Abstract
The war in Yemen and GCC countries’ ineffective panic stricken leadership provides an excellent opportunity for Pakistan to initiate a low key naval diplomatic initiative to diffuse tensions with PN power projection and deterrence with its nuclear capabilities. PN has stumbled on this regional role due to its decade long participation in UN/US Coalition Task Forces 150/151 in response to of 9/11 and war on terrorism as well as piracy & weapons, drug trafficking in support of terrorist activities in the region. PN can build on its CTF role in the Arabian Sea with naval diplomacy in reconstructing a new regional maritime security regime in the Arabian Sea Littoral and increase its national building activities at home; all paid for petro-dollars.
Introduction
Arabian Sea littoral needs a new maritime and security order to mitigate local armed disturbances, regional military rivalries and international dictates’. This lack of a security regime or hegemon spawns multiple threats from both state and non-state actors. Those threats, real or perceived, in turn emerge in sectarian, tribal and linguistic fault lines. This vicious circle enlarges the trust deficit among regional states which is further compounded by their support of non-state actors such as Iran supporting Shia Arabs & tribes in Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Similarly, Saudis are interfering in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. And then these countries are side-by-side, cross roads or through proxies busy elsewhere – Libya, Afghanistan and Pakistan that come to mind readily.
While Iran has not only survived the Petro dollar (Saudi, Kuwaiti and Emirati) inspired and funded Saddam Hussain Iraq’s invasion of 1980s but also weathered quite successfully the UN/US backed economic sanctions imposed due to its uranium enrichment plant. Iranians have since then spread their tentacles in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In fact, this spread of Iranian influence through a combination of non-state actors such as the Shia tribes of Yemeni, Bahraini Shia Arabs and Shia Arab States of Syria and Iraq and their Shia militias coupled with rapid development in nuclear sphere have thrown the conservative Sunni Kingdoms of Persian Gulf in tail spin in envy, insecurity and jealous rage. Saudis believe that their weapons helped defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. Then their tanks rolled in Bahrain to support the fellow conservative Sunni kingdom from the Shia Arab spring of 2011(?year) And their petro billions in Egypt, Yemen and Pakistan as well as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq have check the Iranian inspired and supported Shia uprising in their neighbourhood.
Compounding these insecurities of the conservative Arab monarchies was a continuous upswing in sectarian uprisings in their neighbourhood and Iran’s emergence as a possible nuclear capable state in the region. Israel seems an appropriate natural ally of these conservative Arab States. However, despite Israel opposing both the Iranian inspired Shia springs and Iran’s emergence as a possible nuclear capable state, the Zionists are not an attractive partners due to their denial of Palestinian Statehood and occupation of Al-Quds is not an option to the Arab psyche. Above all, the presence of a large displaced Palestinian population in all Arab states, seeking support from Israel is not conducive to domestic peace either.
Furthermore, the sea lanes of communications (SLOC) carrying the Persian Gulf oil to Asia, Africa and Europe goes through the very dangerous area of the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Coast adds another insecurity dimension to the conservative Arab regimes. This is an area full of Somali and regional pirates that have commandeered & hijacked many ships with expensive cargo in and out of these SLOCs. The convergence of pirates, terrorists, traffickers (drugs, human, and weapons), the sanctions on Iran by UN, the Iraqi/Afghani occupations by the US and the allied troops/navies’ long stay in the region, (e.g. Bahrain is home to the US 5th fleet and the CTS 150/151, Qatar has the largest US Airforce base in the Persian Gulf along with presence of US occupying force in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as thousands of US military technicians, trainers and defense sub-contractors are stationed in Saudi Arabia and UAE to facilitate their weapon acquisition, training, maintenance along with US Special Ops providing security to the US nationals). The long stay of these foreign advisors and personnel may have aggravated the delicate internal balance of the conservative Arab monarchies due to domestic religiosity and parochial outlook. In fact, the most common demand of Al-Qaida and ISL has been the expulsion of the modern Crusaders (basically the Zionists of Israel and Bush Crusaders/US forces) from the Holy Lands (both Jerusalem and Mecca/Medina or Arabia).
Hence, this opinion paper argues that the conservative Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf need an alternative solution to their security issues, irrespective if these issues are exploited by state or non-state, regional or international, actors. There are tell-tale signs that these states are scrambling with domestic military build-up, as well as combining their military forces under one defence command of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC). Moreover, they are trying to build an extra-regional alliance of some sort to thwart the Iranian encroachments on one hand and to infuse their armed forces to contain their own Shia populations on the other. Recent high-level diplomacy and financial instruments’ exchanged among the GCC states with Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan are indicative of a strong desire for such a solution. By building a strong military alliance with anyone of these or all three militarily strong Sunni Muslim countries, the GCC states could preserve their integrity domestically and regionally. They are scrambling to get hold of any straws in their panic belief that Iran and its Shia connections will drown them if US compromises with Iran on nuclear issue or withdraws its forces from the Persian Gulf. But presence of US forces and support personnel amidst them inflames hatred for “infidels.” They need an arrangement that could provide cushion against both Iran and Shia inspired Arab spring in their domestic body politic. They desire an ally who could do their bidding militarily but without dominating or aggravating their social milieu with alien culture or religion. An ally with strong military and proven nuclear capability to deter Iran on both military and nuclear basis. Who could provide an amenable military alliance with nuclear umbrella to the monastic order of the Persian Gulf?
With billions of private Indian investments in the Persian Gulf since 1991, India is well suited in terms of nuclear and military prowess, large Muslim population and proximity to the Persian Gulf. In fact, it is waiting for a chance or an invitation to spread its military tentacles in support of its private capital. However, India is a non-starter due to its extensive military, political and state-to-state economic relations with Iran. Moreover, India is not suitable for the defense of the conservative Sunni Muslim Kingdoms for a number of other reasons. India is increasingly emerging as well as being propped up by the US as a regional hegemon for the security of Asia-Pacific. This element raises the question whether Indian hegemony and its security order could be acceptable to the Gulf States or Chinese supported Pakistan. Will Pakistan have a say in this regard as a regional maritime state directly in the Indian way to the Persian Gulf? In addition to such thorny questions India might create more divisive issue in offering its armed and nuclear forces in defence of the GCC countries. Let’s examine the issue of Persian Gulf with a brief perspective of the Indian hegemony and then look at other issues which might be created by the Indian role as a regional defender.
As stated above, India is emerging too powerful in the region due to US propping it up as an Indian Ocean power to contain and control China’s access to the Middle Eastern and African supply of oil and trade. This control and denial of access to one of their biggest customer (China) of oil and supplier of manufactured goods may not be acceptable to either China or the conservative monarchies. In fact, China supplied the Saudi regime 4,000 km range Silk Worm Missiles at a time when no country, including India, was willing to offer such a weapon system in Saudi Arab’s hour of need. India with its growing industrial base is a big consumer of the Persian Gulf oil as well; however, China with bigger economy and being even bigger consumer of the Persian Gulf oil than India cannot tolerate the Indian dominance nor could these states afford to aggravate such a huge customer of their oil and supplier of good.
Moreover, India either refrained from taking any sides during the many recent crises of the Persian Gulf, including Iran-Iraq war and the two subsequent Gulf wars with Iraq. Or it kept is commerce with Iran throughout these conflicts and even covertly supplied essential supplies and weapons to the Iranian regime. Second, India has huge private investments in all Persian Gulf states; these conservative Arab regimes are reluctant to replace Pax-Americana with the Indian hegemony. Third, India has very extensive relations with Iran: military, trade, investment and opening up of Central Asia through Chahbahar port as a counter to the Chinese development of the Gwadar port and opening up of the economic corridor through Pakistan to China and to land locked Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Fourth, India’s relations with its own Muslim population are frowned upon by the Arab populous as a whole and ignore by the conservative monarchs as an expedient policy choice. Fifth, Indian military relations with Israel are looked at with suspicion. Finally, Pakistan’s deep religious, political and military relations with the Persian Gulf monarchies have always provided an alternative to India. Moreover, Pakistan’s proven and well-established nuclear arsenal seems more attractive to the fellow Muslims, in UAE and Saudi Arabia, where most Pakistani leaders end up residing or visiting more frequently than any other part of the world. In fact, the declared nuclear status of Pakistan and its leaderships’ dependence on the Saudi and Emirati goodwill makes it more amenable than even the Arab Egypt or Turkey, which we must look at next.
Turkey is politically powerful, economically prosperous and demographically holds the largest educated populous in the Muslim world. Turkey has the most modern and strongest armed forces in the Muslim world. It has the military capability, economic capacity and political will, especially under the Turkish Islamist president Erdogan. This is a big problem having an Islamist dictating military and political terms on the guardians of the Holy lands of Mecca and Medina. This problem becomes even more acute when looked through the historical prism; the Turkish Sultan until the First World War was the custodian of the Holy Lands. The twist is in this that the Turks hijacked the Islamic caliphate from Baghdad and took it to the Ottoman Turkey. However, during WWI a revolt of Arab colonies under the command of Sharif of Mecca, led by Lawrence of Arabia, freed Syria, Iraq and Palestine as well as Arabia proper. A country headed by an Islamist party may not be trustworthy within Saudi Arabia or even within boundaries of any of the former Ottoman colonies or protectorates, be that Iraq, Jordan, Egypt or Arabian Peninsulas and Persian Gulf Islands states. However, Turkey can be of assistance to the oil rich Persian Gulf monarchies as a peripheral power in countering threats on the open sea, as a conduit for covert relations with Israel, or putting political and military pressure on Shia Iran and Syria, two countries with common borders with Turkey. Hence, Turkey is best kept at arm’s length and at the periphery for power politics and covert relationships with Israel. Turkey may also be useful in direct foreign investment purposes to balance other countries’ economic clout within their economic sphere. If Turkey is not acceptable as a guarantor due to historical and political reason as explained above; then, who could provide military security to the Persian Gulf?
Egypt with the largest population among the Arabic speaking countries, with fairly advance industrial infrastructure and large standing armed forces can easily step in the vacuum and provide a stable defence and security regime, especially because of millions of expat Egyptian civilians serving in the Persian Gulf. However, the recent ascendancy to power of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in a popular uprising and democratic set up poses a very strong possibility that a majority of Egyptians have been seduced by the Islamic militant ideology. Despite financial support of the Egyptian armed forces under General Sisi which rolled back the Muslim brotherhood and the Morsi regime, Egypt is embroiled in a domestic civil war for an extended period. It is best to support Egypt in containing and destroying the militant forces at home than to expand her role in the Persian Gulf and deplete their focus at home. Egypt should be busy for the next decade and half in constructing its new administrative capital with an estimated investment of around US$42 billion. Initially, Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Persian Gulf monarchies are providing around US$4 billion each to support this new capital’s construction. However, separation of the Egyptian administrative capital from the populous Cairo is no guarantee that the Muslim brotherhood will disappear. South Africa history of apartheid system proves that separation and segregation create cesspools that beget multiple competing ideologies that overwhelm the state institutions from within by providing competing ideologies from ghettos and non-state, informal societal institutions, including mosques, madrassas and criminal enterprises. How much of that cesspool of ghettoized ideologies could or have crossed over to the Persian Gulf is a sobering thought in light of the presence of all those expat Egyptians. Moreover, Egypt under the Jamal Abdul Nasir’s military regime vied for the Arab leadership with Saudi Arabia and militarily intervened in South Yemen in support of a Marxist regime against the Saudi support of Sana administration of North Yemen. In the long run, however, the country is bracing itself from the Morsi supporters and the Muslim brotherhood. Egypt is hence stalled in its track for the next decade and a half or until it can solve its own domestic problems. Egypt might be able to pay back its loans and aid from the Persian Gulf kingdoms by stationing some units of her armed forces along the Saudi Arab border with Yemen to contain the Iranian supported Houthi tribes. The Egyptian Navy could be very useful in patrolling the Red Sea between the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden.
However, neither Turkey nor Egypt have an answer to the Iranian nuclear option. Who can then provide the Persian Gulf military security from regional states and non-state actors as well as provide them nuclear deterrence and freedom of oil and trade shipments thru the Arabian Sea lanes of communication (SLOC) and provide nuclear deterrence in the face of nuclear blackmail but without inviting non-Muslim nuclear powers?
Despite the recent mishandling by Pakistani parliamentarians and media and out of depth Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leadership, a viable solution is an alliance between Pakistan and the GCC. First, Pakistan has no claim to the Muslim leadership and her government and state and is extremely influenced by Saudi Arabia. Even Pakistan’s body-politic is increasingly emulating the Muslim culture of Saudi Arabia. Many Pakistani politicians and military bureaucrats are in direct influence of Saudi Arabia. Pakistan and Pakistani state and nation is in service to the Holy lands of Makkah and Medina and her economy is dependent on remittances sent by Pakistani expats in billions from the GCC. Pakistan also has very strong defence establishment, both in terms of personnel training and armament development and production and it is a mature nuclear weapon state with advance delivery vehicles, including planes, ships/submarines, mobile launchers and a variety of short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with potential to develop ICBMS as well in the near future. But Pakistan is a poor country with economic, political, and security issues of its own. However, Pakistan’s military and defence establishment is not only institutionally mature but also battle hardened. More importantly, Pakistan is a declared nuclear weapon state with all the right credentials. Pakistan Army has not only proven its conventional capabilities in a series of wars with its easterly neighbour India but more importantly has been helping all the Persian Gulf Kingdoms and many other regional countries with well-armed army units as well as in their training and institution building. Similarly, Pakistan Airforce pilots, navigators and technicians have served friendly Muslim-Arab states both as trainers on deputations or as guest workers. In fact, Pakistan Army and Airforce have permanent missions, contracts and non-combat deployments at one time or another in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan. Despite all these military and nuclear capabilities Pakistan will not be able to sustain such an alliance on its own. It will require the Petro dollars to prop Pakistan to this status.
With the current fury of diplomatic activities and high official and Prime Ministerial visits between Pakistan and these countries shows not just urgency but also panic to coax Pakistan to join an anti-Shia, anti-Iran coalition to halt the Iranian successes in Iraq, Syria and now in Yemen. It seems that north and south Yemen are poised to separate again along the sectarian line. This is a dangerous fault line for Pakistan to get involved in and it was a wise decision by Pakistan not to move its Embassy from north Yemen to Aden in the south as the conservative Arab regimes have hastily done due to fall of Sana’a to Shia Houthi tribes backed by Iran. However, the Pakistani consulate in Aden could be upgraded to a full-fledged Embassy should the division between north and south Yemen become permanent as in the 1960s and 1970s. Only this time the Saudis and their conservative Arab allies would be siding with the south, rather than the north along the sectarian line, as opposed to the earlier times when they opposed the communism driven south on ideological lines.
Officially, Pakistan has refused to become party to an intra-Arab or sectarian coalitions against Iran or Yemen but it has been giving its citizens, especially the armed forces retired personnel to join the Persian Gulf Arab kingdoms’ security forces. The latest example has been in Bahrain where retired Pakistani naval officers and sailors as well as law enforcement staff have been offered not just similar jobs in the Bahraini Navy or armed and police services but also given Bahraini citizenship to boost their Sunni population to counter-balance the Bahraini Shia majority. Historically as well the Bahrainis, Kuwaitis, Qataris and the Omani armed and police forces have recruited Pakistanis, both retired and fresh recruits for permanent and/or temporary positions. However, the trend now has been to even grant some of these highly trained and recruited individuals with citizenship. This may result in long term defence dividends but it is a slow and arduous process with uncertain future. What the Persian Gulf monarchies need is an immediate shot in the arm to help them stand secure within their own borders, protect their harbours, coastal waters and EEZs, and secure SLOC with their own means rather than depending on non-Muslim help which has strong negative ramifications as voiced by Al-Qaida and its off shoot ISL and exploited by Iran. If Pakistan is persuaded to take this mantle of defending the GCC countries, even if reluctantly, then one should look at the modalities that need to work out so no one in the region is alarmed and benefits are accrued both ways. How could this defence cooperation between Pakistan and the Gulf be formalized and what are its modalities that can be implemented without raising alarm bells in Tehran, New Delhi and other world capitals? What will be the short or long term political and strategic implications of such a defence or collective security treaty between the GCC countries and Pakistan?
Time may also be ripe for such a collective security treaty and its institutionalization, especially in light of the China-Pakistan development of China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC), to revive the old Silk Road with communication cables, rails, roads and pipelines. It will virtually replace the Chinese dependence on a perilous sea route through the Strait of Malacca, with presence of hostile India-US Asia Pacific axis, and cut the distance down from 18,000 miles to less than 2,000.
The Chinese connection would be convenient as the Middle East oil is China’s major source of energy and its expanding economy may force increase of imported oil even further. Also, China is not only developing the port of Gwadar but also building the infrastructure, including oil pipelines thru Pakistan to China. In addition, China is Pakistan’s largest supplier of arms, including warships and jet fighters. China needs security of oil supply from the Persian Gulf and the producing nations need the two way commerce with China. The protection to both the consumer and the suppliers of oil – China and the Middle East respectively – can be provided by Pakistan. Eventually, the same could also be true for Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas and oil pipelines.
However, Pakistan must chart its way very carefully. Pakistan needs to strategize in such a way that it could extract maximum benefits for the domestic economy and diffuse their air and naval assets’ deployment in the nearby Persian Gulf within a framework of a military alliance, defence/security treaty or enhanced security relationships with the conservative Arab monarchies. The framework could be a NATO style collective security mechanism in which Pakistan provides both conventional and nuclear protection with rotating air force and naval deployments. Secondly, it could be done in a piecemeal basis with one or two Persian Gulf monarchies at first and then it could be extended to all GCC nations. The most threatened of these regimes is the Kingdom of Bahrain. A bilateral collective security agreement with Bahrain can extend the Pakistani nuclear and conventional cover with Pakistan Navy (PN) playing the pivotal role.
PN is in fact already playing a very important part in the security and manpower needs of the Bahraini Navy. The next door Qatar is also in a similar situation and has increased its defence relationships with PAF. Both these countries are host to the US 5th fleet with its naval base in Bahrain and its forward air base in Qatar. If Pakistan could replace these two irritants in the popular parlance by deploying its naval and air assets with the US help and approval, then with one stroke Pakistan, Bahrain and Qatar could achieve their strategic objectives with minimal disturbance in their domestic or regional strategic balance: Pakistan could increase and deploy its naval and air assets with infusion of much needed petro dollars and the Bahraini and Qatari regimes under a defence treaty. Pakistan can provide both conventional defence and by extension its nuclear umbrella against any adventurous nuclear aspirants. More importantly, Pakistan can help both these kingdoms in balancing their Shia population with well-trained Pakistani Sunni immigrants. The Bahrainis are already implementing this policy with Pakistani immigrants and the Qataris may soon follow suit.
The exchange of Pakistan military expertise and trained military manpower for the Gulf petro dollars is a win-win scenario for both regional and international purposes. When this regional defence and security treaty is extended to Oman and Kuwait and eventually to Yemen or to Aden if it separates, it could provide not only a domestic and regional security regime but also usher in a new international order for the security of oil transportation between strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and Bab-al-Mandeb in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden along the coast of Oman and Yemen for Suez bound shipping, which could be further protected again by the two dominant riparian states Egypt and Saudi Arabia with their naval cooperation. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan already have a bilateral defence cooperation treaty in place since 1982; however, it needs tweaking in light of recent immature actions by both countries in a panic situation in Yemen.
As far as the oil & container ship traffic between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia passing thru Strait of Malacca, it can be protected by China and other regional states straddling the Malaccan narrows. In fact, a consortium of India, Malaysia, Indonesia and China could provide a regional maritime order to the Malaccan strait for free flow of international trade against piracy, terroristic-militancy, and hegemonic designs of any one dominant state.
With these three choke points of Asia secured, then there won’t be any dominant need for an outside power such as the US or their Asia Pacific pivot of propping India against China. Similarly, India-Pakistan rivalry in the western Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf region could also be mitigated further with the collusion of the Indian capitalism, already deeply penetrated throughout the Gulf, and the Pakistani militarism with effective management by the Persian Gulf monarchies while Pakistan neutralizing any Shia or Iranian threats in the process. Since the Strait of Malacca is out of scope of this study, we should concentrate on the above subject area and its two choke points to see how Pakistan’s naval diplomacy and nuclear deterrence could be deployed to further peace, development and nation-building, which is discussed next.
By signing a mutual defense treaty with the Kingdom of Bahrain, Pakistan could extend its conventional and nuclear umbrella thru Pakistan Navy as a test case for protecting the Bahraini geographical and governmental integrity against external or foreign influenced insurgency or acts of terrorism. However, such a mutual defence treaty will definitely require a prior nod of approval of the US not only for integration of the two countries’ air and naval forces but also for letting Pakistan Navy and Air Force use the US sold air and naval platforms such as the US supplied Frigate in the Bahraini Navy (BN). In fact, the BN’s integration with PN task force for Bahrain would be relatively easy due to PN familiarity with similar weapons and employment of ex-PN officers in the BN. Hence, the integration would be transparent and the treaty could be endorsed by the US. The only objection to this defense arrangement would be coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran, fearing political eclipse of Shia population of Bahrain, which could be mitigated by Pakistan. In a creative naval diplomacy, PN and Pakistan could offer Iran a combine petrol of SLOCs in the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.
Once Iran accepts Pakistan’s mutual defense treaty with Bahrain and observes that it is the PN and PAF without the Army boots on the Bahraini soil, this defense treaty could be extended one by one to other GCC Kingdoms as well as to Yemen/Aden. It is a simple, regional solution which addresses the GCC states insecurities and stabilises a highly volatile region from domestic, regional and international interference and helps restore a new order that guarantees smooth flow of Persian Gulf oil going out to consumers worldwide and consumer and technology goods coming in-return.
Pakistan’s naval diplomacy in the Persian Gulf as outlined above can help Pakistan in terms of both economic development and defense diversification and dispersed deployment. However, the implementation of this plan requires careful and timely actions on the part of PN, PAF and the policy makers. A carefully crafted template for such a policy is an absolute necessity which could be worked out among the defense establishment, including PN, on the one hand and foreign office and PMO on the other. An attempt is made to draw some perimeters and contours of this policy in the following paragraphs, however, the devil is always in the details.
First, the treaty of defense and alliance with Bahrain must be prepared after a policy debate and reached with consensus within the Pakistani bureaucratic circles, both civil and military, a select number of participants from important political parties and national think tanks as well as academics. Secondly, it should provide permanent solution to Bahrain’s strategic instability in return for Bahraini investment in Pakistan’s economic development in general and direct investment in Pakistan Navy’s ship building and missile manufacturing facilities in particular. Bahrain must not only fund the Pakistan Navy contingent in its operation but also fund Pakistani ship yards to build capital equipment such as ships in Pakistan for Bahrain maritime defense. In addition, the members of the Pakistani contingent stationed in Bahrain may be given permanent residency of Bahrain at retirement or after serving five years. The success of this treaty with Bahrain will become the basis on which such treaties could be extended to other GCC countries.
Third, if Iran objects to this treaty, then Pakistan may offer Iran a mutual non-aggression treaty. Either way Iran-Pakistan naval forces could jointly patrol the Waters in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. This posture of regional powers should be acceptable to the US because it will continue to flow the two way trade in and out of Straits of Hormuz. And if the treaty results in the departure of all or most foreign troops such as the US 5th fleet in Bahrain and Qatar and its training personnel in Iraq and the GCC in tertiary roles will appease Iran and nullify the demands of non-state actors such as AQAP and ISL in their relentless pursuit of expelling foreign (albeit Christian) forces from Arab lands. Pakistan Air Complex (PAC) and its personnel will have to be inducted to replace the parting US technicians. The US could further help the situation in solidifying PN effectiveness by transferring surplus equipment, including patrol vessels and handing over its training and maintenance contracts with GCC air forces to PAC.
Fourth, there is much that can be proposed in terms of spreading the surplus petro dollars from their idle stupor in the cold bank vaults in the west to their active circulations in shipyards in Gwadar, Ormara and Pasni to starting freightliners, oil & gas tankers to container ships made in these shipyards and carrying goods and commodities with protection from regional naval forces such as PN.
The petro-dollar funding of Pakistani shipyards and early connection of Gwadar, Baluchistan to CPEC will rejuvenate not just Pakistan but also the Central Asian States and China’s Xinjiang province and Tibet. It also lessens China’s anxiety of passing 90% of its oil imports from the narrows of Malacca, China’s shipping choke point. PN must initiate and solicit these policy choices both at home and with all concerned actors, especially the GCC states, Iran, China and the United States. PN’s diplomatic efforts with UAE and Saudi Arabia must also go beyond poorly handled, public display of raw emotions by politicians and media. PN can wash the slate clean with its naval diplomacy. It can restore order with its show of force and nuclear deterrence in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. In the process it may also accelerate nation-building in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan through its economic and social activities and come out of the shadow of PA and PAF on its own without disturbing the status quo at home or abroad.
