The contemporary pattern of non-proliferation politics and its South Asian direction has generated a debate on the growing Indian nuclear program along with New Delhi’s desire to secure full membership of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). In 2005, a state visit of the US to India added a new dimension in the South Asian arms race by acknowledging India’s so-called responsible nuclear behaviour while declaring Washington’s full support to New Delhi’s exception entry into the group of 48-nation NSG. The extension of NSG by including a 49th member will, no doubt, enhance the scope of global non–proliferation regime, but a criteria–less and India–specific approach based on bilateral strategic commitments between New Delhi and Washington has raised serious questions on the legitimacy, universality and credibility of the international non-proliferation efforts. Potentially undermining the efforts of global non–proliferation campaign under a state–specific exemption has hampered the chances of peace, security and stability between neighbouring nuclear rivals of South Asia. Therefore, the discussion on NSG’s extension towards South Asia generally, and positively viewing New Delhi’s candidacy in enhancing the scope of international supplier group specifically, diverted the attention of the international community towards South Asian strategic equilibrium which will have an adverse impact on Indo–Pak arms competition ultimately.
A comprehensive analysis of the Indian nuclear program by highlighting its unnoticed and unobserved features has not only presently become an essential need but it is proved to be an area lacking scholarly considerations. In the presence of above mentioned worrisome scenario, a concise examination of India’s unsafeguarded nuclear program parallel to its pretension of being a responsible nuclear status can reveal the actual picture of New Delhi’s fast growing nuclear capabilities. A recently published book Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment presents a brief investigation of India’s unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and reprocessing capabilities. The trailblazing story of unvoiced attributes of New Delhi’s nuclear facilities has been published by an Islamabad based research institute that echoes objectively a non-traditional and comprehensive assessment of Indian initiated South Asian arms race. The four authors of the study attempt to launch a new debate on an area of immense importance regarding the discretely unsafeguarded and rapidly growing Indian nuclear capabilities.
The four chapters of the book consisting of 141 pages show the different dimensions of India’s unsafeguarded nuclear program which compelled the regional states to actively participate in regional nuclear race. The discussion begins by Adeela Azam providing historical records of Indian nuclear reactors (Indian Nuclear Energy Needs and Uranium Reserves). The second chapter (Uranium Enrichment Capacity and Future Requirements of India) completed by Ahmed Khan highlights the enrichment capacity of Indian nuclear reactors. Syed Muhammad Ali discusses emphasis on an estimate of New Delhi’s bomb manufacturing capability (Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: The Role of Individuals, Politics and Technology). The book ends by Sameer Ali Khan’s final chapter which focuses on the role of New Delhi’s nuclear reprocessing stations (Indian Nuclear Reprocessing Program). The four chapters reflecting four different parts of the book address to different extents the unsafeguarded characteristics of India’s nuclear program.
Adeela Azam is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad and a university graduate in Defence and Diplomatic Studies is energetically investigating the various aspects of South Asian non–proliferation issues. Her contribution in the book starts with the story of the oldest nuclear program of South Asia that has evolved in past seven decades. Presently, India has 20 nuclear reactors in operation, one is under extended shutdown based on domestic uranium reserves – 199,428 tons (p. 4–5). Out of the total 21 nuclear reactors, only thirteen are placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and are appropriately eligible to receive foreign fuel supplies. Besides the American nuclear cooperation, New Delhi has acquired considerable supplies of nuclear fuel from the international market (Russia, France, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Niger – for uranium exploration). The international community has helped India for development of its safeguarded nuclear reactors, according to Azam. Parallel to the import of foreign nuclear fuel, the domestic uranium deposits are left for unsafeguarded facilities. The fast growing nuclear capabilities of India are inherited in an approved future plan for the further instalment of 44 reactors (p.11). The leading uranium mines of India are Jaduguda, Bhatin, Narawapahar, Turamdih, Bagjata Banduhurang and Mohuldih in addition to two milling plants at Jaduguda and Turamidh (p.19). The first chapter of Azam, after providing an analytical account of historical details dealing with evolution of Indian nuclear program, transfers the debates to Ahmad Khan, who has authored the second chapter of the book.
Khan, another visiting fellow of ISSI and teaching strategic studies in universities, is a prolific writer. He offers an impressive account of Indian uranium enrichment capability which is a largest and fastest increasing enrichment capability among non – NPT states. The existing nuclear abilities of New Delhi will be abnormally augmented by completion of Special Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), Chitradurga in 2017 (p. 63). Seven tables describing interesting specifics of enrichment capacities of New Delhi validate the arguments of Khan. The strategic future calculations of New Delhi intends to enhance its naval power by building five Arihant class nuclear powered fleet ballistic missile submarines in a decade (p. 68). By conversing Pakistan’s regional standing, Ahmad Khan mentions the offer of Islamabad to Indian for designing bilaterally an arrangement for not conducting a nuclear test (p. 72). Khan ends his arguments and shifts the discussion to the second last chapter of the book written by Syed Muhammad Ali.
Ali, a senior research fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) and a former correspondent of Voice of America, possesses an excellent academic career plus remarkable research skills. His contribution in the third chapter reveals the role of internal factors such as individuals, politics and technology in evolution of Indian nuclear facilities. Ali initiates the conversation from Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement and ends at economic incentives of producing nuclear weapons by India. Academically fascinating and theoretically interesting part of chapter three reflects the writer’s rich intellect and strong academic background. An apposite application of neo–classical realist paradigm further explains the significant role of domestic factors resulting in a matured nuclear program in India (p. 80). The external environment shaping New Delhi’s nuclear diplomatic journey focuses on the Cold War politics of Washington–Moscow–Beijing, according to Ali. In short, the combination of local and global factors considerably remained the main source, persistently emerging Indian nuclear capabilities is the central theme of Ali’s writing. Theoretically well–structured and intellectually well– organized rational elegance sends the main story of the book to last, and short, chapter finalised by Sameer Ali Khan.
The second Khan a university graduate in Strategic Studies with his vast international experience presents his balanced thoughts on Indian reprocessing capacity. He summarises his impartial views impressively in a few pages by providing essential details of New Delhi’s leading reprocessing nuclear facilities. He points out the huge stockpiles of reactor – grade plutonium that is capable of unusually increasing Indian existing nuclear weapon strength. Upcoming Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) will further enable New Delhi to advance its nuclear program by acquiring the 140kg weapon – grade plutonium per year (p. 136). Such quantity will probably result in at least 28 weapons each year.
The book mainly provides a new and unspoken version of New Delhi’s nuclear reactors with the help of various primary sources. The critical approach of the four authors points out the historical, political, strategic, economic and technical aspects of the nuclear program owned by India. The scholarly investigation of all four breaks the traditional visualization of Indian responsible nuclear behaviour which will be an interesting field requiring more academic contribution. The regional and global strategic community needs to extend the work of Islamabad based young scholars by appreciating and acknowledging their academic potential. The unsafeguarded nuclear weapon manufacturing ability of New Delhi is no more a secret to the international community. Four young researchers have remarkably become the pioneers of the nuclear safeguard discussion over Indian nuclear facilities. The compelling arguments coupled with empirical evidences enabling evaluation of New Delhi’s oldest and largest unsafeguarded nuclear record has now added a new chapter in the South Asian nuclear debate, this will encourage more writers to add further dimensions in the study.
