Introduction
1. Traditionally people of the sub-continent have been quite lax on the usage of mild intoxicants. Emperor Babur repeatedly mentions the use of opium in his autobiography Tuzk-e-Babri while his son Humayun died after falling down from the stairs of his observatory after having a dose of opium. Emperor Jahangir was so fond of opium that he became an addict and ultimately died of effects of usage of this drug. This pattern continued through the Sikh period. Ranjeet Singh too was fond of his opium.
2. Soon after annexing the Punjab the British brought the consumption of these intoxicants under law basically to generate income. The Opium Act of 1878 and The Punjab Excise Act 1914 were aimed at regulating their production, manufacture, buying, selling and consumption besides fixing quotas for opium and charas. Bhang being a common man’s drink particularly in the summer remained under largely outside or under mild control. Even opium and charas became controlled rather than banned substances. The British aim was to control and substitute these local intoxicants by their alcoholic drinks which would generate much more income besides becoming a booming market for their alcoholic drinks industry. Otherwise many British officers themselves enjoyed local bhang to beat the oppressive summer heat of India.
3. After the birth of Pakistan more control started being exercised on these as part of the ‘Islamization’ trend. These commodities became banned substances particularly after the promulgation of the 1977 Martial Law. All quotas of bhang and charas were abolished and their consumption, drinking, selling or dealing were declared as cognizable crimes. The usage of all these was basically controlled by the Excise Department and illicit actions came within their preview. It is clear that till mid-seventies the Government machinery existed to regulate and not to eradicate these items from the society.
4. Due to advancement in technology the poppy being grown in Pakistan’s tribal areas, augmented by Afghan poppy across the Durand Line, started getting converted into heroin on a large scale and further exported to Europe, Middle East, SEA and Australia. Meanwhile under external pressure and funding from western countries the addiction in Pakistan reportedly jumped from a few thousand in the 70s to 3.5 million in 1995 and 7.9 million addicts in 2014, if the sample surveys were to be believed.
Establishment of PNCB & ANF
1. On persuasion and provision of financial assistance by the US and European countries the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) was raised in 1974 to combat the drug trafficking menace. The efforts to stop these drugs from going abroad resulted in their dumping in the local market. The Afghan war continuing since 1978 has resulted in a totally porous border with thousands crossing it on regular basis daily inhibiting any enforcement. Within a decade of PNCB functioning it was realized that it had failed to deal with the magnitude of the task. Rather than examine the reasons for its failure and overcoming them, a new force, the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) headed by the Army officers was raised in 1993-94; this was perhaps the only example in the world where Army officers are involved in excise/police duties. This was done under pressure exerted by the western powers fearing a drugs epidemic in their countries originating from South Asia.
2. Introduction of the Army leadership did raise the initial quality of the ANF and resulted in record seizures of banned substances, better prosecutions and more convictions at the lower courts. However, after the initial euphoria the ANF suffered from inertia; the performance of ANF after its initial success story at best can be described as lackadaisical. Some of the major reasons are:
a. The Army does not send its best officers. It is apparent from the fact that most of the officers posted were or got superseded.
b. It suffers from a lack of continuity as the Army officers are rotated after 2-3 years.
c. All the knowledge expertise, foreign courses etc gained by Army officers gets wasted due to this rotation policy.
d. No incentive of promotion or induction for Army officers deputed to ANF within this Force.
e. Army officers have to do public dealing with hand core criminals, their kin, mafias and lastly the courts for which they are not trained e.g. a Police officer is far more experienced in these aspects as he is doing it right from his commission.
f. Army officers have been dragged into courts, insulted and disgraced; it may be recalled that the Chief Justice once ordered a Lt. Col and a Major to be arrested for exceeding their limits.
g. Army officers who have led a neat and clean career find themselves bewildered in an environment of adverse treatment, intrigue, corruption and greed.
h. Budget constraints adversely affecting manpower, vehicles, seed money for informants etc. Initial group got double pays and house rent allowance.
The ANF has now been existing for more than 30 years but has not made the difference that was expected. In its present form it cannot deliver and the tasks of eliminating narcotics trafficking is beyond its capability.
Recommendations
1. The Control of Narcotic Substances (CNS) Act needs to be revisited. Some of the draconian punishments need to be revised downwards. There is also need to de-criminalize use of bhang and charas etc in line with what is happening in other countries. This will substantially reduce the work load of ANF.
2. In an order to give ANF necessary punch, strength and incentive following are suggested.
a. The HQ of ANF may be converted into HQ CAF: The structure of ANF HQ is remarkably fit to be converted into HQ of combined CAF’s. The Regional Directorates can be placed under command of respective FC/Ranger. This will give it the necessary manpower, flexibility of operations and clout that they lack at present.
b. Terms and Conditions of Army officers deputed should be changed. Only Majors should be inducted after about 20 years of service in the Army. After the initial deputation of 2/3 years they should remain in ANF for as long as they are useful to the Force i.e. the deputation should be extended as long as the officer is useful to the Force. These officers maybe promoted within the ANF if a Lt. Col/or Grade-19 vacancy occurs. Anyone not found up to the mark may be retired. The aim should be to create a cadre of ANF officers. Nowhere in the world are Army officers heading a police force combating drug trafficking.
Conclusion
The Pakistan Army has been involved in far too many non-operational tasks for quite some time now. It should concentrate on its basic task of defending the Nation and should give one time injection only by providing officers and other manpower to be inducted on permanent basis by ANF and subsequently divest itself from ANF for future.
