India and Pakistan must learn that Pathankot and Peshawar were mindless acts of terror, to prevent whose recurrence, there is the need to enhance cooperation, not diminish it. Pakistan must continue to take the preventive measures in real earnest and India must try and rein in the detractors. The stakes are staggeringly high for both. Failure in carrying forward the initiative for comprehensive dialogue that has happily begun may have winners among the ‘nay-sayers’, but will also have two losers: India and Pakistan. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
Introduction
The lure of Lahore can be overpowering. Through centuries the Ravi river valley, on which the city is located, has attracted droves of humanity. Many have entered through the Khyber Pass in the Hindukush mountains from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Plunderers, predators, pilgrims and poets have treaded this path, sometimes tarrying to trade and tending to other needs, on occasions settling down, and oftentimes transiting deeper into the vast recesses of India. Over time the city was founded, and experienced the efflorescence of its resplendent beauty. Kings and emperors, the mighty Mughals included, sought to rule India from there. The remnants of the Lahore Fort bear testimony to the city’s glorious past even to this date.
But it was not these alluring charms of the past and the present that drew India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi to this site last Christmas after a trip to Kabul in Afghanistan. It was the dynamics of realpolitik. It was an attempt to use the element of surprise to achieve a calculated end. The aim was to leave his footprint, if possible indelibly, in the shaping of, if not lasting peace, at least détente, for now, between the two arch rivals, India and Pakistan. He found a willing partner in his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif. But in the immediate aftermath, the Pathankot terrorist incident was evidence that the detractors were equally active. So will the Modi-Nawaz gamble work? This paper will seek to answer.
Modi’s Initiative, Nawaz’s Response
Mr. Narendra Modi is a bit of an enigma. Some even see him as a bundle of contradictions. For instance, his modest background is no constraint to the flashes of opulent flamboyance to which he, at times, lends himself. The gold-striped suit is an example. His intense Hindutva predilections and his alleged role, or the lack of one, in the Gujarat riots of 2002, does not normally endear him to India’s Muslims. Yet he has reached out to Muslim Pakistan in a way that the most secular Indian leaders in the past were wary of attempting. In doing so, he had chosen to ride roughshod over the shrill clamour of criticism that was bound to arise, as it did, from the extremists of the saffron Right in India. A logical explanation of the behaviour pattern is that if he senses a desired goal is achievable, he will go for it, come what may. The constellation of forces was also favourable. Mr. Sharif was fighting, as he still is, to keep himself relevant to the politics of Pakistan. Heading a civilian cabinet in his country is no guarantee that such will remain the case. So something spectacular needed to be done. The opportunity to play host to Mr. Modi’s impromptu visit provided a miraculous opportunity to do so. And he rose to the occasion.
The generals in Pakistan normally prefer to reserve dazzling dare-devil performances to themselves. They usually prefer civilian prime ministers to play a passive role, and then turn the offices of government (not necessarily the reins, which they like keep in their hands) to a successor peacefully – the major reason why such transitions in Pakistan are tending to be smooth. In other words, changes of government do not generally entail transfer of power. So, it was important to ascertain, at least from the Pakistani angle, whether this display of camaraderie between Mr. Modi and Mr. Sharif had the blessings of Pakistan’s all-powerful military chief, perhaps the world’s most powerful head of Army, General Raheel Sharif. Available evidence points to the fact that it did.
Mr. Modi’s initiative in deciding to travel to Pakistan provided a huge and necessary thrust to moving forward a process that had begun some weeks ago in Bangkok on 6 December 2015 in a meeting between the Pakistani National Security Advisor General Nasir Janjua, a confidant of Raheel Sharif (who had reportedly nominated him for the post) and his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval. The meeting cleared the way for a visit to Islamabad by India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, and a bilateral dialogue of sorts began. This is not to say that Mr. Modi, in any way, would be either constrained or motivated by any advice offered or wishes proferred by Mrs. Swaraj, let alone Mr. Doval. He is much too powerful and independent for that. But this is to say that the civilian Mr. Sharif would have had the consent of the Pakistani Army to respond to Mr. Modi’s overture. This assent is an essential prerequisite for a forward movement towards any possible détente between these two major South Asian protagonists.
Detractors Attempting Derailment
Sure enough, the detractors swung into action immediately in an attempt to derail the possibility of détente. Within a week, there was an attack on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot that left several dead and also the proof that no site, however protected, can be secure from determined terrorists. The main perpetrators were alleged to be a group called Jaish-e-Muhammed based in Pakistani territory. But the fact that they used such heavy artillery that would have been difficult to ferry access the frontiers, and the puzzling behaviour of a senior Indian police official, indeed the police chief of Gurdaspur, pointed to the possibility of local collaborators, or at least empathisers. So the situation was infinitely more complex than what met the eye.
If there were local participants in the assault, it underscores the need for yet greater cooperation between the two sides to prevent recurrence. Of course, it was rational for India to ask for some positive initiatives from the Pakistani authorities. It was also rational for Pakistan to respond, which they did by incarcerating some masterminds including its leader Masood Azhar. Given that these elements command strong support among some sections of the masses, this simply was not small beer. India’s appreciation came in the form of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s Rajnath Singh’s comment that he saw no need to “distrust” Pakistan, a massive endorsement given the culture of mutual acrimony.
No Alternative to Cooperation
The alternatives to cooperation between India and Pakistan are fading fast. There are larger existential threats to both than each other. The burgeoning threat of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) is one such. The ‘Caliphate’ of ISIS is no respecter of the traditional Westphalian states: They do not make distinctions between India and Pakistan, viewing the entire region as ‘Khorasan’, a classical geographical concept derived from Islamic history. Ironically, Pakistan is a greater target, not in spite of, but for being a Muslim state, as most Pakistanis in ISIS’ assessment have gone astray along the path of apostasy. They must be brought back to the fold. The broad majority of the Indians are not seen as such, not having ‘seen the light’ in the first place, but there is a significant Muslim population whose ‘sufistic’ or syncretic sophistry is not to ISIS’ extreme ‘salafist’ taste. Also, it must be borne in mind that the moderate ‘Barelvi’ and the more extreme ‘Deobandi’ schools of Islam were born in India, and should conflict between resurrected versions surface, India would be the most apt battleground. Paris is an example that ISIS can also hit out at non-Muslims if they prove too much of a ‘contradiction’, so India’s Hindus are not immune.
Second, both Pakistan and India are prone to fissiparous tendencies. In Pakistan there is a raging insurgency in Balochistan seeking to delink those parts from the mother-country. In Sindh, the Sindhudesh movement and others of that ilk raise their heads from time to time. In what is now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the Pashtoons behave somewhat contemptuously towards the Durand line, created by the British Raj, aiming at dividing Afghanistan from the then Frontier Province (now KP). The Taliban, earlier used by the Pakistani military, in particular its intelligence wing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to advance its interest in Afghanistan and India, have now turned to bite the hands that feed them, and , like Mary Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein’, have become uncontrollable. The massacre of children they perpetrated in a military school in Peshawar in December 2014 was the turning point in the Pakistani Army top brass’ attitude towards them. In India the situation in Kashmir and the insurgencies in the North East are straining the Union. Add to it the foibles of the Maoists and the segments of alienated communities which see the State as the tool of exploitation. The States of the Union are becoming increasingly assertive, and fault-lines between them and the Centre have begun to develop perceptibly. A logical corollary of this development could be that New Delhi’s relevance to the States of the Union may come to be threatened. As of now, the States need New Delhi, but this situation would need to be sustained. If the Partition of 1947 was the watershed that both India and Pakistan see worth preserving (except for the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, which was a political reality which both sides ultimately accepted – though Pakistan, grudgingly), then there is an obvious need for New Delhi and Islamabad to work together.
Third, security is not the only issue that concerns the two countries. Economic development is also another. This requires improved relations. For instance, there is an immediate need to reach an agreement on the Non-Discriminatory Market Access on Reciprocal Basis (NDMARB), which is the South Asian translation for the World Trade Organization’s phraseology of ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’. This would be designed to liberalise trade between the two. According to Shahid Javed Burki, a former Pakistan Finance Minister and now a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at ISAS, it would increase Pakistan’s GDP by at least 2%. There is now much informal trade routed through Dubai, and both would profit if the links were direct. Both countries are also susceptible to natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, which strike India and Pakistan with relentless regularity. There is the need for common approaches to mitigate the disastrous consequences. There is also the need to coordinate approaches towards issues such as Climate Change, given the geographical proximity towards each other.
Fourth, major global powers are evincing keen interest in the burial of hatchet by both India and Pakistan. The received wisdom was that China is Pakistan’s perpetual ally vis-à-vis India. But while China is likely to continue to champion Pakistan’s cause, the anti-India component of such partnership is beginning to show some erosion. The current Chinese leadership, and President Xi Jinping, have invested a great deal in their ‘One Belt One Road’ policy that include the pumping of US$ 47 billion into the ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor’ which require regional stability if the concept is to reach fruition. For example, part of the corridor is said to run through disputed Kashmiri territories; continued political differences between India and Pakistan would not augur well for the Chinese plans. Moreover China needs both Pakistani and Indian support to take on their Uighur extremists. So, Beijing stands to gain more from an understanding between Islamabad and New Delhi than the lack of one. As does the United States, currently embroiled in their regular electioneering process, which, at least this time round, is verging on the rancorous and unsavoury, as some candidates see such behaviour-pattern more conducive to vote-gathering. When their situation returns to absolute normal, the rational US position will favour, as it does under the Obama administration, a peaceable India-Pakistan relationship. This would obviate the need to having to choose between the two.
Finally, an overwhelming majority of the people of both India and Pakistan now want their conflict to be a thing of the past. A cursory look at the social media would support such a conclusion. Since India is already a vibrant democracy, and Pakistan by all indications appears set on the path to becoming one, public opinion, which translates to electoral preferences, matters for the political leadership. Such views which leaders, including Mr. Modi and Mr. Nawaz Sharif must take into account, include those of the powerful, huge growing diaspora of the Indians and Pakistanis, who, in their lives abroad are drawn to each other by their cultural commonalities. This was evidenced in the deliberations, for instance, in the South Asian Diaspora Conventions hosted in Singapore by ISAS in 2011 and 2013.The non-residents may not themselves have votes, but they have financial resources and thereby the ability to largely influence electoral outcomes. The sentiments are fed by powerful cultural tools, particularly in the South Asian context, such as the cinema. A recent movie entitled Bajrangee Bhaijaan tells the story of a young Hindu devotee from India surmounting all odds to return a lost, dumb, Muslim child to her parents in Pakistan. It can be interpreted as a metaphor, with the child symbolising the ‘lost relationship’ between the two peoples, and the act of ‘return’ as ‘reconnecting’ the two. Despite some protestations from the Hindu right-wing, the film became a box-office hit in South Asia and abroad.
Deterrence Exists, Detente Necessary
For now, the Foreign Secretary-level talks, scheduled for 15 January 2016, have been deferred to a later date. But this should not necessarily invite the wringing of hands. In the present political milieu, it would be unlikely for these to yield any fruitful results. A failed meeting would be worse than no meeting at all. Diplomats on both sides are professionally-tested, fairly-seasoned, and are assets that both nations could take a modicum of pride in. They understand this reality. Hence the postponement was mutually agreed upon. Foreign Secretaries are bureaucrats, and can only advance on routine agenda, which, even if critical to the overall relations, is subject to the will and directives of their political masters. It is the leaders who must create the appropriate political climate for bureaucrats, even if they be permanent heads of their respective foreign offices, to work on. To effect this necessary change of current political matrix, the roles of the National Security Advisors, military leaders (especially in the case of Pakistan), Foreign Ministers, and ultimately the two Prime Ministers themselves would be critical.
Both countries have managed to build sufficient deterrence vis-à-vis each other. Both have nuclear weapons, and therefore the capability to prevent each other from pursuing too aggressive a course of action. There can be skirmishes between India and Pakistan, but no war where territories can be won or lost. What is now needed, indeed essential, is détente between the two, the easing of relations accompanied by a relaxation of tensions, so that substantive negotiations across a broad spectrum of issues can take place. Such was the case during the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s when a raft of agreements on arms control were signed that actually helped avert a confrontation that many had seen as inevitable. India and Pakistan must learn that Pathankot and Peshawar were mindless acts of terror, to prevent whose recurrence there is the need to enhance cooperation, not diminish it. Pakistan must continue to take the preventive measures in real earnest, and India must try and rein in the detractors. The stakes are staggeringly high for both. Failure in carrying forward the initiative that has happily begun may have winners among the ‘nay-sayers’, but will also have two losers: India and Pakistan.
