Preamble
Economic development thrives in a climate of tranquility while industry shies away from areas of conflict because battlegrounds are not synonymous with good industrial environment. While “power flows through the barrel of a gun”, one must also accept that “peace depends upon the power that flows through the barrel of a gun.”
While peace has usually been bought at a high price, once peace is restored both the intelligentsia and the populace has no knowledge of, or conveniently forgets the blood sacrificed by its soldiers and the horrors of strife. When our existence is threatened we fall over ourselves to eulogise and honour our soldiers, the memory fades away quickly as surely as the setting sun. Whereas politicians very rightly have a vested interest in decrying any standing role for the Army in national politics, the sight of businessmen and industrialists climbing onto the bandwagon of a very fickle media lambasting the Army whenever the crisis passes is ludicrous. The “robber barons” suffering wide-scale nationalisation carried out post 1972, prayed harder than others to be rid of their socialist tormentors in 1977. The casus belli for the public was the aversion of a likely civil war situation, the industrialists found possible hope of return of their taken over ventures. Only a privileged elite enjoyed rapport with the political regimes, paper losses extending to millions. One conveniently forgets that the loans taken by industrialists standing against most former assets were much in excess to their respective values. Unfortunately at the later stages of all the military rules, the robber barons managed to buy their way into the military elite ruling the country. Because of a few corrupt men in uniform, the entire military got the blame. Martial laws, unless absolutely necessary, do not do any country any good, and when imposed must be short and effective, without debilitating the capabilities of the Army as an institution.
One of the prime Hindu ploys since centuries (read Chanakya’s Arthashastra) is that if you cannot beat somebody on the battlefield, use psychological and other forms of subterfuge to undercut the base of support and gain victory. For the Muslims of the South Asian sub-continent and all other ethnic, racial and religious compositions other than Hindu in South Asia, a strong and motivated Pakistan Army is the surest safeguard against Indian hegemony. While the numerical strength of the Army has certainly increased relative to the defence posture necessary to meet the twin threats from the North West and East, recently there has also been qualitative increase in professionalism.
One of the most significant economic force-multipliers is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a true game-changer for the destiny of the nation. CPEC’s US$ 46 billion budget is nothing compared to what will follow if it is implemented fully. CPEC by itself will throw up lot of security challenges, in the ultimate analysis it is the Armed Forces that will have to cope with it.
The Aim of the Defence Services
The aim is to defend the ideological frontiers of the State and the territorial sovereignty of the Nation at all costs. All other functions are subordinate to the Aim. In the fulfillment of the Aim, the primary requisite of the Armed Forces is to prepare for war. Our preparation for war will be dictated by the prevailing geo-political conditions, the enemy’s strength, intentions and capabilities, the terrain and our own resources. Allocation of forces and material depends very much on optimum strategy devised by our planners, the Tables of Organisation and Equipment (TO&E) of the Armed Forces being different for each sector and service.
Conventional Warfare
All Armies train for war during peace without coming out of their peacetime syndrome. Armies almost never learn from the experience of others, they are even less likely to learn from their own bitter experience. Most military men have mindset fixations about practices which may have been followed for generations, considering it to be a heresy to even debate otherwise. Despite two wars, each a sorrier experience than the previous, the Pakistan Armed Forces have not really broken out of the shackles of World War II except in the upper reaches of military hierarchy to some extent. Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of a second chance, having neither geographical depth nor industrial resilience to come back (like we did when we lost East Pakistan) from a military catastrophe. Some organisational and management changes were effected in the 50s because of induction of US military aid, while the Ts O & E have been modified, upgraded and updated to some extent, there has been no real change in organisational tables. Basic tactics have evolved only through the experience of counter-insurgency for the last decade or so. Military analysts may be led to wrong conclusions by the humiliating collapse of the Iraqi Army, caution has to be exercised to obtain relevant lessons out of the fog of war that has further been coloured by the euphoria of Allied victory.
Conventional Warfare of the 21st Century is essentially one of attempting to obtain electronic dominance in the first stage of conflict, coordinated simultaneously with the battle for air superiority. A combination of electronic warfare and judicious use of high-tech weapons ensured that the Allies had total aerial command of the battlefield within 12-24 hours in both the First and Second Gulf War. Once air superiority had been firmly established over the battle zone, channels of communication are then targetted, wiping out the means of communicating with field formations, whether landline or wireless, and the logistical means for re-supply. With surplus weapons-delivery capacity available the next targets are industrial potential and socio-economic civic facilities with unrestrained vengeance, warfare cannot be waged with any holds barred. However air superiority has limitations, as exposed in Yemen and against “Daesh” occupying portions of Iraq and Syria. Air superiority needs boots on the ground.
The geographical layout of the country, a study of India’s war capabilities and previous experience points to the following possible Indian moves, viz (1) blockading of Karachi and Pakistan’s coastline, (2) invasion of Sindh, (3) attempt to sever Pakistan in the narrowest section from Rahimyar Khan to Daharki, (4) the usual attempt to capture Lahore and/or Sialkot, (5) inroads in Azad Kashmir sectors from Siachen down to Bhimber, and (6) carrying out heliborne attacks to capture nodal points to await link-up with a ground attack or in conjunction of an air strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. Though it is possible, it is quite unlikely that India can bring maximum forces to bear on any one sector because of logistical limitations in concentrating forces either in the open desert or the Punjab plains. Concentrated force can be exerted in a combination, e.g. (1) invasion of Sindh and (2) a blockade of Karachi and Pakistan’s coastline.
Any long-term strategy for our defence needs must take in relevant existing factors: (1) the geographical layout and terrain (2) the enemy’s intentions and capabilities, (3) our own existing defence preparedness and available resources, and (4) likely help available from our allies and other friendly countries. Experience has shown that instead of going in for some complicated strategy we must stay with the KISS formula, i.e. “Keep it Simple, Stupid!”
The major military experience from the Gulf Wars, Iraq and Afghanistan was the ability of dominant air power to paralyse the Command and Control functions. To cater for breakdown of channels of communications we must create integrated Commands, each capable of independently fighting large-scale battles, if a need so arises, by having dedicated ground, air and/or naval forces or a combination thereof as the case may be. The Command should have an integrated staff with complements of the three services in ratio to the Services effort in each separate Command. The OC Command should have a Deputy Commander of Major General’s rank and a Chief of Staff of similar rank. The allocation of troops and resources may vary from Command to Command, it should be suited to the terrain and likely opposition. We must give serious thought to a poor man’s Air Force composed of light fixed wing aircraft armed with air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles operating from Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) to give close support to each Command in the first phase of battle when the PAF will be engaged in the battle for air superiority.
Lacking the economic capacity or the industrial potential to match quality for quality in every sphere, especially without any geographical depth and outnumbered badly in quantity, while there must be some ratio in numbers to opposing forces (India enjoys an edge of almost 5:1), it is the fighting spirit, motivation and the willing response to higher call of duty that drives the Pakistani soldier. The soldier has to face more and give more than what can be normally expected out of a human being. Given Pakistan’s long borders with India, its lack of natural depth, its sensitivity to deep encroachments effecting vital lines of communication of the entire country, the preponderance of numbers of the Indian manpower, the Pakistani soldier simply HAS to hold his ground, the nation cannot afford even small tactical withdrawals except in stray cases. There will be a life and death struggle on the seas and in the air, it will be nothing compared in relative terms to the quantum of sacrifice in sheer numbers on the ground. While the Indian Army’s aim will be to get astride the tenuous Pakistan Lines of Communication i.e. seize critical real estate, the Pakistan Army’s aim will be to blunt and then destroy the Indian ground forces. Pakistan depends upon the highest professional skills of its airmen and sailors, and the ground battles fought by the Pakistan Army, our ultimate salvation may lie in the final arbiter of its independence and sovereignty, our nuclear deterrent.
Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a combination of many forms of warfare and is not a new thing. The modern tool available has made it far more effective than warfare by conventional means. Aiming to achieve their objectives without violence, those practicing hybrid warfare use a range of activities to make their adversaries do what they want them to do, a technique known as “reflexive control”.
Their weapons of choice are social media campaigns on Twitter and Facebook, spreading disinformation and exposing truths, ‘false flag’ incidents designed to fool people into believing they were carried out by someone else, and intelligence gathering. Extensive use is made of cyber and information warfare blending conventional and irregular warfare. The actions of others in a modern battlefield can be effected in ways that are not necessarily violent. Important lessons from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will draw together a host of existing and developing capabilities essential to meet the challenges of modern conflict and warfare. To escape the binary mindset of peace or war, operations or training must ensure that military planners do not remain bogged down in their existing World War II mindset.
Gone are the days of fighting wars in the conventional manner; today’s strategy is a combination of conventional warfare, irregular tactics and terrorist acts, including subverting the media by using the advertising power of financial institutions of the State itself other than violence, coercion and cyber warfare. Employing both modern technology and modern mobilization methods, States use a variety of non-state actors, or a combination thereof. Wikipedia describes this new military strategy as “Hybrid Warfare”, envisaging attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare, combining kinetic operations with subversive effort, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution.
The flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace require a highly adaptable and resilient response. US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Bill Nemeth says hybrid warfare is a contemporary form of guerrilla warfare employing both modern technology and modern mobilisation methods, involving four threats according to CSIS’s Nathan Frieir: (1) traditional, (2) irregular, (3) catastrophic terrorism and (4) disruptive, exploiting modern technology to counteract military superiority to be fought on three decisive battlegrounds. To quote US Army Colonel Jack McCuen: (1) within the conflict zone population, (2) homefront population and (3) international community by the enemy employing, according to Frank Hoffman, “complex combination of conventional weapons, irregular warfare, terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to achieve objectives.” Blending the full spectrum of modern conflict, hybrid warfare’s no-holds-barred approach is common with terrorism.
According to “Financial Times”, “The war of the future will not necessarily be declared but will oversee as a sliding scale of aggression and violence.” With smart power being a judicious mix of hard and soft power, India is using force-multiplying smart power in conducting hybrid warfare against us. With Modi’s National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Duval (very much a state actor), in the driving seat, ‘false-flag terrorism’ has gone into overdrive and “Cold Start” has now become a distinct possibility. Subverting our ideology, culture and economy within and outside Pakistan by using proxies or outsourcing the task, isolating us in sports force-multiplies the mass civic frustration according to a well-crafted Indian gameplan. We are already under siege, being subjected to this new warfare which is not only using terrorism as a weapon of choice but subverting a section of our media (with inadvertent support of the corporate sector giving these subverted media entities advertisements in billions).
The ‘media reality’ dominates influence over conventional reality by creating perception, especially in political life. The critical weapons used in Hybrid Warfare include “Media and Information Warfare”, attacking both Information Technology (IT) systems on which a military opponent may depend upon, controlling and manipulation of the information available to the civilian populace on both electronic and print media. This includes Command and Control, Intelligence-based Electronic and Psychological warfare, etc, etc. The enemy has been using both its media and our own to influence persons (bribe, compromise, coax or threaten) to achieve its designs. The surmise that Pakistan’s conventional forces will be forced to fall back on the tactical nuclear option when faced with being overwhelmed can only be tested on the battleground.
Boots on the Ground
The basic fighting unit that makes up a soldier is composed of a human being, his weapon and his equipment. The modern environment of warfare makes improvement in the quality of the weapon and equipment imperative in keeping pace with the development of the human being as an effective fighting machine. Despite the overwhelming numbers that it used to good effect in “human wave” assaults in the Korean War, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) realized the great disadvantage of lack of superior infantry weapons (among other weaknesses) in its short war with Vietnam, pragmatically it set about rectifying this anomaly.
Armed Forces across the world have shifted over or are shifting over to a more modern smaller calibre weapon. To meet the requirement of increased firepower a soldier should be able to carry more ammunition with him, the weight of the rifle and ammunition has to be reduced drastically, requiring calibre reduction of automatic rifles. The increased use of transport e.g. APCs, Jeeps, Helicopters, etc. called for a weapon with shorter barrel and foldable butt. For a country like Pakistan the major requirement is universality and ease of logistics. The standardization of all small arms equipment from SMG to rifle to Light Machine Gun to Heavy Machine Gun for multi-purposes, easy maintenance and 100% interchangeability of parts for ease of logistics pointed to the Bullpup design. Among the positive factors, despite the short barrel were all the advantages of a long barrel, easy handling, compactness, quick action, shortness as well as guarding against rusting, wear and tear because of its special material.
Only with the necessity of fighting counter-insurgency we started using the SMG, we strive for one type of ammunition throughout the infantry battalion, double the firepower which can presently be man-carried and with easy interchangeability of parts, etc. While changeover will cost money in the short run, indigenous production will ensure that in the long run we would make up in recurring expenses, unlike the rest of the armies entering the 21st century, we were in a time-freeze till very recently. Our policy used to be penny-wise, pound foolish in all respects.
Infantry warfare is constantly changing shape, as we have seen in Swat and FATA the sniper is as important as in World War I. Entire front lines can be held hostage to the hidden sniper. Some of our battlefields will always be over fixed lines, particularly in the mountains and along the Sialkot and Lahore fronts. To gain ascendancy over the battlefields, infantry units must have many more snipers constantly engaging the enemy. The fear of being taken out by a hidden hand in a conventional war will make the enemy immobile, it will take a particular toll among the younger leadership because they do have to show themselves, that essential unit in the leadership chain will be decimated at very little cost to ourselves. Our aim should be to provide at least one sniper rifle in each infantry section.
We must pull out Div tank Regiments from Divisions that are more or less fixed defences and make heavy armoured brigades from each comprising 2 tank regiments and 2 mechanised infantry battalions along with an anti-tank regiment and anti-aircraft regiment. We could possibly have 7 to 8 such heavy armoured brigades.
While one could understand the British employing para-military forces in the tribal areas and to patrol international borders, we are still persisting with the same formula without catering for cost efficiency. The Frontier Corps in the two Western Provinces and the Rangers in the two Eastern Provinces constitute approximately four plus divisions of light infantry i.e. without the infantry divisions usual complement of artillery, armour, engineer, etc. During wartime these units were to be used as regular infantry but while they had lot of practical training in patrolling, internal security, anti-smuggling operations, etc. the para-military soldiers are not really geared to fight army-type operations during a full-fledged counter-insurgency post 2002. At the same time, discipline, morale, efficiency, etc. were not at the level of regular troops despite their being as brave and hardy or even more. The units must be able to fight a war as well as other comparable other units, i.e. an addition of almost 36-40 fully equipped, fully trained motorized infantry battalions for possible use with the proposed light armoured divisions.
The Air Dimension
The advent of aircraft completely changed the dimension of warfare in the 20th century. The primary aim of the PAF must be to gain air superiority over the battlefield, the secondary aims must include destruction of the enemy’s vital military installations and giving Close Air Support (CAS) to our land and the sea forces. Economic targets are important but are a distant third unless vital to the enemy’s immediate war effort.
The PAF is going to have their hands full for the battle for air superiority, with a quantitative edge that the Indians enjoy to the extent of 4-1 over the PAF, barely offset to some degree by the qualitative superiority of our pilots, it will require their highest professional skills to hold their own in achieving relative dominance over the battlefield and then carry out (1) close support and (2) interdiction missions. Needless to say the PAF Commander will be hard put to allocate resources so that he does not detract from his main aim, command of the air. The Punjab Plains and the Sindh-Rajasthan desert are most conducive for decisive aerial operations against ground troops. Gaining of battlefield air superiority or at least neutralisation of the conduct of aerial warfare to an extent will certainly affect the future course of battle. The Gulf Crisis has also shown that whatever damage air power may do, in the end ground troops must be engaged to carry out the ultimate destruction of any fighting machine.
A few days must elapse during which our land forces will be at the mercy of Indian CAS missions, we will find it difficult to contain their ground offensive without adequate air support. The Army Aviation, which already operates Super Mashaks must have them properly armed and fitted in a CAS role. While the attrition rate in this “poor man’s airforce” will certainly be high, it will not be of the Kamikaze-level as some are suggesting. CAS by Super-Mashaks under the control of the immediate battlefield commander will be an effective local force-multiplier which will free the PAF to carry out its primary aim of gaining air superiority without having to divert its resources for missions extraneous to the prime one. The PAF can return to the CAS role with a vengeance once it wins the battle for air survival.
Other than making Jacobabad a permanent base, Golari Base in the vicinity of Hyderabad will be a welcome addition to the PAF’s ORBAT. Despite the overwhelming superiority in numbers enjoyed by the Indian Air Force, the PAF has always maintained a qualitative edge because of our superior manpower. To overturn this advantage into their favour, the Indians have been on a shopping blitz in both the East and the West.
The PAF is still an excellent fighting machine but is in severe danger of being swamped into obsolescence by numbers and technology. If that should happen, Pakistan’s very existence as a nation will be threatened. PAF’s weakness is presently in numbers if not in quality and is a grave threat to our existence.
Defending the Coastline
One of the major failures in our strategic evaluation has been the failure to properly define the Navy’s mission. Given our geographical positioning and our resources the primary aim of the Navy must be to defend Pakistan’s coastline, the secondary aim would be to keep the sea lanes open. Given that India’s vast coastline gives it physical land domination of the Indian Ocean with its inherent advantages of sea domination and has a blue-water Navy with an overwhelming superiority in numbers, we must re-define our secondary aim to reflect ground (sea?) reality and change it to that of denying India the free use of its sea lanes. Defending its sea lanes forces the Indian Navy to divert resources away from its primary aim which must be to blockade the Pakistani coastline, with Karachi as the major focus of its operations.
Given that our Navy cannot match them gun for gun, Pakistan Navy’s major aims would be to (1) keep the Indian Navy away from the shores of Pakistan and (2) break the invariable blockade that will be surely enforced. This action will be subsidiary to the ground war which will be the main Theatre of employment. Our Navy has to operate within the arc of air cover provided by the PAF, with only limited capabilities for offensive forays. There will be no immediate real Naval influence on the conduct of the battle on land and in the air.
The only ships plying to Pakistani ports will be to and from the Gulf Ports, therefore both Gwadar and Ormara are important. Why not develop Pasni as a fourth port? To try and break this screen is possible but at unacceptable cost to men and material so the objective of keeping our sea lanes open as an exercise is only good in theory and that only partially. As such what we really need is protection from Karachi in the East to Gwadar (and the mouth of the Gulf) in the West to a distance outwards of at least 200-300 nautical miles (nm) from the coast. Instead of putting all our logistics eggs in the Karachi and Qasim Port baskets we should have a number of transient points, making it more difficult for the Indian air and navy to interdict without taking heavy casualties in men and material. This will also ease congestion on the South-North highways and the only rail-link, both susceptible to disruption by enemy air action.
Land-based aircraft armed with air to ship missiles will keep the Indian Navy at a safe distance away from the shores, it will be the primary requirement followed by a combination of fast missile-boats, torpedo-boats, minelayers and submarines. The arc of operations for these aircraft will have to ensure protection of the Gulf entrance so as to provide air cover to our coastal vessels. To guard against sneak Indian incursions, a marine force is a requirement. We also need adequate anti-aircraft defences, particularly around vital installations, possibly putting Air Defence under Strategic Forces.
Given its vast depth and resource availability, the Indians will always have a distinct edge over us in the field of logistics, why should we try to match them on this count ? What is a critical requirement is to ensure that our own logistics is not disrupted by enemy interdiction. Constant movement of the quantum of cargo through a flamboyant lot, no better than pirates, known politely as “blockade runners”, in fact glorified smugglers. A fair amount of smuggling goes on through our coastal areas from the Gulf. Despite attempts at interdiction by the Pakistan Navy, the PAF, Pakistan Coast Guards, Maritime Security Agency, Customs and Excise Staff, etc., our enterprising smugglers are most effective, almost second-to-none in the world. Their enterprise is quite visible in flourishing “Bara Bazaars” in the major urban areas of the country, on the way out the smuggling of our foodstuffs virtually feeds neighbouring countries. A considerable amount of Iranian POL is smuggled through the land route in Balochistan Province. Let us make this weakness in peacetime into a strength during war. This “expertise” can be put to good use during times of crisis and also emulated by our logistics people, smugglers must be made patriots. Didn’t the Americans use the Sicilian Mafia successfully against the Germans in World War II?
The Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) must be fully in charge of the Pakistan coastline, this would include all the formations needed for its defence including air and land forces. This must be a clear statement of fact. The Maritime Security Agency (MSA) and the Pakistan Coast Guard should be merged into one unit, with the land-based units rotated from the Army as has been conceptually suggested many times for Frontier Corps and Rangers. The aircraft designated for coastal defences must be available only to the PAF for employment elsewhere when not required for its primary aim of defending Pakistan’s coastline. Karachi’s air defence units must directly be under the command of the Naval Chief.
Nuclear Command Authority
Playing nuclear brinkmanship India has repeatedly brought the world perilously close to a holocaust. You may block the LOC, you may put the world’s most sophisticated sensors, you may monitor from satellites, the indigenous revolt within Kashmir will continue to fester, as night turns to day and day turns to night, these will go on and on. History is replete with numerous instances of successful indigenous uprisings against repression.
Anywhere in the world both tactical and strategic nuclear forces need to have a central command channel to ensure that nuclear forces that necessarily remain on a knife edge do not inadvertently cause a catastrophe triggered by an accident. In order to have absolute control over our nuclear deterrent, an “Air Force Strategic Command” was established in 1983, thereafter the Army’s Strategic Command and the Naval Strategic Commands were created. Once Pakistan carried out its nuclear test in 1998, central coordination was necessary to oversee the employment, policy formulation, deployment, research and development, and operational command and control of Pakistan nuclear arsenals. The National Command Authority (NCA) was established in 2000 as the apex civilian-led command channel working directly under the Prime Minister.
Pakistan has “ground and air capability for the delivery of nuclear weapons”, which means that they can be delivered by airplanes and missiles. To ward off a possible nuclear accident our nuclear weapons are not maintained on a hair-trigger alert, in times of peace the nuclear weapons are kept in a “disassembled state” the warheads were kept separately from the missiles capable of delivering them to targets. Pakistan’s stockpile is hidden in underground facilities where no antagonist could either seize or destroy the warheads. During any confrontation, the bombs can be assembled “very quickly” with the Army responsible to transport nuclear weapons to their delivery systems. This process of moving nuclear weapons into different locations poses a significant stress on the security system, requiring a tight control of multiple locations and means of transportation.
Given the overwhelming conventional superiority in numbers and equipment, the quality of our Armed Forces will be hard put to stop the enemy short of the critical small distance needed to cut our vital North-South communications. We lack both tactical and strategic depth, this being only offset by non-conventional means. Given India’s “Cold Start” Plans, war can be imposed on us without warning and without mobilization. Ten Indian Composite Brigades Group will attempt to seize vital Pakistan ground and assets before we can react and deploy our strategic nuclear deterrent. Therefore our tactical nuclear deterrent must have an ingrained capacity for quick decision-making over effective and secure lines and means of communications.
With our SPD functioning alongwith our Strategic Forces and given our “minimum credible deterrence” in the face of a possible “Cold Start” situation, do our rulers have the courage and capacity for quick decision-making?
Confronting “Cold Start”
The Indian Army’s “COLD START” plan is meant to viz (1) harness Indian Army’s combat potential fully, gradually diminishing distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” (2) independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, mobilized in forward locations within hours and employed at the first go (3) Strike Corps re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force (IAF), in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets (4) Obviously, India’s Strike Corps elements have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. The Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, “which never came in the last three wars and all of them remained unutilised” unquote. This is military adventurism pure and simple, with or without cause.
Employing speed of both deployment and operations, “COLD START” envisages moving forces into unpredictable locations at high speeds and making decisions faster than their opponents can, Indian Independent Brigade Groups (on the Israeli pattern of 1956 and 1967) will seek to defeat Pakistani forces in the field by disrupting their cohesion in line with the tenets of maneuver warfare. “The Indian Army would also seek the advantage of surprise at both the strategic and the operational levels to achieve a decision before the US or China could intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. An unspoken assumption seems to be that rapid operations would prevent India’s civilian leadership from halting military operations in progress, lest it have second thoughts or possess insufficient resolve”.
The military challenges for Pakistan posed by COLD START are, viz (1) “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how battle groups would be launched (2) Fighting air-battle with IAF having significant superiority in numbers (3) Devising credible anti-ballistic missile defence (4) Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three “Army Reserve” formations presently configured and located to take on all five of India’s “Strike Corps” (5) Offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support (6) Counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear (7) When and how does the doctrine of “First Use” of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent come into play, when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured, or when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military machine has taken place or when the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is endangered? (8) Deep long range penetrative strikes to stop Pakistan reacting by inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war and (9) India would not sit by idly and suffer in case of a Pakistani nuclear strike but would launch a massive nuclear retaliation.
Preparing for War
Nations that want to retain their sovereignty have to spend substantial sums for their defence needs, emphasis on defence expenditures extending even to those countries whose defence shields are provided by protective allies. For third world countries, already over-burdened economically by crushing external debt, earmarking of large outlays for defence material and manpower is for the most part unacceptable. With such an implacable and unrelenting foe on our borders, our financial circumstances take secondary thought as we make pro-rata commensurate increases in our defence outlays. While matching them gun for gun may not be either feasible or possible, we are obliged to maintain a proportionate ratio so that numerical or qualitative superiority does not overwhelm us. Our volatile borders dictate a two-front approach with provision for containing internal strife. The division of our meager resources indicate a defence posture based on interior lines of communications with an inherent capability to move large bodies of troops on short notice for strategic and/or tactical purposes.
Reorganisation
For the Army, there are four main areas of operations, the high mountains, the mountains, the plains and the desert. Pakistan Air Force, applying the interior lines for defence theory into practice much more assiduously, is well balanced with its induction of advanced equipment and their allocations to different sectors. In the field of maritime warfare, there is only one possible mission for our Navy, viz, to ensure logistics continuity. Economic targets are important but are a distant third unless vital to the enemy’s immediate war effort. We will be hard to put to stabilize our air posture over the battlefield despite our quality edge in manpower. Because of the fact that we lack geographical depth, our strategy cannot depend upon conventional means but has to rely on non-conventional means.
Critical areas which we must defend, last man last round. In AK (two Corps), Lahore and Sialkot (one Corps each), Bahawalpur (one Corps) Rahimyar Khan-Pano Aqil belt (one Corps) and Chor-Umerkot-Nabisar-Badin (one Corps), the rest of the Army should be grouped into Brigade-sized Task Forces (Divisional sized only when specifically required) within respective Commands supported by commensurate Air Force elements as well as Artillery and Anti-Aircraft Divisions in addition to their integral supporting arms, e.g. artillery, armour etc. Both Central and Southern Commands should each have Brigade-sized Long Range Desert Groups (LRDGs), desert-mobile as well as having camel-mounted ancillary troops.
For this we have to create seven Commands, each looking after a separate front. In accomplishing the mission, two more Commands, viz (1) Three Strategic Reserves, one spread in depth in Balochistan’s western border and the other in depth for Northern and Central Command, each strategic Reserve compose one armoured and one mechanised divisions as “Rapid Deployment Forces”.
The present perception of the structure of the Armed Forces is exceedingly top-heavy. With the war being fought (or will be fought) on multiple fronts in multiple nodes, this perception is reinforced by a realistic assessment of the number of commanders promoted into various positions. During time of peace, top-heavy structures pose administrative problems only but during wartime they can prove to be operationally fatal. The defence services must be made lean and tough, the way to go about it is to drastically reduce (1) the number of HQs right down the line (2) the number of staff in each HQ and (3) the ancillary troops attached to each HQ. This is necessary to make better use of our manpower and to have a better ratio between the men actually expected to do the fighting and those in supporting roles. It goes without saying that the fighting arms must have adequate logistic support but the present tendency, not only in Pakistan but all over the world, to have the main mass of men in logistical services and very few men forward in the field of battle must be immediately reversed. For the Air Force, which uses a single pilot (mainly) in a combat aircraft (or a small crew) this is acceptable but for the Army and Navy certainly not. With the advent of more Corps Formations in the Army, the administrative functions as regards manpower management of the Divisional HQs should be drastically cut down and taken over by the Corps HQ, the support and supply functions are already handled by the Logistics Areas. Battalion, Brigade and Divisional HQs should basically be at Tactical HQ strength and located, as has been the case in actual war conditions, with the reserve sub-unit within the respective units.
Mobility must be focussed around concentrated armour formations. The tank regiment should be taken away from the Infantry Divisions and organized into at least 8 to 9 heavy Armoured Brigades from the existing inventory. The anti-tank capability of the Divisional Recce and Support Battalion as well as that integral to each of the nine infantry battalions must be upgraded in lieu. Troops must be designated to each sector as required, e.g. for effective command and control Azad Kashmir (AK) should have more two Corps and Divisional Headquarters. Similarly infantry battalions across the Army (except in mountainous defences such as AK) must be made smaller, three rifle companies instead of four for the same. Each of the Land commands should be able to fight independent battles with committed air support provided from airbases integral to it. A Command may have one or three Corps, the composition of the Command being according to the terrain and enemy dispositions.
Strategic Forces
All forces for non-conventional warfare should be made into a new service equivalent to the Army, Air Force and Navy. These will well include all Strategic Forces, SPD and Anti-Aircraft Defence, anything to do with our nuclear options. Many countries in the world have gone this route.
I am deliberately not going into details of this for reasons of security, in any case they are already in one form together but must be constituted and commanded by a four star officer who can be from the Army, Air Force or Navy.
Countering Insurgency
An unmitigated disaster militarily, the 2004 operations in FATA and the subsequent 2007 one in Swat were psychologically devastating, debilitating for the morale and self-confidence of the Army. Going into battle without adequate training or being properly equipped is bad enough, without sufficient force, without proper motivation and/or battle-tested commanders down the line, is asking for trouble. Not surprising that military tactics on the ground were badly flawed. With consequent set-backs in operations a peace treaty had to be signed.
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations training became a must for all troops going to FATA and Swat starting 2008. Intensive combat orientation is necessary to destroy the terrorists’ capacity to remain a “clear and present danger” to the country. The entire process involved rotating of fresh troops, replenishing depleted ammunition reserves and inducting of increased aviation capability and also included training for protecting against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs. Locally recruited Frontier Corps (FC) troops were lightly armed, good only in their policing role, dealing with internecine tribal rivalry and border smuggling, rather than engaging in military operations combating well-armed and experienced guerillas. The entire FC orientation had to be changed into that of combat mode. Shifting troops from proximity to their battle locations and retraining troops for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations became a fine balancing act. The Army’s counter-insurgency capacity had to be substantially enhanced. And it was done successfully as has been seen in Operation Zarb i Azb.
It is counter-productive to keep the Army engaged over the long period it has been, viz (1) the local population starts to react to what the militants propagate as Army excesses and (2) there is a debilitating and corrosive influence on the efficiency, morale and motivation of Army personnel. Far more worrying is that success in the battlefield leads to over-confidence and that can breed arrogance, the signs of it are already noticeable, particularly among those who have not seen battle, but revel in the publicity of its success thereof.
Countering Terrorism
Dec 16 was a day of grief for many reasons. For 43 years we spent the day in gloom remembering the abject surrender in East Pakistan in 1971. On Dec 16, 2014, something so horrible happened that words alone cannot describe it, the Army Public School (APS) Peshawar incident brought home to the people of Pakistan the brutal mindset of the terrorism in graphic detail. It unified the people’s resolve to eradicate the scourge of terrorism, all over the country rallies and vigils marked this day of infamy.
The present confrontation in Sindh about power symbolizes the problems we are facing because of our corrupt political culture. There is a linkage between corruption and terrorism, sometimes through organized crime, sometimes directly. Terrorist groups need arms and money, motivated by ideology and criminals by greed, their linkages include money-laundering, fabricating passport and identification documents, providing safe houses, supplying explosives, etc. Successfully infiltrating into the higher reaches of government in Pakistan, and circumventing the rule of law, the nexus between corruption, organized crime and terrorism has instead tended to become the rule of law itself. The impasse deliberately created by the Sindh Govt filibustering about giving powers to the Rangers to operate in Karachi blatantly exposes this.
Huge amounts of money channelled into three concentric spheres support necessary logistics for terrorism: e.g. explosives, hideouts, travel and the search and observation of soft vulnerable targets. The consequences of this funding are death and murder. The terrorists in the inner-most circle are surrounded by a second wider circle of direct supporters, planners, commanders, religious personalities, etc., serving as their infrastructure. The third circle is made up of religious, educational and welfare organisations, some inadvertently and some under pressure. The fourth circle, compromising elected representatives and bureaucrats is potentially the most dangerous, democracy focused in this tunnel vision is unthinkable.
With due respect to the Honourable Superior Court judges, in being deliberate about dispensing justice and giving relief to outright criminals they have inadvertently allowed crime to flourish. To understand how criminals function in the name of law, consider the political luminaries and bureaucrats involved in the many cases under investigation. The intelligentsia and the public is blissfully unaware of and/or indifferent to the activities of the parallel society both inside and outside the control of the government and its nexus between illegal underworld and the economics of parallel illegal markets. Money is also used to influence favourable media attention. Dr. Asim Hussain’s case has brought this out in graphic detail.
Terrorism cannot function without “Organized Crime” and organized crime, which provides couriers smuggling drugs, arms and human beings across the countries and regions, cannot function without corruption and money earned from drug trafficking. Illicit operations like drugs trade and criminal activity render militant cells more vulnerable to detection. Remedial measures include improving police capability to locate and disrupt criminal networks. But what happens when officials of the police become directly involved in fostering corruption and organized crime. Whether Dr. Asim Hussain is guilty or not is a moot point, that DSP Altaf Hussain of Sindh Police exonerated him in record time while destroying evidence shows the criminal governance prevailing today. Can a military court try this policeman for abetting crime and/or being accessory after the fact? Is it not possible to enforce the rule of law by following the rule of law in a totally lawless environment?
We have blurred the distinction between religion and nationalism. Those who incite ethnic and/or sectarian violence should also receive the maximum penalty. Those directly connected to the perpetrators and those giving indirect assistance to them must be targeted, with close monitoring of funds ostensibly meant for charity. Terrorist funding comes through corruption and from foreign sources, only electronic processing through scheduled banks that will give both origin and recipient thereof will stop the illegal flow.
The civilised world still has illusions that it is possible to enforce the rule of law in a totally lawless environment. No country has a law against cannibals eating citizens because such an act would be unthinkable, but it is time the world evaluated options of bringing the unthinkable into the statute books. Efforts to counter terrorism need creation and development of successive layers of defence against corruption and organised crime. Among the required capabilities, viz: (1) detect people organised in terrorist activity and identify them, and have the capability of simultaneously monitoring their movements; (2) detect the money trail and the supply sources of explosive materials: after all the terrorists can’t procure it off the shelves; (3) mobilise one’s defence capability to recognise and counter specific threats; (4) mobilise adequate and coordinated intelligence capability, utilising both human and electronic intelligence; (5) focus on air, sea, rail and road travel as potential terror targets; (6) guard the country’s frontiers: monitoring and surveilling thousands of miles of borders and (7) target those connected directly to the perpetrators and those indirectly giving sustenance.
Countering Terrorism is presently beyond the capacity of our law enforcement agencies. A fully equipped independent Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF) must have its own personnel, equipment, mobility and intelligence potential drawn from the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, the customs and paramilitary forces. This should be developed on the pattern of the tremendously successful Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) that almost eliminated poppy cultivation and drug smuggling. The nucleus of the ANF’s existing administrative, operational and intelligence structure can easily be converted into the CTF. The CTF can be a part of the Homeland Security Directorate. Well aware that the CTF will cut into their corruption and, by default, organised crime, will the politicians ever want a CTF? And without a dedicated CTF we will conceivably keep on fighting terrorism for another hundred years.
A terrorist uses a cause to justify his motives, the difference is that he mostly targets non-combatants with maximum prejudice as he did in the APS Peshawar incident. The mindset of a terrorist is that of a murderer, both callous and brutal. The commitment, will and determination of the “great silent majority” to fight this murderous criminal mindset stems from their participation with power at the grassroots level. Local Bodies powers being drastically curtailed so that they are toothless entities is a mockery of democracy. As in Sindh today, the political compulsions of the elected representatives force them to (a) deny acknowledging the obvious (b) shift all the blame for the terrorism on the warped ideology of its perpetrators instead of coping with the root causes and (3) passing on the buck even when prima-facie the evidence is credible. Such an attitude does not bode well for democracy.
The brutal terrorist act of Dec 16, 2014 may have woken up the nation. The real question is, when will our rulers ever wake up?
Homeland Security Directorate
A “Homeland Security Directorate” reporting to the Army Chief must comprise all the aforementioned (including the DSG) and must a be dedicated and effective single command and control mechanism for protection of strategic assets and countering terrorism. Headed by a senior three star general, preferably someone having actual combat and internal security experience, it should immediately take over security of ports, airports, air, army and naval bases etc. Rangers and FC must separate their internal security and border security contingents. With NACTA becoming an integral part, a “Counterterrorism Force” (CTF) can be developed from within this Directorate.
Diverting significant amount of police personnel from their given task of “policing” relegates the police to a passive role and affects the security and sanctity of the common citizen and his property. The tactical commitment 24/7 in routine functions in any case degenerates the ability of the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to pick early warning signals of impending hostile action and slows down their response time. No doubt honest and dedicated elements in police are trying their best, the police are unable to take the initiative in actively locating and ferreting out terrorists from various localities with political interference.
Logistics for terrorist hideouts, money, ammunition, supplies, uniforms, vehicles, safe mobility through the streets, etc are very much the responsibility of the Provincial LEAs to interdict. However the higher responsibility to the state for external threat remains a Federal power. One cannot absolve the Federal Govt and their myriad number of intelligence agencies from their task. Rangers and Police normally respond fairly swiftly, they got lucky differentiating between friend and foe in eliminating “friendly fire” casualties without clear-cut fail-safe boundaries during the smoke and confusion.
Critical assets such as ports, airports, etc. need protection on a regular basis, they must come under a unified command dedicated to organizing, planning, training, equipping and implementing both protection and counter-terrorism response. The criteria of public assets (airports) will differ from non-public assets (airbases) but the mission statement remains the same. At present our protection, response and rescue efforts remain fragmented, even the Army’s Defence Security Guards (DSG) are supplemented by denuding the fighting formations of infantry units on makeshift arrangements. Are the affected Corps, Divisional and Brigade Commanders content with the diversion of their fighting troops?
The Border and Internal Security Forces i.e. Rangers in Sindh and Punjab, Frontier Corps (FC) in KPK and Balochistan, and FIA’s Immigration, report to the Ministry of Interior, ASF to Aviation Division and Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) to the Ministry of Narcotics Control. Officered by the Army, all have multiple parents except for Immigration, the crisscrossing channels of command causing confusion and duplication.
Combining unity of command with amalgamated intelligence potential and commonality of personnel, weapons and equipment, etc. under one single entity saves money by avoiding duplication. Instead of lip-service rhetoric and vacillation, there must be a credible and effective counter to the existential terrorism threat faced by this country.
One of the most important additions to the Homeland Security Directorate will be the force created to guard the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) and the Chinese companies working there. Obviously this has to be highly trained and must be paid accordingly, not equal to but something on the lines of SDP. The personnel of this force should only be recruited directly in extreme circumstances. Tried and tested personnel should be chosen from Rangers, FC, ASF, DSG, etc.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJSC) must not continue to exist in its present form. Instituted by late PM, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, not for military reasons but primarily to curb the power of the Army Chief to impose martial law, the continuance of JCSC in its present toothless-tiger form exposes the mind block of our political and military planners who are loath to disturb routine, howsoever useless it may be. Our political leaders have shown a bankruptcy of confidence in their abilities to ward off military rule while our military planners have shown temerity (or dangerous complacency) in pointing out that the JCSC is utterly useless without a single authority’s operational and administrative ability to wield power over the three Services. Lip-service is given to some JCSC (as yet unclear) role during times of conflict, failing to be an on-going reality during peacetime, coordination during the stress of wartime will remain a pipe dream in its present role.
The other fallacy being propagated is that because the other Services may be resentful, the post of Chairman JCSC should be rotated among the three Services. One may well ask, why is not the same principle followed in the appointments of the NATO C-in-C or Commanders of US Central and Southern Command, who are always Army Generals or why is the US Commander in the Pacific always a Naval Person? The reason is that the Service which will have the dominant employment in a Theatre of War must invariably have a specialized person of that Service to be the Theatre Commander.
Given the fact that the decisive battle has to be fought on land, only a soldier must head the overall command of the three Services.
A symbol of Inter-Service coordination, the Pentagon is the perfect example of harmony. Each Service Chief has full authority over his branch of Service but for Joint Services action, it is the Chairman who calls the shots. Authority is then delegated to the Theatre Commander who assumes field responsibility for forces in his domain. Our biggest problem is that in Pakistan we have never really carried out standardisation of weapons and equipment except when forced by circumstances, this is primarily due to totally independent command of each Service, guarding jealously their own prerogatives to make separate choices. the JCSC should be able to pick a particular weapon or equipment which en masse can be used for all the three Services. Whereas some arms and equipment may be specialised for a particular Service, there are lot of areas for standardisation e.g. small arms, vehicles, clothing, battle gear, etc. Vehicles procurement and utility thereof is one sorry example. Only the items which are specific to each Service should be handled by the Service concerned. For Third World countries, it is important to build self-reliance based essentially on economization.
The choice of the man to head this new concept of UNIFIED COMMAND becomes important, given the fact we cannot afford to experiment. The choice of the Heads of the various Defence Services should not be seniority but merit-based and founded in the supreme national interest. Given these parameters we need a mature and tested personality who will create the right precedent for the future, someone who is a known quantity in the realm of practical support to democratic institutions and the experience of having served on Senior staff positions and held Field Command. If there is a COAS having universal respect, he will then be the right man because other than experience he will have both the moral and legal authority to effect the changes in JCSC needed for an unified command. Sheer merit, professionalism and contribution to the cause of democracy in Pakistan should decide the issue without further debate. What is important is that this concept must be implemented swiftly, speculation will be counter-productive to the interests of Pakistan, the time of decision-making was yesterday.
Conclusion
Whatever one may decry of military rule, for most it has meant unreserved economic freedom, helped along by the born-again chameleon philosophy of our bureaucrats who transformed themselves from public sector protagonists to private sector supporters overnight. The Civil War will intensify and ebb in Afghanistan but the pressures on Pakistan have increased, both physical and psychologically manifold because of our becoming the ground zero of terrorism, of the altered ourselves, be drawn into the vortex of war and for it to spill over into Pakistan, particularly into the urban areas of Pakistan which has become the prime enemy target. The single most positive factor in Pakistan for peace and tranquility is the strong, stable Pakistan Army, the finest fighting machine in the world, a reputation that particularly wards off adventurism from our loving neighbour, India. It is in our self-interest to sustain and motivate this fine Army and not resort to self-flagellation. Criticism, if any, should be well conceived and objectively targeted without slurring the reputation of the Army as a whole.
A soldier has not much to offer except his life for his country and a deep conviction that in sacrificing his life he will be saving that of countless others or even from surviving a living death under foreign tutelage. Everyone gets paid to do one’s work but only a soldier (a sailor and an airman) is expected to give up his life for his country when required to do so. His life is thus forfeit to the Nation, an equitable mortgage which is held not only for the succour of the nation’s population but as an effective deterrent. To ensure peace and stability against adventurism in the 21st century a mean and lean fighting machine must be re-organised to fight the many wars we must contend with in this day and age to survive as on independent Pakistan.
An abridged version of this appeared in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2015.
