Z A Bhutto

Introduction
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto pronounced his self-styled “revolutionary” administrative reforms, the basic purpose of which was to disestablish the system of “service cadres” introduced by the British in the eighteenth century and later on introduced in Pakistan, with certain modifications, subsequent to partition.¹ One motive underlying such disestablishment however was the intent to weaken bureaucratic resistance to Bhutto’s ambitious social and economic policies and specifically to challenge the authority of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Several policies introduced in 1973 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto included: (1) the abolition of the CSP Academy; (2) the adoption of a uniform pay scale that reduced CSP officers’ comparative advantage in salary structure; (3) the elimination of reservation of posts for CSP officers; (4) the abolition of the CSP as a group; and (5) the introduction of lateral recruitment, designed in a way to politicize the bureaucracy. The underlying rationale behind Z.A. Bhutto reforms was that he wanted to gain control over the bureaucracy.² Such measures on the part of Bhutto were viewed as monopolizing the powers in the best interest of his party. This stance had left the dismissed bureaucrats resented against his government, which ultimately led to his debacle.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Administrative Reforms
The Public Service
The Bureaucracy had a high priority on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s plane to undermine the institutions of the governance so that he could rule the country without any hindrance.³ The initial task for this purpose was to keep all powers in his hands. For this purpose he facilitated himself under the cover of Martial Law and within his first week in office Bhutto dismissed half a dozen highly placed public servants under various Martial Law orders. All these orders were protected against any superior authority. On March 10, 1972, under Martial Law Regulation 144 all the guarantees and safeguards available to the public services were swept away and they were placed entirely on the mercy of the political executive.⁴ The new order was as harsh as it was sudden. There was no requirement of show cause notice or a charge sheet. In sharp contrast the laws providing protection in disciplinary and punitive action against public servant were available during the period of Martial Law under General Yahya khan and Ayub Khan.⁵ But during Bhutto’s rule there was no such opportunity for the affected person to defend himself against injustice. It was all in all monopoly of the Bhutto’s government in all the institutions of the country.

Here is the evidence of the promulgation of Martial Law regulation 114, given by Mr. Vaqar Ahmad, Cabinet and Establishment Secretary during Bhutto’s rule in a statement recorded, after his removal from office, on 25 November, 1977:

“In the first flush of victory, general screening was ordered by the then prime minister in January, 1972. The Law Division was clearly told by him not to include any provision for (a) show cause notice. The then President Z. A. Bhutto rang me up in the middle of the night and told me that he had heard that I was suggesting that there should be provision for (a) show cause. He told me that he did not believe in the Anglo Saxon sense of justice and his Revolutionary Government would not accept any such suggestion”.⁶

The inequity of the Law aggravated the situation, when it was put into effect. Suddenly, on the evening of March 12, 1972, about 2000 public servants who had normally attended the offices earlier in the day, heard on radio and TV that they had been dismissed or removed from offices or reduced in ranks on the charge of corruption or inefficient.⁷ These announcements were made by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi however he emphasized that the government had made the detail painstaking scrutiny of the service records, so no hardship would be caused against this legal stance.

Mr. Vaqar Ahmad’s statement of November, 25, 1977 shows that Mr. Jatoi was the Minister for political affairs during the Bhutto era and he was made the in-charge of these operations. He had got lists directly from the governors of all the provinces like Mr. Khar Governor Punjab, Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto Governor Sindh and Mr. Mir Sherpao Governor NWFP (KPK).⁸ Dr. Mubashir Hassan the Finance Minister in the federal government then recommended these lists which were quite large taken from Customs department, Central Excise and Income Tax departments. The provincial list had also included the names from federal government employees from WAPDA, Police etc. Mr. Vaqar Ahmad was also asked to give the names of corrupt officers from federal government and he was touch with I.G. Special Police to give the names, who prepared a list of 60 persons in consultation with Mr. Vaqar Ahmad. Mr. Jatoi rejected the list and told Mr. Vaqar Ahmad that the names are too few and president would be annoyed at this.⁹ Mr. Vaqar Ahmad then asked the I.G. Special Police to do another exercise and expend the list and the list came to 150 approximately. All these were placed before the then President, who gave a final approval without any reason. The list from Sindh was very large and Sindh provincial government had got the opportunity to get rid of as many Sindhis as they could.¹⁰ The final list was ultimately announced by Mr. Jatoi on TV and radio. But few names were discriminately dropped from these lists later on the recommendation of influential persons and by the then President. This was the first sad shock given to the bureaucracy by Z. A. Bhutto.

Another comprehensive note submitted on October, 5, 1977 by Mr. Abdul Aziz who as a joint Secretary Establishment was also associated with the bulk of the work relating to compulsory retirements and disposal of review petitions during the Bhutto regime.¹¹ According to him on February 5, 1972 Mr. Vaqar Ahmad addressed a letter to the federal Secretaries asking them to forward lists of officers who were corrupt or reported to be corrupt; only nine days were given to them for this task.¹² Except the ministry of finance whose response was poor, because the Minister in-charge was Dr. Mubashir Hassan who took special interest in collecting names. While ministry of Finance reported 106 names and other ministries reported only 27 names. These names were included by him without authentic source report. As many as 219 names were selected by Mr. Vaqar Ahmad on the basis of general reports with regard to them. Thus Mr. Vaqar Ahmad was responsible for retiring 245 officers on his own initiative.¹³ These dismissal lists were sent to Bhutto without even a forwarding letter and were full of faults. All these faulted exclusion of the bureaucracy later on become threat to the Bhutto’s long run government debacle.

Similarly, the Special Police Establishment (now FIA) was also ordered verbally to forward cases under investigation. From these lists 88 names were picked up regardless of the fact that investigation against some of them were in initial stages. The remaining names were received in the form of lists given by those sources that were authorized by Bhutto to report. These sources were Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, federal Minister and Mr. Khar, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, and Sherpao, who were then the Governors, respectively of Punjab, Sind and NWFP (KPK). The lists were also sent without forwarding letters. These names were forwarded by these sources on competing influences with each other. These lists did not contain any allegations or signature of the person who was responsible for compiling them; nor the Establishment Division have today any record to show who forwarded these lists, to whom and when, and in response to what directions.

Here is another example of the Bhutto’s government discrimination. In a large number of cases, mistakes regarding names, places of posting, designations and departments occurred in the relevant Gazette Notification (No. 2/2/72/DA issued on March 13, 1972).¹⁴ These mistakes were inevitable because names collected from these lists were not checked with the original records of the government relating to these persons. These errors were alarming and disappointing in both variety and magnitude. The selections of the names were without any scrutiny. Briefly the whole exercise turned out to be an attempt to look for necks that fitted the noose. According to the same source, the names of at least 34 persons were incorrectly given and the designation of 18 officers was wrong.¹⁵ Similarly 13 officer’s department names and 55 officers’ only names were given without any designations and 25 officers names were given but the place of posting were missing.¹⁶ Further, in case of 34 officers, there were serious differences between the Gazette Notification and Press release. Mr. Maqsood Ahmad, whose name appears at serial No. 23 on page 326 of the notification, was identified in the schedule with words: “Posting not known”.¹⁷ This shows the extent of apathy that was evident in the entire exercise by Bhutto for dismissal of the bureaucracy.

Three officers of the Police department and one officer of the PCS who were retired by this order had died sometimes back and four Custom Department officers who did not exist at all but were ordered retired under MLR 114.¹⁸ Similarly eight officers were subjected to the exercise of retirement for the second time – they had already retired on date prior to the broad cast announcement by Jatoi.¹⁹ The most revealing instance of the government’s failure related to the retirements perhaps was the case of one Mr. Abdul Rehman Memon, Assistant Engineer (SDO) Irrigation department of Sind. Coincidentally there happened to be two officers with the same name in the Department of which the first one was supposed to retire. A battle was started for survival and ultimately after much lobbying one of two succeeded in staying on and the other had to go.²⁰ Here is another example of the then government regarding paradoxical retirement of the innocent people without any cause is, the gazette Notification listed one Mr. Abdul Karim Brohi, under the heading “Irrigation Department” at S. No. 55 on page 314. When it was discovered that no such person existed another person by the name of Mr. Akram Baloch who was SDO, at Larkana²¹ was retired instead!

The embarrassment was overwhelming for Bhutto’s government. One Mr. Abdul Rashid Sheikh, class one Officer on page 318, at serial No 44 who was retired and he resigned from charge. But meanwhile his brother, Mr. Abdul Wahab Sheikh, was promoted Secretary, Irrigation Department, and apart from this mistake committed by the then establishment, another Officer also named Mr. Abdul Rashid Sheikh (but not a class I or even Class II officer) was also forced to resign on March 18, 1972.²² Similarly, Dr. Muhammad Azam who was attached to Civil Hospital, Khairabad, was retired. A few days later the government realized that the doctor was recruited on service for only three months on ad hoc basis and had not yet appeared before the Public Service Commission for regular selection. In order to cover up this embarrassing mistake by the then incompetent establishment, Dr. Muhammad Azam of the Civil Hospital, Nowshera was made to retire in his place.²³ Many names have been repeated twice, three and even four times in the list. Numerous additions and detections were made in the list released to the press after the speech of the Minister for Political affairs.²⁴ It was massive disappointment and resentment among the dismissed people. They were not satisfied with the people’s party policies and even ready to get rid of Bhutto government on any cost.

Despite the fact of surety given to nation by the Minister of the political affairs that no further dismissal would be made so there is no need to fear. Contrary to that statement on March 18, 1972 the Governments of the Punjab, the NWFP (KP) and Sindh, retired further 518 officials under the MLR 114, of the respective provincial governments.²⁵ Similarly on April 18, 1972, 24 judicial officers and on April 20, 8 officers of the Intelligence bureau were retired by the federal government, both actions were taken under Para 3 of MLR 114. Thus the total retirements in the first flush of Bhutto’s rule reached to 1866.²⁶ It is interesting to note that these Notifications were also classified as “confidential”. This attempt of the concealment was the first act in the history of the sub-continent.

The public reaction to these orders was sharp, even Bhutto felt something must be done immediately to avoid public unpleasant feelings and then Law regulation MLR 114 was replaced by MLR 116.²⁷ Which gives the impression that any instance of injustice in the application of 114 would be set right forthwith. The new regulation had been given somewhat chance to the public to review injustice done to them. A total of 1770 review petitions were received in the Establishment Division in response to MLR 116, they were never scrutinized and remained locked in the custody of the dealing officials, except few fortunate ones were benefited, for whom recommendations were received from Bhutto, MNAs, MPAs or others.²⁸ However, the cases of those officials retired on the basis of reports from the Ministries and Special Police establishment (now FIA) were intended for second opinion. In one case special Police chief himself drew the attention of the review Committee’s that no inquiry had been conducted against Mr. Ahmad Shuja Khan, Assistant Income Tax Officer, who had been retired and his name had apparently been confused with that of Mr. A. S. Khan Ghuri, who also had been retired.²⁹ Subsequently for the rest of names, Mr. Mustafa Khar, from Punjab, Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto from Sindh and Mr. Hayat Sherpao from NWFP (KPK) were asked to forward the names from their respective provinces that they would recommend for reinstatement. Some more names were also cleared by the President Bhutto. These above examples clearly indicate the evidence of political superiority over the bureaucracy.

In the end a grand total of 189 lists were submitted to Z. A. Bhutto who ticked some 150 names and were reinstated. While others were left to follow his advice in the course of a speech at Liaquat Gardens, Rawalpindi, on December 2, 1972, when he said:
“Let them (those retired under MLR-114) file appeals to God and justice would be done to them on Doomsday”.³⁰

A press note was issued more than a year later, on June 18, 1974 saying that the review petitions of the remaining petitioners had been rejected. All these regulations of MLR114 and MLR 116 cases were protected under administrative tribunals. Later on further amendments were made in the 1973 constitution by Bhutto for further manipulation of his policies over the bureaucracy.

Constitutional Protection given by Bhutto to His Reforms
On April 21, 1972, Martial Law was withdrawn; both the relevant Regulations MLR-114 and MLR-116 were included in the first Interim Constitution promulgated by Z.A. Bhutto.³¹ There were series of Ordinances included in this schedule like, Martial Law Regulation and Presidential Orders, which could not be challenged on the ground of the basic Rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Nevertheless a large number of total 430, writ petitions of the affected persons were submitted in the High Courts at Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. Bhutto’s Government, instead of establishing the Bona fide of their action and defending the cases on merits, asserted that the Courts had no jurisdiction to hear these petitions, as the interim Constitution’s Article 281had validated all the martial law Regulations and Orders.³² The Bhutto Government for further strong hold had bought about more amendments in the Article of constitution March 3, 1973. Its effect was that the validation conferred under this Constitution shall not be called in question by any Court. For further propagation of their stance the words “notwithstanding any judgment of any court” were included in the Article during the well known Asma Jilani case. The purpose of these words was to offset the effect of Supreme Court’s Judgment. This amendment was made through the Constitution Sixth Amendment Order 1973 (President’s Order No 3, of 1973).³³ For further jurisdiction of the High Court’s the Government device more amendments and set up administrative Tribunals, under Article 212 of the Constitution, which had come into practice on August 14, 1973. This measure did not prove strong effective, and therefore another Constitutional amendment was brought about in Article 212 in order to cover those cases which were already pending in high Courts. This was done through the amendment made in the constitutional Act of 1974, which added the following words in Article 212 (2) of the Constitution:

“All proceedings in respect of any such matter, which may be pending before such other Courts immediately before the establishment of the administrative courts or tribunal, shall abate at such establishment”.³⁴

A corresponding amendment was also passed later on in the Service Tribunal Act 1973, to ensure that all the previous cases that had been dealt under the MLR 114 (as well as MLR-58) were also brought under the Service Tribunal.³⁵ The result of this amendment was that all the petitions submitted under the Civil Service grievances have been remanded by the Supreme Court to the High court for the disposal having worthless. Only few of those cases were reinstated by the order of Tribunals. All other cases were still pending with the Service Tribunals when Martial Law was enforced on July 5, 1977.³⁶ But all the public servants were left on mercy of Government monopoly, till the end they were not given justice under the jurisdiction. This stance was much embarrassing for the Bhutto’s government towards the bureaucracy and ultimately such type of causes were led to the inevitable downfall fall his rule.

Abolition of Guarantees from the Administration
The massive expulsion of the public services by Bhutto under MLR-114 had shaken and demoralized the entire administration of Pakistan.³⁷ Massive resentment was evident against the government. Then a few weeks later the Interim Constitution was promised to enforce stability by virtue of the guarantees to the public services. It gave new hope to the people for reinstatement. By that time the permanent Constitution was also expected, it gave back a bit of support and strength to Bhutto to proceed more arbitrarily. The guarantees which had to be practiced under the Interim Constitution were disguised under the 1973 Constitution and not properly implemented. The authority of the public servant was reduced to the level of private employees.³⁸ Their dependence of livelihood and promotion in services lay upon the will of their employers namely Bhutto and his Lieutenants, and their favorites in the higher ranks of bureaucracy.³⁹

Under Article 220 of the Interim Constitution, a person who was a member of an All-Pakistan Service cannot be dismissed or removed from service or be reduced in rank, unless he has been given “a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action. This guarantee did not however apply to cases where the competent authority “considers that, in the circumstances of the case, it is not practicable to give the person an opportunity of showing cause or it would be prejudicial to the security of Pakistan for the person to be given such an opportunity”.⁴⁰ The Constitution had also enabled the government under Article 221; to retire from the service any person covered by the above guarantee on the completion of 25 years. This was the whole, a satisfactory scenario of the Bhutto government under which the guarantees provided for the public services were by no mean promulgated. But it did not accord with Bhutto’s long term plans for the subordination of the services to his political purposes.⁴¹ Accordingly, when the permanent Constitution was promulgated legally, then the guarantees provided to the services, under the Interim Constitution, were practically swept away and nothing effective was left of the eleven Articles dealing with the Public Service Commission.⁴² The public services and Public service Commission’s both were thus left entirely at the mercy of the political executive and the ruling party in parliament.⁴³ Consequently majority of the dismissals were carried on the political grounds rather on legal basis. The powers were all in all transformed to the politicians. This was a serious threat to the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. It ultimately led to the aggressions among the dismissed people against the Bhutto government.

The public service commissions were reduced, in effect, to mere shadows of their former selves. The Federal Public Service Commission Act, 1973, prescribed no qualifications for the members.⁴⁴ Its consultative functions did not extend to disciplinary matters, and were limited to “such matters as may be prescribed relating to the terms and conditions of service of persons who are members of an All-Pakistan Service or hold civil posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation”.⁴⁵ After the enforcement of the Civil Services Act, the Government fully monopolized the powers to throw out any public servant who ventured to take a stand on matters.

Z.A. Bhutto’s Second Purge of 1976
The second major purge which covered officers of both the Federal and the Provincial Governments as well as some of the corporations was undertaken in October 1976. Preparatory work had begun two months earlier. The deliberations of this purge were also confined to few politicians, like the Establishment Secretary, Mr. Vaqar Ahmad, the Special Secretary, Establishment Division, Mr. K. Mahmood, and the Director General FIA, Mr. A.K. Chaudhry.⁴⁶ No other official was associated; these confidential and sensitive matters were being discussed in a number of meetings held on daily basis attended by the above officers in the Establishment Secretary’s room. There is no information on record to show how the list of officers to be retired compiled and what checks and procedures were followed. Meanwhile, the powers of the authorized officer were assumed by the Establishment Secretary in respect of all Government servants in Grade 17 to 20 irrespective of the Department in which they might be serving. The Establishment Secretary normally is the authorized officer for officers of All-Pakistan Unified Grades. But the period from 9^th October 1976 to 7^th January 1977, during which the above mentioned notification remained in force, the powers to take disciplinary action remained vested exclusively in hands of the Establishment Secretary.⁴⁷ The Chief Secretaries to the Provincial Government were also asked to assume similar powers in respects of officers in Grade 17 to 20 of the Provincial Government.

Now the stage had been thus set for launching the proposed retirements. The plan given by the Establishment Secretary was that all retirement orders, as well as the show cause notices, and also the orders of termination of service in respect of corporation employees would be served simultaneously on the 16th October 1976.⁴⁸ The retirement orders would become effective forthwith. On this turn special chance was given to the victims and only 7 days were given for reply to the prescribed show cause notices. Except for few cases, the cases regarding the show cause category were to be retired on October 30, 1976, deadlines were dully observed.⁴⁹ The lists of those officials, who were to be retired, were sending to the Chief Secretaries concerned at Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar by officers specially deputed for the purpose by the Establishment Secretary. Unfortunately on 14^th October 1976, the Establishment Secretary informed the Chief Secretaries on phone regarding the retirement plan (minus names), and this whole exercise went round the clock. The retirement orders and the show cause notices were sent to the officers on 16^th October 1976, either early in the morning, at their residence, or in their offices, before 1200 hours.⁵⁰

Among those officers who were given show cause notices, 13 were later on cleared. The record shows that one was a case of mistaken identity, and one was a transparent case where the officer was not responsible for the allegations attributed to him confirmed by FIA. While in the remaining 11 cases, 3 cases were ordered by the Prime Minister, but there are no orders on the remaining cases.⁵¹ However, it is not sure that why these cases were not cleared by Mr. Vaqar Ahmad. He must have received orders from above to clear them. Consequently the records shows that the majority of the cases cleared were on political grounds rather on merits. However there was one case in which the reason for the officer’s clearance was definitely not political. It was of Mr. G. Moinuddin, DIG Police, who was spared on a petition by his wife, reminding Mr. Bhutto that she had attended him as a nurse in hospital in 1964.⁵²

The background to Bhutto’s government screening operation also figures in a statement by Mr. Khaqan Mahmud, formerly special Secretary in the Cabinet Division, recorded in the course of an official inquiry after the fall of the Bhutto regime:

“The Cabinet Secretary told me that the Prime Minister wanted him to submit the names of about 200 officers to be sacked and whether I had any names to suggest….. I made an earnest request to the Cabinet Secretary that he should dissuade the Prime Minister from doing so. A few days later, I was told that the Prime Minister had agreed to remove only about 60 people instead of 200. The Prime Minister further amended this figure to be around 100”.⁵³

Since the fall of the Bhutto regime, the findings of the Federal Review Board set up by the Martial Law Administration to examine the cases of dismissed retired public servants, have brought to light countless cases are arbitrary and vindictive actions.⁵⁴

Lateral Entry into Government Service
The concept of Lateral Entry in an administration is not new for the theorists of public administration. It was formulated in British administrative structure on the recommendations of the commission headed by Lord Fulton. This idea aim was to free the administration of the crust of conventional thinking and routine procedures and infuse freshness of approach and dynamism through new blood.⁵⁵ Contrary to this, during Bhutto regime this concept was adopted as a device to induct incompetent, politically affiliated persons into the administration system.⁵⁶ Their selection main purpose was to undermine the neutrality of the administration according to their monopolies. Bhutto had always held administrative neutrality in contempt and even as a minister in the Ayub regime, had proposed the enlistment of Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police as a member of the ruling political party. The assumption of supreme power in 1971 gave Bhutto an opportunity to put his ideas in practice and the circumstance did not permit him to go as enlisting the government officers as members of his party, he stop only a step short of that. Bhutto between his first blow to the service under MLR 114, and the final blow in August 1973 by of his “ revolutionary” service reforms, he was able to destroy the moral, image and structure of the bureaucracy and reduced its power to the political executive and the ruling party.⁵⁷

Z.A. Bhutto made 5,476 appointments in grade 16 and above under the lateral entry scheme. Their break-up was:

Federal Government	2,796
Punjab	1,519
Sindh	650
KPK	452
Baluchistan	60
Total	5,47658

This function was headed by Bhutto and Prime minister throughout the tenure of Peoples party rule. To impart fairness in the frame of selection Bhutto could have framed certain recruitment and selection rules for lateral entries at the senior level but he did nothing of this sort which later on become the cause of his inevitable lose in shape of his debacle.⁵⁹ The officers of the establishment division, responsible for holding the lateral entry examinations and preparing the results, have now admitted that there were no rules for these selections and that the appointments were made arbitrarily by Bhutto.⁶⁰

The Federal Public Service Commission holds a competitive examination on an all Pakistan basis every year in order to make the appointments in various groups for grade 17. This system was well organized and free from all sort of injustice.⁶¹ This examination comprises written tests in various subjects for 1100 marks and an interview for 300 marks. But during the Bhutto regime this system was replaced by Lateral Entries, the Establishment Division headed by Bhutto.⁶² The establishment division prescribed only a short cut examination of two papers of only 100 marks for each, appointment to the post in grade 17 and 20. No marks were allotted to the interviews in the examination held in 1973-74 and 1975, for various posts from Federal Secretariat up to the Minister downward in the foreign secretary.⁶³ There is no record about these proceedings of the interviews and grading. The absence of the records shows that even the criteria laid down by the Establishment Division were also not strictly applied. It ultimately shows that the selections were made on politician’s monopolies during Bhutto rule.⁶⁴

Similarly the interviews for the post of Deputy Secretary and joint Secretary held in 1974 by a board that consisted of a politician ( Rana Mohammad Hanif, a minister in federal Government) and politically motivated bureaucrats (Mr. Vaqar Ahmad).⁶⁵ Similarly in 1973, the board of five members for the selection of Foreign Service officers also consisted of three politicians namely, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mr. Rafi Raza, Mr. Khursheed Hassan Meer and Mr. Vaqar Ahmad and the fifth member was the then foreign secretary.⁶⁶ The available records of lateral Entry Examinations shows that 73 out of the 291 selections of joint and Deputy Secretaries and 57 out of 157 selections for the Foreign Service, were not made on merit.⁶⁷ Similarly 185 persons selected as Joint and Deputy Secretaries were ineligible, they did not fall within the prescribed age. Between 1973 and 1975 six people as joint Secretaries and four as a Deputy Secretaries were appointed without any Lateral Examination.⁶⁸ Similarly in the same period as many as 47 persons were taken in foreign services without any Lateral Examination.⁶⁹ Most the officers according to records were appointed on the recommendation of Z.A. Bhutto. Seven others persons who had failed the Lateral Examinations were appointed as joint or Deputy Secretaries.⁷⁰ There were many officers in various departments who were unable to pass the lateral Examination selected on the high ranks of 22 to 23 grades.⁷¹ For instance, (Retd) Raja Khurshid Ahmad, Mr. Mohammad Tanvirul Haq Haqqi and Mr. Ikram Rasool Khan were appointed as Joint Secretaries. Though, they had failed the Lateral Examination, but appointed on the endorsement of application by Z.A. Bhutto.⁷²

Conclusion
During the Ayub’s government bureaucracy played a vital role in policy formulation and its implementation. Bureaucracy was known as the “backbone of the state”. The whole bureaucratic system worked effectively and efficiently. During this period the bureaucracy boosted the economy and provided the political stability. There are innumerable examples of the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Many developing countries during that time sent their envoys to study the plans, policy formulations and their implementation of Pakistan. Most of the states have emulated the Pakistani plans and made a good deal of progress. Bureaucracy, along with the army, was the main player of the state system. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to the helm of affairs he played havoc through the ranks of the bureaucracy in order to elongate and strength his role. He was insecure of the bureaucracy. Stanley Wolpert in “Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan” has psychoanalyzed that Bhutto was an insecure type of personality. He had, as above mentioned, through arbitrary postings and dismissals weakened the bureaucracy to a great extent. Moreover, the lateral entry scheme further aggravated the situation. Albeit the fact that lateral entry scheme is a very productive policy with regard to the needs of the modern bureaucracies yet Bhutto had utilized it for his own personal gains. He carried out appointments through his own wishes which exacerbated the morale, performance, solidarity and efficiency of the civil services. As aforesaid Bhutto started the purges in the 1973 simultaneously with the promulgation of his constitution. He had chalked out reforms for the bureaucracy in his constitution which he had undermined several times afterwards. He circumvented laws, ignored legalities, and cast a blind eye on the after effects of his behavior in order to prolong his own rule.

In a nutshell it can be said that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in order to fulfill his own desire of elongating his rule, destroyed the most efficient, sincere and effective bureaucracy of Pakistan.

Bibliography
Primary Source:
White Paper on the performance of the Bhutto Regime. Vol. II. Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, His Family and Associates. Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan, 1979.

Secondary Sources:
Ahmad, Mumtaz. Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan. Karachi: National Institute of Public Administration, 1974.

Hassan, Mubashir. The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years 1971-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hussain, Syed Shabbir. Ayub, Bhutto and Zia: How They Fell Victum to Their own Plans. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publisher, 2011.

Kennedy, Charles H. Bureaucracy in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Niaz, Ilhan. The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Syed, Anwar H. The Discourse and Politics of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1992.

Wolpert, Stanley. Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Waseem, Mohammad. Politics and the State in Pakistan. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1989.

Yousaf, Hamid. Pakistan: A Study of Political Development 1947-97. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1999.

Ziring, Lawrence. Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History. Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 2004.

End Notes
¹White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1979), 119.
²Ilhan Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 128.
³White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 119.
⁴White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 120.
⁵Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 111.
⁶White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 121
⁷Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 112.
⁸White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 122
⁹Ibid., 123.
¹⁰White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 123.
¹¹Ibid., 123.
¹²Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 111.
¹³Ibid., 124.
¹⁴White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 124.
¹⁵Ibid.
¹⁶White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 124.
¹⁷Ibid., 125.
¹⁸Ibid.
¹⁹Ibid.
²⁰Ibid., 126.
²¹Ibid., 125.
²²White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 127.
²³Ibid.
²⁴Ibid.
²⁵Charles H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 80.
²⁶White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 128.
²⁷Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 88.
²⁸White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 129.
²⁹Ibid.
³⁰White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 131.
³¹Ibid.
³²White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 132.
³³Ibid.,132.
³⁴Ibid., 123.
³⁵Ibid., 133.
³⁶Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 145.
³⁷Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 114.
³⁸Mumtaz Ahmad, Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan. (Karachi: NIPA, 1974), 196.
³⁹White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 134.
⁴⁰Ibid.
⁴¹Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 113.
⁴²White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 135.
⁴³Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 113.
⁴⁴White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions,136.
⁴⁵Ibid., 137.
⁴⁶Ibid., 139.
⁴⁷White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 141.
⁴⁸Ibid.
⁴⁹Ibid.
⁵⁰White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 142.
⁵¹Ibid.
⁵²Ibid., 143.
⁵³Ibid., 144.
⁵⁴White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 147.
⁵⁵Ibid., 158.
⁵⁶Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 130.
⁵⁷Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008, 117.
⁵⁸White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 159.
⁵⁹Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 149.
⁶⁰Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan. (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994), 305.
⁶¹Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 131.
⁶²Ibid., 131.
⁶³White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 160.
⁶⁴Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, 305.
⁶⁵White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 160.
⁶⁶Ibid.
⁶⁷Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 131.
⁶⁸Ibid.,141.
⁶⁹White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, 161.
⁷⁰Ibid., 160
⁷¹Ibid., 161.
⁷²Ibid., 162.