One is proud of the will, courage, commitment and sacrifice of our 34th PMA Sri Lankan course-mates, they fought terrorism for over 25 years through Sri Lanka’s darkest period. My good friend Maj Gen (Lucky) Wijayaratne, who when commanding 1st Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLI) at Panagoda “inducted” me into his battalion, was killed in action. When Prabhakaran and the remnants of his Tamil Tigers were ultimately cornered by the Sri Lankan Army in 2009, the Indian Foreign Minister demanded the offensive be stopped to allow them safe passage. Poised to eliminate the bloody scourge that had turned their island paradise into a hell with the help of India’s Research & Analytical Wing (RAW), the Sri Lankans flatly refused.
The timing of the failed terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore was too much of a coincidence, it was not a “kill” mission but a bid to kidnap and exchange them for the Tamil Tigers’ leader. The far greater fallout was that it put paid to international cricket in Pakistan. Incidentally, why did the terrorists infiltrating Mehran Air Base in 2011 ignore and walk past far more sophisticated warplanes on the tarmac and specifically target destroying the India-specific P3C Orion aircraft parked some distance away?
RAW’s machinations in Balochistan continue, RAW-controlled Afghanistan’s Intelligence agency has a proven association with TTP. Latif Mehsud, TTP’s No. 2, escorted by Afghan intelligence agents to meet Karzai, was captured by US Special Forces and taken to Bagram. Why did Karzai vociferously demand his release? And who gives sanctuary and support to Maulana Fazlullah? Who were the Uzbek terrorists working for? Forgive me for being suspicious!
Had the lightly armed ASF personnel failed to stop the terrorists getting to the several passenger aircraft readying for take-off at Karachi Airport, the loss of lives in the ensuing inferno would have been catastrophic. Mercenaries for a “false flag” operation, the Uzbeks had a far more deadly purpose. Foreign airlines, irrespective of the windfall profits they make at the expense of PIA, courtesy of our deeply flawed “open skies” policy, would have ceased their operations forthwith. Killing a women passenger and aircrew shooting up a PIA aircraft landing at Peshawar airport shows that somebody is desperate to isolate Pakistan from the world. While a disaster did not take place in Karachi, those exploiting our horrendous internal situation makes it waiting to happen.
Flush with ill-gotten money, the egos of our so-called VIPs, the “democratically” elected political elite who can to afford private security, require blocking entire roads and moving around with whole convoys of police (and Rangers) mobiles with flashing lights and blaring sirens. Unless local police comply with their “fashion statement”, they are harassed, transferred and/or terminated. Diverting significant police personnel from their given task of “policing” relegates the police to a passive role and affects the security and sanctity of the common citizen and his property. The tactical commitment 24/7 in routine functions in any case degenerates the ability of the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to pick early warning signals of impending hostile action and slows down their response time. The police are unable to take the initiative in actively locating and ferreting out terrorists from various localities.
Logistics for terrorist hideouts, money, ammunition, supplies, uniforms, vehicles, safe mobility through the streets etc are very much the responsibility of the Provincial LEAs to interdict. This does not absolve the Federal Govt and their myriad number of intelligence agencies. While the Rangers, Police and Army responded fairly swiftly, they got lucky differentiating between friend and foe in eliminating “friendly fire” casualties without clear-cut fail-safe boundaries during the smoke and confusion at night. Somebody up there is (still) looking after us!
Lessons learnt from Karachi Airport, viz (1) non-existent unity of command (2) lack of coordinated intelligence gathering and sharing (3) lack of adequate weapons, equipment, vehicles, light helicopters, etc (4) lack of trained manpower dedicated to tackling terrorism and protecting sensitive sites (5) duplication of effort and (6) bureaucratic interference and insensitivity to LEAs’ financial requirements. Delivering reports cautioning threats to every conceivable sensitive location, our intelligence agencies claim it as an achievement if it happens. Without “actionable intelligence” being shared immediately, terrorism cannot be countered.
Critical assets such as ports, airports, etc must come under a unified command dedicated to organizing, planning, training, equipping and implementing both protection and counter-terrorism response. The criteria of public assets (airports) will differ from non-public assets (airbases) but the mission statement remains the same. At present our protection, response and rescue efforts remain fragmented, even the Army’s Defence Security Guards (DSG) are supplemented by denuding the fighting formations of infantry units on makeshift arrangements. Are the affected Corps, Divisional and Brigade Commanders content with the diversion of their fighting troops?
The Border and Internal Security Forces i.e. Rangers in Sindh and Punjab, Frontier Corps (FC) in KPK and Balochistan, and FIA’s Immigration, report to the Ministry of Interior, ASF to Aviation Division and Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) to the Ministry of Narcotics Control. Officered by the Army, all have multiple parents except for Immigration, the crisscrossing channels of command causing confusion and duplication. A “Homeland Security Command” comprising all the aforementioned (including the DSG) must a be dedicated and effective single command and control mechanism for protection of strategic assets and countering terrorism. Headed by a senior three star general, preferably someone having actual combat and internal security experience, it should immediately take over security of ports, airports, air, army and naval bases etc. Rangers and FC must separate their internal security and border security contingents. With NACTA becoming an integral part, a “Counterterrorism Force” (CTF) can be developed from within this Command.
Combining unity of command with amalgamated intelligence potential and commonality of personnel, weapons and equipment, etc under one single entity saves money by avoiding duplication. Instead of lip-service rhetoric and vacillation, there must be a credible and effective counter to the existential terrorism threat faced by this country.
