The killing of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike is a major setback for the insurgent movement. His death comes barely a year after the disclosure of the death of the Taliban’s founding leader Mullah Omar. Mansour was reportedly targeted by US drones in Ahmedwal town, 20 kilometres from Balochistan’s Noshki district on May 21. According to US officials, the precision air strike against the Taliban leader was authorised by President Barack Obama which included multiple drones. US Secretary of State John Kerry earlier said that he had notified Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by telephone of a US drone strike that ‘likely killed’ Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mansour. Afghan leadership was also apprised of the US air strike against the Taliban leader. “The US considered the new Taliban chief a major hurdle to peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan”, says Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.i The death of the controversial leader has instigated fresh turns and twists not only for the future of the Afghan Taliban, but also for the negotiations for Afghanistan’s reconciliation under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) or any other forum. The major questions are: why did the US drone target a moderate Taliban leader in Balochistan after he had entered Pakistan from Iran? What would be the likely fallout of Mullah Mansour’s death on the short-lived Afghan reconciliation process under the QCG? What are the major deeply-seated issues of war-torn Afghanistan, besides those of security? What is the right course for peace in Afghanistan? The article is an investigative attempt to provide comprehensive answers to these important questions.
Afghan Taliban under Mullah Mansour
M Ilyas Khan, a prominent journalist associated to BBC, sketched a brief period of Mansour. “Mullah Mansour was born sometime between 1963 and 1965 in Band-e-Taimoor, a village in Maiwand district of Kandahar, a southern province of Afghanistan that shares a border with Pakistan’s south-western Balochistan province. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Mullah Mansour, like some other members of his family, is said to have carried a gun alongside Islamist resistance fighters of the mujahideen. In 1987, he is known to have moved to Quetta and later to Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where he resumed a religious education that had been interrupted by the war in Afghanistan. Mullah Mansour was among the first bands of Taliban, or seminary students that descended from Pakistan to capture Kandahar and then the rest of Afghanistan in a two-year blitzkrieg that wiped out nearly all the various mujahideen groups except the Northern Alliance,”ii writes Khan.
According to an independent Afghan news agency, Pajhwok, after the capture of Kandahar, the Taliban leadership put Mansour in charge of airport security in the southern city and later made him “commander of its jet fighters”.
“When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, he was initially appointed as director of the Afghan airline Ariana and was later made the minister of civil aviation, with additional responsibility for transport and the air force. There have been allegations that when the Taliban were in power, he used drug money from the poppy fields of the south to set up businesses in the Gulf,” added Khan. At that time, he was considered among those closest to Mullah Omar, and mostly consulted on all major decisions.
Like most Taliban leaders in the south, Mullah Mansour moved to Quetta when the US attacked Afghanistan in late 2001. As Taliban resistance to the US grew, he was named shadow governor of Kandahar; an indication of his importance within the movement. He also quickly climbed the ladder within the Taliban ruling council. In 2007, Pakistani security forces captured former Taliban defence minister and the movement’s acting head, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund in Quetta. The Taliban’s ruling council replaced him with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and appointed Mullah Mansour as one of his two deputies. Mullah Baradar himself was arrested in a joint ISI-CIA operation in 2010, paving the way for Mansour to become the acting head of the movement.iii
Mullah Mansour formally took charge of the Taliban last year, when it emerged that the Taliban’s long-time leader Mullah Mohammad Omar had died in Pakistan in April, 2013. Confirmation of Omar’s death at the end of July, 2015 touched of a leadership battle inside the group, as various factions endeavoured to lead the Taliban. It was only in September that the Taliban announced an end to the leadership struggle, after Omar’s relatives pledged their allegiance to Mansour as the new Taliban leader.
Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s brief rule was mostly dominated by internal suspicion and friction. After his takeover of the movement, Mansour cultivated an acquaintance with the Haqqani network aimed at persuading its central commanders back into the fold of the Taliban. He also pledged positions on the leadership council to the powerful group. “Before assuming the leadership of the Taliban, he functioned as the acting head of the movement on behalf of Mullah Mohammad Omar, its founder and spiritual head. In this capacity, he is understood to have authorised the release of periodic statements by Mullah Omar on the official Taliban website, even after Mullah Omar had been dead for a long time. This created controversy within the higher echelons of the movement, and there were allegations that he might have conspired with some other tribal allies or elements in Pakistan to assassinate Mullah Omar. Many of his detractors accused him of being firmly in the hands of the Pakistani intelligence apparatus, which they say offers him sanctuary and protection”iv, penned down Khan.
However, the main challenges to his leadership eased away when al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed his allegiance to Mullah Mansour as the legitimate successor to Mullah Omar, after his appointment in July 2015. “As emir of Al-Qaeda, I pledge to you our allegiance, following the path of Sheikh (Osama) bin Laden and his martyred brothers in their allegiance to Mullah Omar,” said Zawahiri, in a recording referring to the former Al-Qaeda leader and to the long-time Taliban chief.v This paved the way for Mansour to lead the Taliban quite easily until his death. However, some minor fissures and divergences surfaced time and again between Mansour and the rest of the group.
Meanwhile, Mansour strove to strengthen his position by appointing as his vice-president, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani network, which is regarded by both Afghanistan and the US as the strength behind the Taliban. Therefore, “the Haqqanis added both manpower and military sophistication to the Taliban operations,” according to a report issued by A.P.vi Mansour also gave Mullah Omar’s son and brother top positions on the leadership council. However, it took some months and bloody conflicts inside Afghanistan between feuding Taliban factions before a kind of harmony was brought to the movement.
The group saw the revival under Mullah Mansour with conspicuous military victories, which greatly helped him to cement his power and sway by polishing his credentials as a successful commander. The Taliban briefly captured the strategic northern city of Kunduz on September 28, 2015 in their most spectacular victory in 14 years. According to some media reports, around 500 Taliban fighters stormed Kunduz city and forced 7,000 personnel of the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and the militia, known as Afghan Local Police, to flee. “The battle for Kunduz has emboldened the Taliban and dashed any hopes of peace talks between them and the Afghan government. The fall of Kunduz city to the Taliban set a benchmark by which the situation in Afghanistan would be judged in future”, wrote down Rahimullah Yusufzai,vii a well-known expert of the Afghan Taliban. Under the command of Mansour, the ill-equipped Taliban captured the first major city since the collapse of their regime in 2001. Moreover, Southern opium-rich Helmand province was almost entirely under insurgent control when Mansour was leading the Taliban.
Many experts of the Afghan Taliban predicted that the death of Mullah Mansour would trigger a battle for succession and deepen fractures that had emerged in the insurgent movement after the death of its founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar. It was possible there might be infighting in the Taliban regarding succession after Mansour’s death, particularly between Mullah Omar’s brother Mullah Abdul Manan and son Mullah Yaqoob and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Haqqani network chief as Haqqani was Mansour’s deputy and operational commander. However, the process of succession went quite smoothly. Days after the strike, on May 25, the Taliban announced their new leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada. Sirajuddin Haqqani (the former number two) and Mullah Yaqoob (the son of the founding emir Mullah Omar) were named his deputies.
Afghan reconciliation process under QCG
Mullah Mansour was known as a moderate figure and prone to a peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict. After Mansour’s death, the fate of the QCG is rather bleak. The Taliban have lost whatever trust they unwittingly reposed on the US for a peaceful settlement of the protracted Afghan issue. Now, the QCQ is dead. The imminent successor of Mansour will not be lured and nudged to the negotiating table. China, an active member of the QCG, is now doubtful of the US seriousness about a lasting solution to the lingering Afghan imbroglio. Since Kerry publicly said that Nawaz was informed about the drone strike, Pakistan’s role as the mediator in the peace talks will come under serious questions.
“Mansour’s killing not only diminished the tiny ray of hope for the peace talks in Afghanistan, but also deepened suspicions among neighbours in the region, who already suffer from distrust rooted in history, geography, and beliefs”,viii writes Daud Khattak in The Diplomat magazine. Abdul Basit opines that after Mansur’s death “all stakeholders will adopt a wait-and-see approach and reassess the situation that arises following his death.” It is certain that after the death of Mullah Mansour Akhtar, the Taliban are now highly unlikely to continue peace negotiations with the unitary government of Afghanistan. If the Taliban agree to negotiate, they would cleverly use the reconciliation process to re-group themselves and re-emerge with more sophisticated war tactics designed to fight against the crisis-ridden Afghan government.
“The new Taliban leader and his two deputies are hardliners and are expected to continue the inflexible Taliban policies of late Mullah Omar and his successor Mullah Akhtar Mansour,” warns Yousufzai, “Haibatullah Akhundzada is a foremost proponent of Shariah and strict in implementing Islamic teachings and punishments. Like his late leader Mullah Mansoor, he is expected to reject peace talks with the Afghan government, more so after Mansour’s assassination by the US in the drone attack,” adds Yousufzai. The outcome of such reluctance by the Afghan Taliban for talks does not bode well for the crisis-ridden unitary government of Afghanistan. It is highly likely that the Taliban will ramp up attacks on Afghan institutions.
In the post-Mansour period, the fledgling unitary government of Afghanistan should brace itself for a series of deadly assaults by the angry Taliban. Soon after consolidating his grip over the group, the new leader will probably allow a slew of fatal bombings and organised attacks on Afghan institutions, government functionaries and security forces. Presumably, more Kunduz like attacks would be organised to bring more territory under the Taliban control. Since the under-trained and poorly equipped Afghan security forces are unable to stymie deadly attacks, it will result in timely and frequent US military interventions under the garb of Afghan security.
Threat of IS- Khorasan after Mansour’s death
ISIS was looking to strengthen itself in Afghanistan as they seek it as their natural stronghold. They also asked Taliban to submit to their caliphate but Taliban refused and actively started executing their fighters. Ominously, the death of Mansour has bestowed the IS-Khorasan, the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State, with a golden opportunity to tactically expand its “sphere of terror” in the war-torn country. When Mansour was at the helm of the Taliban, he vehemently challenged the legitimacy of the IS-Khorasan while declaring an all-out war against the outlawed militant group. The Taliban’s stiff resistance to the IS has proved effectual in preventing the rampaging terror group from establishing strong roots in Afghanistan. Now, the deadly militant group will capitalise upon the death of Mansour and the imminent squabbling amongst the frontrunners to perpetuate its reign of terror.
“ISIS’s regional affiliate, Wilayat Khurasan, has entrenched itself in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan and launched a violent campaign against local Afghans to crush any opposition. Its fighters have defeated the local Taliban and have begun recruiting new members from 25 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Although officials initially dismissed the threat that ISIS poses to the country, they have now been forced to sit up and take notice as its growth and wealth expands at an alarming rate,” according to a report released by Daily Mail, a famous newspaper of Britain. Since most of the Taliban reject the militant ideology of IS, the latter will not be able to shed blood on Afghan soil. Unlike the disgruntled Sunnis of Iraq, the Afghans do not adhere to the extremist views of the militant outfit. IS-Khorasan is also facing challenges in the Middle East due to air strikes by the US, Russia and other Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, the Taliban are engaged in waging their spring offensive against the unitary government and American troops stationed in Afghanistan. Therefore, the IS would find it hard enough to expand its tentacles in Afghanistan.
Protracted Issues of Afghanistan
Despite possessing a significant geo-strategic and geo-economic location, Afghanistan has been unstable politically, backward economically and impotent militarily. Due to persistent instability, the country has been a battlefield for the big powers to flex their muscle against their enemies. Presently, since no agreeable and a doable political solution is on the horizon, the war-ravaged country would continue to be further plagued by increasing terrorism, accelerating militancy and deliberate bad governance.
Afghanistan’s protracted issues are multi-dimensional which should be carefully diagnosed and resolved accordingly if the international community seriously wants lasting tranquillity in the terrorism-stricken country. But, it is rather futile to run after long-lasting peace by only fighting against the resurgent Taliban, while systematically depriving the neglected and disillusioned Afghans their due socio-economic and political rights.
Leadership crisis
Decades of insidious internal conflicts and Soviet and American invasions have made Afghanistan a divided, polarised and a weak state on all fronts. Since 1979, Afghanistan has lacked a powerful, democratic, responsive, accountable and competent leadership. From the Soviet-installed hand-picked government to the incumbent, all have amassed considerable wealth, plundered national resources and perpetuated bad governance with impunity. The culture of rampant loot and plunder has made former President Hamid Karzai one of the richest persons in Afghanistan. The continuous vacuum of honest leadership has created fissures amongst the provinces, thus exacerbating ominous ethnicity and sectarianism throughout the country.
Both Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah and President Ashraf Ghani are currently involved in unprecedented favouritism and horse trading aimed at fostering their individual position in the government. According to The Economist, “In truth, with two people at the helm, twice the number of campaign loyalists had to be placated, while seeking a reasonably broad cabinet representation by ethnicity, geography and even sex involved much horse-trading”. The spectre of massive corruption has eaten up almost all Afghan institutions, and it still continues to pose an existential treat to the security and budding democratic institutions of the country. “Graft in government contracts, land grabbing and illegal drug production and trafficking are major problems”,ix admits President Ghani.
Apart from that, Transparency International consistently ranks Afghanistan among the world’s most corrupt countries. “Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) placed Afghanistan at 166th among 168 nations.”x US officials have also repeatedly ringed alarm bills against rampant political corruption in the country. According to the US Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), corruption remains one of the major impediments to the stabilisation and reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Haroun Mir, the Executive Director of Business Integrity Network Afghanistan (BINA), says that, “regrettably, corruption is no longer considered taboo in Afghan society; it has been ingrained in the culture as an accepted norm.”
Weak and crisis-ridden security forces
One more back-breaking and recurrent issue faced by Afghanistan is the long-lasting dearth of adequate, well-trained, fully-equipped, committed, professional and depoliticized police and armed forces. “We do not have heavy weapons to use against the enemy,” says a major of the Afghan Armyxi. “Another problem we are facing is a lack of logistical and air support. When our posts are attacked and surrounded by the enemy, we do not have helicopters to get supplies or weapons,” he adds. The army and police of Afghanistan are also plagued by a high desertion rate, nepotism and corruption. According to figures released by the US military in December 2015, in 2015, the Afghan army had to replace about a third of its roughly 170,000 soldiers because of desertions, casualties and low re-enlistment rates. “These high turnover issues increase the possibility that when US-led forces leave Afghanistan for good, whenever that is, they will be leaving Afghan forces unable to fend off a still-ferocious insurgency,” says Michael Kugelman, a senior associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. Some US top military officials consider incompetent leadership and tough working hours and environment the main reasons for these issues. “High attrition rates are because of poor leadership and soldiers rarely getting a holiday. In some areas, soldiers have probably been in a consistent fight for three years,” said US General John Campbell, commander of US forces in Afghanistan.
Menacingly, a large number of well-trained supporters of the Taliban are also clandestinely working in the security forces of the country so as to gather intelligence for attacks. Therefore, the Afghan security forces are largely incapable of battling against the lethally-armed Taliban, rampaging Daesh, powerful transnational drug cartels and other non-state actors. The corrupt Afghan government and the divided international community are fully responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Afghan security forces. Under such circumstances, the Taliban, Daesh and the ilk will continue to mount fatal attacks on the country, thus worsening the already fragile security condition of Afghanistan.
Poor economic condition
The international community should open its slumbering eyes and realise that long-lasting peace in war-ravaged Afghanistan will always remain a pipedream unless the long-neglected Afghans are afforded their due economic rights. Like some highly backward African countries, Afghanistan does not have a well-regulated and well-planned formal economy. Its informal economy composed of smuggling, drug exports and international aides has further exacerbated the poor economic conditions of the country. Without checks and balances, terrorism, militancy abject poverty, widespread corruption and drug smuggling are the by-products of the Afghan economy. More than half of the Afghan population is living in abject poverty. Poor, uneducated and jobless Afghans mostly end up joining disruptive terrorist and militant outfits to earn a livelihood.
According to a report issued by the World Bank on Apr 08, 2016, the deteriorating security environment and persisting political uncertainty continue to undermine private sector confidence and affect economic activity in Afghanistan. Economic growth increased only marginally from 1.3 percent in 2014 to an estimated 1.5 percent in 2015. Domestic demand remains weak, with no signs of a pick-up in private consumption and investment. The numbers of new firm registrations – as a proxy for business activities — indicate only a small increase in new investment activities in 2015, but it remains significantly below the levels of 2012-2013. Consumer prices dropped to-1.5 percent, down from 4.5 percent in 2014, due to lower private consumption and global commodity prices.xii
The report further adds that agriculture, which is the second largest contributor to GDP growth after services, declined by a projected 2 percent in 2015. With population growth estimated at 3 percent per year and 45 percent of the poor relying on agriculture for their livelihood, sluggish GDP growth and a decline in agriculture production put continuous upward pressure on poverty, which is projected to have further increased from the 39.1 percent estimated using the latest data available. Declining job opportunities and growing insecurity have also driven up migration in 2015. Growth is projected at 1.9 percent in 2016, assuming adjustment in domestic consumption and investment. Growth is projected to gradually increase from 1.9 percent in 2016 to 3.6 percent in 2018, predicated on political stabilisation and stronger reform efforts. However, further deterioration in the security environment pose significant downside risks and could weaken growth prospects.xiii
Massive cultivation of drugs and its smuggling
Bad governance and politicians’ complicity with international drug cartels have made Afghanistan the main regional and international drug exporter. Afghanistan has been the world’s greatest illicit opium producer, ahead of Burma (Myanmar), the “Golden Triangle”, and Latin America since 1992, excluding the year 2001xiv Helmand Province is the world capital of opium and heroin production. Afghanistan accounts for 90 percent of the world’s heroin; more than two-thirds of that comes from Helmand’s opium poppies, according to United Nations figures.xv Burgeoning drugs trade has made Helmand a battle ground for assorted groups fighting to gain sway in the province. As a result, Helmand has become the deadliest province in Afghanistan, with “more than half of all the country’s combat fatalities in the last year.”xvi “There is a big game going on, and Helmand is at the centre of it,” says Maj. Gen. Abdul Jabar Qahraman, President Ashraf Ghani’s envoy for Helmand. “The war and the fighting in Helmand is a tool for everybody — they’re making millions off it,” He adds.
In this well-paid narcotics trade, a large number of Afghan politicians, men in uniform, Taliban and foreign drug dealers are heavily involved. Presently, hundreds and thousands of Afghans, specifically the youth, are addicted to drugs. Non-state actors are also immersed in amassing millions of dollars due to the burgeoning drug trade. The mushrooming Afghan drug trade has adversely impacted the adjoining countries, particularly Pakistan. Without uprooting the expanding drug market, it is elusive to search long lasting tranquillity in Afghanistan.
Falling education sector
The sector of education has been systematically neglected by all Afghan governments in order to promote their interests by keeping the people in the dark. Lack of proper and quality education has emboldened incompetent Afghan rulers to loot and plunder public money and the depleting national resources. A large portion of the population is illiterate and unfit for jobs, thus they resort to joining terrorist organisations and drug mafias to make both ends meet. No doubt, illiteracy is one of the major causes of militancy and terrorism in Afghanistan.
In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, net enrolment was estimated at 43 percent for boys and a dismal 3 percent for girls. Moreover, there were only about 21,000 teachers (largely under-educated) for a school-age population estimated at more than 5 million — or about 240 students for every trained teacher. Since 2002, school enrolment has increased from 1 million to 8.7 million, of which 36 percent are girls and the number of teachers has grown to more than 185,000. The majority of the teacher force has received teacher training either through Teacher Training Centres or In-service Teacher Training. Efforts are ongoing to continuously upgrade teacher qualifications and overall access to equitable and quality education in Afghanistan. Although the number of teachers hired and trained has risen with enrolments, the quality of teachers is a concern. The teaching profession does not attract the best candidates, because teacher pay is low and the profession attracts the least qualified of those progressing to higher education. Half of Afghanistan’s 412 districts do not have qualified female teachers. Moreover, the deployment of teachers across provinces is sub-optimal, leading to unemployed teachers in urban areas and teacher vacancies in rural zones.xvii
Foreign Interventions
Direct and indirect interventions first by the former Soviet Union and then the US have shattered the budding political and economic institutions of Afghanistan. To achieve imperialistic designs, the unbridled big powers have weakened Afghan political institutions, ruined the already dilapidated transport infrastructure and created rebels and terrorist outfits. The recent US announcement that it would stay in Afghanistan for some more years will further complicate the political and security conditions in the country.
India and Pakistan are two major players in terms of Afghan reconstruction, peace and security. Undoubtedly, both have contributed tremendously to Afghanistan’s rebuilding and rehabilitation. Apart from this, both the countries have also been immersed in a cold war against each other in Afghanistan meant to acquire and foster dominance on the security and economic fronts. India has made Afghanistan a training place for Baloch insurgents and Pakistani Taliban calculated to foment insurgency and terrorism on Pakistan’s soil. Some elements in Pakistan also support Afghan Taliban so as to employ them against India in the region. Such a tug of war for power and influence has aggravated the security predicament of Afghanistan.
A way forward
It is time all the aforementioned perennial problems faced by Afghanistan were ascertained and resolved with unflinching commitment without further delay. Any shortcuts will definitely double the crises of the Afghans. Rather than embroiling in a cold war against each other in Afghanistan, both Pakistan and India should come forward and contribute earnestly to the lasting serenity of the country.
Firstly, the unitary government of Afghanistan should come out of the politics of vested and sectional interest for the sake of greater national interests. Rather than appointing party members and relatives, the government needs to recruit people on merit in all government departments. A crackdown on corruption and loot and plunder is also the need of the hour. The elements within the government who support the Taliban should be identified and brought to book. Presumably, if the lingering leadership crisis of Afghanistan is genuinely resolved, all remaining issues will be solved automatically by competent public representatives. In this regard, the international community should come forward and assist the unitary government in terms of enhancing leadership effectiveness, efficiency, capability and capacity.
Secondly, negotiations with the Taliban are one of the prerequisites to Afghanistan’s peace and rehabilitation. The US should exercise seriousness by announcing an early drawdown from the country. Before that, all institutions of Afghanistan should be strengthened to the maximum. It is likely that the Taliban would agree to serious peace talks after US withdrawal.
Thirdly, the Afghan security forces ought to be properly trained and adequately-equipped so that they can counter any threat without American support. Reasonable pay packages and plausible duty hours will help the security forces discharge duty comfortably and more effectively. The politicisation of both the national army and police must be put an end so that the forces would be able to take timely actions against those who take the law into their hand with impunity.
Fourthly, since lasting peace and stability require healthy socio-economic conditions, the Afghan government with the support of donor countries needs to provide people with modern technical education, create job opportunities for university graduates and increase trade relations with the rest of the world. It is also imperative to abolish all kinds of social injustices and crimes committed against the women folk of the conservative country. Like men, women should also be educated and bestowed with employment opportunities so that they can be able to contribute to the socio-economic development of the country.
Fifthly, the international community should also come forward and ensure that no external power be allowed to occupy Afghanistan in future. Such interventions have weakened the country on all fronts. It is important to note that India is occupying Afghanistan silently by gaining swathes of land in lieu of military and financial assistance. If India is permitted to continue with such insidious policy, it would instigate a cold war between Pakistan and India on Afghanistan’s soil for divergent reasons.
Conclusion
The death of Mullah Mansour has further complicated the task of Afghanistan’s reconciliation. Mansour was amiable and wished for a negotiated settlement of Afghan imbroglio. After his death, all hope of negotiations under the QCG has altogether withered away. Under the new leader, it is likely that the spring offensive of the Taliban against the Afghan government will increase in frequency and enormity. Threateningly, IS-Khorasan is also probable to gain more footholds in the war-ravaged country. Apart from security challenges, Afghanistan is also beset with a slew of political and socio-economic issues. If the international community aspires for lasting tranquillity in Afghanistan, it will have to take these problems into consideration and resolve them as soon as possible.
End Notes
i Abdul Basit, Fallout of Mansour death, The News, Karachi May 24, 2016 http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/122233-Fallout-of-Mansours-death
ii http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34405035
iii Ibid
iv http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34405035
v http://www.dawn.com/news/1200274
vi http://nation.com.pk/international/22-May-2016/akhtar-mansour-s-brief-reign-as-taliban-chief-marked-by-turmoil
vii http://tns.thenews.com.pk/the-portentous-fall-battle-for-kunduz/#.V1B2yzV95dg
viii http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/did-hope-for-afghan-peace-die-with-mullah-mansour/
ix http://www.dawn.com/news/1204240
x http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/corruption-indexes-don-afghanistan-ashraf-ghani-160204132917875.html
xi http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/world/asia/afghanistan-security-forces-taliban.html
xii http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview
xiii Ibid
xiv http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf
xv http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/world/asia/afghanistan-helmand-opium-poppy.html?_r=0
xvi Ibid
xvii http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview
