It is a sorry state of affairs that since the beginning of 2014, hardly a day has passed without a terrorist event of one type or another. Widespread incidents of violence, of all hues, in Pakistan’s urban centres signify the challenges confronting the federal and provincial governments in restoring law and order. Taliban’s trajectory is twofold; they claim propriety over high profile terrorist attacks while at the same time they frequently reiterate their talks offer asking the government to create “conducive environment for the meaningful dialogues”. Options of ceasefire and Jirga are also being floated by some quarters. Unrelenting events of terrorism have weakened the pro-dialogue constituency and have strengthened the hawkish school of thought that sees ruthless use of force against terrorists (read Taliban) as the only solution.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesperson Shahidullah Shahid has claimed on Sunday that the TTP leadership was willing to enter into meaningful and serious dialogue with the government from day one and has always displayed serious behaviour in this regard. However, Taliban are aware that nation’s patience would not last indefinitely and eventually someone is going to say enough is enough. That is why alongside acts of terrorism, Taliban are articulating their willingness for “sincere and meaningful talks”. If sincerity requires the government to halt all military action in the tribal areas even as the TTP itself continues its campaign of violence then this is certainly an untenable position. However, these are not Taliban alone that have turned this country into present disorder, as the criminals within the country and also the foreign intelligence agencies are at work and exploiting the situation. Pakistan is confronted with elusive, imprecise and omnipotent terrorism— not confined to Taliban alone. Government should not fall victim to tunnel vision and attribute everything to Taliban. Government needs to counter terrorism of multiple fronts.
There are indications that the federal government is planning a targeted operation against banned outfits in the country’s settled areas. Such operation aims at pre-empting any reaction by members of these groups in major cities and towns once a ground offensive begins against their hideouts in the tribal areas. Other aspects of government’s strategy include denying these groups any space in the settled areas and choking their financial support—a task easier said than done. Strategic environment does not support a wholesome and protracted operation. Hence any such operation is likely to be limited in scope and duration, to be followed by a renewed effort for talks. Some analysts opine that the country’s militancy issues would be resolved once the US and its allies exit Afghanistan. They have a valid point, but it does not mean that government should till then remain hands off viz-a-viz protection of life and property—even in urban centres.
During the previous ten days or so, Pakistani and Afghan Taliban entities have demonstrated their motivation and capability of hitting high value as well as routine targets at the time and place of their choosing. In Pakistan a speeding suicide bomber detonated his bomb at a checkpoint close to the General Headquarters. On the same day, Afghan insurgents tried to fight their way into a NATO base near Kandahar. Beside this incident, Afghan insurgents also claimed responsibility for a suicide assault on a Lebanese restaurant in Kabul in which 21 people, including 13 foreigners, were killed.
When the new government came into power, it had unanimous backing of all political elements and military leadership that gave it a free hand to form a strategy for countering the menace of terrorism; it chose dialogue as first option. In all sincerity, all segments of state and society went along the idea of talks with Taliban. However, as the clock ticked by, and government lost precious six months, the consensus has weaned out and the issue, once again, stands politicised.
Government is still struggling to cobble together a national policy. Political leadership does not have unlimited time at its disposal, every lost day means collecting more dead and injured persons, additional loss of public and private property and reinforcing the aroma of perpetual insecurity for a typical ‘man on the street’. Even essential back-ground work has not gone into establishing the parameters like identifying the real dialogue partners and bandits, and putting forward at least a ball-park framework for negotiations. Nobody expects the government to solve internal security issues during this year. However, demonstrating strong and clear intent is the need of the hour. Jockeying between appeasement and punitive strikes is radiating messages of confused thought process and lack of political will. Though the government has issued three ordinances pertaining to countering terrorism, these are yet to become an act of parliament. Delay in formulation of counter-terrorism policy has left a void that the Taliban are filling through their show of power actions to improve their bargaining position.
It is indeed mind boggling that 12 years into the war, our law enforcing entities have serious capacity and capability shortfalls. Terrorist outfits continue to be intelligence black-holes. Inter agency coordination is inadequate and our approach towards countering terrorism has not graduated beyond day-to-day fire fighting—it is reactive rather than proactive. National consensus is missing on vital issue as to the ownership of war as well as a tenable exit strategy. There is certainly a need for purpose raised anti terrorism force with appropriate vision, training equipping and skills. Shortage of life saving kits and flawed judicial process leading to acquittal of apprehended terrorists due want of evidence have certainly affected the morale of the personnel of law enforcement agencies.
Anxiety is running high both in Pakistan and Afghanistan about whether the end of US-led combat operations in Afghanistan this year will create even more violence and instability on both sides of the border. A recent US intelligence report warned many of the military gains made in recent years could be lost by 2017. In another development, President Karzai has linked signing of Bilateral Security Agreement to American negotiations with Taliban.
Leaving aside the foreign dimension of the dilemmas of security, there is a need to confront and neutralize the internal factors contributing towards perpetuation of terrorism in Pakistan—with the objective of maintaining at least a semblance of law and order in urban centres. Neither talks nor use of force in isolation are likely to work; it will indeed have to be a delicate combination of the two.
There is no doubt that government is serious in establishing peace and is in no way ready to call off dialogue process. Dialogue and talks favour the national interest. However, present situation demands serious and prompt actions from the national leadership. The government needs to take charge and generate appropriate response. A meaningful message must immediately be sent to the terrorists that the government has the will and power to eliminate them; should they continue to practice terrorism.
While international focus is on bracing up for post 2014 Afghanistan, recent spiralling terrorist attacks have propped up a national contingency for us—tackling 2014 Pakistan. The headline-grabbing attacks have reignited long-simmering controversy over whether Pakistan should respond to the TTP menace by fighting or talking. The government is certainly running out of time; its lethargy is foreclosing the option of dialogue even before it could begin.
