Why the CPEC
April 20, 2015 was a red letter day in the Pakistan-china relationship. The much awaited visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping to Islamabad, the capital city of Pakistan finally materialised. a number of memoranda under the umbrella of china Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) were signed between the two states for establishment of a network of highways, railways and pipelines connecting Pakistan’s newly commissioned deep seaport of Gwadar with Kashgar in the north-western province of Xinjiang in china. China has agreed to invest a colossal sum of forty-six billion US dollars, considered the largest investment by china in a foreign country.i The CPEC as a concept aims to expand the Chinese trade and commerce sea lines of communications via the seaport of Gwadar in Pakistan that would link the Chinese mainland with ports throughout the Middle East and coasts of africa.ii (See map below).
Being the world’s second largest oil consumer and largest oil importer with the bulk of oil imports from the Gulf States and Africa and with the expected oil consumption to grow by 5.8% annually,iii the creation of new trade routes as envisaged in the CPEC has become imperative for the continued growth and sustenance of the Chinese economy. It is a mega project and once on ground, the corridor would shorten the current sea routes from the Middle East and Africa considerably. According to Hassan Khan:
In terms of trade route, china mainly relies on the shipping route that passes through the Strait of Malacca and it takes some 45 days to reach Europe via the Middle East. When the CPEC is completed, it would take approximately 10 days for Chinese shipments to reach their destination, as the Kashgar Gwadar route will play a pivotal role in reducing the staggering amount of time and distance. Not only this, the reliance on the Malacca route would be significantly reduced, as it is already a potential flashpoint of blockade by the united States Pacific command (USPACOM) in periods of major hostility.iv
Despite the CPEC being floated strictly as a commercial venture primarily to protect and expand china’s economy, USA views it with deep suspicion and the US Department of Defence explains it in terms of the ‘String of Pearls’ theory that refers to a network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationship along the sea lines of communication.v The military aspect of the String of Pearls theory has been refuted by China and questioned by some analysts who point to China’s strategic vulnerabilities specifically in terms of its naval power which pales in front of its rival, the US Naval behemoth, which makes it very unlikely for China at this stage to undertake such a provocative naval initiative. As expected the String of Pearls theory has been readily adapted by the Indian military and its media.vi
Why Now
A commerce and trade corridor through Pakistan, reminiscent of the old Silk Road, one that would provide access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea must have been high on the priority list of China the country (Chinese main-land) won its independence under Airman Mao Tse Tung in 1949 and was declared as the Peoples Republic of China. Besides the for able hurdle posed by the mighty Himalayas and the lofty Karakorum formed a land barrier between two countries, the lack of political and economic might of the PRC as it struggled to establish and regain its past glory and status as an empire and major player in the world scene did not permit realisation of the new Silk Road dream. The vision was not discarded but in the backburner and necessary steps related to capacity build to undertake such a gigantic project were put in motion. The Chinese as a nation are renowned their long term strategic thinking perseverance and patience. These characteristics were amply on display in the implementation of the CPEC mega project, almost seven decades later.
For the new Silk Road to become a reality, China first needed establish cordial and friendly relationship with Pakistan despite the latter in the 1950s being firmly in the US camp as an active member of CENTO and SEATO whose primary objectives were to contain the Communist threats posed by USSR and China. Sino-Pak relationship survived partly because India was viewed as a common adversary and Pakistan won China’s goodwill when it supported PRC’s quest to replace Republic of China (Taiwan) as the true representative of the Chinese nation in the UN General Assembly. In the India-Chinese War of 1962, Pakistan’s sympathy lay with China and the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement that was signed by the two sovereign states in 1963 where border disputes between China and Pakistan in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh regions were amicably resolved, further strengthened the bonds between the two nations.
PRC’s role during the Indo-Pak War of 1965, where beside diplomatic and moral support to Pakistan, Chinese perceived military threats to India across the Himalayas had prevented the latter from withdrawing its forces from the mountains for deployment against Pakistan. Post war, China’s unconditional military aid to Pakistan when the latter was reeling because of the crippling US arms embargo cemented the relationship to an extent where China become the staunchest ally of Pakistan and has remained so to date. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the young foreign minister of Pakistan under President Ayub Khan in the first half of the 1960s was the principal architect of the policy that propelled China-Pakistan friendship to new heights.
The formidable Karakoram and Himalaya mountain ranges separated the Chinese landmass from the Indian subcontinent and any access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea had to overcome this daunting obstacle. In 1958 a modest project Indus Valley Road (IVR) was initiated to provide an all-weather road link between Swat and Gilgit. In 1966 under a Sino-Pak agreement IVR was upgraded to Karakoram Highway (KKH), aka Friendship Highway.vii It aimed to connect the Chinese north-western province of Xinjiang with Gilgit-Baltistan of Pakistan across the Karakoram mountain ranges via the Khunjerab Pass, tracing one of the many paths of the ancient Silk Road. The project was completed in 1978 by a joint Chinese-Pakistani effort and over 800 Pakistanis and 200 Chinese workers and engineers lost their lives in the process. KKH is regarded as the Eighth Wonder of the World.viii
The most difficult portion of the new Silk Road was now in place. Karachi and Port Qasim (adjacent to Karachi) seaports were the only Pakistani harbours in Arabian Sea that were operational in 1978. The two were saturated and had limited scope for further expansion. Gwadar in the coast of the Balochistan province, despite having the potential of being developed as a deep seaport was only a fishing harbour then.
Gwadar is located on the shores of the Arabian_Sea in Pakistan’s western province of Balochistan. It is about 533 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranian border and 380 km northeast of the nearest Sea. Placed at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, just outside the Strait of Hormuz, near the key shipping Gulf, it has a natural hammerhead shaped Peninsula protruding into the Arabian Sea from the coastlineix (see maps below). The surrounding region is home to around two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves. Along with Chabahar seaport of Iran it is the nearest warm-water deep sea port to the landlocked, but energy rich, Central Asian Republics and landlocked Afghanistan.
Gwadar was identified by Pakistan as a potential seaport way back in 1954 when it was still under the Omani rule. After four years of negotiations, Pakistan purchased the Gwadar Enclave from Oman for $3 million on September 8, 1958 and Gwadar officially became part of Pakistan on December 8, 1958, after 200 years of Omani rule.x the decision to develop Gwadar as a modern deep seaport was taken during the rule of General Musharraf. An all weather coastal highway linking Gwadar to Karachi was laid out by December 2004xi and the first phase of making it into a deep sea port completed in December 2006. Following the completion of phase one the government of Pakistan signed a 40-year lease agreement with Port Authority of Singapore (PSA) for the development and operation of tax-free port and duty free zone.xii The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2011 that Gwadar was doing little business as a commercial port and Pakistan had approached China to take over its operations. A year later China confirmed it would be taking over control of Gwadar as they believe it has the potential as an oil pipeline hub for Chinese energy needs.xiii In February 2013 Gwadar port under an official government contract was handed over for expansion, operation and maintenance to the state-owned China Overseas Port Holdings Limited. The port is said to be strategically important for China as sixty percent of China’s oil comes from the Persian Gulf by ships travelling over 16,000 kilometer’s in two to three months, confronting pirates, bad weather, political rivals, and other risks up to its only commercial port, Shanghai.xiv
KKH had provided an access from Kashgar in China across the Karakoram to the Pakistani hinterland. By 2013, PRC’s economy had leapfrogged to become the second largest economy just behind that of USAxv. China over the past two decades has amassed a very healthy cash surplus, mostly in the shape of US treasury bonds amounting to over a trillionxvi and a total of about four trillion US dollarsxvii that it could easily employ to further its economic and geostrategic interests it the region and beyond. USA, the sole superpower, in the meanwhile is perceived to be witnessing a waning ability in its effort to control world events despite still fielding the strongest military force in the world by a wide margin. The decline has apparently set in primarily because of the fiasco suffered due to the Iraq invasion and the unsuccessful Afghanistan venture. The two wars Have taken a heavy toll on the US economy to an extent where the gung-ho policy of the junior Bush era become a thing of the past. USA according to some analysts is currently suffering from the “imperial overstretch” syndrome.
With the Gwadar seaport becoming operational and being run and managed by a Chinese owned consortium, a robust economy, a very cordial relationship with Pakistan and the reduced ability of USA to intervene, the basic parameters for launching of the CPEC were finally in place.
The CPEC announcement was planned in the autumn of 2014 but the political upheaval in Pakistan because of the joint PTI and PAT dharnas (sit-ins) delayed the event by about six months. The die has finally been cast and while major obstacles in the way of the project have been removed, serious challenges still remain before the dream can be turned into a reality.
Broad Contours of the CPEC
The central theme of the CPEC is linking Gwadar seaport to Kashgar in the Chinese north-western province of Xinjiang through a network of highways, railways, oil and gas pipelines and optical fibre link. To achieve this end a revival and extension of KKHxviii and three trade corridors through Pakistan have been identified in which these infrastructures will be built. The three independent corridors for the purpose are: western, Gwadar-Quetta-D.I. Khan-Bannu-Peshawar onward to KKH; central, Gwadar-Khuzdar-DG Khan-Mianwali-Taxila onward to KKH and eastern, Gwadar-Karachi-Hyderabad-Multan-Lahore/Faisalabad- Islamabad-Taxila onward to KKH (see map below).
Map displaying the alignments of the three corridors. Western corridor (black arrows), Central Corridor (white arrows) and Eastern Corridor (gray arrows).
Establishing of economic zones with special tax exemptions every 200 miles along the 2400 kilometres of the central axis (Gwadar, Turbat, Khuzdar, DG Khan, Mianwali, Abbottabad and Mansehra) is also a part of the CPEC master plan,xix as are the establishment of power projects of up to 16,500 MW.xx
During the visit of the Chinese President to Islamabad a total of fifty one MOUs were signed and out of them nine related to the improvement Gwadar seaport where a sum of one billion US dollars were committed by China for expansion and upgradation of the port, a new international airport, a 300 MW coal-fired power plant, a water desalinization plant a 300 bed hospital and an expressway along Gwadar’s East Bay.xxi Power shortage in Pakistan was identified a major impediment in the economic growth of the country and a sum of $ 15.5 billion worth of energy projects were pledged to be constructed by joint Chinese-Pakistani firms rather than the governments of either China or Pakistan.xxii Although power generation does not fall under the direct purview of trade corridors, both China and Pakistan realise that unless the acute power shortage the latter is being confronted with is· redressed, Pakistan’s economy would continue to stagnate and without economic stability, the security challenges it faces would be difficult to overcome.
Pakistan has assured China that it will release the requisite funds needed to complete its portions of the CPEC projects. The completion of the entire CPEC is likely to take over a decade and fortunately as a concept it has the unanimous approval of all the political parties in Pakistan, hence any change of government is unlikely to affect or halt the project. While it is true that the Pakistani nation as a whole stands behind the CPEC model, there are serious security and political hurdles that can derail the entire process.
External Challenges
The US fear that the trade and commerce boost that is likely to accrue to China as a result of the CPEC would invariably lead to the build-up and deployment of a stronger and more belligerent Chinese naval power in and around the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to protect its economic and maritime interests has much merit. The CPEC is, therefore, viewed as a threat to the sea supremacy in the oceans which the naval forces of the US Central and Pacific Commands currently enjoy. The US-India strategic relationship which has grown and matured since 2005 is a result of such a mind-set where one of the principal objectives of USA is to encourage and promote the Indian naval power to jointly challenge the growing Chinese naval presence especially in and around the Indian Ocean.
India has more than willingly joined the US bandwagon against the CPEC as it still views its relationship with Pakistan as a zero sum game and any benefit to Pakistan whether in the economic, political or military fields is seen as a loss to India which must be resisted at all cost. India, according to the Pakistani intelligence agencies, has already embarked on covert operations to promote unrest in Balochistan by providing financial and military support to the Baloch insurgents while in Karachi, the financial hub of Pakistan, it trains, funds and support groups that sabotage the peace and tranquility of the metropolis through terror and subversive acts.
The US naval power is unmatched to date and along with its air and land forces USA is viewed as the sole superpower of the world since the break-up of – USSR in the 1990s. Given the irresponsible and reckless manner in which it has employed its military ” might particularly during the first – decade of the current century, majority of Asian, African and South American nation states believe a bipolar or even a multipolar world would be better for global peace and stability. Superpower status after all is not the birth right – of any particular nation.
Iran is also apprehensive of the growth of Gwadar as a deep seaport because when fully functional would provide a stiff challenge to its own seaport of Chabahar which has built at a considerable cost with the financial and technical assistance of India. Chabahar is situate on the Makran Coast of the Sista and Balochistan province of Iran a it has been developed as a free tra and industrial zone. It serves as an alternate trade route for the Indian trade with Afghanistan and the Central Asian States after Pakistan refused India transit trade route facility to Afghanistan through its territory.
Security Challenges
Both Gwadar and Kashgar confront multiple security challenges in the shape of non-state terror syndicates which have to be eliminated or at the minimum marginalised if the CPEC is to become a reality. The creation of five economic zones in kashgar, the Chinese hope, will transform the economic landscape of Xinjiang to a degree where the Uighur separatists will be no longer relevant. It also expects Pakistan to initiate necessary measures to take action against the Uighur rebels who have infiltrated in their Tribal Belt and conduct sabotage activities across the a Pakistan-China border. One of the objectives of the ongoing Operation zarb e Azb is to free the country of all foreign terror groups who had taken shelter in the hitherto inaccessible portions of the country’s western and north-western frontier regions. The success achieved so far has to a fair degree addressed the Chinese concern about the Uighur separatist threat emanating from Pakistan.
The threat posed by the Baloch insurgents who have taken up arms against the Pakistan government in the province of Balochistan where Gwadar is located is a major stumbling block that must be addressed for the CPEC to move forward. The creation of multiple economic zones along the central corridor passing through Balochistan should boost the provincial economy to an extent here it would address the genuine grievances of the Baloch about being exploited and economically deprived their due share of revenue by the centre. This in turn should drastically reduce the support by the locals to the rebel groups.
Operation against the Baloch rebels by the country’s paramilitary. Forces has been ongoing since the past decade and it has finally provided a window of opportunity for a peacefully negotiated settlement of the insurgency. A number of local Baloch mid-level leaders and insurgents have laid down their arms and they have been provided full amnesty by the state. Since April 2015, there has been a declining terror attacks in Balochistan by the rebels but the resistance is still active.xxiii A number of key diehard Baloch separatist movement leaders have indicated their willingness to come to the negotiating table in the hope of a mutually agreed resolution and the state of Pakistan has reacted positively to their gesture.
While the long-term objectives of both Pakistan and China is to minimise the security risks to the project through a complete economic transformation of the province, in the short and medium term the Pakistan Army has pledged to provide full security to all Chinese workers engaged in the CPEC projects in Balochistan – a ten thousand strong well trained and well equipped force is being raised exclusively for the purpose. According to media reports, the new force, named the Special Security Division, will comprise nine army battalions and six wings of paramilitary forces the Rangers and the Frontier Corps. A two-star general will head the special force.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship also has an important bearing on the security situation in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Kunar and Nuristan provinces in neighbouring Afghanistan are hotbeds for multiple terror groups, some local (TTP), some regional (the movement of Islamic Uzbekistan, Turkestan Islamic Party etc.), and some with global affiliations (al Qaeda, ISIS). These groups pose a threat to the CPEC in the northern regions of Pakistan. Rooting out the terror structure in neighbouring Afghanistan, therefore, becomes imperative.
Pakistan’s declarat ion con demning the Afghan Taliban spring offensive was a step in the right direction but its efforts towards rebuilding trust with Afghanistan is being actively thwarted by the Northern Alliance faction of the current Afghan governmental set-up with the active connivance of India. China with its soft power can and is playing a role in reducing the tension and friction between the two neighbours because for as long as they remain daggers drawn, the achievement of the political and economic objectives of the CPEC would be difficult. A marked lowering of the current level of animosity between Pakistan and Afghani tan, if not friendship, would be the absolute minimum prerequisite for the success of the CPEC
Once the work on the CPEC starts in full swing even isolated incidents of terror attacks on the project will be detrimental to the entire scheme. The need, therefore, is to root out the terror structure not only in Balochistan but in the country as a whole.
Lack of Political Consensus within the Country a Major Concern
In the CPEC master plan three independent corridors were to be developed linking Kashgar with Gwadar, namely, western, central and eastern. Of the three the west ern axis is the shortest followed by the central and eastern alignments. On the security and cost issues, the order is reversed: compared to the eastern one where the security situation is comparatively better and the road and railway lines exists and needs upgrading, the other two still have unresolved security challenges and much of the infrastructure has to be built from a scratch. In terms of the time and cost factors also the eastern one can be completed earlier and would be less expensive than the other two.
When examined from the view point of uplifting the economy of underdeveloped regions, the two western corridors take precedence over the eastern one. In fact both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would be the principal beneficiaries of the special economic zones that has been planned every two hundred miles along the central axis. For the two provinces, the central corridor takes precedence over the other two.
The priority of development of the three axes has become a serious bone of contention where Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa accuse the centre and punjab of concentrating on the development of the eastern corridor while ignoring the two western ones. Senators from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa pointed out that the eastern corridor would bypass their provinces and its benefits would largely be enjoyed by Punjab.
The federal minister for planning and development Ahsan Iqbal informed the senators that the Chinese investors were unwilling to construct the western routes on BOT basis because of security and cost issues, hence the government has decided to complete the relatively easier eastern route first with the Chinese assistance but it has not abandoned the original western routes which would be constructed later.xxiv It further proposed that the eastern and the central routes are planned to be completed by 2018 while the western one will be later as a part of the long-term plan.xxv
The federal government has denied any alteration in the original development plan but their denial has not appeased the complainants and this slanging match is being prominently played out in the print and electronic media of the country. The consensus among the provinces to set up a special bicameral parliamentary committee for regular oversight of the CPEC project is a positive move.xxvi If the committee becomes and is seen as an active forum by all the provinces it will help overcome the concerns being voiced by Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Although the fruits of the CPEC if it progresses as planned will be visible within a couple of years, its completion in its entirety would take several decades during which several government would have changed in Pakistan.xxvii To ensure the committee is not viewed as non- functional is absolutely essential for the sustainability of the CPEC in the long run.
Conclusion
There is a near consensus among the experts and the decision makers both in Pakistan and China that the CPEC is a game changer and its successful implementation will enhance Pakistan’s status as a key player in the regional trade and commerce fields besides giving a major boost to its economy. The project would also promote China’s status as a global player while benefitting its already powerful economy. According to Muhammad Amir Rana:
This writer’s recent interactions with Chinese scholars and officials suggested the latter are extremely enthusiastic about the CPEC project. They see it as a flagship project of China’s vision of Belt and Road’ a brief version of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. They anticipate that a successful implementation of the corridor project will encourage other regional countries, including Central Asian states, to engage in similar projects with China. The next target for China would be to pursue India, Bangladesh and Myanmar for the East Asian corridor. According to some estimates’, these routes will benefit more than three billion people of the South and Central Asian regions.xxviii
On its own Pakistan would have found the enormity of financial and geo-strategic challenges associated with the CPEC too huge to over come but with the support of China, the project has become viable. China will be funding the major portions of the cost mostly on a BOT basis and an influx of about 46 billion US dollars in a three years spar would kick start Pakistan’s economy.
The CPEC is viewed as a challenge to the US world supremacy and it would like to curb the growing economic and military clout of PRC in the region. For China, however, the CPEC is a major initiative it considers necessary for the future of its national economy and any direct intervention by USA to sabotage it could have serious political, social and military consequences at the global level. With trade and commerce between USA and PRC so closely intertwined any major conflict between the two would seriously hurt both the parties, thus restricting the US options.
The Indian opposition can be handled by Pakistan and with the backing of China, India would find it hard to pursue any serious move to disrupt the process. The growing India- China trade relationship would further hamper the former from taking any steps detrimental to a key Chinese initiative. As the CPEC starts to take shape or Ground, India would find itself increasingly isolated in the burgeoning trade and commerce activity that would be generated among Central Asia, South Asia, Africa and Europe. It would have to re-examine its current anti Pakistan tirade which appears to be the trademark foreign policy doctrine of the present Modi government. India would have to extend the hand of peace and friendship towards Pakistan if it wants to be a part of the trade bonanza and when that happens, Pakistan should reciprocate and abandon the zero-sum game both are currently engaged in.
In conclusion the success or failure of the CPEC largely rests with Pakistan itself. Internally, a dramatic improvement in both style and substance of governance, crackdown on corruption specially at the official levels that has reached epic proportions, zero tolerance against any group that promotes religious or sectarian disharmony and a satisfactory resolution of the Baloch uprising are some of the key steps that have become absolutely essential. The current bickering between the smaller provinces and the centre on the issue of the priorities of the three corridors must be amicably resolved. The federal government must not ignore the sensitivities of the smaller provinces and at the same time the provinces must not put their interests ahead of the national interest.
Externally, mending fences with Afghanistan would help resolve much of the threat foreign non-state actors pose to the security of Pakistan. Improving relations with Iran should also be a priority and given the current extreme adversarial relationship between Iran and the Arab States and the importance Pakistan attaches with both, the matter must be approached with caution and care. If the Iran’s nuclear deal with P5+1 eliminates the danger of a nuclear weapons capable Iran and brings it out of international isolation, the task of Pakistan to maintain cordial relationship with all the key players in the Middle East would become much easier.
CPEC is a game changer, and for once the stars are all lined up in favour of Pakistan; it must seize this golden opportunity with both hands.
End Note
i https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_of_Pearls%281ndianOcean%29
ii Ibid
iii Ibid
iv Hassan Khan, Is China-Pakistan economic corridor really a game changer, accessed from and retrieved on Nov 24, 2015, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/20 15/06/13/comment/is-china-Pakistan-economic-corridor-reality-a game-changer/
v The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal United States Department of Defence report titled ‘Energy Futures in Asia, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String of Pearls_%28Indian_Ocean%29 accessed on Nov 25, 2015
vi Ibid
vii Retrieved from http://humshehri.org/place/kara-koram-highway/ accessed-on Nov 25, 2015
viii Retrieved https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karako-ram-Highway/ accessed-on Nov 25, 2015
ix Retrieved https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwadar_Port accessed on Nov 30, 2015
x https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwadar, accessed on Nov 30, 2015
xi Ibid
xii https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GwadarPort accessed on Nov 30, 2015
xiii Ibid
xiv Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwadar
xv http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economic.asp accessed on Nov 26, 2015
xv https://www.investopedia.com/article/investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economic.asp accessed on Nov 26, 2015
xvi Retrieved from https://www.investopedia.com/article/investing040115/reasons-why-china-buys-us-treasury-bonds.asp accessed on Nov 26, 2015
xvii Shobit Seth, The reason why China buys US treasury bonds. April 1, 2015, retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/040115/reasons-why-china-buys-us-treasury-bonds.asp accessed on Nov 26, 2015, also see –http://www.tradjngeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves that puts PRC’s reserves as just over 3.5 trillion US dollars for October 2015.
xviii Safdar Sial, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor: an assessment of potential threats and constraints, retrieved from sanpips.com/download.php?f=268.pdf accessed on Nov 30, 2015
xix Hadi Aziz, China agrees to invest 52 billion USD in Pakistan in next five years, retrieved from http://www.thenewstribe.com/2014/02/24/china-agrees-to-invest-52-billion-usd-in- pakistan-in-next-five-years/ accessed on Nov 24 2015
xxi https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cbina%E2%80%93Pakistan_Economic_Corridor accessed on Nov 24, 2015
xxii Ibid
xxiii Mohammad Amir Rana, economic corridor challenges, Dawn, May 17, 2015, retrieved from http://www,dawn.com/news/118240 accessed on Nov 25, 2015
xxiv Op. cit. Safdar Sial,
xxv The News, official map shows no change in original CPEC route, may 14, 2015, retrieved from http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-318064-Official-map-shows-no-change-in-original-CPEC-route accessed on Nov 30 2015
xxvi Op. cit. Muhammad Amir Rana
xxvii Ibid
xxviii Ibid
