Context
As we approach the end of the year, the pace of unprecedented global change is in no way easing. While the Iran nuclear deal was a remarkable achievement, it was accompanied by two hypotheses: will the agreement bolster Iran to exert even more influence in the region, or would it have to adjust its behavior after being mainstreamed?
This debate has now been marred by the Russian actions in the Middle East. As compared to Iran, it is Russia that seems to have been more emboldened. While the West may have hoped to pull Iran into its orbit with the signing of the deal, Russia seems to have preempted that prospect by forming its own alliance to tackle Daesh, and now the debate is more about Russian intentions.
As noted previously, the present stage of the war against extremism has gotten immensely intricate; it has gotten intertwined with the tussles of regional and global balance of power. In Syria, the stated position of Russia is to fight Daesh, which is a goal it shares with NATO and the regional states. The question is why would it be willing to risk getting military involved in Syria if the NATO led alliance was already working on that goal?
Alarmingly, NATO and Russia have been slowly moving towards a collision course in Syria. The Russians are increasing their support for pro-regime forces while the US and Arab allies are doing the same for those opposing. The interjection of limited number of US Special Operations forces, albeit in advisory role, has further heightened the risks of a confrontation.
Just as the events of Ukraine and Crimea reset the geopolitics of Europe, Russian military involvement has altered the dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa. However, the tragic terror attack in Paris on November 13, followed by the San Bernardino event on December 2, will increase pressure on Russia to change its focus away from sustaining the Assad government and focus on fighting Daesh. In this context, the agreement reached in Vienna over an 18-month transition plan for Syria is a positive development. However, significant differences are likely to emerge amongst various stakeholders on what constitutes the opposition in Syria and who is a terrorist.
In order to make PoliTact’s strategic insights and research queries more accessible, we have summarized them below as part of our quarterly strategic outlook. These were developed as a result of various analyses and media discussions performed between August to early December 2015.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India
Insights
• In the absence of progress in the Afghan political solution and the presence of threats directed against Pakistan from that direction, pressures are likely to mount on the nation to shift from the posture of Force Protection and towards Force Projection; one without the other makes no sense.
• This increases the risk of Afghanistan becoming the Syria of South and Central Asia, especially if there is no progress towards reconciliation, India grows its security footprint in Afghanistan, and Daesh continues to make inroads. These reasons and risks may be behind the recent uptick in Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach as in relation to Afghan reconciliation and improvement in ties with India. The Heart of Asia conference held in Islamabad in December reflected this urgency.
• To protect national interests and state sovereignty, international appetite for cross border interventions is growing, and in this, the utility of Good Non-State Actors is increasing – to challenge the likes of Daesh and Al Qaeda.
• During the recent visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif to the US, some reports on Pakistan’s nuclear program projected a perception that the concern has to do with the safety of its nuclear program, in fact it is the unease surrounding the increasing capability of Pakistan nuclear weapons program – the growing number of tactical weapons and ranges of its nuclear capable missiles. This attention may also be an effort to create a pressure point on Pakistan, especially in relation to Afghanistan. Conversely, Pakistan desires mainstreaming of its nuclear program on the same footing as India.
Discussion
The US-Pakistan relations will evolve in the above laid out context. The direction of US-China ties, including the US-India security and economic cooperation, will be the important determinant of the shape of US-Pakistan ties. The Indian direct defense and security involvement in Afghanistan will likely aggravate the situation and add pressure on Pakistan to adopt an overt force projection posture, as described above. All of this increases the risk of Afghanistan becoming the Syria of South and Central Asia, especially if there is no progress towards a political solution and Daesh continues to make inroads.
The Afghan situation is reaching a breaking point. Clearly, the talking and fighting cannot continue indefinitely. Since 9/11, the application of military force has been able to eliminate the AQ leadership, but has failed to weaken the Afghan Taliban. The presence of safe havens in Pakistan may have helped the sustainability of Afghan Taliban however, no insurgency can survive without local resonance and support.
One of the foremost agenda items during the meeting of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Obama was the process of Afghan reconciliation and Pakistan’s role in the new alliance against Daesh, which the US is assembling. In addition, the US once again raised the issue of targeting the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan, on the other hand, highlighted the Kashmir conflict and the security concerns arising from Indian military practicing its Cold Start doctrine, accompanied by threatening political messages.
This was one of the suggestions of the Atlantic Council report released in October to pressure Pakistan in de-operationalizing the Haqqani Network. The report was endorsed by a mix of senior serving and retired US officials and stated: “We further recommend the development of a multinational effort to engage Pakistan in support of this objective, backed by incentives, disincentives, and sharing of intelligence.”
US Politics, Elections, Authorization for the War against Daesh
Insight
• Since 9/11 the debate has continued about the US mission, right strategy, and how much resources would be needed to accomplish it. Then there are questions regarding the war authorization as the threat has morphed from Al Qaeda to Al Qaeda and Associates, and now to Daesh.
The regional allies, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, are proving incapable of halting the extremist onslaught on their own. The downing of the Russian plane over Sinai, the Paris and San Bernardino attacks have raised the voices for the return of ground troops, and are complicating the domestic and foreign policy quandary as the American elections approach.
Discussion
As noted above, the Russian actions in Syria have raised questions regarding the US Middle East policy and strategy to counter Daesh. The US response is being closely watched by both allies and adversaries, especially China. Consequently, we are likely to see more assertive US activity in the Pacific region, to avoid the development of any incorrect impression. Meanwhile, the US-Sunni Arab allies are not very happy about what they are seeing in Syria, and particularly in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. The news about the Russian cooperation with the French in the aftermath of the Paris attack will further heighten concerns.
Then there are questions regarding the US strategy, war authorization, election cycles, and its fiscal health. In the aftermath of 9/11, US got militarily involved in Afghanistan and then Iraq. Since then the debate has continued about the mission, the right strategy, and how much resources would be needed to accomplish it. These discussions took place in the backdrop of major economic crisis that got underway around 2007. One of the main foreign policy goal of President Obama to bring the troops back home from Afghanistan and Iraq, has not only proved to be elusive, but lately has reversed altogether.
The expanding war theater, and the emergence of Daesh has meant that US and NATO are being compelled to reinforce their military presence in the region. Meanwhile, as the situation in the Middle East worsens, the European refugee crisis is also getting dire, creating unprecedented security, economic, and social challenges.
Russia, China, US Dynamics
Insight
• In the Islamic world a unique dynamics is emerging. The core Islamic nations represented by the Sunni Arab world are attempting to strengthen their alliance with the US and NATO. This is particularly true as Russia encroaches with the coalition of its own in the region, characterized by the Shia governments of Iran, Syria and Iraq.
On the other hand, Chinese and Russian influence is resurging in the periphery represented by the Islamic nations of South and Central Asia and the Pacific. Pakistan is furthering its strategic ties with China and Russia, while India is building on its alliance with the US. Meanwhile, the future of Afghanistan hangs in balance.
• Why is Russia willing to risk getting military involved in Syria and Middle East if NATO led alliance was already working on the objective of fighting the extremists?
The tragic terror attack in Paris on November 13 and San Bernardino on December 2 will increase pressure on Russia to change its focus away from sustaining the Assad government and focus on fighting Daesh.
• One theory for why Russia intervened in Ukraine is that NATO was impinging on its home sphere of influence, known as the Near Abroad. On the other hand, in addition to countering the extremists in Syria, the fall of government there would have represented a loss of a key ally and footprint in the Middle East.
Will the same logic also apply to China’s future behavior, as US enhances its political, economic, and security presence in the Pacific? Will this pressurize China to flex some muscle, as much as it does not want to, just as Russia had to in Syria? This makes the Pacific, including the Central Asia region, the next hot spots.
Discussion
As different nations recalibrate their alignments vis-à-vis the emerging economic and security blocks of BRICS and SCO, the GCC Sunni nations have moved closer to the NATO and US, at least on Syria. In the Islamic world, a unique dynamics is emerging.
The resurgence of Russia in global affairs is obvious and perhaps desired by the West when it comes to countering extremism. This fact is not lost on South Asia where Pakistan is increasing its military cooperation with Russia, with great dismay of India. On the other hand, the Chinese participation in the Afghan peace process is maturing. The temporary fall of Kunduz to the Taliban in September has raised the stakes for the Central Asian states, China, and Russia. Moreover, the Taliban attack on Badhaber camp, located near Peshawar, once again reminded Pakistan of the risks involved in the continuing Afghan instability.
The predicament for Pakistan is not much different than what the Saudi’s confront in neighboring Yemen, and that Turkey faces on its border with Syria. In the absence of progress in the Afghan political solution, and the presence of threats directed against it from that direction, pressures are likely to mount on Pakistan to shift from the posture of Force Protection and towards Force Projection, one without the other makes no sense.
The challenge is that India is also looking at its defense posture towards Pakistan with a similar premise. This, after all, is the very principle under which the West has fought the war against terror; ‘we are fighting them over there, so we do not have to over here’. In our July newsletter, we had pointed out to the growing international appetite for cross border interventions to protect national interests and state sovereignty, and in this, the utility of Good Non-State Actors is growing.
These evolving postures are difficult to comprehend without a deep sense of history and how the matters have evolved in these regions during the last two centuries. These assessments, and their conclusions, are very much on the minds of different players as they decide on which nexus to tilt towards as the balance of power transitions.
The shape of the balance of power in the Middle East is creating unique challenges for the peripheral nations, as it did, when Saudi Arabia sought Pakistan’s military assistance for its operation in Yemen, and to counter Iranian backed Houthis.
To prevent further deterioration of affairs along these lines would first require détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it would necessitate that core and peripheral nations not get used against one another, as part of one or the other alliance, and in a manner that lead to the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. The Heart of Asia Conference provided an avenue for this, as it was attended by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and the US, and including organizations like NATO and the SCO.
