The Zionist Plan for the Greater Israel by dividing Middle East: Oded Yinon Plan

Introduction
While turmoil and anarchy in the Middle East can be attributed to the disunity among Arabs, the possibility of execution of well known Zionist plans to divide the Middle East in fragmented states cannot be ruled out. The “Bernard Lewis Plan” named after its architect Bernard Lewis, a specialist in ‘oriental studies’, the ‘history of Islam’ and the ‘interaction between Islam and the West’ was published in DJ. Lewis is a widely read expert on the Middle East, and is regarded as one of the West’s leading scholars of that region. In his over a 60-year career, his advice has been frequently sought by policymakers, including the Bush administration.

In order to help the reader to understand the hidden facet of turmoil in the Middle East and the Muslim world, yet another Zionist Plan for the establishment of greater Israel by dividing the Middle East known as “Oded Yinon Plan”, is to be kept in view. The document being reproduced here pertaining to the formation of “Greater Israel” constitutes the cornerstone of powerful Zionist political parties, as well as within the Israeli military and intelligence establishment. According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl, “the area of the Jewish State stretches “from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.” According to Rabbi Fischmann, “the Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”

When viewed in the current context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011 war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria, not to mention the process of regime change in Egypt, and developments in Yemen, Bahrain, annexation of Arab areas in West Bank and oppression and isolation of Gaza must be understood in relation to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. The latter consists of weakening and eventually fracturing neighboring Arab states as part of an Israeli expansionist project.

“Greater Israel” consists in an area extending from the Nile Valley to the Euphrates.

The Zionist project supports the Jewish settlement movement. More broadly it involves a policy of excluding Palestinians from Palestine leading to the eventual annexation of both the West Bank and Gaza to the State of Israel.

Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as well as parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

According to Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya in a 2011 Global Research article, The Yinon Plan was a continuation of Britain’s colonial design in the Middle East:

“[The Yinon plan] is an Israeli strategic plan to ensure Israeli regional superiority. It insists and stipulates that Israel must reconfigure its geo-political environment through the balkanization of the surrounding Arab states into smaller and weaker states.

Israeli strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic challenge from an Arab state. This is why Iraq was outlined as the centerpiece to the balkanization of the Middle East and the Arab World. In Iraq, on the basis of the concepts of the Yinon Plan, Israeli strategists have called for the division of Iraq into a Kurdish state and two Arab states, one for Shiite Muslims and the other for Sunni Muslims. The first step towards establishing this was a war between Iraq and Iran, which the Yinon Plan discusses.

The Atlantic, in 2008, and the U.S. military’s Armed Forces Journal, in 2006, both published widely circulated maps that closely followed the outline of the “Yinon Plan”.

Aside from a divided Iraq, which the Biden Plan also calls for, the Yinon Plan calls for a divided Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. The partitioning of Iran, Turkey, Somalia, and Pakistan also all fall into line with these views. The Yinon Plan also calls for dissolution in North Africa and forecasts it as starting from Egypt and then spilling over into Sudan, Libya, and the rest of the region.

Greater Israel” requires the breaking up of the existing Arab states into small states.

“The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must 1) become an imperial regional power, and 2) must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its source of moral legitimation… This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has been a recurrent theme.”

Viewed in this context, the war on Syria and Iraq is part of the process of Israeli territorial expansion. Israeli intelligence working hand in glove with the US, some regional powers and NATO is directly supportive of the crusade directed against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), which ultimately seeks to destroy both Syria and Iraq as nation states. [Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research]

“The Unfolding of Yinon’s ‘Zionist Plan for the Middle East’:
The crisis in Iraq and the centrality of the National Interest of Israel, illustrates how the ethno-sectarian fragmentation and internecine warfare between Shiites and Sunnis is in line with the Yinon plan to enhance Israel’s security and was ignited by the neocon-inspired US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Netanyahu and the neocons currently view Iran as a greater threat in the Middle East than ISIS, and while they advocate US military intervention, they emphasize that such intervention should not empower Iran, notes Stephen Sniegoski. The Yemen crisis if not handled properly may suck in Pakistan in addition to local players, widening the scope.

This paper aims to highlight the salient aspect of the Yinon’s Zionist Plan for the Middle East and suggest “Counter Plan” to thwart this mischievous scheme.

The Zionist Plan for the Middle East
The Israel of Theodore Herzl (1904) and of Rabbi Fischmann (1947): In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, says that the area of the Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.” Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: “The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”

Oded Yinon is an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the Foreign Ministry of Israel. This document [Translation & edited by Israel Shahak.] is the most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of the Zionist strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands as an accurate representation of the “vision” for the entire Middle East of the Zionist powerful ruling elite. Its importance, hence, lies not in its historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.

The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must:

1) become an imperial regional power, and

1. must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state.
2. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its source of moral legitimating.

This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme has been documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG publication, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism (1980), by Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach’s study documents, in convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties.

The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out to the minutest detail. The second and more barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well, in fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding their desire for a strong and independent Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They also seek acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as by the Palestinian people. What they want and what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980’s,” talks about “far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967″ that are created by the “very stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel.”

The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very much an active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times of conflict, such as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled ”Israel Talks of a New Exodus” is included in this publication to demonstrate past Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides the main Zionist document we present, other Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine.

It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982, that the “far-reaching opportunities” of which Zionist strategists have been thinking are the same “opportunities” of which they are trying to convince the world and which they claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion. It is also clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of Zionist plans, but the priority target since their viable and independent presence as a people negates the essence of the Zionist state. Every Arab state, however, especially those with cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target sooner or later.

Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian strategy, unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and incoherence. There is no indication that Arab strategists have internalized the Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead, they react with incredulity and shock whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab reaction, albeit muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as long as the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken seriously Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will be the same.

The following essay represents, according to author the accurate and detailed plan of the Zionist regime for the Middle East which is based on the division of the whole area into small states, and the dissolution of all the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect of this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the attention of the readers to several important points:

1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down by Israel into small units occurs again and again in Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze’ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha’aretz (and probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the “best” that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: “The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi’ite state, a Sunni state and the separation of the Kurdish part” (Ha’aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old.
2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is very prominent, especially in the author’s notes. But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the “defense of the West” from Soviet power, the real aim of the author, and of the Israeli establishment is clear: To make an Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim is to deceive the Americans after he has deceived all the rest.
3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel. Much of it is pure fantasy. But, the plan is not to be regarded as not influential, or as not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi movement, and determined their aims for East Europe. Those aims, especially the division of the existing states, were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the global scale prevented their consolidation for a period of time.

A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties by Oded Yinon
This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions), A Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14–Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, Yohanan Manor, Eliezer Schweid. Published by the Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem.

At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need of a new perspective as to its place, its aims and national targets, at home and abroad. This need has become even more vital due to a number of central processes which the country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different from what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an understanding of the central processes which typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we need a world outlook and an operational strategy in accordance with the new conditions. The existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic and foreign affairs.

This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle. The dominant process is the breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western civilization since the Renaissance. The political, social and economic views which have emanated from this foundation have been based on several “truths” which are presently disappearing–for example, the view that man as an individual is the center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his basic material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present when it has become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet Man’s requirements, his economic needs or his demographic constraints. In a world in which there are (then) four billion human beings and economic and energy resources which do not grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of Western Society, i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless consumption. The view that ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his material needs do–that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing. We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they concern the simple question of what is Good and what is Evil.

1. The vision of man’s limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face of the sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world order around us. The view which promises liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and social justice have been transformed by socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not been put into practice properly and the majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear world in which we are (still) living in relative peace for years, the concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no meaning when a superpower like the USSR (then) holds a military and political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it.
2. The essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West, are undergoing a change due to political, military and economic transformations. Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch that has just ended into the last respite before the great saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past world wars will have been mere child’s play. The power of nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity, their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside down within a few years, and we must align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to our existence and that of the Western world. [with dismemberment of USSR after Afghan adventure this threat has been minimized]
3. The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third World, are transforming the world we know, given that one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over the gigantic resources in the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority of world minerals are located. We can imagine the dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in the future. [USSR may now be substituted by China?]
4. The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich areas of the Third World. That together with the present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in the course of which the West’s military might well be destroyed and its inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed Clausewitz’ dictum into “War is the continuation of policy in nuclear means,” and made it the motto which guides all their policies. Already today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and throughout the world, and the need to face them becomes the major element in our country’s security policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That is our major foreign challenge.
5. The Arab Muslim world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its growing military might. This world, with its ethnic minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly self-destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a real threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes. The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorities and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that every Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in some a civil war is already raging.
6. Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million in the eighties). Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful nation. [After Qaddafi Libya is in state of civil war]. That is why he has been attempting unifications in the past with states that are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians.[Sudan has been successfully divided by creating Christian South Sudan]. In Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem majority facing a large minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state of their own, something like a “second” Christian Lebanon in Egypt. [After overthrow of democratically elected president Morsy, military dictatorship has been restored by USA & KSA].

All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority and the Shiite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population) testifies to the severity of the domestic trouble.

Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors, although its majority is Shiite and the ruling minority Sunni [no more now reversed]. Sixty-five percent of the population has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren’t for the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues, Iraq’s future state would be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today [proved to be true]. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom the Shiites in Iraq view as their natural leader.

All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the Shi’ites are the majority but are deprived of power. In the UAE, Shi’ites are once again the majority but the Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen there is a sizable Shi’ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds power.

Jordan is in reality Palestinian ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin minority, but most of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi’ite with Sunni commanders (no more now). This has great significance in the long run, and that is why it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time except where it comes to the only common denominator: The hostility towards Israel, and today even that is insufficient.

Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem states share a similar predicament. Half of Iran’s population is comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey’s population comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and two large minorities, 12 million Shiite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million Shiites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni Pakistan there are 15 million Shiites who endanger the existence of that state (this is far from truth, harmony exists).

This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region. When this picture is added to the economic one, we see how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to withstand its severe problems.

In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly income of 300 dollars (80s). That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling to pieces. It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south and up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major Haddad’s state of Christians and half a million Shi’ites) [now some stability, but Iranian supported Shia Hezbollah, plays dominant role]. Syria is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain in the future after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with the basic problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the worst situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely populated area of the world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating efficiently and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the peace.

In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence, something that no army can guarantee.

7. The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. [true even now as the Saudis are asking for military support from Egypt, Pakistan and other Sunni Arabs] A sad and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.

The “peace” policy and the return of territories, through a dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive opinions at home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such as territorial compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing.

8. Today, we suddenly face immense opportunities for transforming the situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state.

In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is geo-morphologically identical to the rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil.

9. The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs. (Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements. [note turmoil in Sinai by terrorists]. The fault for that lies of course with the present Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat’s visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March 1979.
10. Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its pan-Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day.
11. The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into “fact.” In reality, however, Egypt’s power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political power in the Arab World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow.
12. In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.

Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development which was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long run.

13. The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precedent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today.
14. Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization.
15. The entire Arabian Peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of the present political structure.
16. Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.

There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a long time, and Israel’s policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigration from the territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa’amr plan of September 1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the present situation without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs only in Jordan.

17. Within Israel the distinction between the areas of ’67 and the territories beyond them, those of ’48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen in its entirety without any divisions as of ’67. It should be clear, under any future political situation or military constellation, that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.

Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the major strategic consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of Jews today.

18. Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal strategic objective. The transformation of the political and economic structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized economy in which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our own hands, of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and politics, and by our own growing isolation.
19. From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance, military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no compromises.
20. Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the present form in the future.
21. Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat’s method). Despite the difficulties of the mistaken “peace” policy and the problem of the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these problems in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion
Three important points have to be clarified in order to be able to understand the significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.

The Military Background of the Plan
The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many occasions where something very like it is being “explained” in closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian “unrest” on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of “Haddad forces” or of “Village Associations” (also known as “Village Leagues”): local forces under “leaders” completely dissociated from the population, not having even any feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for example). The “states” proposed by Yinon are “Haddadland” and “Village Associations,” and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that any movement of revolt will be “punished” either by mass humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment (Gaza) and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.

It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be foreseen.

Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?
The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-Jewish elite [for the masses follow the TV and Begin’s (PM) speeches] has to be persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid “persuaders” and “explainers” (for example medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then “learn it,” more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I was “in opposition”) the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of conquering “the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity” was explained in the years 1965-67.

Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a consequence of the war on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the persistent, and completely false declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?

In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more or less serious commentators take their information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles in the “liberal” American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call “the constructive criticism.” (In fact those among them who claim also to be “Anti-Stalinist” are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always “good intentions” and only “makes mistakes,” and therefore such a plan would not be a matter for discussion–exactly as the Biblical genocides committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation exists in which Israel is really a “closed society” to the rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.

How to Counter to Zionist Plans
Zionist established the state of Israel in 1948, but to expand it and sustain it as a dominant regional power the division of Middle East in to small statelets is the deep desire of imperialistic Zionist designs. Continued oppression of Palestinians, denial of basic human rights and expansion at the cost of Arab lands and population is basic ingredient of their policy. Arabs if united, can harness their power and resources to not only safeguard the human rights of Palestinians but also put a check on further expansion of Israel, end turmoil, restore peace and stability not only in Middle East but in world. Precious Arab resources and wealth can be spent on the development of poor Arab states, raise their stand of life rather than purchasing expensive weapons from USA and European to benefit their arms industry.

The best counter to thwart any Zionist plan for the division of Middle East in to small fragmented states is to maintain unity among Arabs at any cost, rest will follow. This is important because all Zionist plans (Oded or Lewis Bernard’s) hinges on the disunity of Arabs. Since the issue is not regional, due to international ramifications, the unity of Arabs should be integrated with the unity of Muslims, which will also facilitate the support of other countries on the basis of humanity, justice and peace. This shall put sufficient pressure at international level on USA and West, the real benefactors of Zionist Israel to refrain from undertaking such a venture.

Arab & Muslim Unity
It’s not the political or geographic unity as advocated and perused by some nationalists or religious fanatics but developing broad consensus on major issues for peace and stability being the foremost. The Arab & Muslim unit may be defined as; “States coming together for an agree upon cause, each giving of their resource and support for the common cause, all staying united to realize cause’s fruition and maintaining relations after the cause has ceased.”

It can be initiated simultaneously; firstly the Arabs unity, due to common language, religion, culture, history and geographical proximity & linkage, secondly among other geographically closer predominantly Muslim countries. There could be many clusters, which may form a broader alliance for cooperation in various fields. The OIC has failed to deliver, being just a forum for discussion only. Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia can play an important role being the custodian of most holy Islamic sites, Harmain Shareefain but has to rise above the sectarianism.

Ironically just thousand years ago, the great cities of Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo took turns to race ahead of the Western world. Islam and innovation were twins. The various Arab caliphates were dynamic superpowers—beacons of learning, tolerance and trade. Yet today the Arabs are in a wretched state. Even as Asia, Latin America and Africa advance, the Middle East is held back by despotism and convulsed by war. The rulers, thinkers and intellectuals among Arab and Muslim world have failed to present counter plan to thwart the mischievous expansionist designs of Zionist.

History can guide as to what can countries of the Middle East learn from past crises to help them in the future? What causes Arab states to unite or disunite, and has “Arab unity” ever existed? If a collective will is necessary to solve the problems of the future, what does the past foretell: a grim or hopeful picture? Ashley Heacock in her thesis “Arab Unity Revisited, Nationalism versus Common Cause”, has tried to address these questions.

Excerpts
In order to answer these questions, one has to understand how relationships between Arab states came to be and what forces impacted their actions and beliefs. There is no guideline for what makes up the entire Arab nation, and it has varied across time. From Morocco all along Mediterranean to Lebanon, Syria to Yemen there are 22 counties known as Arabs at present. However: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Syria made up the core Arab countries in the past century, therefore, by focusing to these six primary countries the analysis should be greatly helpful.

The concept of holding an Arab identity came about in the mid-late 1800s, when prevailing loyalties were to the Ottoman Empire, Islam, or local tribes. An Arabic literary revival centered around Lebanon, along with a growing demand by Muslim elites for greater autonomy in Arabic speaking provinces (because spoils of the Ottoman Empire were not reaching them) helped establish a never before known notion of Arab nationalism. Christians in Lebanon were highly influenced by European trends and worked to establish Arabic as a language that could be used extensively for learning, plays, novels, and media like it never had been used before. Furthermore, the Muslim elites asserted that only Arabs could bring back the glorious days of past empires due to their keen understanding of the language of God and organized their supporters in Damascus. This initial awakening did not produce revolutionary effects, but it did plant an awareness among the public of their shared language. It also questioned the legitimacy of Ottoman rule.

The Future of Arab Unity
An analysis of the causes of Arab disunity and unity throughout the history of the modern Middle East by looking at three separate events of international character, Arab-Israel wars of 1948, 1973 & 1991 Gulf war, one may reach reasonable conclusions that may be helpful for future discussions on the topic.

Military Factor
Apart from political reasons the superior military power also played its role in the defeat of Arabs. The Israeli army being well motivated, – again in contrast to Arabs – was well trained and well led. Many of its soldiers had fought in the Jewish resistance movements, such as Haganah, Lehi, and the Stern Gang. Others had fought against the Nazis. Although this wasn’t so relevant by 1967, the fact that all Israelis, men and women, had to do intensive military service, provided a large number of soldiers for the army. Equally, they benefited from talented leaders, such as Ariel Sharon and Moshe Dayan. Again, by contrast, there were no outstanding Arab military leaders. Their training was well illustrated by the speed of their advance across Sinai in both 1956 and 1967. Likewise, in 1967, the Israeli air force managed to wipe out the air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in less than two days! These tactics very much gave Israel an advantage: she used surprise, for example in the 1967 war, and successfully employed the tactic of defending against one country while fighting another, before moving on to the offensive. In contrast, the Arab armies made their intentions clear, as in 1967, giving time for the Israelis to prepare.

This Israeli success was also the result of good equipment, and in this Israel benefited from its links with the USA. In 1948-49, the first ceasefire gave the Israelis time to rearm with modern American weapons. Thereafter, all of their weaponry was up-to-date. Although the Arab countries did receive weapons from the USSR, these were rarely as modern as the Americans, and the Arabs were rarely well trained in their use.

In brief, there were a variety of reasons why Israel defeated Arabs in the wars of 1948-67. These were a mixture of their strengths and Arab weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant reason was the motivation – helped by equipment and training – of the Israeli forces. This was only assisted by the weakness of their enemies in similar areas.

Presently rich Arab Kingdoms and Sheikhdoms are spending billions of dollars in purchase of latest military hardware but lack in training and in strategic & tactical employment.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War
This war demonstrated that contradictory causes lay the foundation for disunity right from the start. If states do not have a common cause to gather around, resources will not be spent, states will not support other states in achieving their specific goals, and relations after a cause will most likely be sour. Factors that were most prominently at play in 1948, were quests for power, state security, and pacification of the domestic population. Consideration for the Arab nation and what may be most beneficial to all was hardly on the minds of Arab leaders. Nationalism, rather, dictated state decision

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Oil Embargo
This war told a different story. Although states had separate and distinct causes they were striving towards, none of the goals directly undermined another state’s ambitions, and each state’s objectives could be achieved by joining with other Arab states and starting along the same path. Therefore, Arab unity did exist before and towards the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, because state goals varied, the solution to, achievement, or abandonment of each separate objective was necessarily unique to each country. In effect, after Arab unity had been exploited to get a state to a certain point, it was abandoned, and the causes of all the other Arab states were irrelevant to the nation’s prevailing interests. Factors influencing states in 1973 were primarily pursuit of occupied land and domestic appeasement— both nationalistic causes. The exception was Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was highly swayed by feelings of responsibility to the Arab and Islamic nation that requested his assistance in limiting Israel’s advancements on Muslim lands. Saudi Arabia did not have any territory or economic incentives to gain, yet decidedly took a leadership role and acted on the part of the entire Arab nation—even if it was limited in scope

The 1991 Gulf War
The 1991 Gulf War exhibited Arab disunity from the beginning of the conflict to the end due to divergent interests and dissimilar causes. Alliances were primarily based on economic or state security rationales (both nationalistic tendencies) and did not consider what was best for the Arab nation as a whole. Moreover, Arab unity was deemphasized by leaders and popular opinion had little sway. Instead, placating a state’s donor or guardian was the most important interest for states.

Future Prospects of Unity
Given the history and reality of Arab unity in the past, what can be learned and what does the future hold? The most salient observation comes from the first clause of the definition of Arab unity: “Arab states coming together for an agreed upon cause.” If, in the future, states have causes that conflict with each other, grounds for disunity are automatically present. If states have causes that are different but do not clash, unity may be present, however only up until a certain stage. Consequently, what is essential for Arab unity to persist is for the cause to be the same for each state and for it to be something that all states are motivated to achieve.

The assumption in this analysis is that Arab states act out of national interests, not pan Arab interests, so goodwill and charitable actions are not realistic. This was consistently evidenced in the three cases analyzed, except for the lone example of Saudi Arabia in 1973.

Therefore, the only way Arab states will unite in the future is if there is a common cause that all states feel like they would benefit from. The cause would have to be something that they all agree was in their best interest to pursue, and that they would not lose more than they gained.

Looking at current issues in the Middle East, the conflict in Palestine remains divisive among Arab states and hope for unity is quite dim.

Water issues at present are being handled diplomatically to some extent, but if shortages become disastrous for certain states, disunity and clashes may ensue.

Regarding terrorism, many states have been pointing fingers at other states, blaming them for problems, instead of joining together to combat the violent criminals.

An economic confederacy like the European Union has been suggested and would likely solve a lot of the economic problems many Arab states face. However, convincing the absurdly wealthy Gulf States to join in such an entity with their absurdly poor neighbors to the west would likely prove difficult.

Although the future of Arab unity does look gloomy, each of these pressing issues does have the potential to be a unifying force, although states will first have to see the benefit of uniting for a common cause before they give up their nationalistic tendencies.

There also is a possibility that the rich Gulf States may decide to play more of a big brother role in the Middle East and help poorer states get off their feet. Most of their oil wealth presently is being invested in the West, namely the US, but if that money were to be invested in projects in the Middle East, there could be a major turnaround and chance for greater cooperation.

In conclusion, the Arab world is not a monolithic entity by any means, and past notions of Arab unity between state actors are mere fallacies. The Arab people did often times think of themselves as belonging to a larger community and pressed their governments to follow common cause policies. However, nationalism ultimately prevailed on the state level and it continues to be valued over Arab unity to this day. Consequently, until states find a similar goal that they can all gather around, or until philanthropy becomes the norm, disunity will predominate in the Arab world for years to come. [Same formula may be applicable to the unity of Muslim world]

Recommendations
Muslims cannot get away by putting all the blame upon Zionist conspiracies, they should do soul searching to identify weaknesses and make efforts to address the real issues, for stability and progress. In terms of reasons that applied to all of the conflicts & wars, perhaps the Israelis’ greatest strength was their sense of unity and of purpose which they still maintain. They believed that they were fighting to save their existence, a belief that was increased by the language of Nasser before the 1967 war, when he talked of ‘exterminating’ Israel. As a result, they were determined, well motivated and ruthless. By contrast, the Arab armies often had different aims and poor cooperation: in the 1948-49 war, the Arab leader – King Abdullah of Jordan – was only interested in the West Bank, as it concerned his country. Similarly, the Arab soldiers were quick to give up when the fighting worsened. In the covert war as being fought now by the Zionists through their proxies in the form of terror groups like ISIS (Daesh) exploiting sectarian divide among Shia and Sunnis which need to be addressed by Arabs involving Iran.

Presently the regimes in the Arab and Muslim states appear to be providing assistance and facilitation to implement Zionist plans rather than countering it, which is apparent form the disunity among them on petty issues.

The foremost is the unity of Arabs. The emergency Arab summit hosted by Qatar in March of 2009 after the Israeli siege on Gaza—which killed approximately 1,300 Palestinians, including more than 500 women and children:

(1) Displayed Arab disunity, disagreement, and disillusionment at their best. New alliances formed, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on one side and Qatar, Syria, and Hamas on the other.

(2) Rather than joining together for a common cause that seemed so straightforward and non divisive, the Arab states underscored their fluctuating rivalries and longstanding disagreements.

Meanwhile, the region faces numerous challenges: Palestinians remain hostage to a repressive occupation, the state of Iraq sits somewhere between a police state and civil war, fragmented by ISIS (Daesh), water shortages face many countries of the Middle East, a military—and possibly nuclear— standoff exists between Israel and Iran, economic hardship pervades much of the region while populations grow at alarming rates, and Islamic extremism threatens the entire region as well as the whole world. These foreboding factors have the ability to cause immense strife and conflict in the region if not confronted using all the resources and ingenuity of the collective Arab states. Moreover, if Arab states use these complex issues to place blame and acquire power rather than assist weaker neighbors and develop the region, hardship and violence may well prevail.

The opposition and removing the democratically elected government in Egypt by resorting to old military dictatorship is source of concern. Iran meddling in the affairs of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and now Yemen is hindrance to the war against ISIS [Daesh], Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. This can only benefit Zionists to implement their plan of fragmentation of Middle East.

Following is suggested in broader terms to counter Zionist expansionist design:

1. Introducing true democratic reforms gradually to establish governments according to the will of people, greater participation of people in the affairs of state.
2. People should raise the issue using peaceful means of protests and through media, not armed resistance against established rule even if it is dictatorship or kingdom. Any destabilization or effort to regime change by force will result in anarchy and bloodshed.
3. Establishment of justice and fair play, good governance, reduce corruption for stability.
4. Arab countries should build strong well trained, well motivated professional military forces. National defense cannot be out sourced. Mere purchase of modern military hardware cannot defeat the aggressors. It’s the man behind the weapon which matters.
5. Activate UNO, Arab League and OIC to defeat the non state terrorist groups like ISIS (Daesh), Al Qaida, Taliban, Boko Haram (Nigeria) etc, with support of world powers and Muslim states. The bigger Muslim states like Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Bangladesh should take initiative.
6. Muslim Peace Force may be established on the lines of NATO, financed by rich countries while others can provide manpower.
7. Arrange immediate cease fire among all the other fighting factions, followed by negotiations to address the grievances and settle the disputes.
8. Efforts be made to restore Iraq and Syria with in established boundaries.
9. If establishment of smaller states in Iraq and Syria is inevitable, then possibility of establishing 2 or 3 Arab states with readjusted boundaries by uniting smaller sub states be explored. Concept of confederation of smaller states could also be considered as an option.
10. Instead of making tall buildings and towers, heavy investment be made in education.
11. The religious education be controlled by state, teaching sectarianism, hatred and extremism be curbed while tolerance, patience, peaceful coexistence, human and moral values, the hall mark of Islam be emphasized.
12. Establishment of study groups, intellectual forums and think tanks to constantly review, analyze and recommend measures for stability, peace and progress.
13. Active participation in the global affairs for peace by contribution in the field of science, medicine and technology.

References
http://AftabKhan-net.page.tl