‘The desire to gain an immediate selfish advantage always imperils their ultimate interests. If they recognize this fact, they usually recognize it too late’. Reinhold Niebuhr
There is never a dull moment in Pakistan and whenever a new circus comes to the town everybody asks if the show is put by amateurs or it is a sponsored event. On August 14, Pakistan’s capital Islamabad saw two large gatherings demanding resignation of the current government that took over power in June 2013. One group is headed by the newly emerged political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) led by former cricketer Imran Khan and second led by a cleric Tahir ul Qadri who heads a small evangelist religious outfit based on personality cult but has no political base.
Like many post-colonial states, in Pakistan there is still some confusion regarding the system of governance, legitimacy of government and ideological debate about Islamic and secular aspects of polity. There are many who consider democracy experiment as failure and advocate complete overhaul but they are not clear about how this will be achieved and who will do it? Others argue that with proper trimming and cleansing democracy can flourish in the country with the caveat that objective will be achieved only if they are at the helm of the affairs. The unrest and instability caused by these ripples sometimes threaten the established order and military leadership, either directly or indirectly, steer the ship towards what they perceive as correct direction.
There are speculations, allegations and rumors about the objectives of Khan and Qadri. Why there are strong suspicions about role of army in stirring trouble for the current civilian government even if General Head Quarters (GHQ) has no direct role. Qadri is a resident of Canada with no political stakes in the current set up and not even a single seat in the parliament. He has openly talked about a new set up under military supervision therefore many think that he is pedaling the army’s agenda. The current march by Qadri is a re-run as he brought his supporters to Islamabad in January 2013 against the Zardari government when civil-military relations were at its lowest ebb. PTI has been a non-entity for over a decade. Genuine desire for a third force to break the hold of two major political parties i.e. Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) gave PTI a big boost as party’s slogan was change. In the 2012 elections, it emerged as a strong force and was able to form the provincial government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).
We need to go back to 2008 to understand the context of the current crisis. In 2008, former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf, then serving as President was eased out by a unique combination of factors and rare convergence of interests of three main power players. Newly appointed COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, a protégé of Musharraf was in the process of easing out senior army officers appointed by Musharraf to important positions, consolidating his own grip on army and distancing the army from Musharraf’s legacy as later had become a lightening rod. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won majority in 2008 elections but in view of the assassination of party leader Benazir Bhutto, her husband was in the process of taking full control of the party. Main opposition party led by Nawaz Sharif had no love lost for Musharraf as the latter had overthrown, jailed and then exiled Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Musharraf was a wounded gazelle on the Serengeti and the herd especially Kayani, Zardari and Sharif were not interested in his survival. In addition, an independent media liberalized by General Musharraf and general public resentment at Musharraf’s sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry left absolutely no role for Musharraf. He was forced to resign and in a Machiavellian move, Zardari got himself elected President of the country.
Zardari as President ran the show while elected Prime Minister of PPP served a subservient role. The Army found itself in an unenviable position as it detested both PPP and opposition leader Nawaz Sharif. In these circumstances the emergence of a third political force advocating right of center policies was not a bad option from the army’s point of view. In 2008, Kayani handpicked Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha as Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Pasha was one of two senior generals highly respected by Kayani (the other was current Corps Commander of Mangla Lieutenant General Tariq Khan) for their professional competence. Pasha, an infantry officer had a good reputation for professionalism but was a very poor choice to head a powerful intelligence agency. He was not known for any serious thinking and had a temper problem which later had disastrous consequences on civil-military relations.
Kayani relied heavily on Pasha and three major crises put severe strain on civil-military relations. In 2010, GHQ came very strongly against the Kerry-Lugar bill passed in United States Congress that stipulated that army should refrain from interfering in the civil affairs of Pakistan. GHQ thought that the PPP government through its ambassador to Washington, Hussain Haqqani was responsible for inserting these conditions. In May 2011, Osama Bin Laden was killed near Abbottabad by U.S. Special Forces without informing Pakistan and the army came under severe criticism. Few months later, a scandal called Memo Gate emerged that alleged that Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington Hussain Haqqani had asked a Pakistani-American Manzur Ejaz to pass a note to American government officials to contact Pakistan’s army chief to ease pressure on civilian authorities. Pasha was instrumental in this saga and in a highly irresponsible move not only personally met Ejaz in London but gave an affidavit in the Supreme Court against the civilian government. Kayani doubled down and also gave a statement to the Supreme Court against civilian government. This was the lowest point in civil-military relations. President Zardari completed his five year tenure by completely capitulating to the army. He didn’t oppose the extension of tenure of Pasha as DGISI and also gave an unprecedented three year extension to Kayani.
GHQ’s problems with two major political parties opened the option for a third force. GHQ plays its cards with finesse and senior intelligence officers usually do not meet politicians, however messages can be sent through proper channels. In every political party there are few who are fully aware of the real fountain of power and keep contacts with the military. Contrary to popular perception there is no separate entity inside ISI that works on GHQ’s domestic agenda. Political handling is usually done by the head of internal security division of Counter Intelligence (CI) wing of ISI. Sometimes DG ISI also utilizes head of provincial detachment of ISI to deal with political issues related to a specific province. Internal security wing is headed by a Major General rank officer and provincial detachments of ISI have been upgraded and now run by a serving Major General rank officer (previously Brigadier rank officers were running provincial detachments). It is commonly believed that many politicians aligned with General Musharraf joined PTI on specific instructions from GHQ through then DGISI Pasha. In addition, many politicians with known links with the military establishment are supporting PTI’s demands. Recently, an organization of retired officers called Pakistan Ex-Servicemen Association demanded dissolution of assemblies and new elections. All these facts raise genuine questions about GHQ’s role in current crisis.
GHQ was always suspicious of return of Nawaz Sharif fearing that he has not forgiven the army for overthrowing him in 1999. In October 2013, Nawaz Sharif appointed General Raheel Sharif as the new COAS. The two Sharifs were busy securing their own turfs in the first year but three issues widened the gulf between Nawaz Sharif and the army. The Sharif government has not shown any leniency towards Musharraf and is letting the courts decide the fate of Musharraf on charges of treason. GHQ is upset that despite promises Nawaz Sharif has not provided an escape hatch for Musharraf. In April 2014, a prominent journalist and television anchor Hamid Mir survived an assassination attempt and he blamed ISI. In a highly unresponsive way, the country’s leading television station GEO ran headlines with pictures of DG ISI Lieutenant General Zaheerul Islam while airing Hamid Mir’s allegations. Nawaz Sharif who had personal relations with Hamid Mir dashed to Karachi to meet Mir in hospital. GHQ was aghast that instead of defending the ISI, the Prime Minister met Mir. This gesture was seen as an insult to the army. The narrative of pictures and symbolism could not be more obvious the where Prime Minister is seen visiting Hamid Mir and General Raheel Sharif visiting ISI headquarters to meet Lieutenant General Zaheer ul Islam. GHQ planned an offensive in North Waziristan and worked behind the scenes to get civilian government on board. The civilian government fearing a backlash of violence so soon after coming to power dragged its feet and in a counter move announced negotiations with militants. The Army was not happy with the approach and after few months of restraint went ahead and announced start of military operations. These events have widened the gulf between civilian and military leaders and suspicion and distrust is mutual.
GHQ does not want chaos or violence as it is already stretched too thin with heavy deployment in militancy hit areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan. It is also not interested to take direct control of the shop with lot of broken china. However, weakening of civilian government gives it an opportunity to re-assert itself. GHQ will use this opportunity to try to regain complete control of foreign policy related to India, Afghanistan and United States, extract more cooperation from government to support ongoing military operations and get relief for Musharraf. On international scene, army will portray itself as the only guarantor of stability and more importantly only reliable custodian of country’s ‘crown jewels’ of nuclear weapons. This posture helps the institution to gain independent resources for armed forces outside of normal budgetary process which in turn makes them less dependent on civilian authorities.
General Sharif will also try to get some additional leverage. In October 2014, five senior Lieutenant Generals will be retiring on completion of their tenures. The list includes four Corps Commanders and DG ISI. These generals were promoted and posted by his predecessor and General Sharif didn’t rock the boat in the first year which was a good move. The down side is that for a year, he is first among the equals and need to listen to his peers more attentively. General Sharif will be happy to bring a new team, more junior, therefore he can assert himself inside his own tent. My own assessment is that his personality is such that he may not be feel sure footed and may go for an intermediate approach. He may be considering giving extension to some officers due to retire in October 2014. This will help him to tackle on multiple fronts. The only two logical candidates for extension are DG ISI Lieutenant General Zaheer ul Islam and Peshawar based XI Corps commander Lieutenant General Khalid Rabbani. Zaheer is General Sharif’s ears and eyes and in view of conflict with civilians, General Sharif may want to keep him as Zaheer is familiar with the tortuous terrain. Rabbani is in charge of military operations in tribal areas and argument will be to keep the man to finish the job.
I’m strongly against the extension policy. The Pakistan army doesn’t produce a Rommel or a Guderian where a strong case for extension can be made. One can find three or four equally capable candidates for any job and extension is the single most important factor that causes friction among senior officers and this is not good for the institution. I will not favor extension to any senior officer. In the case of Rabbani, General Sharif can announce his replacement and in the next four weeks, Rabbani can brief incoming commander for a smooth hand over. Troops have been deployed for over a decade and we didn’t see any big change with change of command. The case of Zaheer is more important and his extension will have more damaging results. Promotions and posting of senior officers is army chief’s sole prerogative and civilians usually have no role in the process. The only exception is DG ISI who though a serving army officer is appointed by Prime Minister. In the past, sometimes appointment to this office has caused friction between Prime Minister and army chief.
It is very clear by now the mutual mistrust and in fact animosity between Nawaz Sharif and Zaheer in view of events cited above. If Zaheer is expressing his views candidly in the Corps Commanders conferences, I’m pretty sure that Nawaz Sharif is getting some hint of what is being deliberated at GHQ. If Zaheer is given an extension it will be likely continuation of his DG ISI tenure that will further deteriorate civil-military relations. It will be prudent for General Sharif to let Zaheer complete his tenure and use this opportunity of appointment of a new DG ISI to repair relations with Nawaz Sharif. If General Sharif goes with extension of Zaheer, Nawaz Sharif should remember Zardari-Pasha episode and resist continuation of Zaheer as DG ISI after October 2014. Prime Minister is the appointing authority for DG ISI and Nawaz Sharif should ask for three names from General Sharif and appoint one of them. It is very unlikely that even if Nawaz Sharif succumbs to General Sharif on this issue, he can get GHQ off his back. However, Nawaz Sharif is so weakened and unnerved and that he may not offer any resistance.
Civilian and military leaders are equally responsible for the widening gulf and strain on civil-military relations. The way forward is not to continue on the current path but to pull back. PTI should seriously ponder on its course of action and always remember that in a country with 180 million people, any political or non-political entity can bring 40 to 50’000 people to the capital. They have opened a Pandora box and even after midterm elections they come to power, PML-N or PPP or even Karachi based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) can bring much larger crowds to the capital and paralyze any sitting government. Even if present government is removed before completing its tenure, it is very likely that cycle of instability will continue after current crisis is over.
GHQ should remember that no matter how imperfect, Nawaz Sharif is the elected Prime Minister and he should not be pushed or removed through un-constitutional means. Few starting points for General Sharif:
– Immediately convey to all sides that GHQ has no favorites or enemies in this crisis and encourage and facilitate dialogue.
– Strict orders to intelligence apparatus to keep their hands off.
– Do not give extension of service to any senior officer especially DG ISI and use the end of tenure to repair relations.
– Always remember that civilians and military are on the same team and resist the temptation of self goal.
– Local, regional and international environment and enormous challenges facing the army are not conducive for any showdown with civilian government and all efforts should be made to avoid it.
On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif should know that overbearing GHQ can only be kept in its own lane by improving governance. There is no short cut and simply murmuring, mumbling and yelling about democracy and constitution is not enough. Few starting points for Nawaz Sharif:
– Use all available resources to decrease tensions and go all the way for dialogue with opposition.
– Work urgently and seriously on election reform process to improve it.
– Separate business and state interests in the earliest. Family members involved in business should be kept away from government and vice versa.
– Institutionalize government business and select capable experts to help ministers responsible for tackling urgent issues of governance, security and economy. Transition from highly personalized to institutionalized form of governance.
- – Exchange views on critical issues with army in an organized set up. Foreign policy team of foreign office or internal security team of interior ministry should have regular meetings and brainstorming sessions with counterparts from armed forces on various forums i.e. National Defence University and civil avenues.
In my view three critical issues are casualty of current crisis. The country’s weak economy got another punch in the rib with flight of capital and in short term there is no likelihood of outside investment. Current crisis is distracting both civil and military authorities from the fight against militancy which is now an existential threat. One issue which is below the radar and no one is paying attention to is that country is sleep walking into the sectarian conflict of the Middle East. It is quite clear that the army gave a generous severance package to the leadership of militant organizations operating against India in Kashmir. Many mid level commanders and foot soldiers joined sectarian organizations as well as militants entrenched in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) as well as opening franchises in Southern Punjab, Karachi and Balochistan. Lucrative outside sources are changing the dynamics and these groups are now heading to greener pastures and killing fields of Middle East that will exacerbate sectarian schism inside the country. This factor has the potential of unraveling the state if not handled in time. Military and civilian leaders have taken several rides on the roller coaster in the last six decades and one expects that now they are mature enough to know the limits of brinkmanship. There will always be friction and disagreements but these should be handled in a more mature way by both parties.
“There are no desperate situations; there are only desperate people”. Heinz Guderian
Acknowledgement
Author thanks many for their valuable input. Conclusions as well as all errors and omissions are author’s sole responsibility.
