Managing Pak-Afghan Security

“…. why Britain had to relinquish its Indian empire in 1947. It argues that imperial policy towards Indian nationalism suffered from a chronically poor sense of timing. Misjudgments led to moderate nationalist leaders being marginalized and militant ones being strengthened. Over time, the secessionist agenda of the latter gained respectability among the Indian masses. Despite having detailed knowledge of secessionist plans, the British authorities failed to prevent their success. This was because they lacked knowledge of the reasoning that underwrote these plans. Instead of facing up to the cognitive divide between them and the Indians, British officials relied on pre-conceived analytical models to monitor subversion.”¹

History
The above statement symbolizes the later course of politics in divided sub-continent where the traits remain the same. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in the year 1979 and a religious group called Mujahideen² emerged as the only resistance force aiming to eject the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. With the United States and Pakistan providing considerable financial and military support, the Afghan Mujahideen were able to inflict heavy losses on the Soviet troops. The Daily New York Times maintained that around 15,000 soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan. In 1989, the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Afghan Mujahideen, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud³, surrounded the Afghan capital, Kabul, and took over the rule three years after the departure of the Soviets. The Afghan government that was backed by the Soviet Union and led by President Najibullah was subsequently overthrown. There was chaos everywhere and an interim setup was established under the leadership of President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Unfortunately, it failed to maintain consensus and ended up fighting one another.⁴

Pakistan remained a principal U.S. ally during the cold war era, soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The two allies were skeptic of Soviet presence and its backed nominee as President in Afghanistan, at the same time Iran was going through an Islamic uprising against the U.S. backed Shah of Iran; the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown in October 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, analysts believe that the Soviet invasion in 1979 was a different matter and its goal was to shore up a communist regime that was on the brink of collapse. The Soviet leadership wanted an Afghanistan that would be like other Soviet satellite states i.e. under virtual Soviet imperial rule with only the facade of independence.⁵

Emergence of Taliban
The Taliban was one of the Mujahideen factions that was formed during the Soviet occupation and the internal fighting in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and the attempt to impose communism on a rural and largely illiterate Islamic country produced a predictable result i.e. a mass national uprising.

Pakistani support for the Taliban is based on strong religious and ethnic bonds between the Taliban and Pakistan, especially with the tribal areas on the North-West borders of Pakistan. Most of the Taliban’s leaders were educated in refugee camps in Pakistan where they had escaped to after the Soviet invasion. Taliban militants are Sunni Muslim Pashtun while Pashtun constitute thirteen percent of the total population of Pakistan. Pashtuns enjoy a good majority in Pakistan’s military also. They are mostly concentrated in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) now renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) that was then the command center for the Mujahideen groups fighting against Soviet occupation and a major destination for the Afghan refugees.⁶

In the year 1994, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Gen. (Retd.) Naseerullah Babar officially requested the Taliban to guard a convoy trying to open a trade route from Pakistan to Central Asia. For the protection of its own interest and trade routes to Central Asia Pakistan provided weapons, military training and financial support to the Taliban. The Taliban took no chance and gained control over several Afghan cities and successfully captured Kabul in September 1996.

In the same period there was a public condemnation of the Saudi monarchy for allowing U.S. troops to enter and operate in Saudi Arabia. A local Saudi businessman Osama Bin Laden emerged as a resistant leader against the Saudi Monarchy to stop U.S. influence, however, he failed to gain public support and had to flee to Sudan later. He went onwards to Afghanistan in 1996 where he was warmly welcomed by the Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar since he had also fought against the Soviet occupation; some sources also claimed that Osama later married one of the daughters of Mullah Omar, and became a family member of the Taliban’s supreme leader (to legalize his stay). The Afghan Taliban had allowed Osama Bin Laden to recruit militants and operate training camps for militants. After the horrible 9/11 atrocity the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed two resolutions UNSCR 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) asking the Taliban to cease its support for terrorism and hand over Bin Laden. The Taliban defied these resolutions. After the U.S. embassies bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the later attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the United States asked the Taliban to either oust Bin Laden from Afghanistan or hand over Bin Laden to U.S. The Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden and ignored the U.S. demands, in response, U.S. and its allies bombed Taliban’s strategic military sites in Afghanistan. The attacks went so fierce that Taliban soon had to evacuate Kabul. The allied forces completely routed Taliban from Kabul on 9 December, 2001.⁷

Earlier, most Afghans supported the coalition forces that overthrew the Taliban from 2001 onwards, although with the passage of time the support has been dwindling as the coalition has failed to provide law, order and reconstruction. The Taliban influence mostly restricted to the Pashtun dominated areas, ignoring the minority forty percent non-Pashtun Afghans and because of this the other majority came under constant attack from Taliban.

U.S. withdrawal and its aftermath
Many believe that the presence of U.S. and Allied forces remains the last option for Afghans, however, the inability of respective governments to control the Taliban and the support they relish amongst the masses is alarming for the U.S. and its presence. And its is because of this reason that despite concerted efforts the local security forces have failed to stop the deadly attacks, while the horizon of Taliban attacks is expanding.

Taliban places a simple reason behind their attacks on the local community, for them whoever does not accept their ‘diktat’ is an ‘infidel.’ They believe that the Taliban ideology is the one on the righteous path and also that the Muslims who joined their respective security forces and their governments are misguided people. The Taliban sends an open message to the world in this regard, they may attack anyone whom they believe are infidel and against the Islamic teachings. They also deny prevailing constitutions in Muslim countries and so do its followers specifically in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The political elite seem reluctant to pass laws against them while some believe that this hard-line mindset is gaining support in the power corridors. Due to this negligence and slow process in passing laws against these elements, heavy losses have been suffered by the security forces.

As a case study of Pakistan, a new administrative set up has taken place in Pakistan in 2013, The Prime Minister, Chief Justice and the Army Chief have been replaced (as per rules on completion of their terms), so the challenges are more severe and need to be addressed very seriously with more concentration and avoiding past mistakes. The Pakistan Army’s newly appointed Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif is a well-respected soldier and people have many expectations from him. According to many, he is more determined than his predecessor. For him there are challenges to deal with political uncertainty within the country, economic downturn and above all, a solid determination to reorganize the Army.

Talking about Afghanistan it has been now more than a decade that the war torn country has been going through political uncertainty with most of their Pashtun dominated areas being influenced by the Taliban, if not openly, than parallel to the government. Another important reason for Afghans to fear the Taliban is the fact that they were once directly ruled by the Taliban. The United States has already announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

For the past few months President Hamid Karzai has not been on good relations with the U.S who has already blamed Karzai for suspected dialogue with the Taliban (without U.S. involvement) on back channels for the survival of his presidency and government. Mr. Karzai presents a different version and maintains that the situation post U.S. withdrawal may be uncontrollable if different Taliban factions were not taken into confidence. However, U.S. has refrained from any hasty decision of its withdrawal from Afghanistan and no official statement has been given that the U.S. forces may leave Afghanistan by the end 2014, they have set some preconditions for leaving and extended their stay. The issue is to be debated in respective parliaments and needs more consensuses abroad. The foreign forces suffered heavy losses and there was public condemnation and pressure in allied countries for a safe and peaceful exit from Afghanistan. Analysts believe the situation may be more alarming if Afghanistan is left in such state.

In 2011 bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were marred by accusations that each was helping militants and enemies of the other, and Afghan officials said they suspected Pakistani intelligence of backing the Taliban and its insurgents ally the Haqqani Network. Turkey took a quantum leap at that time to break the ice and called a summit and being a mediatory to bring the stakeholders together and to reverse the course of mistrust and ease tensions between the two countries. There had been a flurry of speculations about drawing the Taliban and Haqqani group into consultations to end the fighting in Afghanistan, a subject of mounting urgency ahead of expected U.S. combat troops withdrawal by the end of 2014.⁸

Even at the Istanbul process⁹ President Karzai underlined the Afghan suspicion that Islamabad was backing the Taliban and went on to say that any negotiations he has should be with Pakistan.¹⁰

A comprehensive declaration was passed after the summit, details of which are given in ANNEXURE I (Enclosed).

In February 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attended an eighth Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit in Ankara. The agenda of the summit was ‘Sustainable peace in the Heart of Asia’. The three leaders shared their views and it was expressed that the positive momentum in the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan was observed, while efforts were initiated by the two countries to build a broader relationship with strengthened trade and economic relations.¹¹ Details of the joint statement can be seen in Annexure III.

At the joint statement in which the common resolve to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations was reiterated, it was also noted that every effort be made to further develop the growing people-to-people contacts between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the joint projects for socio-economic development which would serve as an important asset in building mutual trust and solidarity in the region would be encouraged. It was emphasized that the international community should continue to support Afghanistan’s socio-economic development beyond 2014.

Conclusion
The situation in Afghanistan remains tense between the Americans and the Karzai government, while on the other side of the border the Government of Pakistan is trying to mend fences with its own Taliban, known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Humera Iqbal writes,
“The Pakistan-US strategic dialogue clearly defined the future direction of US agenda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. All the three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US, are set to align their policies in accordance with the possible choices available and achieving results for their interests.”¹²

In Pakistan, the newly installed government has decided to negotiate with Pakistani Taliban (as they are called). Unfortunately, the offer was followed by several deadly attacks in all provinces of Pakistan, with Taliban claiming its responsibility for some. Experts view these fierce attacks as negotiation tactics to pressurize the present government to their own terms.

Heavy casualties in civilian and military sectors were suffered in the past ten years as can be seen in the attached data sheet that outlines the facts and figures in Annexure II of this paper.¹³ An insight Map also highlights the details of the affected areas.¹⁴

“… the experience of British India offers a major point to ponder in the ongoing War on Terror. Should counter-terrorism aim to deny the political objective of a terrorist movement, or should it confine itself to discouraging the use of terrorist tactics? A pre-emptive crackdown on terrorist groups might lead to a drop in violence, but it might also force them to introspect about their military weakness. By developing a better understanding of the context within which they operate, terrorists usually become more, not less, dangerous. They develop a keen sense of timing and learn to optimize employment of scarce resources.”¹⁵

An intention to attack may be preserved and capabilities can be gradually rebuilt for contemplation of new opportunities that might present themselves. A better understanding of the social system is required where the terrorist prevails and the social order they were brought about. Unfortunately, the knowledge progressively becomes rarer as the need for it increases.

A final assessment may be made about the importance of different time-scales. The intelligence community needs to take a similar analysis of time as their counterparts in a dissident organization. Failure may continue an illusion of harmony in what might be the eye of a very big storm. This is because hostile memories can last very long without being detected.¹⁶

Bibliography
¹http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm Data Collections
²http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume20/Article1.htm, The paradoxes of Ethnographic Intelligence – A case study of British India
3http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/images/Conflict_Map.html, Maps Asia Conflict Map

⁴www.circle.org.pk, Pakistan Since 9/11: A statistical data on decade of war on Terror, Centre for Innovation, Research, Collaboration and Learning

⁵Bruce Riedel, ‘Pakistan’s Role in Afghanistan War’s Outcome,’ opinion, 20 May, 2010

End Notes
¹Prem Mahadevan, “The Paradoxes of Ethnographic Intelligence: A case study of British India”, Fault lines :Volume 20, January 2011
²Mujahideen is a term generally used in Muslims as one who defends his religion.
³Ahmad Shah Massoud was one of the foremost leaders to fight soviet occupation and was head of the Northern Alliance a group consisted of non-Pashtun majority in Afghanistan.
⁴Matinuddin, Kamal, ‘The Taliban Phenomenon’ Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
⁵Bruce Riedel, ‘Pakistan’s Role in Afghanistan War’s Outcome,’ opinion, 20 May, 2010.
⁶Matinuddin, Kamal, op.cit.
⁷Moreu, Ron. “Where the Jihad Lives Now” Newsweek 150.18 (2007): 26-34
⁸The Daily Dawn, ‘Turkey wants Afghan-Pakistan summit to reduce mistrust’, 1 November 2011
⁹The summit was know as the Istanbul process
¹⁰Ibid.
¹¹http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_afghanistan_pakistan-trilateral-summit-was-held-in-ankara.en.mfa
¹²Humera Iqbal, “Pak-Afghan Ties In The Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue” Institute of Strategic Studies, www.irs.org.pk
¹³http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm Data
Collections (Enclosed).
¹⁴http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/images/Conflict_Map.html, Maps Asia
Conflict Map (Enclosed).
¹⁵Prem Mahadevan, Opicit.
¹⁶Ibid.

ANNEXURE I

ISTANBUL PROCESS ON REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION FOR A SECURE AND STABLE AFGHANISTAN

1. We have convened in Istanbul on 2 November 2011, under the leadership of H. E. Mr. Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and H. E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey, and at the joint invitation of H. E. Mr. Zalmai Rassoul, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and H. E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to reaffirm our strong commitment to a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan in a secure and stable region.
2. We affirm the commitments enshrined in the 2002 Kabul Declaration of Good Neighbourly Relations and agree that promoting regional security and cooperation requires measures to build confidence and trust among countries. Hence, we will be guided by the following set of common principles and commitments, which shall include, but not be limited to:

• Recognition of the central role of the United Nations in international affairs;
• Equal and indivisible security;
• Respect for the territorial integrity of States;
• Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states;
• Support for the stability and peace in Afghanistan, as well as respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity;
• Continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan, as they develop their country, re-construct their economy, and further improve their human capital;
• Resolutely combating and eliminating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and violent extremism, and preventing safe havens for terrorists and terrorism in the region;
• Dismantling terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens, disrupting all financial and tactical support for terrorism;
• Acknowledging that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security as well as a common challenge to our societies, to the region, and that it can only be addressed through the concerted efforts of all countries;
• Facilitating the voluntary, dignified, and orderly return of Afghan refugees;
• Support for an inclusive Afghan national process of reconciliation, in accordance with
  the Constitution of Afghanistan and in ways which is Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and
  Afghan-driven;
• Constructive and supportive relationship between countries of the region;
• Refraining from the threat or use of force and not to allow one’s territory to be
  used against another;
• Elimination of illicit drug production, trade and trafficking;
• Preventing the cultivation and production of narcotics;
• Preventing the activities of extremist organizations and organized crime
  networks through enhanced cooperation;
• Supporting and promoting law enforcement cooperation;
• Peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter
  and international law;
• Fulfillment of obligations under international law;

3. Afghanistan and its international and regional partners will seek to develop and coordinate contributions to advance the above-stated principles.
4. We recognize Afghanistan’s role as the land bridge in the ‘Heart of Asia’, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia and the Middle East, and reaffirm our support in the strongest possible terms to the secure, stable and peaceful future of Afghanistan. We welcome Afghanistan’s willingness and determination to use its regional and historical position to do its part to promote security and peaceful economic cooperation in the region.
5. We respect Afghanistan as a sovereign, independent, democratic state, which constitutes an integral component of the peace, well-being and prosperity of the region and beyond. We support the Government of Afghanistan’s priorities on the issues of security, governance, economy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and regional cooperation.
6. We re-emphasize our determination to help Afghanistan fight terrorism and illicit drugs. In return, Afghanistan re-iterates its commitment to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbours, and to assure them that its relations with any state, on which it will be transparent, will not be directed against any third party. Afghanistan also reconfirms its will and determination to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, strengthen its economy, especially by ensuring good governance, promotion of investments, and addressing corruption, fight radicalism and narcotrafficking, respect human rights, in particular the rights of women, and to work together with its friends and partners for enhanced regional co-operation.
7. We reiterate our resolve to combat terrorism, extremism and separatism in all its forms and manifestations, the financing, harbouring, training and equipping of such activities, and acknowledge that terrorism, extremism and separatism pose a common challenge that can only be addressed through concerted efforts by countries of the region and the broader international community.
8. We will strengthen cooperation with Afghanistan, as well as regional and international cooperation, to counter the threat posed by the illicit production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs, in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility. Cooperation in combating the illicit drug production, trafficking and consumption should be exercised in a comprehensive manner and comprise poppy and cannabis crops eradication, elimination of drug laboratories, interception of drug caravans, detention of drug traffickers, freezing proceeds from illicit drugs, diversion of drug precursors, as well as introduction of alternative agriculture projects and strengthening measures directed at reduction of the level of drugs consumption in regional and international markets.
9. In assisting Afghanistan, we endorse its efforts at promoting an inclusive reconciliation process and welcome and support the efforts of the High Peace Council, and the implementation of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program. We strongly condemn the heinous terrorist attack which took the life of the former President and Head of the High Peace Council, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. We will continue to support Afghan-led efforts to reconcile and re-integrate those Afghan militant elements who renounce violence, cut links with terrorist groups, and accept the Afghan Constitution. We remain convinced that a peaceful Afghanistan, with functioning institutions and strengthened security forces, is key to a successful regional cooperation. We remind that the international community and the region are not separated and emphasize that we all have a stake in the security and stability of the region.
10. We mark our full support to the ongoing process of transition of responsibility for providing security in Afghanistan from ISAF/NATO to ANSF in the framework of the ‘Kabul Process’. We remain convinced that progress to be made between now and 2014, when transition will be completed, will make a decisive impact on the future course of efforts underway in Afghanistan. However, transition should assist Afghanistan and development of its relevant structures with a sustained support in the form of long term commitments to be made by regional and international partners. We welcome ongoing efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and its regional partners to foster trust and cooperation with each other as well as relevant cooperation initiatives developed by the countries concerned and regional organizations. The promotion of a sound regional cooperation in the ‘Heart of Asia’ will be an important contribution to these efforts. In this context, enhanced trade connectivity along historical trade routes will also constitute an added value and will require conducive regional environment.
11. We recognise that Afghanistan is today at a critical juncture. It still faces significant security, economic, and development challenges, which are of an interconnected nature. These challenges cannot be addressed without building upon the already constructive support of Afghanistan’s regional and international partners. The efforts to meet these challenges are most effective when they are Afghan-owned and driven, and supported by all partners and pursued in a transparent and constructive manner.
12. While not all challenges specifically affect each country in similar degree, no single state or international organization can deal with these challenges by itself. A concerted effort towards stability and prosperity is needed. Consequently, regional and international cooperation are indispensable to address challenges.
13. We declare our readiness to engage in sincere, result-oriented cooperation at all levels, which will not just help Afghanistan, but will also be beneficial to security and prosperity in the region as a whole. We welcome the central and impartial role of the United Nations, in line with the Security Council mandate, and we recognize the important role of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the United Nations Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation in strengthening regional security and promoting regional cooperation. We welcome the participation of Afghanistan in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as its application to obtain the status of observer state with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
14. Similarly, we also positively take note of those bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral initiatives between Afghanistan and the regional countries that could contribute to the improvement of regional cooperation. We welcome and support all these mechanisms, organisations and processes that add value to regional dimension. We also welcome various efforts aimed at intensifying cooperation and dialogue between Afghanistan and regional countries, recognising the intertwined nature of various challenges faced by all countries in the region. Our regional cooperation vision is not intended to substitute them, but to build synergy between these efforts.
15. These fundamental frameworks and principles of cooperation among countries are unequivocally pertinent in dealing with challenges. We note the value of a more coherent and structured approach to individual initiatives. We pledge to give strong emphasis and further impetus to the ongoing regional cooperation endeavours.
16. With this understanding, based on the principles, including guarantees of territorial integrity, sovereignty and refraining from the threat or use of force to resolve disputes; guarantees for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States; and peaceful settlement of disputes according to international law, stated in this document, we will endeavour to build confidence through broad ranging and effective Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), where appropriate and based on self-differentiation basis, which may include, but not be limited to, the areas listed hereafter.

A) In the political and security field:

• Enhanced cooperation for fighting terrorism, including through exchange of information;
• Participation in Civil Emergency Planning to assess risks and reduce vulnerability of
  the civil population to terrorism;
• Enhancement of cooperation among Afghanistan and its immediate neighbours
  for effective border controls;
• Creation or enhancement of conditions conducive to the voluntary and safe return
  of refugees, in a dignified and orderly manner;
• Exchange of information regarding forces responsible for counter-terrorism
  operations and facilitate contacts among them as appropriate;
• Co-operation and interaction among regional countries in the area of counter narcotics and the trafficking of illegal goods and lethal substance, and their precursors, including enhancing bilateral efforts to prevent illicit movement of personnel and material across international borders.
• Development of joint guidelines for cooperation in the field of disaster management;

B) In the economic field:

• Build, where appropriate, on the model of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit
  Trade Agreement, ways to expand trade across the region;
• Trade facilitation strategy – The development of a coherent strategy to develop
  a regionally coherent trade and border management;
• Preferential Trade Agreement within the region without prejudice to existing
  trading agreements;
• Establishment of databases and a system of data exchange in trade and
  economic spheres;
• Improvement of the exchange of information on commercial opportunities and
  specific trading conditions;
• Improvement in the provisions for the settlement of commercial disputes,
  including various forms of arbitration;
• A strategy to encourage participation of the private sector in regional development programs, including through private sector-public sector joint ventures;
• Exchange of information on development of international tourism and
  tourist infrastructure and assistance in establishing and strengthening contacts;
• Exchange of information regarding suspicious financial transactions, illegal
  financial operations and assistance in establishing and strengthening contacts
  between appropriate authorities;
• Facilitation of the development of co-operation in the various field of environment;
• Improvement of business contacts and facilities;
• Encourage the establishment of a framework for enhanced cooperation among
  Chambers of Commerce;
• Training of personnel in various fields of economic activity;
• The development of a coherent strategy to develop and maintain a regionally
  connecting infrastructure, with support from international partners;
• Encouraging Afghanistan’s role as a land-bridge, connecting the region through cooperation and completion of bridges on transboundary rivers, roads and railway networks; in this connection, focusing on construction of new automobile bridges over the Panj River in Kokul and Ayvaz fields of Tajikistan and supporting the implementation of the project on a railway route from East, Central, South and West Asia and to the sea routes through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan with existing Uzbekistan- Afghanistan railway being connected to a prospective Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-
  Afghanistan railway, and supporting the implementation of the project on a railway route from Iran to Afghanistan, the Khaf- Herat Railway;
• Co-operation on easier flow of energy resources within, from and across the region, especially with regard to electricity, minerals, oil and gas, including their exploitation and transit, through regional projects, such as TAPI, and CASA-1000 project which has to be implemented with a broader financial contribution, as well as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank;
• Wider support for Tajikistan`s efforts to conduct the 5th Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA V) which is planned to be held on March 26-27, 2012 in Dushanbe. Amongst other agenda items, the Conference will consider the proposal from Afghanistan and Tajikistan on enhancing trade connectivity along historical trade routes. On the margins of the RECCA V, we support the organization of a business forum and a forum of scientists and researchers.
• Exploring the possibility of cooperation in the development of hydroelectric power and in the sphere of water management without prejudice to existing agreements;
• Consider, wherever appropriate and mutually agreed, development of large-scale irrigation works without prejudice to existing agreements;
• A more effective regional cooperation in the agricultural and rural fields;
• The development of infrastructure around the main ports and linking them via road and railroad for shipment of goods and energy to and from Central Asia, South Asia, Eurasia and the Black Sea

C) In the education field:

• Setting up a structured regional education exchange programme with places reserved
  in universities for students from neighbouring States within the region;
• Broadening cooperation and exchanges in the fields of education and science on a
  short or long-term basis;
• Expansion of links between State institutions and non-governmental bodies whose activities are concerned with questions of education and science and including scientific exchanges, exchange of students, joint events;
• Ensure that radical and hatred references are removed from education curriculum;
• Reform the curricula that promote extremism.
• Promotion of the role of mass media as a driver for democratic development and mutual understanding, and to spread messages of peace, harmony and tolerance;
• Establishing a multi-disciplinary professional and technical training Center in Tajikistan which is aimed at preparing civilian specialists for the needs of the Afghanistan economy, with support of international community.

D) In the cultural field:

• Joint projects aimed at disseminating information on various cultures and traditions
  in the region;
• Co-operation in preserving valuable cultural, historical, archaeological and
  religious assets;
• A common fight by all nations in the region against all forms and manifestation
  of violence;
• A joint effort to promote the true nature of Islam as a religion of peace, tolerance
  and human accomplishment;
• Promotion of inter-faith and intra-cultural dialogue.

E) In the legal field:

• Considering, where appropriate and on the basis of reciprocity, relaxation of visa regimes;
• Considering relaxation of rules and restrictions at border crossings for legitimate
  travelers on the basis of reciprocal arrangements;
• Promotion of law enforcement cooperation;

17. Through the Istanbul Process, we reaffirm our commitment to strengthening regional security and cooperation, including for the purpose of building a secure and stable Afghanistan. To that end, we have decided to redouble and better coordinate our efforts through bilateral channels and existing multilateral frameworks and future meetings at Ministerial and technical level. The Istanbul Process will be developed and marked by consensus decision making of participating states.
18. In this regard, we will continue to exchange views on ways and means to implement our decisions.
19. As the first follow-up on the Istanbul Conference, we have decided to meet again at Ministerial level in Kabul in June 2012.
20. The Kabul Ministerial meeting will be preceded by a preparatory meeting at technical level chaired by Afghanistan. To that effect, Afghanistan will circulate a concept paper by the end of January 2012, outlining the agenda of the meeting.
21. Having stated the above, we recognise that the challenge we intend to meet remains considerable. But, through these confidence building measures, we are aiming at a new mindset of cooperation in the region.
22. The ambitious objective of enhanced regional cooperation, with and around Afghanistan, will need to overcome many hurdles.
    However, the benefits for Afghanistan and its region will reward this ambition and be worth the endeavours.
23. The participants to the Istanbul Conference wish to express their gratitude to the Republic of Turkey for the generous hospitality and commitment to promoting regional cooperation.

Adopted on 2 November 2011 by the ‘Heart of Asia’ Countries which consist of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates.

Welcomed and supported by the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Italy, Japan, Norway, Republic of Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the United Nations, Economic Cooperation Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.

ANNEXURE II

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	3001	676	1702	5379
2014	404	132	274	810
Total*	18560	5630	27136	51326

2014*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	241	86	133	460
February	163	46	141	350
Total	404	132	274	810

2013*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	414	70	265	749
February	360	44	201	605
March	249	43	193	485
April	230	88	234	552
May	283	81	185	549
June	326	62	104	492
July	240	68	149	457
August	224	62	62	348
September	292	46	71	409
October	127	37	70	234
November	144	43	82	269
December	112	32	86	230
Total	3001	676	1702	5379

2012*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	177	117	234	528
February	208	59	193	460
March	207	72	454	733
April	239	36	124	399
May	247	76	193	516
June	303	64	289	656
July	303	60	207	570
August	258	70	304	632
September	278	22	164	464
October	252	40	166	458
November	288	31	69	388
December	247	85	75	407
Total	3007	732	2472	6211

2011*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	204	38	255	497
February	107	68	160	335
March	432	48	148	628
April	263	57	254	574
May	161	140	220	512
June	209	80	354	643
July	423	51	337	811
August	430	77	183	690
September	186	39	130	355
October	119	32	172	323
November	91	92	333	516
December	113	43	254	410
Total	2738	765	2800	6303

2010*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	182	33	387	602
February	92	68	340	500
March	168	36	502	706
April	182	50	558	790
May	156	38	833	1027
June	72	44	598	714
July	220	36	618	874
August	113	30	177	320
September	216	27	305	548
October	72	31	296	399
November	141	34	274	449
December	182	42	282	506
Total	1796	469	5170	7435

2009*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	250	69	245	564
February	216	31	430	677
March	168	67	171	406
April	132	89	297	518
May	279	155	1590	2024
June	200	157	1397	1754
July	156	58	768	982
August	155	34	531	720
September	111	77	662	850
October	255	118	1001	1374
November	175	93	792	1060
December	227	43	505	775
Total	2324	991	8389	11704

2008*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	88	111	455	654
February	182	33	30	245
March	137	26	41	204
April	80	25	16	121
May	61	30	37	128
June	149	31	38	218
July	82	71	250	403
August	339	124	784	1247
September	272	67	876	1215
October	262	60	735	1057
November	225	50	482	757
December	278	26	162	466
Total	2155	654	3906	6715

2007*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	26	16	29	71
February	35	4	8	47
March	28	21	261	310
April	176	18	83	277
May	57	10	14	81
June	31	12	40	83
July	144	143	191	478
August	56	63	117	236
September	101	67	144	312
October	282	101	154	537
November	293	94	341	728
December	293	48	97	438
Total	1522	597	1479	3598

2006*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	114	29	22	165
February	88	16	2	106
March	91	19	221	331
April	96	44	53	193
May	43	39	5	87
June	26	29	47	102
July	12	52	49	113
August	22	43	44	109
September	22	0	2	24
October	42	7	83	132
November	42	45	9	96
December	10	2	1	13
Total	608	325	538	1471

2005*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	30	7	2	39
February	11	0	6	17
March	77	15	3	95
April	6	2	2	10
May	63	5	2	70
June	8	1	0	9
July	29	2	43	74
August	14	10	1	25
September	32	17	40	89
October	27	15	16	58
November	13	0	12	25
December	120	7	10	137
Total	430	81	137	648

2004*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	0	4	0	4
February	2	0	1	3
March	47	45	25	117
April	6	5	1	12
May	45	0	0	45
June	60	37	24	121
July	28	6	19	53
August	42	17	4	63
September	70	36	70	176
October	114	11	28	153
November	5	19	72	96
December	16	4	0	20
Total	435	184	244	863

2003*

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	7	0	0	7
February	18	3	1	22
March	0	0	1	1
April	1	0	0	1
May	6	0	1	7
June	5	13	0	18
July	61	2	0	63
August	4	0	0	4
September	10	0	0	10
October	8	5	18	31
November	0	0	2	2
December	20	1	2	23
Total	140	24	25	189

Note: A large number of target killings, which many believe are carried out by the terrorists, backed by warring political parties, in Sindh were inadvertently left. Now that fatalities in such incidents have been included for the years 2011 and 2012, the data has been changed accordingly.

ANNEXURE III

Joint Statement Adopted at the Conclusion of the Eighth Trilateral Summit of the
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the President of the Republic of
Turkey and the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, His Excellency Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey and His Excellency Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan held their eighth Trilateral Summit Meeting in Ankara, on 13 February 2014.

On the occasion of the Trilateral Summit, the three Leaders, together with His Excellency Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, held fruitful and comprehensive talks on regional and international security issues at a time when the Heart of Asia is going through a decisive period for the future and significant developments that may have impact on efforts to promote peace and security in the region are expected to take place.

The Leaders, accompanied by the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs and high level security officials,

Recognizing the contribution of the Trilateral Summit Process to regional dialogue,

Reiterating their determination to continue close consultations among the three brotherly countries,

Mindful of the importance of effective bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation at all fora including security and intelligence for implementation of agreed mechanisms,

Recalling their commitment at the first Trilateral Summit held in 2007, to deny sanctuary, training and financing to terrorists and to elements involved in subversive and anti-state activities and to initiate immediate action on specific intelligence exchanges in this regard,

Convinced that peace and stability of Afghanistan is critical for peace and stability of the whole region, and reiterating that both Turkey and Pakistan attach importance to maintaining stability and unity of Afghanistan,

Welcoming the positive momentum in the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan,

Determined to bring this momentum into fruition by cooperating to promote a secure environment during the Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections which is scheduled to take place on 5 April 2014,

Cognizant of the ongoing efforts for peace and reconciliation in the region,

Recalling their agreement at the sixth Trilateral Summit held in 2011, on the need to further broaden and deepen the security consultations between the relevant Afghanistan and Pakistan institutions, and thus agreeing to render their cooperation more result oriented, through interim review processes,

Reiterated the importance of the ongoing electoral process in Afghanistan in securing a smooth and successful political transition in the country, and underlined in this regard the necessity of a suitable security environment,

Underscored that the international community should continue to contribute to the efforts aiming at supporting Afghan-led and Afghan-owned processes, including those concentrating on further enhancing the Afghan National Security Forces,

Emphasized the pivotal importance of a political settlement within the framework of the Afghan Constitution, to ensure durable peace in Afghanistan and called upon the Afghan Taliban to join the peace process,

Stressed the importance of enhanced cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan as immediate neighbors and the need to taking practical steps in supporting the Peace and Reconciliation Process and in promoting the necessary security environment during the Afghan Presidential and Provincial Council elections,

Underlined the necessity of enhancing close coordination between the brotherly countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan for effective border management,

Reiterated their common resolve to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

Welcomed Pakistan’s decision to extend the stay of registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan until 31 December 2015, while calling upon the international community to assist the two countries in the timely and honorable return of Afghan refugees and their sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan,

Took note of the growing people-to-people contacts between Pakistan and Afghanistan and encouraged that every effort be made to further develop such contacts,

Welcomed efforts of Pakistan and Afghanistan to build a broader relationship with strengthened trade and economic relations,

Acknowledged the development cooperation of Turkey and Pakistan in reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan,

Encouraged joint projects for socio-economic development which would serve as an important asset in building mutual trust and solidarity in the region,

Underscored that the international community should also continue to support Afghanistan’s socio-economic development beyond 2014,

The Leaders were also briefed by Mr. Rifat Hisarcıklıoglu, President of Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges on the work of the Istanbul Forum.

His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, His Excellency Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan conveyed their thanks to His Excellency Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey and to the Government and brotherly people of Turkey for hosting the eighth Trilateral Summit.