With the US/ISAF- Afghanistan retrograde on track there are some apparently intractable issues that remain when looking at the military-political strategy for Afghanistan and its surrounding areas.
A new American intelligence assessment on the Afghan war predicts that the gains the United States and its allies have made during the past three years are likely to have been significantly eroded by 2017, even if Washington leaves behind a few thousand troops and continues bankrolling the impoverished nation, according to officials familiar with the report.*
This article is geared to shed light on the Afghanistan National Army’s (ANA) and Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capacity to deal with the security of the country post-2014 withdrawal of the ISAF apparatus. It will shed light on the structure of ANA, the manpower it consists of and its training, order of battle (Orbat), and military balance equipment.
I’ll leave the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for some other time to be explained in depth about its modes operandi. For the record the ANSF constitute the following;
• Afghan National Police (ANP)
• Afghan Border Police (ABP)
• Afghan Local Police (ALP)
• Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)
• Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
• Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
The effectiveness of the ANA is only one element of securing peace and stability in Afghanistan. But the composition of the ANA is of critical importance in providing lasting security and stability and denying Afghanistan as a future base for international terrorism and extremism, since Afghanistan is still at war and will probably be at war long after 2014.
More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan security forces. There are few signs that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in neighboring countries.
Efforts to rebuild the ANA have been going on for about six years, and judgments about its progress have been mixed. In November 2009 the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established as a multinational military organization. After being activated the NTM-A was tasked with providing a higher-level training for the ANA and AAFC.
Being that Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country, this posed the first and foremost hurdle that the trainers were faced with. Uncertainty as to which language the instructional training should occur in was a problem. It was decided it should be in English. The main focus for NTM-A was that security means that the Afghans handle the violence, not the ISAF. The Afghans themselves have to mange their districts and cities while the ongoing insurgency is occurring.
The known weaknesses of recent efforts in Afghanistan in creating the ANA are (1) lack of modern-style professionalism, greatly caused by illiteracy and lack of education, (2) high desertion rates/poor retention rate of soldiers, and (3) lack of equally-distributed proportional representation by all the major communities, with some of the predominantly Pathan (Pushtoon or Pakhtoon) areas such as Kandahar and Helmand contributing less than the Farsi (Dari) speaking Tajiks and Hazaras.
After a somewhat rocky start, institutional training appears to have progressed well. The programs of instruction appear sound and attuned to the needs of the Afghan army. More problematic is the unit-level training, which depends in large part on the efforts of embedded training teams. It was relatively easier for the officer corp to be instructed in English, however, at the lower ranks enlistments this caused significant problems. It was observed by some NATO trainers that after the class was dismissed the enlisted men gravitated towards their own lingual comrades and stayed with them most of the time and conversed in their ethnic languages.
In 2003, the collation (ISAF) had set a quota of 40 percent Pashtoons and 25 percent Tajiks for the ANA. Instead, the Tajiks, along with Uzbeks and Hazare, filled the ranks, with very few southern Pashtoons signing up. The attitude amongst the ANA troops “we should not go out on patrol and stay at respected unit’s base.” It appeared to imply units, which have non-Pushtoons in them, were unwilling to patrol Pushtoon areas and visa versa regarding Pushtoon units in non-Pushtoon areas.
The latest report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) states: In ANA Tajiks, which represent 25% of the population, now account for 41% of all troops who have been trained, and that only 30% of the troops are now Pashtoon, 12 percent Hazari and 10 percent Uzbek, with the rest made up of smaller ethnic groups, which is approximately the percentages of these communities in the Afghan population.
Now at its biggest size yet, 214,000 soldiers, the ANA is so plagued with desertions and low re-enlistment rates that it has to replace a third of its entire force every year, according to SIGAR. The desertion rate amongst the Pashtoon is the highest. The attrition strikes at the core of America’s exit strategy in Afghanistan: to ensure that the ANA that can take over the war and allow the United States and NATO forces to withdraw by the end of 2014.
According to USCENTCOM, on the day the retrograde is completed the total combined forces of ANA and ANSF should reach its planned strength of 394,000 troops, assuming that there are no large scale Pashtoon desertion.
On the line is also the critical status of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the USA and Afghanistan. With the effect (BSA) at least ANA & ANSF would not be left themselves to deal with the inevitable and impending frontal onslaught by the insurgents (Taliban and other groups).
BSA will assure the region that the United States will remain engaged and will not abandon Afghanistan as the US once did in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal. The BSA is also the keystone of a much wider international commitment of several countries involving over years of ready to provide economic and security assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2015. Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, with the exception of Iran and India, also understand the importance of the BSA. President Putin of Russia, President Xi of China, and Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Sharif of Pakistan have all personally urged President Karzai to conclude the bilateral security agreement.
According to some estimates the insurgencies are running at less than 50% of its capacity. It took the US and its NATO partners eight years to realize that Afghanistan is not large-scale combat; instead it’s a war of intimidation – brief fights and heavy field and aerial bombing intended to instill fear, causing the insurgence to pull back and go into hiding. General John N. Abrams son of famous Gen Creighton W Abrams Jr (Chief of Staff of the United States Army during Vietnam war) said in 2003, that don’t let war in Afghanistan become “Afghanization war of attrition”; alas this is what this war has become. To build and maintain the spirit of ANA has become the central theme of US-Afghan war policy since 2009. The Americans have put all their chips on the ANA so at least they [ANA] can control and keep open the cities and highways, otherwise, if there are superficial cracks in ANA while fighting the insurgences the Americans can always provide heavy air support to breach the attack and spirit of the Taliban (Pashtoons) for the time being. Some months ago Gen. (R) Stanley McChrystal said that ‘’…if there are problems in Afghanistan they flow into Pakistan like river Kabul.’’
For Pakistan the BSA is something which ought to happen for its security in Afghanistan. As long as the US has a visible footprint in Afghanistan, which entails giving air support to ANA and training ANA troops, Pakistan’s security parameters are more or less guaranteed. Pakistan is currently fighting a major internal insurgency (with one of its hands and legs tied) with the so-called Pakistani Pashtoon aka almost 55 groups who call themselves Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Presently there is a hodgepodge effort to deal with this insurgency that is bent on destroying the Constitution of the country and wish to impose its own brand of perverted understanding of Islam, which is of Khawarij mindset. For some odd reason if any faction of the Pushtoon Taliban return to Kabul post 2014 things likely will become difficult for the elected government in Islamabad and other provisional capitals, hence, the possibility of popular military take over becomes very imminent with mass approval of the populace.
However if there is no BSA the situation in Pakistan’s FATA and more or less most of Afghanistan will be open and hostile to Pakistan’s sovereignty and national security. What if there is an attack on the mainland USA and the postage stamps points straight to FATA or any area in Afghanistan? The USA will not ask the Pakistanis to do more or try to talk some sense in Kabul’s regimes but rather they’ll use air assets to bomb the area mercilessly for its attack at the mainland USA. “Even the talk of US pullout has started having its impact. Pakistan has started to receive more Afghan refugees than before,” said Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US Jalil Abbas Jilani. “This shows that the people of Afghanistan too have fears,” Said Jalil Abbas Jilani Pakistan’s new ambassador to the United States. “In case the bulk of the troops withdraw, the major responsibility would lie on our shoulders. Security responsibilities, previously being shared by others, then exclusively become Pakistan’s responsibility. It is certainly going to be a big challenge,” he said. It should also be noted here that if for some reasons the backflow of Afghan civil war into Pakistan the country will be very susceptible for a military take over because of the securities concerns of Pakistan nuclear weapons and its program.
Below is the chart of the military equipment that the US and its allies have given to ANA and ANSF. This chart doesn’t include small arms (assault rifles, rocket launchers, pistols, motor rockets and its launchers, communication equipment etc)
| Country of origin | Weapon Designation | Type of Weapon | Number Delivered | Year of Delivery | Original Status |
| Bosnia | D-30 122mm | Towed Artillery | 60 | 2011 | Modernized prior to delivery |
| Czech Republic | Mi-24 Hind-E/V Mi-17 Hip-H | Gunship-helicopter Transport Helicopter | 6 6 | 2009 2008 | Aid:NATO Modernized prior to delivery |
| Italy | G-222 | Tactical Transport Aircraft | 20 | 2012? | $321 million: US FMF |
| Norway | BGM-71 Tow-ll missile | Anti-Tank missile | 159 | 2009 | Aid |
| Russia | 1 An-12 Club Mi-24 Hind-D Mi-17 Hip-H | Transport Aircraft Gunship Helicopter Transport Helicopter | 1 5 63 | 2002 2002 2002-2012 | Aid Modernized to Mi-35 27 US Supplied ($375million) Rest Russian Aid |
| Slovakia | D-30 122mm Mi-17 Hip-H | Towed Artillery Transport Helicopter | 24 3 | 2006 2008 | Aid Aid |
| Turkey | M-114A1 | Towed Artillery | 24 | 2007 | Aid, US made Guns |
| UAE | Mi-17 Hip-H | Transport Helicopter | 6 | 2008 | Bought by UAE from some Eastern European country (might be Ukrainian) |
| USA | M-113A2 M151 series jeeps M-1117/ASV-150 Cessna-180 Light Skywagon Cessna-2008 Caravan MD-500E C-130H Hercules | Tracked APC HMMWV Up-Armored Wheeled APC Light aircraft Light Transport Aircraft MD-500E Heavy Transport Aircraft | 188 13,086 290 6 26 6 4 | 2005 2006-2012 2011-12 2011-12 2011-12 6 4 | Aid: Includes 15 M-577A recovery Vehicle US Aid US Aid, includes ambulance, ARV,AEV. Some source say that by the end of 2015 the total M-1117 will increase to 1,000 Aid Aid Aid. One lost when Afghan pilot landed it on a designated landmine field. Aid: ex-USAF |
| UK | Mi-17 Hip-H | Transport helicopter | 2 | 2010 | Ex-Bulgarian |
| Ukraine | An-32 Cline | Medium Transport Aircraft | 4 | 2008 | $19m FMF US. Already lost two An-32 |
| ANA Strength | Total Bases and Airfields | APC, HMMWV | Helicopters Transport | Transport Aircrafts | |
| 214,000 | 700 | 13,764* | 75 | 40 | |
| Special Forces | One Commando Battalion to each corp | ||||
| Kabul Security Brigade | 1x Commando Battalion | ||||
| 111 Capital Division | HQ at Kabul | active May 2009 | 2x Brigade | 1x Commando Brigade | |
| 201 Corps | Based at Kabul | Active 2008 | 4x Infantry Brigade | 2x Mechanized Infantry Battalion BPM-1/2, M-113, PT-76, BTR, HUMMVVE | 1x Tank Battalion (T-54/55/62) Unknown numbers. Est 100 MBT |
| 203 Corps | Based at Gardez | Active 2009 | 5x Infantry Brigade | ||
| 205 Corps | Based at Kandahar | Active 2012 | 5x Infantry Brigade | HUMMMVE | |
| 207 Corps | Based at Herat | Active 2012 | 5x Infantry Brigade | HUMMVVE | |
| 209 Corps | Based Mazar e Sharif | Active 2012 | 5x Infantry Brigade | HUMMVVE | |
| 215 Corps | Lakshar Garh | Active 2010 | HQ Battalion 2x Infantry Brigade |
Command echelons include Corps (15,000 – 20,000 troops), a Division (approx. 10,000 troops), Brigade (3,000 – 4,000 troops), kandak (battalion – about 600 troops) of four toli (a company-sized unit of rather more than 100 troops, toli being the Urdu word for troop). Most of these units are numbered sequentially, as in the 4th Toli, of the 3rd Kandak, of the 1st Brigade, of the 201st Corps [4th Toli, 3rd Kandak, 1st Brigade, 201st Corps], and cannot be uniquely identified without reference to their upper echelons. But others have identifiers such as Weapons Toli or 201st Combat Logistics Kandak.
The US will have three CV (Nuclear powered aircraft carriers) groups at the northern Arabian sea, plus tactical air wings at Al Udeid Air Base Doha, Al Dhafra, UAE, plus a strategic base at Diego Garcia. This entails close to 350+ fighter aircrafts plus bombers and hundreds of stand-off missiles. This leaves the USA enough airpower to dominate Pakistani airspace in 40 minutes and Indian Air space in 70 minutes according to recent estimates. As I have written, it will not take them [US] long to start bombing without any repercussions if needed in Afghanistan. The main concern is what has Pakistan planned for this scenario’s occurrence. If things go wrong in Afghanistan they will flow into Pakistan just as they did during Nov-Dec 2001 and Jan-Feb 02. These notions of “do more” will turn into you are the culprits and we’ll take care of our problem inside your country. Pakistan’s armed forces neither have the capability nor the capacity to sustain this type of assault.
On the other hand, the Indians’ planners wish that the Afghans would refrain from signing the BSA. If the BSA is not signed the Indians will try to establish themselves as the main power provider for the Kabul regime. This will cause a lot of problems for Islamabad, Beijing and Washington DC. Recently, when President Karzai visited New Delhi his Defense Minister tabled a long weapons wish list to their counter part. This wish list shows a dramatic shift from the type of weaponry that the USA and NATO have assigned to ANA and ANSF. This wish list included 120 pieces of 105mm medium artillery, 150 T-72 heavy tanks, 24 Mi-17 Hip assault Helicopter, 24 Mi-35 Hind gunship helicopters. If for some reason India is able to provide these weapons the face of the ANA will change from being mainly a counter insurgency and defensive force into an offensive force which will definitely threatened Pakistan.
Indian hawks, in their army and Ministry of external affairs, have a mindset which encourages taking a robust and possibly even a military role in Afghanistan. They wish to fill the security vacuum left by the US withdrawal, force Karzai not to sign BSA, advance its regional interest, and compete with China rivals for a permanent influence in Afghanistan. They wish to thwart their Pakistani enemies at the same time.
Historically the trust deficits between the majority Pashtoon and Tajik plus Uzbek have never been reconciled. Since the majority of ANA and ANSF is of Tajik and Uzbek groups it is inevitable that after some time these two groups will turn their guns towards the Pashtoon. If this happens more than likely the Pashtoon will fall back towards the east and the fighting will be eventually be at Pakistan’s border. With the ANA weaponry and added arms from India, there is a good possibility that Pakistan will be dragged directly in Afghanistan’s ethnic civil war.
| ZSU-23-4 Shilka | SPAAG | 1976 | 20 | USSR |
| BTR-60PB | APC | 1979-1986 | 600 | USSR |
| D-30 122 | Towed Artillery | 1978-79 | 508 | USSR |
| T-34 | Tank | 1978-79 | 150 | USSR |
| 9M14M/AT-3 Sagger | Anti-Tank Missile | 1979-90 | 6000 | USSR |
| T-54/55 | Tank | 1978-1991 | 905 | USSR |
| BM-21 | Grad MRL | 1979-88 | 142 | USSR |
| BMP-1 | IFV | 1979-1990 | 350 | USSR |
| BRDM | Rec-AV | 1979-1988 | 250 | USSR |
| BTR-50 | APC | 1979-1988 | 560 | USSR |
| M-46 130mm | Towed Artillery | 1979-1991 | 428 | USSR |
| T-62 | Tank | 1979-1991 | 155 | USSR |
| BMP-2 | IFV | 1987-1991 | 150 | USSR |
| M-194/D-1 152mm | Towed Artillery | 1988-1991 | 222 | USSR |
| 2S9 120mm | SPA | 1988 | 40 | USSR |
| BTR-70 | APC | 1989 | 320 | USSR |
| MANPAD (Man-Portable Air-defense System) | Various types dated belonging to Afghan Mujahideen: FIM-92 Stinger, BlowPipe, SA-7, and FIM-42 Red eye | 1982-1989 | -750 | USA, UK, USSR, China, Egypt. |
| ATGM (Anti-Tank Missile) | Milan, Dragon, 1982-1989 | 1982-88 | 7,000 | USA, UK, USSR, Egypt, China |
| SS-30 127mm | Long Range ASTROS ll rockets | 1986 | Unknown | Purchased by Saudi Arabia from Brazil and passed on to Afghan Mujahideen forces as single rocket launchers which could be transported by donkeys. |
The choices for Pakistan are very well defined. Pakistan should make sure that Afghanistan signs BSA with USA, hence, making sure that the USA is engaged for 10 more years and the funding to sustain ANA and ANSF continues unabated. Pakistan needs to make sure that Afghan refugees return to their homeland plus at some critical points the border needs to be secured with birded wire fence and landmines, even if this security measure requires Pakistan erect this fence within its own border. There ought to be foolproof flight cargo manifesto for all the Indian flights, which use Pakistani air space to and from India to Afghanistan to determine if illegal arms are being moved without Pakistan’s permission.
President Karzai has views about Pakistan which do not sit well with the defense managers of Pakistan and USA. He informed one of the US Army officers of the following “Everyday ANA are getting stronger. No government in Kabul can have a good relationship with Islamabad unless there are no hostile material and slogans from Pakistan.” He blames everyone from Pakistan’s ISI, religious scholars, traders/businessmen for any problems in Afghanistan. On the other hand, he often refuses to acknowledge that the drug problem is one of the main incubators of insurgency in his country. “If we come to know that Pakistan is being used against us we will make sure we take out these camps with our ANA, we are very strong and can teach Pakistanis a lesson in a very short time”, said President Karzai.
Intelligence estimates give various figures as to what type of weaponry that were in possession with Taliban till October 2001. These weapons are still not being accounted for or have been destroyed by the ISAF. Since estimates say that the insurgencies are working at 50% of their capacity and presently are only fighting the ISAF and ANA with small to medium arms plus IED. When the US completes its withdrawal their heavy weaponry might reappear in insurgencies’ hands and this would change the battlefield equation dramatically. Some of the heavy artillery like ex-Soviet M-46 130mm and multi rocket launchers BM-21 122mm plus the famous Brazilian SS-30 ASTROS (Artillery Saturation Rocket System) with a maximum range of 30 km which where purchased by Saudi Arabia and passed on to Afghan Mujahideen forces in 1986 are unaccounted for. The same rockets where confiscated by Pakistan’s FC from Baloch Liberation Army arms cache in 2011.
Afghan President Karzai has complained to Secy. of Defense Hagel about Pakistan’s Haft IX Nasr SRBFBM because he feels after post 2014 Pakistan might use these missiles against ANA. Also, one of the reasons that Karzai is refusing to sign BSA with the USA is to insert provisions that the ANA could enter into Pakistan territory and attack suspected militant camps. The US refused his request completely and said they will not be party of anything of this nature. If Afghanistan deteriorates into a chaotic civil war after the US leaves, it would be bad for Afghanistan but a royal disaster for Pakistan.
Afghanistan has been in a perpetual state of Buzkashi game. What is earnestly needed is that the Afghans sort out their own affairs without any outside advice or mediation. The only two countries, which have permanent, interest in what happens in Afghanistan, are Iran and Pakistan. However, they should honestly keep their hands off when the Afghans are sorting out their affairs. Other countries have interest in Afghanistan (USA, Russia, China, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia) but have no permanent interest in Afghanistan and they should be told to keep their hands off. Yes, if the situation takes a turn for the worst these aforementioned countries will eventually feel the repercussions.
However, it would be very difficult to keep the above-mentioned countries out of Afghanistan’s affairs because Afghanistan as a country can’t stand on its own but requires massive amount of external aid to run its affairs. At this junction it would be very prudent for these later countries to help Afghanistan but keep a very strict check into how and where their aid money has been spent.
For Pakistan, a stable and normal Afghanistan is critical for its prosperity and development. Since 2002, more then 70,000 Pakistanis have died because of the overflow of violence from Afghanistan and it has caused economic losses estimating close to $100 billion.
The safe havens in North Waziristan Agency ought to be destroyed and cleared from the militants (both locals and foreign) who are fighting the State of Pakistan. This is also the area in which are several individuals who are kidnapped and held by their kidnappers, who the US intelligence agencies have described as high value sensitive liabilities (HVSL). The elected members need to make sure that the hub of insurgency in FATA becomes an integral part of Constitutional Pakistan. The main threat to Pakistan territorial integrity, survival, and sovereignty is clearly from India, which should not be given any leverage to establish a permanent base in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan.
Works Cited
Askarson, Katterina. “”Prospect for a Crisis in Post-2014 Afghanistan,”.” Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2013.
Author. Informal Conversation with retired US Army Major-General Stanley McChrystal. Washington. DC, 2013.
Dalrymple, William. “A Deadly Triangle: “Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India,”.” A Deadly Triangle: “Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.” June 2013.
Defense, U.S. Department of. “Report on Progress towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” 2012. U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.
Jilani, Jalil Abbas. Pakistan’s Ambassador to USA Anwar Iqbal. Dawn Newspaper, 2 January 2014.
“National Intelligence Council,.” 2030.
