battles like the ones in the Atlantic, Pacific or Mediterranean in the Arabian Sea during both World Wars. Neither was any sinking of ships witnessed on the scale experienced in the Atlantic during World War II in waters adjacent to the sub-continent. Also, the Kashmir dispute narrowed down our periscope look to the land. An unsavory proof is that it took Pakistan almost 60 years to make a coastal highway while the rest of the country progressed with an impressive network of roads and other infrastructure”.
Alluding to CPEC he added, “Loading a container from Kashgar and on board a ship at Gwadar is only half the job. Other half and the difficult one is to get it safely to its destination traversing more than one ocean. Only a robust Navy with a balanced mix of surface, sub surface and air arm can ensure secure and safe execution of this task. We must have a Navy capable of “sea control “ (condition which exists when one has freedom of action to use an area of the sea for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, deny its use to an opponent) at least covering our EEZ if not more if CPEC is to bear fruit”.
In this “century of oceans” and Indo-Pacific in global public eye, anyone with a cent of knowledge on CPEC and how it may turn Pakistan’s economic fortune will not disagree with the senior war veteran. The challenges to maritime security in Indo-Pacific are fast reshaping. A considerable reduction in piracy and other transnational challenges (except likelihood of natural calamities) has been off-set by crucial “peer competition”. The last is now fiercely back in the spotlight and this developing trend is going to persist and in fact increase in future. Deterrence and necessary war-fighting capabilities are being reintegrated within the spectrum of core naval missions by most Asian Navies.
Only a well thought-out maritime policy and strategy along with maritime doctrine under an overarching national maritime vision will safely steer CPEC and the country’s future economic well-being. The national maritime vision must be made an integral part of the government’s ambitions illustrated in Vision 2025.
