Abstract
In the changing dynamics of global politics, the burgeoning sea trade is getting rapidly complex with more focus on commercial activities and resultant economic prosperity. In this politics, Gwadar port has its unique strategic and prominent geopolitical importance because it would connect three regions, namely oil, gas and uranium rich Central Asia, strategically important South Asia and the energy-rich Middle East. This article is an attempt to explain in details the implicit growing strategic and economic interests of regional powers including the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Moreover, it also gives specific emphasis on the imminent but ominous competition between the Iranian Chabahar Port and Gwadar Port and the active role the world’s most populous countries, India and China, would extensively play with regards to these shipping ports. An attempt is also made to predict pragmatically and highlight manifestly the dire repercussions for Pakistan emanating from the decidedly divergent interests and approaches of the regional powers towards the port. Importantly, the article also practically provides a long term and prudent way forward for developing Pakistan to safe-guard Gwadar Port from the menacing specter of regional conflicts calculated to reap optimally rich economic and military dividends.
Introduction
The celebrated American naval strategist, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, once remarked that “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century and the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.”1 In this game, the strategically important Gwadar port is the main gateway that makes it quite easy to altogether dominate the littorals of the Indian Ocean; the port connects energy rich Central Asia, rising Russia and emerging China to the Middle East, mineral rich Africa and the economically integrated ‘Europe.
In the contemporary geopolitics and geo-economics, Gwadar port plays a significant role in the international sea trade politics. The port is located in the vital choke point of the India Ocean in which about 100,000 ships traverse yearly; half of world’s container traffic and 70 percent of petroleum trade pass; it is home to 65 percent of the world raw materials and 31 percent gas and over half of world oil export.2 Importantly, the world economies are in need for potential energy resources. and surprisingly Gwadar port can provide the only feasible, inexpensive, nearer and safe route to capitalize upon the prospective natural resources of Central Asia, whose market access is hindered by political and geographic conditions, including continued Russian. influence.3
Secondly, Gwadar Port is located at the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz through which an estimated 17 million barrels of crude passes daily and over 40 percent of the world’s seaborne trade4, and which holds 2/3 world oil reserves.5 The same strait is directly connected to Iran that is also rich in oil and gas resources. Iran possesses 1,187.3 trillion cubic feet gas reserves and has the fourth largest proven crude oil reserves in the world estimated at 157.8 billion barrels. It already produces 2.8 million barrels per day. The International Energy Association forecasts that an end to sanctions will allow Iran to ramp up production by an additional 600,000 to 800,000 barrels per day within months, roughly four percent of global output.6
Thirdly, Gwadar port provides the most inexpensive, less perilous and the nearest port access to the energy-rich Central Asia. According to the British Petroleum’s 2013 Statistical Review of World Energy, only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have 3.6 billion barrels of proven oil and 663.8 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. Moreover, Kazakhstan possesses the Central Asian largest recover able coal reserves, 33.6 billion tonnes.7 Besides, according to the World Nuclear Association, it holds the second largest reserves of uranium with 679,300 tonnes, 12 percent of the world’s total uranium.8 Kazakhstan is the “world’s second largest producer chromium, ranks as the eighth largest producer of iron, second largest producer of phosphorous, fourth largest producer of lead and molybdenum.
Fourthly, Gwadar port is also located close proximity to the oil and the gas-rich Middle East. For land locked Central Asia, Western China and Russia the port provides the best suitable route to connect with the Arab monarchies economically and militarily. The Middle East which, according to the British Petroleum (BP)’2012 Statistical Review of World Energy, possesses 48 percent of the world oil and 38 percent of natural gas reserves.
History of Gwadar Port
Historically speaking, Gwadar was purchased by Pakistan in 1958 from Omani Sultanate at the cost of US $3 million. During its construction phase, from 1988-1992 a small port was constructed. In 2007, General Musharraf inaugurated Gwadar deep sea port. From 2007- 2012, Gwadar port remained under Port Singapore Authority (PSA) but due to its poor performance, the port was handed over to China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) in 2013. Since then the construction work has been done at a rapid pace. Along with Gwadar port, the building up of Gwadar city, Gwadar power generation plants and Gwadar International Airport are the pro posed projects under construction and development. The port has begun shipment, seasonal cargo, and commercial trade but it is still under construction and it has been reported that port would be fully operation till the end of this year.9
Regional Strategic and Economic Interests
The cherished emergence of the deep sea port as a vibrant economic hub has caused regional and international consternation and a bogey. Arguably, Iran, Dubai, India and the UAE are anxious about the potential port and consider it a fly in the ointment which could well considerably dwarf their international ports by throttling back burgeoning business activities at their shipping ports. Therefore, they are clandestinely and frenetically immersed in obstructing the timely operation of Gwadar port by backstairs influences such as fuelling disruptive sectarianism, ethnic militancy and low-level insurgency in the restive Balochistan; so does the United States (US). Other powers such as China, on the other hand, view the port with unfolding and brewing economic opportunities and they have the hankering to reap rich economic and military dividends once the port is completely operational.
Chinese Interests
China needs Gwadar Port for two explicit objectives i.e. economic and military. The world’s second largest economy, China, wishes to further expand its trade with the oil and gas-rich Middle East and miner al rich Africa via Gwadar Port because the port provides the cheapest, safest, easiest and nearest access to these regions. Chinese existing sea route passes through risky South China Sea, Pacific Rim, the Strait of Malacca and Sri Lanka and Chinese vessels have to cruise about 10,000 km to reach the trading partners in the region. But Gwadar port will reduce the sea distance to 2,500 km instead of 10,000 km and land distance for Kashgar to 2,800 because Kashgar is 4,500 Km from main Chinese port, the port of Shanghai while Gwadar is 2800 km from Kashgar, thus not only saving time, but also millions of dollars for the country.10
The Chinese Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) took over Gwadar port in 2013 for 40 years to make it fully operational by the end of 2015. In this regards, Beijing signed energy and infra structure deals with Pakistan worth $46 billion, including the one on the development of Gwadar port. The port opens up a 3,000 km-long trade corridor that will connect Gwadar to Kashgar via roads, railways and pipelines to transport oil and gas.11
Moreover, China has an eye on the obtrusive copper and gold reserves at Rikodek, known as the “Hillock of Gold” situated in Chaghi, a tehsil of Balochistan. According to recent estimates, it is the world’s 4th largest reservoirs of gold and copper (there exist 10 billion kilogram copper and 370 million gram gold, about the US$ 260 billion of worth). To acquire these objectives, China is financing and constructing a $46 billion economic corridor that will connect Gwadar to China’s land locked and economically underdeveloped Xinjiang province.12
As regards Chinese military interests, China needs this critical choke point to achieve its strategic objective of becoming an “impregnable naval power” in the Indian Ocean. It is calculated to check the Indo-US domination of the Arabian Sea, and use Gwadar port as an alternate sea route in case India blocks the busy Strait of Malacca. China will establish a naval listening post here to observe the maritime actions and maneuvers of the US in the Persian Gulf and those of India at nearby Indian bases of Gujarat and Mumbai. Moreover, China also intends to monitor the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) from the persian Gulf because about 60 percent of Chinese energy requirements come from the Gulf. Furthermore, it also wants to control the oil sea routes and trade links among regions such as South sia, Africa, Central Asia, Gulf and the Middle East.
About the increasing Chinese engagement in the region, Kaplan opines that “China’s involvement and projection to utilize the geostrategic importance of Gwadar as the development of an oil pipeline which would transport middle Eastern oil into the western provinces of China, as a result of his action, reducing India’s power to hinder Chinese oil supply through Straits of Malacca.” Quite probably, a Chinese commanding presence at Gwadar port and that of Indian at nearby Chabahar will disturb regional naval calculus at the disadvantage of Pakistan. Both Chinese and Indian blue sea navies will play asymmetrically a competitive naval muscle-flexing, compellence and encirclement of each other primarily aimed at clipping the naval wings of each other and the domination of energy passages. Such maritime practices will tremendously intensify owing to greatly divergent regional interests of both of these powers in the foreseeable future.
Central Asian Republics’ (CAR) Interests
The Central Asia Republics (CAR) are potentially rich in mineral resources specifically oil, gas, coal and uranium and possess thriving markets which have craved for Gwadar port since the 1990s. These republics have been heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas companies to supply energy resources and, in return, they have to silently but unwittingly adopt Russian policy dictations on significant domestic and foreign affairs. As a result, sometimes they unwillingly compromise on matters of immense importance related to their vital national interests; recent stoppage of gas supply to the European Union by Russia over the strategic incursion on Crimea resulted in a loss of revenues and credibility is a case in point.
Unfortunately, these republics are landlocked and have to rely on other littoral states for port access for their exports and import purposes. The region provides two port accesses to CARs, namely Iranian Chabahar port and Gwadar sea port. The former is surrounded by a host of uncertainties and imminent barriers due to Iranian covert nuclear programme. Therefore, the Central Asia states are disposed to utilize the Gwadar port to access Indian, Far East Asian, Middle Eastern, African and European markets for exports and imports.
To the advantage of CARs, all Central Asia republics are members of the emerging regional economic bloc, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and have intimate historical, cultural, ideological and religious connections and affinity with Pakistan, which would tremendously help them foster economic ties manifold with Pakistan and capitalize upon its prospective ports. More importantly, Pakistan has recently gained full membership status at the powerful Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and therefore, it is highly likely that the republics will ratchet up diplomatic endeavors primarily aimed at enhancing bilateral relations considerably so that their long-cherished dream of accessing Gwadar port will be fully realized.
Iranian and Indian Interests
Gwadar port is not in Iranian and Indian strategic interests as they perceive it as a forthcoming threat to their escalating regional interest. Both have established the deep-sea port at Chabahar in which has been helped and incentivised by the Indian investors. With the advantage of developed road infrastructure, through Afghanistan to Central Asia, Chabahar is ready to take the most important position in the region. Interestingly, Chabahar and Gwadar ports are separated by a distance less than 110 miles and both Iranian and Pakistani governments are leaving no stone unturned to take part in a regional competition primarily based upon exploiting the Central Asian resources and dominating regional sea trade altogether, thus optimally reaping tremendous economic benefits.
India has been immersed in financing and constructing Chabahar port since 2003. On May 6, 2015, it concluded a long-awaited memorandum of understanding with Iran to complete the development of Chabahar port by December 2016. The agreement included an investment of $85.21 million from India to construct a container terminal and a multi-purpose cargo terminal. Moreover, in New Delhi, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif offered India a deal to develop the second phase of Chabahar port and operate it.13
Both Iran and India have invested considerably in the development of Chabahar. A 600-kilometer long high way linking Chabahar to Zahidan in Iran’s north-only 240km from Malik on the Iran-Afghanistan border-is already operational. India spent $100 million on building a 220-kilometer Zaranj-Delaram highway in 2009 in the southwestern Nimroz province of Afghanistan which is 700 km away from southeastern Iran and can be easily extended to link Chabahar. Iran has also commenced constructing a railway line from Chabahar to Zahidan where it connects the Iranian rail network to Central Asia.14 Recently, Afghanistan also finalized a tripartite trade agreement with Iran and India on using the Chabahar port as an alternative route.
India is predisposed to import enormously oil and gas at throw away prices from Iran and Central Asia while exporting cars, computers and information technology related products to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, India also wishes to single-handedly access and fully utilizes $3 trillion worth resources of Afghanistan while hampering Chinese interests on the same Afghan resources. Both India and China, Asian giants, are trying to develop the major port, road, train connectivity calculated to approach the Central Asian natural reserves. It has created intense competition between China and India. Kaplan says that “the geopolitical, military, and financial competition between China and India has increased to some degree by competing Chinese and Indian influence and interests in Central Asia”.
India also observes Gwadar port from the military and realistic perspective, and is extremely apprehensive about Chinese arrival in close nearness to its naval bases thus challenging its naval hedge in the India Ocean regions. Kaplan argues that, “Additional important element of this economic and energy competition is that China’s establishment of noticeable military presence in Gwadar, called by the name of the “string of pearls” strategy, immediately challenges India’s place and situation in the region where India does not let any nation to challenge its authority”.
Both China and India import a large amount of their energy resources, such as oil and gas, through the Strait of Hormuz that is very close to Gwadar port (less than 250 miles). Gwadar port will provide an extra edge to China by having its large military and naval presence at Gwadar. It will also give a significant and valuable quality for protecting Chinese shipments which is an extreme threat to Indian conditions. It has, therefore, forced India to finance and provide engineers, technicians and experts for the development and up-gradation of Chabahar deep-sea port to swiftly counter and contain Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.
While Iran is inclined to capitalize on Chabahar port by providing with port access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and India and in return acquire billion dollars in revenue. The port will also help Iran access the world quite easily for exports and imports. Here comes Gwadar port as a formidable stumbling block to the very regional interests of so-called Indo-Iran alliance. Resultantly, both these countries have been immersed in clandestinely fuelling the low-level insurgency and bubbling ethnic militancy in the restive province. Arguably, the rising Indo-Iran bloc is likely to ramp up such insidious, obstructive and covert shenanigans in mineral rich Balochistan intended to make Gwadar port useless for China for their regional interests.
The United States’ interests
Since the commencement of Gwadar port, the US has been concerned about Chinese engagement with the port. It fears that the world second largest economy, China, would use the port to carve up ‘spheres of influence’ in the Middle East and Africa while threatening American regional interests. Furthermore, the US perceives the arrival of Chinese Navy in the warm waters of the Arabian Sea as a challenge to its long lasting hegemony in the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. It, too, is striving to inhibit China from becoming more powerful economically by banking on resources of Balochistan, Africa and oil and gas of the Middle East via Gwadar Port and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
As a result, the US has been and will continue to stoke the simmering insurgency and Shia-Sunni schism in Balochistan. Possibly, it will assist both Iran and India in terms of sup porting and stirring up insurgency calculated to create a host of stumbling blocks in Chinese way so that China would shun the remaining development work of Gwadar port and go back. Moreover, the US has also been immersed in transforming India as a regional hegemonic power for countering impending Chinese military and economic influence. US-India nuclear accord and growing economic relations are two major cases in this point.
In American strategic policy quarter, it is always taken into account that if China succeeds in tapping and capitalizing oil, gas, coal and uranium resources of Central Asia, it would out smart and significantly dwarf US presence, sway and national interest not only in Central Asia but also in South Asia and in the Middle East. So far, the US has avoided a game of energy competition with China in Central Asia. In this context, Gwadar port is the only viable and inexpensive” route available for the US to rely on in terms of accessing burgeoning energy resources of Central Asia and countering Chinese presence there. Presumably, in the near future, America could well show the interests of using Gwadar port for its export and import purposes with the region. It is self-evident that the US will also slowly begin to use the port for its naval objectives on the clumsy ground of flushing out terrorism and militancy in the region. However, the real objective would be about countering Chinese naval rise in the Indian Ocean.
European Interests
Europe is faced with some kinds of energy shortages due to Russian stoppage of oil and gas to the continent recently on the issue of Crimea and subsequent economic sanctions on Russia. Interestingly, Russian companies purchase the Central Asian energy resources and sell them to the European nations on profit. These practices created strong encouragements for European nations to build pipelines from Central Asia to Gwadar because the said pipelines would greatly benefit those countries by excluding Russian tentacles and obstructive role.
Implications for Pakistan
Due to the potential cauldron of big power interests pertaining to the emerging Gwadar port, Pakistan is highly likely to face a range of both economic and security-related problems and issues. Kaplan says that, “the geopolitical, military, and financial competition between China and India has increased to some degree by competing Chinese and Indian influence and interests in Central Asia.”
On top of that is the ongoing com petition between China and India aimed at controlling and developing regional seaports for trade and security purposes? India perceives Gwadar port as a rival to that of Chabahar where it has been heavily engrossed in building the port. Moreover, the Indians are of the opinion that China through Gwadar port will not only dominate regional trade and energy resources but also use the port for its naval and military objectives in order to counter Indian rising naval power. They mostly refer to the Chinese pearl of string strategy, by which China is building ports in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as a Chinese lorig-term policy of Indian encirclement and containment.
To counter and impede China from banking on Gwadar port, Indian has been reportedly involved in fanning terrorism, militancy and insurgency in Pakistan by its plethora of diplomatic missions based in war-torn Afghanistan. A large number of Baloch separatists are gaining money and arms from India primarily calculated to ratchet up the ongoing insidious insurgency in the restive Balochistan. Resultantly, the Balochistan-based insurgents are employing Indian supplied bombs to blow up bridges, gas pipelines and ruin the already dilapidated Trans port infrastructure throughout the province. Arguably, such India assistance to the separatists will double given the fact that China has determinedly decided to make Gwadar port fully operational at any cost. Therefore, it will result in massive casualties and ruination of rail and road infrastructure. Above all, the TAPI and IP gas pipelines would be frequently attacked because these pipelines have been so designed that they will traverse through Balochistan to reach Punjab and India.
Moreover, the Sino-Indian race of competition will also result in arms race in the region at the disadvantage of Pakistan. India has been rather apprehensive that China will establish naval facilities at Gwadar port as well. Thereby, India has endeavored to attain the third leg of its deterrence by successfully making its naval ships capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Due to Indian naval build up and advancement, Pakistan has also decided to achieve its naval deterrence ant time in the future for the protection of its integrity and security. Pakistan is already a cash strapped country that it would be a huge burden on it to embark on a naval arms race with India.
A Way Forward
The unfolding situation needs special attention so that optimal benefits could be taken from Gwadar port. In this context, all the multi dimensional issues of Balochistan should be taken into consideration with a view to resolving the existing socio economic, political, and educational and security problems.
To begin with, for long term and effectual security of Balochistan, both the federal and the provincial setups should embark upon genuinely reforming the servitude and toothless 38,000 police force of the province. It is imperative to supplement police number by inducting educated youth through competitive examinations and proper vetting; it should also be provided with modern training, equipped with sophisticated weapons, armored vehicles and needed helicopters; it must be completely depoliticized; competent salary packages with adequate medical and educational amenities should also be given so that personnel live a sort of descent life and shun ending up with massive corrupt practices and around the clock basic intelligence coordination with premier intelligence agencies should also be ensured. To boost its moral, effectiveness and efficiency, honest, valiant and competent personnel and officers should be rewarded with promotion and national awards.
Secondly democratic political reforms meant to instigate good governance are also badly needed. For viable, workable and result oriented democracy, elections for the provincial assembly and local bodies should be transparent, participatory, fair and inclusive for the willing educated youth. Equally significant, sinister and obstructive sway of affluent landlords and dynastic politicians must also be deliberately cut down. To hinder massive political corruption and irregularities, the FIA and the provincial judiciary need to be reformed and fully empowered intended to clamp down upon loot and plunder of development funds by keeping vigilant eye over the moves and actions of politicians and lethargic bureaucracy. The central government, too, should refrain from needlessly interfering in domestic politics of the province.
Thirdly, to educate people is equal to resolving all sorts of provincial adversities. In this regard, new educational institutions equipped with all necessary wherewithal should be immediately established; special arrangement for higher education such as establishing modem colleges and universities and providing adequate seats to the students of Balochistan with reasonable financial assistance are required; issues of numerous costly ghost schools numbered 3,500 in 2009 and politicized ghost teachers should be solved; parents should also be encouraged to get their daughters educated; private sector ought to be induced into investing educationally in Balochistan and extra measures for qualitative technical education meant to make the youth skilful ought to be taken and adequate job facilities for the graduates should also be arranged by the process of small and medium level industrialization.
Lastly, prudent economic reforms are also required to bring the province at par with the rest of Pakistan. Adequate road and rail infrastructure should be built; China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a laudable start. Gwadar deep sea port should be made operational as soon as possible and skilled and educated locals should be afforded reasonable vacancies and both small and large scale industrialization ought to be commenced so as to tap and exploit regional natural resources. National and international private investors should be lured into investing in Balochistan and in this regards, bureaucratic red tape and security issues should be minimized. Provincial fish market of 155,000 tones excluding those smuggled to Iran should be regulated, facilitated and properly taxed and unchecked smuggling of large catch of fish to neighboring Iran must be stopped. Stringent measures must be taken to hinder drug smuggling via Baluchistan’s littoral areas. A potent dragnet against ministerial and bureaucratic. Corruption should also be spread and sluggish politicized provincial bureaucracy must be reformed for good governance and effective administration.
From the above discussion it is crystal clear that Gwadar port endows Pakistan with both strategic opportunities and challenges. After all, the ball is still rolling in Pakistan’s court that how effectively it will employ its legislative, executive, judicial organs, bureaucracy, military and diplomacy to maximize the deep sea port. If Pakistan succeeds in this regional game, Gwadar port will ensure Pakistan’s high quality all weather connectivity to Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Central Asia, ensuring speedy movement of personnel, goods and services between these countries and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would result in qualitative up-gradation of Pakistan’s land connectivity related infrastructure. If not, India and Iran will reap the benefits thus undermining Pakistan’s core national interest.
References
3Ayaz Ahmed, “Gwadar Port and strategic regional interests”, The Frontier Post, (August 25, 2015)
5Aymen ljaz, “Significance of Gwadar Port”, Pakistan Observer, (August 18, 2015)
6Ayaz Ahmed, “The Iran nuclear deal”, The News (September 12, 2015)
http://www.thenewscom.pk/Todays-News-9-339766-The-Iran-nuclear-deal
7Ayaz Ahmed, “Problems of Balochistan: A Way Forward – Part 1”, Balochistan Point
Ahmed http://thebalochistanpoint.com/problems-of-balochistan-a-way-forward-part-1/
8http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Supply-of-Uranium/
9Aymen ljaz, ibid
10Ayaz Ahmed, “The Iran nuclear deal” ibid
11ibid
12ibid
13Ayaz Ahmed, “Gwadar vs. Chabahar”,The News, October 11, 2015, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/86444-From-magical-to-farcical
14Ibid
Contributed by:
Dr. Faisal Javed is a PhD degree holder in International Relations. Currently he is Assistant Professor at the Federal Urdu University of Arts. Science and Technology (FUUAST), Karachi.
