Introduction
I treasure the memory of my military life (2nd World War, 1943-45, Kashmir War, 1948, September 1965 War and the December 1971 War). During battles I had commanded patrols, platoon, rifle company battalion and a heterogeneous force. Hardly with 6 months service during October 1843 I joined 7/2 Punjab (now part of the Indian Army) in ARAKAN – BURMA (now MYANMAR). It was newly raised, its viceroy commission officers and NCOs had joined the army before the 2nd World War, whereas most of the sepoys had been recruited during the war. It is a fact that from old battalions (of 2nd Punjab Regiment Group – now part of the Indian army) VCOs and NCOs sent were educationally and professionally average. But during various battles my battalion (7/2 Punjab) had won about 40 gallantry awards. Most of the NCOs (NK and Hav) had passed 3rd class or 2nd class Roman Urdu. It is also a fact that during the 1st and 2nd World Wars most of the infantry soldiers of the British Indian Army were enlisted as illiterate because manpower was required to complete the new raisings. They were required to fire .303 rifle, light machine gun and throw grenade. Most of them had participated in successful battles, displayed boldness and won gallantry awards.
These days education has become essential even for infantry soldiers to understand characteristics and working of new weapons, instruments and equipment. But is education an important criteria for infantry soldier fighting his enemy? Of course basic education to understand his weapon is essential, also knowledge of minor tactics (field craft, stalking, camouflage, digging for siting weapons and patrolling) is indispensable, which is achieved with constant practice. It is commonly said, “it is the man behind the weapon who matters’. He has to use his weapon quickly and boldly, if possible shoot to kill, as is taught. Also he is required to make a quick appreciation of the situation for using his weapon in all the operations of war. Officers are required to pass courses and promotion examinations.
Bold Action Jam GHULAM DIN and NK KALA KHAN
I am narrating below some bold action of some poorly educated soldiers.
Havildar GHULAM DIN was performing the duties of officers Mess Hav of 7/2 Punjab Regt. After about 12 years service he was promoted L/NK, and after another four years due to relaxation in the educational standard, he was promoted Havildar. He was not happy as a Mess Hav. The officers Mess cook (a Madrasi Muslim) was educated due to his help the Mess Hav was able to keep the accounts. GHULAM DIN had frequently requested for his transfer to a rifle company but both the PUNJABI Muslim Company commanders had refused to accept him because of his weak educational qualification.
D Company (DOGRA) was holding defensive locality near the Battalion HQ. One day a recce patrol from D Company was sent to collect information of the enemy that was reported in a position about two miles in front of a tree covered long ridge. On the right of the D Company locality a small Muslim village was located about 400 yards from the Bn HQs. One day Hav GHULAM DIN with a Mess waiter and a sepoy in uniform went to buy some chicken from that village, although the officers were also authorized free ration with Rs. 30 as allowance per month. In broken Urdu a villager informed the Mess Hav that a patrol of our unit was hiding on a low detached hill covered with bamboo trees close to the village. Because the village was situated behind a hillock covered with trees, it remained safe from enemy artillery fire. The Mess Have reached the hiding place of the patrol in a few minutes where only one sentry was on duty; the rest were resting. Tea was prepared by a sepoy in the village. The Dogra NCO (patrol commander) looked upset on being caught. Arriving back Hav GHULAM DIN told me about the location of the Dogra patrol and I informed the 2nd-in-command during lunch interval and requested him to transfer the Mess Hav to a rifle company. He agreed and the same time the Dogra commander was informed about the location of the patrol sent by him. The patrol commander was severely admonished and sent two miles forward for 48 hours recce.
From his rifle company Hav GHULAM DIN was sent twice on recce patrol and brought back valuable tactical information about the enemy. On returning by a track just before sunset he found a haversack of an enemy soldier which contained some documents, deciphered at 7 Division HQs which gave the location of the enemy regiment deployed in front. His reports were appreciated and within a month he was promoted JAMADAR and appointed platoon commander, because due to his performance as a patrol leader, the requirement of educational standard was relaxed.
In the battle of KABYU (about) 15 miles north of MOUNT POPA – Central Burma) B Company, while advancing on the road suddenly came under heavy enemy firing. The leading patrol of Jam GHULAM DIN engaged the enemy with deadly fire and attacked from the rear. NK KALA KHAN (only 3rd class Roman Urdu) was cut off with his section for some hours and accounted for 24 of the enemy, whereas GHULAM DIN’s platoon had killed about three dozen Japanese, a total of 60 dead bodies were counted. The success in the battle of KABYU was won due to the bold action of Jem GHULAM DIN and NK KALA KHAN; they were decorated with immediate award of Military Cross and IDSM respectively.
Bold Action of NK ABDULLAH KHAN
During January 1949 I was serving with 4 Punjab as Company Commander. The Battalion was deployed in SADABAD Valley BHIMBER Sector, KASHMIR. Soon after the CEASEFIRE in January 1949 we decided to occupy vacant tactical grounds so that, according to the ground rule, we could claim another 500 yards area in front.
KALI DHAR was tactically the most important feature in the sector. Another high and long hill in the vicinity was also dominating vast area all around. With the help of binoculars we discovered that movement of the Indian (enemy) sentry could be seen in the east of the hill. But no movement was seen on the western part of the hill; it appeared vacant. It was apparent that if we occupied the western part of the hill the area around and the flowing nullah close to the foot of the hill would be included in AZAD KASHMIR. The CO therefore decided to occupy the dominating vacant portion of the hill. A fighting patrol consisting of 25 jawans carrying 3 Light Machine Guns, one 2” mortar, entrenching tools, wireless set, one day cooked meal and personal weapons were selected. The intelligence Havildar (middle pass expert in map reading was promoted by superseding some senior NAIKS) was selected as the patrol commander. He had seen the hill and the area through binoculars many a time during his duty period. He worked out the degree from the starting point and calculated the distance in paces from the map. He was confident to reaching the objective during the dark hours. All through the jawans were also shown the objective and the enemy position. All the members attended the verbal order session. The patrol left the forward base and crossed the start line. It was a cold night but due to the moon visibility was good for fifty yards. The whole night the battalion wireless set remained open to receive signal from the patrol. Complete silence induced us to believe that the patrol had completed its task by occupying the western side of the hill.
We were all disappointed when at about 0800 hours the patrol commander returned with his men. According to him an enemy strong patrol had challenged them that fire would be opened if they would not vacate the area. At the same time about two enemy platoons shouted ‘charge, charge’, so in order to avoid a clash with the superior enemy force, he briskly retired from the position. However during their stay on the hill they had managed to dig a few trenches.
In view of the tactical importance of the western part of the hill it was essential to occupy it, also because the meeting of the UN observers (Col COBLENZ and Col KELLY, both US Army) with Indian and Pakistani representatives was going to be held after three days on our side of the KALI DHAR ridge. The CO decided to make another attempt.
I was commanding B Company (which my younger son SADI commander after about 40 years), on order I selected NK ABDULLAH whom I thought to be bold and able to occupy the centre part of the hill which was likely to be unoccupied by the enemy. I was sure he would be able to face the enemy challenge. NK ABDULLAH had passed 3rd Class Roman Urdu and had been superseded by the Intelligence Havildar. During the 2nd Great War while serving with 3 Punjab in Italy (1944-45) as a LI NI had led a patrol against the German position and for his bold action was awarded Military Medal. He saw the entire hill with binoculars, with help of an educated sepoy he worked out the degree and distance in paces of the centre of the hill. He was given command of 25 Jawans with 3 LMGs, one 2” mortar, entrenching tools and a wireless set. They were to carry one day cooked meal. Wireless silence was to be observed. With permission he selected 5 jawans and stalked close to the foot of the hill; he and the jawans had a close look of the hill, the climb upto the centre part of the hill looked difficult. The hill down to the foot was full of trees and grass. The patrol commander decided to climb up to the centre of the bill by moving between the trees. He stayed with his 5 jawans in the foot of the hill, hiding between the trees.
An hour before dark ABDULLAH sent back two jawans to guide all the jawans of the patrol up to the foot of the hill. The night was cold but due to the moon visibility was good for upto about fifty yards. We all were waiting for a clash and firing to start. My Company was alerted for counter attack and concentrated close of the foot of the hill. At 2200 hours a message on the wireless, in the form of agreed ‘DOT DOT’ was received, this was the success signal. We all felt happy as the tension was over. However, the most dangerous period was likely to approach at daylight for a clash with the enemy counter attack.
At sunlight a few bursts of LMG were fired from the west side of the hill but then all was quiet. We scanned the area with binoculars and saw some soldiers withdrawing. NK ABDULLAH informed on wireless that the enemy had vacated the west part of the hill. This was a great success that was achieved due to the boldness of NK ABDULLAH. To this day, that hill remains a part of AZAD KASHMIR. NK ABDULLAH was promoted Havildar and in his case educational standard was waived. His promotion was communicated to him on the wireless. On his visit to the Battalion HQs he reported that twice the strong enemy patrol had shouted ‘charge, charge’, which ABDULLAH had replied with a few bursts of LMG fire. The enemy also shouted ‘vacate the area, we will attack.’ He shouted back, “come and attack, you all will be killed with our fire.” In view of the presence of trenches on the west side of the hill, UN observers were convinced that that part of the hill had been part of our defensive position before the Cease Fire.
Bold Action of Sub KARAM DAD
He was one of the best JCOs of 14 Punjab because professionally had an edge over most of the JCOs. Educationally he was average (Primary pass), had managed to pass the required standard for promotion to the rank of N/Sub. His knowledge about minor tactics was fairly sound because during training exercise with troops, his performance as a platoon commander and acting company commander was often appreciated. As 2nd-in-command (senior JCO) of his company he used to take keen interest in the training of sportsmen and some of them earned “National Colours” in their respective events.
During the Sept 1965 war my battalion was short of experienced officers for the command of rifle companies. Although some subaltern were present but not experienced enough to command Rifle Company. My faith in the ability of Sub KARAM DAD forced me to appoint him as company commander. From the river TAWI up to the town of JAURIAN for most of the distance his company had led the advance as VANGUARD and valiantly brushed aside enemy opposition enroute. During the encounter battles his company had inflicted casualties on the enemy, captured some prisoners and lot of arms and ammunition left by the enemy during their hasty withdrawal. During the attack on JAURIAN by 14 Punjab, Sub KARAM DAD’s rifle company was the right forward company. The enemy opened up with machine gun fire to stop the advance but with ‘Fire and Move’ the company kept on advancing briskly. Enemy machine guns were destroyed by artillery fire which was called by KARAM DAD, and directed by him, on his company wireless set. His company machine guns and light machine guns had effectively engaged the enemy from a flank and managed to destroy the opposition. His company charged and captured the objective, the enemy ran back helter-skelter. Sub KARAM DAD was awarded SITATA-I-JURAT for his bold action.
A Passage from Field Marshal WAVELL’s book – SOLDIERS AND SOLDIERING
The following passage is being appended from the above book for the interest of our learned readers:
“I remember an officer in my Division at ALDERSHOT, shortly before the war, who had made several unsuccessful attempts to pass for promotion to the rank of Major. He had won the DSO and MC in the 1914-18 war and had subsequently been given a brevet majority for good work in peace as a Regimental Officer. I asked the War Office to excuse him from further examination, saying that he was one of the very best Company Commanders in my Division and was thoroughly efficient but that he lacked book learning and got confused in these written examinations. The War Office was hard hearted and insisted that he should have another attempt. The poor officer gave up his hunting all one winter to study with a crammer and failed again. The War Office then agreed to promote him, which they might just as well have done at once. He justified my opinion of his efficiency by commanding a battalion and then a brigade with considerable success in the last war.”
