Abstract
Afghanistan has always been an intrinsic part of the political, economic and cultural developments in Central Asia in the past. This nexus will certainly become even much stronger and interdependent in the future. Therefore, the paper sheds some light on the role of Afghanistan in the Central Asia’s yesterday, today and tomorrow.
Introduction
The ongoing conflict situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) is one of the most serious threats to the regional security in Central Asia (CA). In the 1990s, following their independence, the CA states (except Uzbekistan) did not pay much attention to the processes occurring in the neighboring Afghanistan. However, after coming to the power in the IRA the religious extremist group Taliban in 1996, the Central Asian countries have revised their policies towards this country. This change in their attitude was provoked by the frequent cases of illegal entry of various terrorist organizations from the territory of the IRA (infiltration of insurgents during the civil war in Tajikistan from Afghanistan, events in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and in the Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan in 2000, explosions in Tashkent in February 1999, etc.), as well as the awareness of the necessity to resist increasing spread of radical forms of Islam. As a result, there was an intensification of the foreign policy efforts of the Central Asian countries to resolve the situation in the IRA.
Another unfavourable aspect is the drug production in Afghanistan and its transit through Central Asia to Russia and the EU which has a destabilizing effect on the region. The Central Asian countries therefore need to strengthen the fight against drug production in Afghanistan too. The authorized counter narcotic agencies of the Central Asian countries, the participating countries of the ISAF and other interested countries need to develop stronger and much more structured cooperation in this regard.
The Afghan conflict has indeed a permanent destructive impact on the regional security and stability in Central Asia. At the same time, its intensity and vertical increase in scope are posing even more growing destructive consequences for both Afghanistan itself and the neighboring regions despite the involvement of the biggest military troops and financial resources.
As can be seen in the current situation in the IRA, the settlement of the conflict seems to be unreachable without meaningful participation of neighboring countries in addition to the concerned great powers. The concentration of the major efforts of the region and the whole international community on building the necessary economic infrastructure, the development of such important areas as education and health care could have a stabilizing effect on the situation in Afghanistan. Based on these arguments, this paper reviews the positions of each Central Asian country towards Afghanistan and the threats its posing by envisaging its future, after the withdrawal of the main international military forces which is expected to mark a historical watershed.
Literature Review
There is a certain amount of research on the relations of Central Asia and Afghanistan. As noted by S. Frederick Starr (2008), since Afghanistan and Central Asia had constituted a single cultural zone for 3000 years, they offered related challenges and possibilities today. He (2005) even recognized Central Asia and Afghanistan as a single region “Greater Central Asia” linked by common interests and common needs.
Stephen Aris (2013) paid attention to the fact that the states bordering Afghanistan had not been active multilateral actors, preferring to conduct their security affairs and relations bilaterally, and when participating in multilateral security framework, had taken a cautious approach.
S. Neil Macfarlane (2004) considered that Central Asia’s significance for international security derived from a spatial imagination and territorial reasoning that situate Central Asia on the ‘front line’ with Afghanistan, and even as part of the same region.
Many scholars are worried about perspective impact of US and NATO forces withdrawal in 2014. In this context Barry Buzan (2003) stressed on the permanent terroristic threat from Afghanistan. As he wrote the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fought with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, taking heavy losses, but the battle-hardened remains also picked up ‘leftover’ al-Qaeda Arabs. They were expected to shift from insurgency to terror and assassinations and to be regrouping in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan before hitting at Uzbekistan. The non-violent radicals in Hizb ut-Tahrir were accused of coordinating destabilisation efforts with IMU.
Stephen Blank (2012) emphasized that Central Asian perceptions of Afghanistan’s trajectory after the U.S. withdrawal were an important, even potentially crucial, element in the future evolution of Central Asia’s international relations and a significant contributory factor to their ties with the other great powers and regional players.
He was firmly convinced that the situation in Afghanistan after the U.S. leaves would have a major and most likely negative influence upon the development of Central Asian states’ relations not only with Washington but also with Moscow, Beijing, Kabul, New Delhi, Islamabad, and Tehran. Everything seen and heard indicated that the geopolitical rivalry for influence in and over Central Asia among the great powers had, if anything intensified and would certainly not stop simply because Western troops were departing from the area.
Jos Boonstra, Marlene Laruelle and Sebastian Peyrouse (2014) emphasized some real potential spillovers to Central Asia from US and NATO forces withdrawal. These included foremost the potential negative impact of a possible collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or substantial flows of refugees from Afghanistan to its northern neighbours, in addition to the risk of increasing destabilisation in Tajikistan resulting from intra-Tajik interaction on both sides of the border.
According to their opinions, the borders between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and especially Tajikistan would remain a source of concern for Central Asia and the international community. The drug flow from Afghanistan through Central Asia en route to Russia and Europe was likely to remain a serious problem.
The ongoing conflict situation in Afghanistan is one of the most serious threats to the regional security in Central Asia (CA) today. In the 1990’s, the CA countries, except Uzbekistan, did not pay that much attention to evolving developments in the neighbouring Afghanistan. However, as the religious-extremist group of Taliban came into power, they reshaped and even intensified their policies towards Afghanistan. This shift in political agenda was provoked mostly by frequent illegal entry of various terrorist organisations from Afghanistan that left the CA states under explosive events. To name a few, infiltration of insurgents during the civil war in Tajikistani, terrorist acts in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and explosions in Tashkentii in 1999 and in the Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan in 2000iii. And, of course, the raising awareness of unfavourable consequences resulting from growing radical Islam had also no less influence in changing the CA states’ foreign policies in regard to Afghanistan. Thus these countries’ interest in regulation of the situation in the neighboring country has remarkably grown since then.
Over the last decade of the 20th century, Kazakhstan had paid less attention, if any, to the problem of Afghanistan as a security issue, since it is not directly bordered. The other CA countries which border Afghanistan had been considered a buffer zone for Kazakhstan.
However with the outset of the US operation “Enduring freedom” in Afghanistan in October 2001, Kazakhstan has become more interested in the Afghan problem. In 2003, it opened its embassy in Kabul and minister of foreign affairs K. Tokayev visited the country in 2006iv. The next year has marked another watershed when Kazakhstan adopted an action plan to promote the development of Afghanistan for 2007-2008. As a part of the plan, the Kazakhstani government provided over $2 million to the Afghan ministry of finance for the implementation of a number of socio-economic projects such as building schools in Samangan province, hospitals in the province of Bamyan and renovating the asphalt road Kunduz-Taloqanv.
Two years later, the governments of two states signed an agreement on cooperation in the education sphere, according to which 1000 Afghans would be studying in the Kazakh institutes of higher education during next 10 yearsvi. Kazakhstan also supports the project of the U.S. administration on the formation of the New Silk Roadvii, which should provide the involvement of the neighboring countries to the socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Astana developed a plan for the economic revival of Afghanistan which consists of over 20 projects, including:
• The restoration of Jalalabad irrigation canal;
• The rehabilitation and construction of complete cascade of power stations on the
Kabul River, creation of reservoirs along the river;
• The creation of specialized stations of agricultural machinery and equipment that
would assist farmers in cultivating the land, harvesting;
• The construction of a plant for the smelting of metals and production of
reinforcement rods;
• The restoration of urban transport in Kabul
• The establishment of a full cycle development of gas fields in Afghanistan, etc.viii
In December 2009, NATO and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the conditions of ground transit cargo in support of NATO International Security Assistance Force. In 2002, the sides determined the procedure and the conditions for using Almaty Airport as a spare area for international coalition aircrafts’ emergency landingix.
In October 2010, after the meeting between the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Brussels, it was announced that the Kazakh army would be sent to Afghanistanx. However, shortly after a series of terrorist attacks in the cities of Aktobe and Astana in May 2011 the Kazakh side rejected this planxi.
The above mentioned Kazakhstan’s foreign policy nuances in the settlement of the Afghan problem and its improving relations with the Afghan government demonstrate:
• First of all, Astana’s active involvement in Afghan conflict which can be perceived as its aspiration to get the status of a “regional leader in Central Asia” before the international community;
• Second, perhaps, promoting multilateral (support of the “New Silk Road” project, participation in the Istanbul process “Heart of Asia”) and bilateral initiatives to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan can be considered as an element of the Kazakh side promotion of its international image;
• Third, Kazakhstan, like other Central Asian countries, has no direct access to the ocean and is in need of alternative transport corridors through Afghanistan;
• Fourth, Kazakhstan is concerned about the growth of drug trafficking from Afghanistan.
In the short term, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan, in our opinion, will not undergo major changes. Primary efforts will be directed to the support of the U.S. and NATO activity in resolving the Afghan problem, the development of trade with Afghanistan, the growth of economic presence and humanitarian assistance. It should be emphasized that as the withdrawal of the main contingent of the international coalition forces is approaching, it is possible to observe an increasing interest of Kazakhstan in establishing cooperation on the Afghan issue with the Central Asian states and the creation of regional mechanisms for responding to a possible escalation of tensions in Afghanistan.
(a) Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has been supporting the activities of the international coalition since the early days of the NATO operation in Afghanistan. The United States and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to open the U.S. Air Force base at Manas airport in 2001. The base still remains a strategically important point for NATO military missions in Afghanistan. However, in 2013 it was announced that Bishkek would not renew the agreement on further operation of the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan and close the transit center at the “Manas” airport on July 11, 2014xii.
Political cooperation between the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan advanced as the Afghan embassy was opened in Bishkek in 2002. However, due to the lack of funding it was closed already in 2006. The Afghan permanent diplomatic mission in Kyrgyzstan became again fully operational from 2011 onward. The Kyrgyz Republic opened a Trade House in Kabul in May 2007. The Kyrgyz embassy, in its turn, started activities in the capital of Afghanistan in March 2010.
The threat to the national security of Kyrgyzstan coming from Afghanistan is primarily the growth of drug trafficking (one of the most important transit routes for delivery of narcotics runs through the south of the country). Secondly, the penetration of various members of terrorist groups in Kyrgyzstan from Afghanistan could destabilize the whole situation in the country. Furthermore, Bishkek is concerned by the growth of radical religious groups in Afghanistan that may contribute to the formation of the “radical ideological center” and militant training camps.
The participation of the Kyrgyz Republic in resolving the situation in Afghanistan can be observed in the following:
• Providing military base in Manas for the needs of the ISAF;
• The training courses for Afghan customs’ employees opened with the support
of the OSCE Centre in July 2010 in Bishkekxiii;
• Planning to export electricity to Afghanistan after the construction of the
necessary substations and transmission lines;
• The proposal to use the territory of Kyrgyzstan for negotiations between the
concerned Afghan political parties.
In the short and medium terms, probably Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy in the settlement of the Afghan conflict will support the efforts of the international coalition at the Afghan territory. However, it should be stated that considering the permanent tensions in the recent internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek prefers to concentrate its activities mostly on solving urgent issues of domestic agenda. Moreover, the continuing problems in the socio-economic sphere primarily can require focusing on these issues from the government’s foreign policy. As a result, Afghanistan is not included in the most priority political agenda directions of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy.
(b) Tajikistan
Tajikistan has also supported the NATO operation in Afghanistan from its inception. Subsequently, it agreed to the transit of goods for the needs of the ISAF in Afghanistan.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been developing intensively since 2001. Tajikistan opened its embassy in Kabul in 2002. In November 2002, the Tajik Consulate was established in Mazar-e Sharif xiv.
The national security threat for Tajikistan emanating from Afghanistan is primarily the drug transit (Tajikistan is one of the most important transit routes for the delivery of drugs into Russia and the EU). For example, only in 2013, the Tajik Agency for Drug Control seized more than 6.7 tons of drugsxv. Secondly, the penetration of various members of terrorist groups in the country from the Afghan territory has a destabilizing impact on the country. A number of members of the so-called “United Tajik Opposition” after reaching a truce in Tajikistan in 1997 moved to Afghanistan, and today their return to Tajikistan may adversely affect the security of the country. Events in the Rasht district in eastern Tajikistan in September-October 2010xvi and in Badakhshan in 2012xvii could justify these assumptions.
Participation of Tajikistan in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan is as follows:
• The French Air Force was admitted at the airport in Dushanbe with the contingent
of 6 “Mirage” military air-craftsxviii;
• The creation of the training courses on combating drug trafficking for employees
of the Afghan security forces;
• The export of small quantities of electricity in spring and summer;
• Afghan students in the field of medicine are being educated in Tajik medical institutesxix.
Tajikistan’s foreign policy primarily aims to support the efforts of the international coalition in Afghanistan. In the short and medium term foreign policy of Tajikistan in the settlement of the Afghan conflict can be based on the support of the strains of the international coalition and gaining credits, grant assistance for the implementation of infrastructure projects (the construction of roads and railways, power lines) passing through the territory of Afghanistan.
(c) Turkmenistan
For Turkmenistan, the NATO military operation in Afghanistan has brought a number of negative consequences. First, the profit from trade turnover with the Taliban was ceased. Previously, the Turkmen side had established contacts with the Afghan government during the reign of the Talibanxx. Second, the military actions have undermined all previously reached agreements with the Taliban on laying the pipeline through Afghanistanxxi. However, Turkmenistan officially has declared its solidarity with the anti-terrorism campaign at the Afghan territory.
The main threat to Turkmenistan coming from Afghanistan is the drug transit through the territory of the country. In 2012 Afghanistan produced approximately 74% of opium (the raw material for heroin) in the world. Every year the country is exporting 3,500 tons of opiumxxii and a significant part of these drugs is being passed through the territory of Turkmenistanxxiii.
Turkmenistan’s participation in the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan is as follows:
• Turkmenistan delivers up to 400 megawatts of Turkmen electricity to Afghanistanxxiv;
• Turkmenistan periodically sends humanitarian aid consisting of diesel fuel,
flour and clothes;
• Turkmenistan assists in the training of the Afghan personnel by annually reserving
a number of seats in its educational institutions for the citizens of the neighboring
country, and provides free medical care to the population of the border areasxxv;
• The Turkmen side in 2007 cancelled the debt of Afghanistan in the amount of
3.8 million dollarsxxvi.
Turkmenistan’s initiatives to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan:
• The offer to host a high-level international meeting on confidence-building measures
in Afghanistan and the development of effective institutions of government under
the auspices of the UN;
• The assistance in training the personnel to Afghan governance structures in
various spheres under the auspices of the UN program;
• The building of the railroad Atamyrat-Imamnazar-Akina from Turkmenistan
to Afghanistan;
• The construction of the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline – Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India (TAPI);
• The increase of electricity supply to Afghanistanxxvii.
It should be noted that the Turkmen infrastructure projects has already been at the implementation stage. Considering the start of the withdrawal of a large volume of cargoes of the international coalition forces, international financial institutions may provide tangible support to Turkmenistan’s initiatives aimed at socio-economic recovery of Afghanistan and improvement of the trade with neighboring countries.
(d) Uzbekistan
Since gaining its independence, the foreign policy priority of Uzbekistan has been to ensure security and stability in the republic, and, in general, in the whole region of Central Asia. One of the main threats to national and regional security during the recent decades has been the unresolved Afghan problem.
The President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov in his speech at the UN General Assembly on 24 October, 1995 drew attention to the Afghan problem, which was evaluated as “a real threat to peace and security not only in Central Asia but also to the whole world”xxviii. In consequence, during his statements in the international arena I. Karimov urged to take concrete measures in Afghanistan in order to prevent further escalation of the situation and the increasing threat of destabilization in the region.
In 1997, the Contact Group “6+2” involving all the neighboring countries of Afghanistan (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan and China), as well as the United States and the Russian Federation was organized with the initiative of Uzbekistan. In July 1999, for the first time, Afghan warring parties came to the negotiating table in Tashkent, and after the meeting “Tashkent Declaration on the basic principles of the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan” was adopted. This document has also been approved as an official UN document on the Afghan settlement, which testifies its recognition by the international community.
After the events of 9/11, Uzbekistan was among the first countries who expressed full support for the U.S. in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan. Tashkent has still been one of the most important participants in the process of stabilizing the situation in neighboring Afghanistan.
Threats stemming from Afghanistan to Central Asia, particularly to Uzbekistan:
• The spread of Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism ideas.
• The activities of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.
• The drug trafficking.
It should be stressed that Uzbekistan has already completed the construction of the railway Hairatan – Mazar-Sharif length of 75 km in the beginning of 2011. In future, it is planned to continue the railway to Herat in western Afghanistan, where it will be connected with the railroad coming from the Iranian border. This will allow Uzbekistan to reach the major ports in Iran with the aim of further export of its goods by sea to various countries.
Uzbekistan today makes a great contribution to the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan:
• In December 2001 a protocol on humanitarian assistance supplies from Uzbekistan
to Afghanistan was signed between the Government of Uzbekistan and the UN;
• Uzbekistan is the important part of the “Northern Distribution Network”’s
non-military cargo deliveries for the needs of the international coalition forces;
• Uzbek companies and engineers have built 11 bridges along the route
“Mazari Sharif-Kabul”;
• Uzbekistan provides electricity to Afghanistan by the power line up to Kabul.
• Uzbektelecom and Afghan Telecom Corp. have an agreement to establish
fiber-optic communication and provide access to the Internetxxix.
In the settlement of the Afghan problem, the Uzbekistan’s initiative on the possibility of achieving consensus in Afghanistan by providing negotiations between the opposing forces, the formation of a coalition government, in which all ethno-national, religious and territorial groups would be presented can be the effective decisionxxx. Sure, it’s a difficult path that requires time, patience, political will and mutual compromise between the warring parties on key issues dividing the country. However, in the current realities of Afghanistan other alternatives for establishing peace and stability seem spectral.
In addition, it is imperative to ensure the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan, the respect to its ethno-demographic characteristics and religious feelings of the Afghan people, the unconditional fulfillment of commitments by the international community to assist in the socio-economic revival of the countryxxxi. Importance of active participation of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries in resolving the situation was stressed by the U.S. President Barack Obama in his strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009xxxii.
It must be emphasized that the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov was the first political leader who emphasized on the absence of a military solution to the Afghan problem already in 1996: “Regardless who would be on power today or tomorrow in Kabul, all the warring parties should understand that: there is no alternatives to the peaceful political settlement of the Afghan tragedy. War and the arms will not solve this problem. Only political peace talks, attended by all the warring parties, all ethnic, regional and religious groups can find the solution to the Afghan problem”xxxiii.
Uzbekistan is interested in creating a stable and developing statehood in Afghanistan with the authorities, who are able to take control of the situation in the whole country. Only in this case we can talk about security in the region, which will undoubtedly serve to the further dynamic development of Uzbekistan.
In conclusion, it should be noted that security and stable development of the countries of Central Asia is directly dependent on the settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan. Since the onset of the US and NATO military operation in Afghanistan in 2001, the situation in Central Asia in the field of security has not improved, that can be confirmed by various examples of terroristic acts committed at the territory of CA states.
In our view, the main goal of different terroristic groups in the CA operating from the territory of Afghanistan is still concentrated on Uzbekistan. Destabilization of the most densely populated country located in the center of the region can lead to very negative consequences for all the countries of Central Asia. The so-called Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT) still has been trying to create sources of instability in Central Asia. According to reports, the core of IMT is based in the Afghan-Pakistani borderxxxiv.
Thus, the Afghan factor has permanent destructive impact on regional security and stability in Central Asia. At the same time, we can reveal the regularity: each new stage of the Afghan conflict leads to its escalation and increasing negative consequences for both Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Each new phase of the Afghan problem is becoming a larger and destructive, involving new great resources and destabilizing new territories.
At the present stage, it is difficult to contend that direct military intervention of external forces in the conflict in Afghanistan has led to a radical change in the political situation in the country. However, it has left open the question of reunification, restoration of statehood, strengthening country’s security and stability.
Based on the above, we can draw the following conclusions:
1. The current situation in Afghanistan may not be stabilized without meaningful participation of neighboring countries and the concerned great powers.
2. The analysis of the situation in Afghanistan over the past period has revealed the presence of still unused great opportunities for cooperation among the neighboring countries and the international community.
The concentration of the major efforts of the region and the whole international community on building the necessary economic infrastructure, the development of such important areas as education and health care could have a conciliative effect on the situation at the Afghan territory.
3. The growth of the drug production in Afghanistan and its transit through Central Asia to Russia and the EU has a destabilizing effect on the region. The CA countries may need to strengthen the fight against drug production in Afghanistan. For example, possibly it can be done in the framework of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre in Almaty. The authorized counternarcotic agencies of Central Asian countries, the participating countries of the ISAF and other interested parties may need to develop strong cooperation.
4. In anticipation of the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan risks and challenges to regional security in Central Asia have been increasing. Hence, in the purpose of timely, adequate and full-length response to the possible threats regional cooperation and mutual assistance in Central Asia may need to be enhanced.
5. The growing militarization of Afghanistan, coupled with the lack of efficiency of the national security forces is provoking the concern on the Afghan weapons, which can fall into the hands of destructive forces operating in the Central Asian states.
References
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vIbid
viIbid
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xxvIbid
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