Future Australian Submarine Force – Ambitions and Reality

Australia is located at the confluence of three oceans and the ‘greatest cluster of strategically significant maritime straits in the world’, the Straits of Malacca.² Australian strategic environment is transforming due to United States rebalance to Pacific and regional military modernization. In the same context, ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc’ has been introduced in Defence White Paper 2013. Despite small population compared to larger continental mass, Australian maritime jurisdiction is the third largest in the world.³ Being an island nation, 99% of export by volume is dependent on sea.⁴ Although an ambitious modernization plan was presented in the 2009 Defence White Paper, about $20 billion of allocated funding was lost due to various austerity measures by 2012.⁵ While Defence White Paper 2013 reconfirmed most of the planned capabilities (including 12 future submarines)⁶, funding announced in 2013 indicated the loss of $33 billion till 2022.⁷ With promises to increase the defence funding upto 2% of GDP, the current funding levels (1.59%) are lowest since 1938.⁸ In order to analyse the capability which can be scaled back, abandoned or removed from current Australian Defence Force (ADF) structure, it has been argued that future submarines are an essential capability which can be scaled back (from twelve to nine) within the framework of strategic guidance. The resultant risk can be mitigated by increasing the availability of submarines with minimum Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) impacts.

Why Australia Needs Submarines?
The Defence White Papers 2013 recognises that Australian Defence Strategy is focussed on Maritime domain to maintain liberty of action of own forces and deny an adversary to use air and sea approaches to Australia.⁹ The Indo-Pacific Region is achieving rapid economic prosperity. Resultantly, the military modernization is also in progress. Most of the nations in the Indo-Pacific region are operating or acquiring submarines. According to a study conducted by Kokoda Foundation, by 2025 there will be total 36 submarines operating in Oceania and Southeast Asia excluding Thailand (due to uncertainties about future plans).¹⁰ Similarly, a total of 221 submarines will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region other than Australia.¹¹ Within this region China and India operate nuclear powered submarines and aggressively pursue future nuclear submarine programmes. Being a maritime nation with heavy reliance on seaborne trade, Australia needs submarine forces to defend its strategic interests. In a recent interview, the Defence Minister also acknowledged that ‘[Collins Class submarine is] the most important capability we’ve got at the moment’.¹² Apart from maritime arena, submarines heavily contribute to strategic interests of Australia during peace and war.¹³ Like other ADF assets, submarines are an essential capability to deter and defeat attacks on Australia. In peacetime, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance are major roles performed by submarines. They are deployed in various exercise and patrolling areas. During their exercises they understand traffic patterns, environmental data (temperature, pressure and salinity) and acoustic characteristics of the various platforms. Collection and analysis of this data is necessary in peacetime for subsequent utility in war. Second important task is contribution to naval diplomacy. Generally surface ships are best platforms for naval diplomacy; however, submarines are also used for such tasks between the closely allied nations. Participation of submarines in exercises, port visits also contribute to naval diplomacy. Even without participation in any such exercise, availability of submarines in any nation’s order of battle provides an edge in the diplomacy by ‘force in being’. The third important task performed by naval forces is constabulary operations. Submarines cannot do such tasks. However, they may be tasked for protection of offshore platforms and can provide disproportionate advantage compared to surface and air platforms deployed for the same tasks.¹⁴ The review of the roles performed by submarines reveals that submarine has unique characteristics which cannot be substituted by any other ADF asset. In view of regional military modernizations and international developments, there is a continued requirement to maintain the submarine capability in order to have a balanced force and maintain strategic relevance.

Current Submarine Capability and Future Plans
The current submarine capability comprised of six Collins Class submarines. The programme commenced in 1980s and first submarine was commissioned in 1996 and sixth submarine was commissioned in 2003. All the submarines were designed for 28 years of operational life. According to evaluation of service life conducted in 2012, the operational life of submarine can be extended to seven years operational cycle excluding the deep maintenance period. The Study into the Business of Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability, conducted by Mr John Coles,¹⁵ identified that Collins class availability is poor relative to other comparable submarines despite the fact that most of the submarines designed in 1980/90 are maintenance heavy. The nuclear and conventional submarines of this era spend around half of their time in various planned maintenance and repairing of defects. It was identified that logistic issues are an important part of the problem rather than legacy equipment and crewing difficulties. During the time of contract, it was planned to have each submarine available for 80% of designed life. It was expected that out of six, five submarines will always be available for deployment.¹⁶ Despite poor availability, sustainment of the Collins Class requires around 30% of Royal Australian Navy’s annual sustainment budget which attracts the attention of public and policy circles. The programme remained ‘at the top of the Government’s Programs of Concern’¹⁸ On the positive side, Collins Class submarine is acknowledged as the operationally potent submarine by allies. Currently it is the only conventional submarine with longer endurance and proven performance against US nuclear submarines and carrier battle groups.¹⁹ During various exercises the submarine penetrated in the ASW screen around US carrier group and underpinned the threat posed by the conventional submarines to naval task groups despite multidimensional ASW capabilities.²⁰

To protect Australian maritime interests, government has committed to replace the existing fleet of Collins Class submarines with 12 future submarines.²¹ The plan is to build the future submarines in South Australia for development of naval shipbuilding industry and maintenance of skills acquired during construction of Collins class submarines as well as operation of submarines.²² This programme also intends to enhance cooperation between Australia and US for development of undersea warfare. The option to acquire nuclear submarine has been ruled out. An amount of $200 million has been approved since 2009 to fund the studies for future submarine capability. Additionally research on the new Submarine Propulsion Energy Support and Integration Facility in Australia is also underway. While four options were available,²³ government has dropped two options involving military off the shelf (MOTS) options.²⁴ The decision is still pending between remaining two options which are an evolved Collins Class and a totally new design of the future submarine.²⁵ However, in an interview on 16 Oct 2013, Defence Minister David Johnston declared, ‘The evolved Collins is the leading option … capitalising on our evolving corporate knowledge, so we will see what the department has done and what the plan is, within the next month’.²⁶ He also emphasized the importance of life extension of existing fleet of Collins Class submarines to avoid capability gap during the transition from Collins to Future Submarine.²⁷

The evolved Collins Class submarine is considered to be a better choice. Because the experience achieved during designing, construction and operation of the Collins, benchmark the standards for future submarine programme. On the other hand, the design of totally new submarine requires considerable time in development, commissioning and gaining initial operating capability. This lengthy process entails gaps in the submarine capability. This timeframe is expected to be around 15 years so the first submarine will be in water in 2030 whereas Collins Class is expected to be retired from 2022 to 2013.²⁸ The design of a totally unique submarine will involve equipment from various sources, and a risk that all the equipment cannot be integrated in the best possible way due to different foreign disclosure procedures of individual countries. In such a situation, the Australia becomes the ultimate sufferer as many countries do not share complete information due to security and intellectual property right issues. The example of French origin Sonar array and US origin combat system on board Collins is a case in point where both the equipment could not be integrated due to similar issues.²⁹ Since the Collins Class is capable to fulfil Australian specific requirements, an evolution of the submarine will mature the process and further consolidate the knowledge and expertise acquired by the personnel and organization. The greatest advantage provided by Collins is the formulation of concepts and doctrines for the use of conventional submarine in the future maritime environment. The submarines were designed and built in the era when cold war ended and technological advances in microprocessors and software changed the naval technology. Japan and Sweden are two nations which have achieved domestic submarine capabilities with evolution of earlier designs and managing the shortcomings. Australia can benefit from this example and continue to improve the submarine industry.³⁰

How Submarine Capability Can be Scaled Back
Despite the plans to acquire 12 new submarines, the rationale to double the existing fleet of six has not been declared. The Defence Minister is reported to state the proceedings of a classified force posture review that keeping in view the deployment, training and maintenance cycle of submarines, three submarines enable to keep one deployed.³¹ Based on the same logic 12 submarines are planned so that at least 4 are always available for deployment. Hence two of them can be deployed for anti-submarine warfare roles and two can be used for other strategic tasks.³² Keeping in view the transit speed of conventional submarines (6 knots) and likely area of operation for Australian submarines (Middle East or South China Sea which is around 4000 NM), around four weeks out of eight week deployment cycle for any submarine will be consumed in transit to and from the area. Therefore only four weeks will be available for on station patrol. Moreover, mandatory activities like routine training and maintenance, pre-deployment preparations, post deployment actions dictate minimum of four submarines to ensure the availability of one deployed submarine.

Nonetheless, it is argued that twelve submarines are ‘nice to have’ and only nine can fulfil the requirements with improvement in submarine availability. Defence White Paper 2013 acknowledges, ‘direct armed attack on Australia remains unlikely, its consequences would be so serious that the possibility must be given priority in our defence planning. The defensive advantages of our geography remain, although they are being affected by the region’s military modernisation’.³³ A war like scenario is unlikely in bilateral domain; however, some incidents can trigger an all-out war involving multilateral partners. These scenarios can be boundary disputes in South China Sea, sovereignty issues on Taiwan or sectarian/ religious tensions in Middle East with impact on global energy flow. In any such scenario where US will be involved, Australia has to participate due to ANZUS alliance. Since US and other allies only operate nuclear submarines, Australian submarines can provide a better option to deploy a quiet, conventional submarine capable to ingress into littorals. Conventional submarines are restricted in their speed and underwater endurance, they remain liable to detection.³⁴ Latest Anti Access and Area Denial technology can force the conventional submarines to remain defensive and without conducting any offensive operations. Moreover in a highly contested nuclear and conventional submarine environment, the likelihood of an Australian submarine playing a ‘useful role’ in a far flung area can be suicidal. The deployment of submarine will be a dilemma due to available opportunities vis-à-vis threats. The only available employment for Australian submarine can be in defensive roles for protection of own ports and offshore installations against enemy submarines. For such a limited task, 12 submarines are ‘a nice to have’ especially in current environment of reduced funding, crew shortages and competing priorities.

Potential Savings and Risk Mitigation
As reduction in future submarines capability is operationally viable, potential savings through reduction in numbers and mitigation of associated risk will be deliberated. The operation and maintenance cost of Collins Class are an example of the expenditure.³⁵ Department of Defence expects that operating and maintenance costs will increase by a compound rate of 4.5% annually and the cost will reach $1 billion by 2021.³⁶ The exact acquisition cost of future submarine programme is difficult to forecast without finalizing the designs and capabilities of the submarines. Based on the historical trends of cost per tonne to build submarines, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) forecasted that each boat will cost around $3.04 billion in 2009. Hence for 12 boats, the expected cost is likely to be $36 billion.³⁷ The cost is more than the proposed cost of Joint Strike Fighter, thus making it most expansive defence acquisition project of Australian history.³⁸ Compared to price forecast by ASPI, a study conducted by Kokoda Foundation in 2011 estimated the price of 3000 – 4000 tonnes future submarine to be around $1.2 – 1.6 billions. The study also concluded that the complete budget will have additional non-recurring costs due to designs, management, trials and training, so total programme costs can be $18 billion.³⁹

The potential saving from reduction of three boats is more than $4.8 billion irrespective of ASPI or Kokoda Foundations forecasts.⁴⁰ Additionally $6 billion will be saved annually in terms of operation, maintenance and system upgrades of three submarines.41 So for a designed life of 30 years, a total of $180 billion will be saved in addition to procurement cost of more than $4.8 billion.

The reduction in planned submarine capability will entail a risk to submarine, anti-submarine and strategic strike capabilities of Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Since some of the tasks performed by submarines are unique which cannot be substituted by any other platform (longer endurance with capability to penetrate enemy defences without detection), other tasks can be substituted by other platforms. The future submarine force of nine boats will enable RAN to deploy at least three at any given time, whereas out of remaining six submarines, three will be on major refit and three can be boxed up to complement the operational fleet. The existing infrastructure to support submarines can be further enhanced to increase the availability of each submarine throughout the life cycles. The recommendations forwarded by Coles Review can be used as a starting point. The existing and planned maritime patrol aircraft (Defence Capability Plan AIR 7000 phase 2B and 2C) will enable extensive surveillance of the area against enemy submarine forces.⁴² As most of the submarines operating in the area are conventional submarines (except India and China), the rigorous patrolling by aircraft will be instrumental in detection of submarines during snorkelling. Continuous surveillance will also restrict the liberty of action of enemy submarines.

Relation to Strategic Guidance
The Defence White Paper 2013 describes Australia’s strategic interests. It is important to see how submarines can contribute to Australia’s strategic interests. Deterring and defeating attacks on Australia is the principal tasks assigned to ADF. It means that ADF shall be capable to deter and defeat attacks without any external support and this is only possible if the air-sea gap north of Australia is positively controlled. In case any hostile force is launched to land on Australian soil, future submarines will play an important role in interdiction of hostile forces. Although interdiction operation can also be conducted by surface and air platforms, submarines are more suitable for this task due to stealth and ability to penetrate in enemy waters. For such a task, submarines can be deployed in two different areas. One possibility is to operate in Indonesian archipelago for anti-shipping and anti-submarine patrol whereas second option is to deploy them close to enemy concentration areas, naval bases for ISR, offensive mining, land attack strikes or insertion of special operations forces.

Stability and security in the South Pacific and Indonesian Archipelago is second in the list of strategic interests. It means that law and order prevails in these areas and they do not become hostile to Australian interests. Generally surface forces (land and sea) are suitable for such tasks. However, aircraft and submarines can also be used for clandestine operations to insert Special Forces for ISR. Additionally surgical strikes are also a possibility prior intervention.

To contribute to the military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific is third important Australian strategic interests. It involves contribution to ANZUS alliance and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. This is only possible if ADF is a technologically advanced and professionally competent force to exert required influence. Historically Australian participation in various military campaigns has been outside the region. In that case conventional submarines have limitations due to their range and endurance. Presence of air to air refuellers enables the air force to deliver similar effects at far off distances.

To deter aggression against Australia, it is necessary to have technologically advanced and professionally competent submarine force. It is only possible through acquisition of right submarine and consolidation of skills acquired by the submarine crew through regular exercises with own and allied forces. For politico-diplomatic strength, the submarine force shall also have capabilities superior or at least comparable to regional submarines. For effective deterrence, submarine force shall be able to convey the ‘will and capability’ of the Australia. ‘This is an area where the Collins Class submarine program has not met expectations. Rightly or wrongly the Collins Class submarines are not perceived internationally as we might have hoped and consequently the deterrent value of them has been undermined. It must be a lesson carried forward in the selection of a future submarine.’⁴³

The strategic guidance provided in Defence White Papers confirms that Australian Defence Strategy is focussed on Maritime domain to maintain liberty of action of own forces and deny an adversary to use air and sea approaches to Australia.⁴⁴ Other than defensive measures, the strategy also focuses on offensive operations ‘to undertake operations against an adversary’s bases and forces in transit, as far from Australia as possible’.⁴⁵ The White Paper also depicts a benign international environment despite ambitious acquisition plans. ‘There is no apparent connection between strategic outlook and force structure and no link between equipment acquisitions and the budget’.⁴⁶ The 2013 White Paper identifies the challenges faced to maritime security and need for diversification of capabilities.⁴⁷ Unlike earlier debates on maritime strategy which focussed on the role of land forces in littorals, the current guidance requires ADF to ensure energy security with its own resources. The DWP focuses on the maritime strategy to deny enemy the use of bases in the region ‘most likely …in partnership with others’.⁴⁸ It also requires ‘an active and visible domestic and regional force posture’ to ensure defence of Australia.⁴⁹ Due to regional military modernization and capability of modern submarines, the strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of submarine and anti-submarine operations for Australia. Any raid on Australian offshore facilities, mining in harbours or interdiction of Australian shipping, although unlikely but may involve enemy submarine. In order to avoid such as consequential scenario, larger submarine fleet is required. This will provide better options to own defence planners and make enemy job even difficult due to disproportionate effects of submarine force.⁵⁰ After scaling back the future submarine capability from 12 to 9, Australia will be able to achieve the effects desired from strategic guidance with substantial savings. The savings achieved in this regard will be invested in maritime patrol aircraft capabilities.

Possible Impacts on Fundamental Input to Capability
It has been argued that despite limited funding and competing priorities, submarine is a critical capability which cannot be abandoned, however, it can be scaled backed from 12 to 9 submarines with potential savings of $184 billion throughout the life cycle of three submarines. However, acquiring submarine does not mean the full potential of submarine capability has been achieved. The submarine capability will include the acquisition of future submarines, associated repair maintenance facilities, operation and maintenance skills and doctrines. Cumulatively all the inputs are called the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC).⁵¹ The FIC impacts of scaling down of submarine capability are described in ensuing paragraphs:

The first FIC consideration is personnel. Keeping aside the availability of Collin Class submarine, the availability of crew to operate and maintain the submarine was another issue. In 2008, a review was conducted by Royal Australian Navy to find out the shortages of crew, and it was revealed that ‘there have been several submarine workforce crises over the last 40 years but the corrective measures that have been implemented seem to have been unable to achieve an enduring impact’.⁵² In order to smoothly transfer from existing Collins Class to future submarines, it is necessary that the personnel issues in all domains of workforce are dealt in overall without any quick fix solution. The experiences of transition from Oberon to the Collins is relevant is this regard when RAN suffered major loss of skilled work force during two decades of transition.⁵³ Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan prepared by Defence Material Organization will be an important enabler in this regard.⁵⁴ The plan identified the shortcomings in white collar and blue collar skills associated with future submarine project.

The second important FIC implication is organizational structure. The project management structure formed during the construction of Collins Class will be implemented with necessary modifications based on the lessons learnt. The priority will be given to personnel associated with previous project in order to utilise their experience and further consolidation of their experience for future projects. The shortages in the organization will be fulfilled by selection from inland and abroad.

The third FIC implication is the collective training. The crew from existing boats will be earmarked as commissioning crew for first three boats. To meet the shortages in the crew, the recruitment of personnel will be enhanced. The selected crew will be provided necessary technical and tactical training by the respective equipment manufacturers. Simulators and computer based software developed by equipment manufacturers will be acquired for individual and collective training. Upon completion of initial training, the crew will participate in Harbour Acceptance Trials (HATs) and Sea Acceptance Trials (SATs). Participation of crew in both the phases is necessary for smooth commissioning and handover of capability. Forth implication is on facilities and training areas. Although the future submarine will be bigger in size than existing submarine, it will be able to use the existing docking, noise and magnetic ranging facilities. In case of training installations, new civil works will be required to accommodate simulators, training material which will be unique to new designs. Since Fleet ASW training areas are suitable to accommodate the nuclear powered submarines despite their large size, the same areas will be used for training and exercises of the future submarines.

The next impact on FIC is the major systems. The available systems and facilities for Collins Class submarine will require up gradation for future submarines. It is important to note that for the duration, the existing fleet is being decommissioned and new submarines are being commissioned, there will be requirement to operate and maintain the systems required for support of both class of submarines. This will enable to take advantage of Collins Class submarine throughout the life. It will also ensure that future submarines acquire the full capability as soon as possible. The choice of evolved Collins class will allow the usage of existing supply chain and inventory control arrangements as the submarine will use the advanced technology of most of the existing equipment.

Implications on support infrastructure and command and control arrangements are the last elements to be discussed. The existing operation and maintenance facilities for the Collins Class will be upgraded wherever required. Due to the introduction of Indo-Pacific strategic arc in strategic environment, there will be a requirement to station the submarine fleet on both coasts. In this regard, plans to shift Fleet Base East to Brisbane⁵⁵ will be required concurrently. It will allow to use submarine options in both oceans in the shortest time. For effective command and control, a new submarine squadron will be raised. Initially existing and new submarines will form part of two different squadrons deployed on Fleet Base East and Fleet Base West. Upon decommissioning of existing Collins Class submarines, the new submarines will be divided in both squadrons. The basic maintenance facilities will be built on both the bases whereas the major maintenance facilities will only be conducted at single upgraded facility. Irrespective of squadron, the submarines will be deployed by present command and control arrangements and under single Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH).

Conclusion
Australia is a maritime nation with heavy reliance on maritime trade. The recently issued Defence White Paper also emphasized the importance of maritime strategy in defence of Australia. While the 2009 Defence White Paper promised an ambitious procurement plan, the required funding has not been allocated. This requires abandoning, scaling back or removing of some capabilities due to competing priorities. It has been argued that future submarines are of essential capability which cannot be abandoned or removed however it can be scaled back from twelve to nine submarines with a savings of $184 billion through life cycle. Of the four available options, evolved Collins Class conventional submarines provide the best option. Despite the scaling down, all the tasks required by strategic guidance can be amicably undertaken with minimum risk by improving submarine availability mechanism from the savings achieved. Future maritime patrol aircraft capability will mitigate the risks to Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities. The impacts on FIC are also manageable due to selection of evolved Collins Class submarines. Because of the improved versions of existing technologies used in the future submarine, the existing infrastructure, training, concept and doctrines can be used interchangeably for both class of submarines. Some additional infrastructure will be built due to enhanced size of fleet of larger submarines. These options will ensure the availability of balanced naval capabilities, improve the inland capacity and capability and create more jobs.

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End Notes
²Brice Pacey, Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarines. Kokoda Papers, Canberra: Kokoda Foundation, 2012,
³Other than mainland of around 7.7 million square km and a coastline of about 34,000 km, Australia has exclusive economic zones of 10 million square km and continental shelf generating a further 2.5 million square km including various offshore territories. Offshore territories include the Australian Antarctic Territory, Christmas Island, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Heard and McDonald Islands, Norfolk Island, the Coral Sea islands and Ashmore and Cartier Islands.
In total Australian maritime jurisdiction accounts to 13.5 million square kilometres, ‘the third largest of any nation’. Andrew Forbes, Australia’s Maritime Economic Interests, http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-may-2011 and Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarine, 24.
⁴According to 2008-09 statistics, Australian economy valued about $1.2 trillion, where seaborne trade accounted for $368 billion (33%). The trade was conducted with 70 commercial ports around the globe. Additionally 5106 million tonnes of trade was conducted between various Australian ports. Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia) 2011, Geoscience Australia http://www.ga.gov.au/image_cache/GA17424.gif (accessed on 10 August 2011).
⁵‘The SRP is a decade-long campaign of reform. It will change and improve the way we do business, it will reduce our costs and allow the resources freed up by those cost reductions to be re-invested into Force 2030’. The Strategic Reform Program – Making It Happen, http://www.defence.gov.au/SRP/docs/srp.pdf
⁶ADF capabilities included: 12 future submarines; three Air Warfare Destroyers; two Landing Helicopter Dock amphibious ships; 24 MH-60R Seahawk naval combat helicopters; ten C-27J Battlefield Air lifters to replace the Caribou aircraft; six C-17 Globemaster III heavy lift transport aircraft; new maritime patrol aircraft; the Joint Strike Fighter; new armoured and logistics vehicles for the Australian Army as well as additional Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles; seven new CH-47F Chinook helicopters; replacements for our Armidale Class patrol boats, supply vessels HMA Ships Sirius and Success and Anzac Class Frigates; and the EA-18G Growler electronic attack capability. Defence White Paper 2013, Para 3.3.
⁷Mark Thomson, Defence Funding in 2013: Means, Ends and Make Believe, 51.
⁸Mark Thomson, The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2013-2014, vi, 28.
⁹Defence White Paper (DWP) para 3.42.
¹⁰These submarines included Australia 12, Indonesia 12, Malaysia 2, Singapore 4, Vietnam 6 and figure for Thailand was unknown. Sub Juidice, 16.
¹¹These figures include China 78, Japan 22, North Korea 43, South Korea 26, India 24, Pakistan 6, Taiwan 8, Russian Far East Fleet 14, SubJuidice, 18.
¹²Belinda Willis, Evolved’ Collins favoured option for next generation of submarines – Defence Minister David Johnston http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/evolved8217-collins-favoured-option-for-next-generation-of-submarines-defence-minister-david-johnston/story-fnii5yv7-1226740876382
¹³Rex Patrick, Roles and requirements for Australia’s future submarines.7.
¹⁴Sub Juidice, 30.
¹⁵John Coles, Coles Submarine Review, Study into the Business of Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability, November 2012.
¹⁶Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audits, ‘Review of Auditor-General’s Report No. 34 1997–98, New Submarine Project,’ tabled in the House of Representatives and the Senate (11 June 1999).
¹⁷Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith and Minister for Defence Materiel, Jason Clare ‘Reforms to Projects of Concern’ Media Release 187/11 29 June 2011 <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/06/29/reforms-to-projects-of-concern>(accessed 7 November 2011).
¹⁸Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith and Minister for Defence Materiel, Jason Clare ‘Release of Terms of Reference for Submarine Sustainment Review’ Media Release 24 August 2011 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/08/24/minister-for-defence-andminister-for-defence-materiel-release-of-terms-of-reference-for-submarine-sustainmentreview (accessed 7 November 2011).
¹⁹Sub Judice, 53.
²⁰Sub Judice, 53.
²¹The future submarines are planned to have (1) greater range, longer endurance and enhanced capabilities relative to Collins Class, (2) low signatures in entire spectrum especially on high speeds, (3) surface warfare, sub surface warfare, strategic strike, and mine detection and mine laying capabilities, ISR and support to special operations forces (4) capabilities to operate UUVs. DWP 2009, 70.
²²DWP para 8.46
²³The four options available to acquire future submarines are an available MOTS submarine, an existing submarine optimised for Australian needs, an evolved submarine from an existing design and a total new submarine.
²⁴It is generally argued that Australian requirements are unique due to its geography and operational environment and MOTS submarine is not suitable for the tasks. In reality most of the Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) submarines have similar capabilities. The European and Japanese submarines have been operating in Australian waters historically. DWP para 8.50
²⁵The new submarine will have displacement of 4000 tonnes and a crew of 60 personnel. The only available conventional submarine of comparable characteristics is Japanese Soryu Class with Kockums AIP system for longer submerged endurance. The RAN and Japanese Navy had high level discussions to ascertain the feasibility of Soryu Class for future submarines, however due to uncertainties associated with Japanese arms export process and little knowledge about Soryu Class operational performance, the option has not been considered for further deliberation. Hamish McDonald, ‘Navy eyeing on new Japanese submarines,’ “The Sydney Morning Herald (9 July 2012) and Simon Cowan, Future Submarine Project Should Raise Periscope for Another look, 11.
²⁶Belinda Willis, Evolved’ Collins favoured option for next generation of submarines.
²⁷Belinda Willis, Evolved’ Collins favoured option for next generation of submarines.
²⁸The Collins Class took 15 years from an existing KocumsVatergotland Class submarine design to present submarine in Commissioning. Simon Cowan, Future Submarine Project Should Raise Periscope for Another look, 10
²⁹How to buy submarine, 10.
³⁰Sub Judice, 57
³¹Simon Cowan, Future Submarine Project Should Raise Periscope for Another look.
³²Senator John Faulkner, response to Senate question on Notice 2557 (25 February 2010).
³³DWP 2013 para 3.11.
³⁴Conventional submarines have to regularly snorkel to recharge their batteries. The frequent snorkelling makes conventional submarines vulnerable to detection and anti-submarine operations.
³⁵In 2011, the operating cost of Collins Class submarine was $165.6 million whereas the maintenance cost was $477.3 million, with total cost amounting to $642.9 million. Response to Senate question on Notice 1595 (10 May 2012).
³⁶The Defence Capability Plan 2012 acknowledges that sustainment budget will increase by a compound rate of 4.7% primarily due to supporting cost of Collins Class submarine. Defence Capability Plan 2012 update (Department of Defence), 10.
³⁷How to buy submarine, 9.
³⁸How to buy submarine, 8.
³⁹Sub Judice, 49
⁴⁰As Kokoda estimates show $1.2 – 1.6 billions per submarine in 2011 and ASPI believe it to be $3.04 billion in 2009, the potential savings in any case are between than $3.48 – 9.12 billion.
⁴²Similarly keeping in view the available data about maintenance of Collins Class submarine, (DCP Project Sea 1439, estimated $30 million for each submarine upgrade per year till 2021), the Cost of each submarine will reach $130 million per annum.42 For a future Submarine the operation, maintenance and upgrade cost is expected to be $2 billion per year. Defence Capability Plan 2012 update, Project Sea 1439 Phases 3, 5B and 6 (Department of Defence) and Simon Cowan, Future Submarine Project Should Raise Periscope for Another look, 14
⁴³AIR 7000 will replace the AP-3C capability to undertake ADF Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Response (MISRR) tasks. While this project is focused on acquiring a capability centred on MISRR tasks, the capability will also support overland Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Electronic Support (ES) roles. Phase 1B is intended to acquire high altitude, long endurance unmanned aircraft systems for maritime patrol and other surveillance. Phase 2B is intended to acquire a fleet of P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol and Response Aircraft, fitted with the Increment 2 capabilities, through a cooperative program with the US Navy; as the manned component of the ADF MISRR capability. Phase 2C is intended to acquire and fit the P-8A Increment 3 retrofit and associated weapons. Defence Capability Plan 2012, Project AIR 7000.
⁴⁴Rex Patrick, Roles and requirements for Australia’s future submarines.
⁴⁵DWP para 3.42.
⁴⁶DWP para 3.43.
⁴⁷The Politics of Defence White Papers, Peter Jennings, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), 14.
⁴⁸James Goldrick, The Future for Maritime Forces, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), pp. 76
⁴⁹DWP para 3.44.
⁵⁰DWP para 3.47.
⁵¹Sub Judice, 37.
⁵²‘Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) and are described in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.2 Preparedness and Mobilisation. Understanding FIC enables Defence to better understand and manage the whole-of-life workforce and funding implications of a new capability’. Defence Capability Development Handbook 2012 Version 1.0, 3
⁵³Rowan Moffitt, Submarine Workforce Sustainability Review (Department of Defence, 31 October 2008).
⁵⁴Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson, The once and future submarine—raising and sustaining Australia’s underwater capability, April 14, 2011
⁵⁵Minister for Defence Stephen Smith and Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare acknowledged the receipt of Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan on 12 December 2012. Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Newsitems/12Dec12_Future_subs_industry.cfm
⁵⁶Joe Kelly, The Australian, August 27, 2013, Taskforce to examine navy move from Sydney to Brisbane. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/election-2013/taskforce-to-examine-navy-move-from-sydney-to-brisbane/story-fn9qr68y-1226704934011#sthash.NlGbMGan.dpuf