Terrorists use diverse attack tactics to hit their targets across Pakistan but their reliance on targeted killings increased in 2012. The issue was directly linked to easy access to illicit weapons and according to an estimate 20 million illegal weapons are in circulation in Pakistan.1
The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in Pakistan is a major source of concern for security and stability vis-a- vis crime-terror activities. The estimated number of guns held by civilians in Pakistan is 18000002. The number of licensed firearm holders in Pakistan is estimated to be around about 7,000,0003, accordingly the number of unlicensed firearms is 11,000,0004. Pakistan is ranked in the medium firearms production according to the classification of manufacturers of small arms5. As for the gun sales and transfers in the state of Pakistan, the private trade and sale of firearms is allowed6. Likewise, the number of license of small arms and ammunition is not limited in the firearms ordinance of 1965 of Pakistan. On the other hand, there are no appropriate measures for stockpiling of small arms privately.7 The lacunas present in the legal context of Pakistan’s laws related to firearms points out the issue of the illicit trafficking of SALWS on the security environment of the state.
The securitization of the SALWs in Pakistan necessitates minimizing the illicit trafficking of weapons which in fact has not been properly addressed in the state’s security policy framework. This paper discusses the security dynamics and perpetuation of SALWS in the Pakistani society, whereas the implications of illicit trafficking of SALWS will be discussed afterwards.
SALWS: An Agent of Crime-Terror Nexus in Pakistan
The trafficking of SALWS had flourished in its full form inside Pakistan during the post-Afghan war period providing a corridor for crime-terror network. At one hand, the presence of ‘Kalashnikov’ culture in the tribal belt of Pakistan during 1980s and 1990s gave ideal grounds for criminal and terrorists activities, on the other hand, the growing incidents of terrorism are making internal security situation more vulnerable than ever8. Since last decade, the already defined illicit routes pave the way for further illicit diffusion of SALWS inside and outside of Pakistan. Hence, the probability of illicit SALWs as a threat to national security of Pakistan is far above the ground.
The external and internal inter- play of power by the powerful states in the cold war period, post cold war period and in post 9/11 period pro- vided a window of opportunity to the VNSAGs for indulging in illicit diffusion of SALWS in Pakistan. Consequently, the violent forces gradually arisen to set up crime-terror networks in Pakistan. The state of Pakistan has been utilized as a transit route for arms trafficking during the cold war period as a CIA pipeline. The non-state actors have played their active role in illicit transfer of SALWs through grey and black markets to the VNSAGS in post 9/11 period. Such particular networks include Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Haqqani Network (HN) and Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan9. The internal security dynamics of Pakistan has been severely affected by the use of illicit SALWs via crime-terror net- works in recent years. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk supported this argument by stating:
“Pakistan’s internal threat environment is plagued by a multitude of internal security threats and governance challenges including inter alia, numerous varieties of terrorism, organized criminal activity and corruption. Terrorism remains a particularly serious problem with bomb attacks and random killings emerging as a monthly occur- rence over the last few years.”10
The geographical proximity with the state of Afghanistan and lawlessness in tribal areas of Pakistan also provided ideal conditions to crime-terror networks for SALWS trafficking. The nexus between organized criminals and terrorists is significant in the tribal areas of Pakistan, especially FATA. The criminal and terrorist networks are muddled up behaving in hybrid forms in Pakistan of which the TTP and HN are most active in the area of FATA. The HN is collaborating with TTP in operationalization of their terrorist and criminal activities.11 HN is incorporating with the terrorist network targeting Pakistan’s military installations and killing dozens of intelligence personnel.12 In 2013 only, 192 major incidents of terrorist attacks have been observed in Pakistan.13 One cannot contextualize all the terrorists’ attacks to be conducted by the SALWS but majority of the tar- get killings and assaults have been operationalized through SALWS in Pakistan.
The HN, as a hybrid organization, is not only involved in crime activities but the network also protects the traffickers passing through their areas. On the other hand, similar to the Sicilian mafia, which emerged in the 19th century in a period when the Italian state was weak, the Haqqani network today is a hybrid organization that is at once terrorist and criminal in nature.14 The network is also running illicit business in the North Waziristan. They own a Transport Company which moves approximately 200 semi-trailers daily across the border between Khost and North Waziristan.15 This pro- vides them more financial autonomy and stability.
The other important aspect which is providing leeway for flour- ishing criminal/terror networks and SALWS trafficking in Pakistan is the ineffective policies of the state. Bribery is used for illicit trafficking of SALWS at the border areas of Af- Pak region; this aspect is also strengthening the crime-terror net- works in Pakistan. Not only are the violent non-state actors involved in it but in certain cases corrupt state officials are also involved in SALWS trafficking. According to data published by Transparency International in its annual publication, Corruption Perception Index 2011, Afghanistan ranks at 174th position and Pakistan ranks at 139th position.16 Most of the traffickers which are operating in Pakistan are the natives of the state. In fact the illicit markets in Darra Adem Khel have not been completely abandoned by the authorities. The weaponry which has been pro- duced through the illegal market in KPK is not of a quality that can be exported across the border, but the non-state actors have the high probability to utilize them for achieving their motives, operationally and financially.
The Pakistani Taliban linked to the Pashtun clan of the Mehsud in the Af-Pak region are involved in the illicit trafficking of SALWS for their operational activities. They correspond with the Taliban on the other side of the border. The cost-benefit procedures of the illicit trade of arms and other goods hamper the security environment in Pakistan, not only in the economic sector but in the military and societal sector as well. The attacks on military installations with illicit weapons, kidnap- ping of foreigners and locals, ransom and extortion and terrorist attacks give a bleak picture of the vulnerable security environment in Pakistan. In 2012 only TTP claimed responsibility for the highest number of terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. (See Table no. 1.1)
| Table 1.1: Terrorist Attacks Claimed by the Terrorist Groups in Pakistan (2012) | |||||||
| Organization | Balochistan | FATA | KPK | Punjab | Sindh | Islamabad | Pakistan |
| Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) | 2 | 197 | 109 | 5 | 36 | 1 | 350 |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) | 67 | – | 1 | 1 | 59 | – | 128 |
| Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) | – | 116 | 8 | – | – | – | 124 |
| Source: Pakistan Security Report 2012, Published by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) | |||||||
The weaponization of the society of Pakistan is hampering the societal sector in the context of security environment. The local smugglers are also providing illicit arms and ammunition to the banned outfits in the urban areas of Pakistan. The TTP network has had been attaining weapons from the local smugglers as well.17 They are providing hand grenades, Kalashnikovs, repeater guns, pistols and heroin to the banned terrorist networks.18 The AK- 47 is one of the best examples that paved the way for Kalashnikov culture in the tribal areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.19
The potential of terrorists converting into hybrid networks by indulging in criminal activities does hamper the security environment in the state. In the meantime, the illicit supply routes in the state of Pakistan must also be taken into consideration for SALWS trafficking.
Gun Smuggling Routes in Pakistan
Gun runners in Afghanistan smuggle American and Russian weapons into Pakistan; then these are being distributed among the terrorist net- works through different routes. A study indicated that the smuggling route goes from the Afghan province of Kunar into the tribal region of Bajaur in Pakistan, then from Bajaur the smugglers ship arms to their customers in the East and the South. The areas include Karachi, Swat, Peshawar, Mardan, Malakand and Kashmir. The route smuggling goes from Afghanistan while the route of illicit trade through Pakistan goes from Afghanistan and Iran in the west to Indian and Sri Lanka in the east. The arms entering from Afghanistan into Pakistan are delivered into three areas to five different terrorist groups i.e.
FATA and Khyber Pakhtun Khaw Province: The base for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province: Militant groups associated with the TTP and foreign clients including HN, Uzbek and Chechen militants.
Western Balochistan Province: Nationalist insurgents seeking independence from Pakistan Karachi: Rival Ethnic Militias including Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Awami National Party (ANP)
Private Buyers: Wealthy farmers and businessmen who use weapons for security.
Small Arms Trafficking in Pakistan
According to Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) report, more than 50,000 people including civilians and military personnel were killed in different terrorist attacks in the year 2012, especially in FATA, KPK and Balochistan.20 According to PIPS security Report (2012), the VNSAGS including Baloch separatists, TTP and many others are major actors of instable security situation in Pakistan in 2012.21
Militants, insurgents and violent sectarian groups carried out a total of 1,577 terrorist attacks across Pakistan in 2012, claiming the lives of 2,050 people and causing injuries to another 3,822. Over 61 per cent (971) of these attacks were carried out by the so-called religiously motivated militant groups, mainly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which caused the killing of 1,076 people and injuries to another 2,227. The Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents carried out 404 attacks, killing 437 people and injuring 823 others. Meanwhile, 202 sectarian- related terrorist attacks, perpetrated by banned sectarian groups, and the TTP and groups affiliated with it claimed the lives of 537 people and caused injuries to 772 people.22
In the year 2012 sectarian violence has increased comparative to year 2011. The intervention of crime-terror networks in the conflict ridden areas of Pakistan has hampered the security situation by utilizing the SALWS. The gun trafficking is going on in all provinces of Pakistan, i.e.
(a) Balochistan
(b) Sindh
(c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(d) Punjab
Balochistan’s Security Environment
In contemporary security environment, the Province of Balochistan is the most vulnerable one. The Narco-trafficking through porous borders of Balochistan with Iran and Afghanistan not only pave the way for narcotics but also support the illicit SALWS supply. The narco trafficking in Makran district of Balochistan is flourishing very rapidly and Imam Bheel, the drug kingpin of the area is the biggest provider of drugs in the related areas. 23 Rehman Malik, the then Interior Minister, stated in one of his interview that, “We are a victim of this drug. We are worried that drugs, arms and ammunition and terrorists are coming across the border” 24
Balochistan is a transit point in the international illicit drug trade route. Imam Bheel is conducting his illicit activities in the province of Balochistan and across the borders whereas the security officials are still incapable of implementing any counter measures against the criminal network. In fact in 2009, US President Barak Obama identified Imam Bheel as one of the Narco-Traffickers significant around the world. He controls the 700 km coastline of Balochistan and is among the top beneficiaries of the strategic location of Balochistan.25 He is controlling the drug trafficking from Afghanistan and Central Asian state to the Persian Gulf and other European Countries. 26 At this point the thought provoking element is the significance of criminal mafia and terrorists gaining momentum in SALWS illicit supply in the Balochistan province.
On the other hand, the Baloch separatist elements are utilizing SALWS to operationalize their violent activities in the province and challenge the writ of the state. The drug trafficking routes provide the window of opportunity for the separatists’ elements to acquire SALWS in the province of Balochistan. Right over here, the operational and financial interest of the non-state actors provide a space for the illicit trafficking of SALWS in the state of Pakistan. The Baloch separatist groups are armed with small non- automatic illicit weapons, these weapons are illicitly acquired from the drug trafficking routes. The rebels in the on-going resistance in South Waziristan and parts of Balochistan have missiles, anti-air- craft weapons and an array of lethal arms at their disposal27 and are targeting the multi-billion rupee development projects.28 The number of terrorist incidents in Balochistan from 2004 onward is increasing and the security personnel who lost their lives here since 2004 are 715.29 Terrorism related incidents which Occurred in Quetta only in 2013 highlight the fact that the SALWS are easily accessible to the terrorist in the province. In recent attacks at the residency of Jinnah in Ziarat and Bolan Medical College (BMC) terrorists tore down the security situation in the province. Acting Inspector General Prisons Shujah Kasi stated in the wake of this incident that “Panic and fear still prevail. People feel unsafe. Security measures are desperately needed”. 30
Market Economy of Small Arms and Light Weapons in FATA
The crime-terror networks have the strongest presence in FATA. The history confirms the cases of Haji Ayub Afridi and Victor Bout involved in SALWS smuggling into the Af-Pak region during post cold war period via FATA. Ayub Afridi has been one of the drug cartels who provided weapons to the Afghan Mujahideens during the Soviet-Afghan war in 1980s through CIA pipeline. Afridi has used his smuggling network for the supplying arms to Mujahideen through illicit means with the help of CIA.31 The drug mafia lot including people like Ayub Afridi are hampering the image of the state internationally on the one hand and on the other hand they pose a security threat for the own native lands. Because of their lust for financial gains they are easily exploited by enemy states who wish to achieve their political objectives. Victor Bout has been running his private cargo airline around the world and has been convicted of arms smuggling to Afghanistan during the Afghan war in 1980s and later in post 9/11 scenario. There are reports proving his links with Al-Qaeda after the attack of United States of America on Afghanistan. There had been a strong connection between Victor Bout and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan during 1980s. Later, in 2001 after the beginning of war in Afghanistan Al- Qaeda had transferred its money and gold from the country with the help of Victor Bout’s cargo company. While transferring the arms through illicit means Pakistan is one of the transit routes for delivery of illicit arms to Afghanistan.32 The non-state actors like Victor Bout and his company work for their own financial benefits, altering security dynamics of the states.
The increasing militancy in the FATA belt is also providing window of opportunity for trafficking of SALWS in the state of Pakistan. According to Brain Fishman, the most important centres of militancy are present in FATA today. As North Waziristan’s Shawal region is serving as a safe haven for HN and providing it an opportunity for continuation of criminal conducts.33 On the other hand, South Waziristan is the centre of TTP activities.34 These safe havens pro- vide them easy access to criminal activities. TTP is actively involved in kidnapping for ransom and extortions. This is where the opportunity for illicit trafficking of SALWs also creates. Fishman illustrate the presence of militants in FATA while high- lighting the region as a safe haven for them.35 Out of which TTP’s presence can be seen in majority of the tribal agencies; TTP is present in:
(a) South Waziristan
(b) Khyber
(c) Kurram
(d) Orakzai
(e) Bajaur
(f) Mohmand
Currently in Khyber agency, Laskhar-e-Islam (LI) the criminal gang posing as the religious force,36 it also maintains ties with the Pakistani Taliban. The group is well maintained and has created significant security problems for the local community and traders in KPK37 and are involved in kidnapping for ransom and arms smuggling. Sometimes the group is also hired by people to settle their personal scores with rivals.38 The SALWS diffusion through black market is leading towards an existential terrorist threat while building up a nexus between criminal organizations and terrorist organizations in the FATA area.
Along with LI, the TTP has been engaged in many criminal activities to keep the funds flowing and for attaining SALWS for operational purposes. 39 The manifestation of SALWS operational use by the TTP can be observed in the year 2012. While TTP had been engaged in sectarian conflicts in recent years, after the launching of operations against them by the Pakistani forces, TTP targeted the attacks against security forces of Pakistan.
The security landscape of FATA in 2012 explains the use of SALWS by the terrorist against security forces of Pakistan. Majority of the militant assaults were carried out by TTP in FATA. Out of 844, law enforcement agencies were targeted in 284 attacks.40 In 2012 around 100 TTP militants attacked a security check post with heavy weapons in Baba Zayarat area in South Waziristan on August 29, killing 9 security personnel. Likewise, in other major attack the TTP attacked the Nawab Shaheed Post near the Afghan border and killed eight paramilitaries.41
Small Arms Proliferation in Karachi
Illicit diffusion of SALWS is one of the major factors which is destabilising the metropolitan hub of Pakistan, i.e. Karachi. The vulnerable conditions and large population of the city make it a ‘friendly city’ for terrorists.42 The presence of criminal gangs, weapon mafias and ethno-political rivalries enabled the crime-terror networks to deliver illicit SALWS in the city. Consequently, the trafficking is hampering the security situation in all districts of Karachi city. The map of Karachi illustrates the district divisions of Karachi.
Crime-terror networks including TTP and Afghani Taliban hold presence in the city of Karachi while launching different terrorist attacks.43 The TTP has increased its fundraising activities and recruitment process in the city.44 They have launched a high profile attacks in recent in Karachi. According to Huma Yusuf, 7000 to 8000 Afghan Taliban fighters with illicit weaponry are residing in the Pushtun areas of Karachi.45 The TTP is posing a real threat to the security of Pakistan while the network has been launching devastating terror attacks in recent years. In 2010, TTP attacked Criminal Investigation Department (CID) Headquarter in Karachi by opening firing and vehicle loaded with explosives near the Governor House. Later, in 2011, TTP attacked two buses carrying Navy officials in Karachi46. This was the major attack against the armed forces of Pakistan. The attack was carried out with SALWS. Then following the same month, TTP attacked the naval base PNS Mehran with rockets, RPGs and Machine guns while destroying two U.S. manufactured P- 3Orion surveillance airplanes.47 The ten-hour long battle between the terrorists and armed forces in the middle of the Karachi city alarmed the state authorities of Pakistan about the national security threat imposed by the crime-terror network. The SALWS illicit supply made it possible for the terrorists to operationalize and execute their attack.
The TTP has been involved in many bank robberies in Karachi as well. According to the Citizen’s Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), fourteen major bank heists occurred in 2009 and twenty in 2010.48 Pakistan’s Interior Ministry confirmed in a 2010 statement that 80 per cent of those robberies could be traced back to individuals originating in the tribal areas and believed to have links with the TTP. The trend continues: seventeen local banks were robbed of more than Rs. 60 Million ($0.6 mil- lion) last year.49 Likewise, TTP has also collected funds through kidnap- ping for ransom in the Karachi city. The other new development in terms of crime-terror nexus is the collaboration of TTP members with criminal gangs in Liyari.50
An Intelligence official stated regarding identifying terrorist in Karachi, “Looking for them in Karachi’s maze is like finding them in the haystack”.51 Analyst on Afghanistan issues, Rahimullah Yousufzai expresses his views about identifying the sources of illicit transfer of weapons in Karachi city and terrorist presence in the same manner. According to him, “Karachi has long been a safe haven for Taliban. With a large Pashtun population it is very difficult to trace Talibans” 52 The strong criminal mafias are providing the illicit firearms and ammunition to the groups involved in ethnic rivalries in the city. Illicit SALWs use is serving to continue the wave of insecurity and instability in Karachi. Approximately 2 million illegal guns are in circulation in Karachi.53 The issue of illicit SALWS is a serious security threat to the Karachi city.
Special investigation Unit Chief SSP Khurram Waris identifies that “the RPG-7s and Russian Grenades being used by criminal gangs and terrorists in Karachi were the same types that have been in use by militants since the days of Afghan Jihad”. 54 The legal framework of Pakistan’s arms ordinance allows the acquisition of prohibited and non-prohibited bore weapons with certain conditions. This allow, the Intelligence officials believe, most of the prohibited bore licenses across the country in the last few years were being used in criminal activities.55 The problem of illicit SALWS requires securitization.
There are several routes from where weapons made way to Karachi. They include sea and land routes linking the city from Balochistan coastal areas through Hub and Lasbela. The geographical location of the city allows various routes for weapons smuggling, which culminate in Karachi without meeting any check posts established on the known routes.56
Acknowledging the easy avail- ability of weapons fuelling violence in the city of Karachi Pakistan’s Interior Ministry repeatedly called for ‘Deweaponization of Karachi’ Earlier Deweaponization campaigns have been launched in Pakistan in 2001, 2005 and 2007. But there have been no serious efforts to confiscate illicit weapons. Even only in Karachi, between July 2011 and January 2012, 16,631 arms licenses were issued.57
In recent decades, there has been a strong connection reported between LeT and D-Company. D- company has been one of the largest organized criminal organizations in Asia. The origin of this company is in India and it has its net- works in Karachi, Dubai, Mumbai and South African States. There are proves against the D-company in supporting LeT and providing them with weaponry for attacks in Gujarat and Mumbai.58 LeT is the banned organization, basically originated from Pakistani land, which provide weaponry to the Kashmiri militants in occupied Kashmir. This terrorist organization is working in transnational nature with people from central Asia and other parts of the world.
Repercussions of SALWS trafficking on Pakistan’s Security
There has been a significant impact of small arms proliferation on the security dynamics of the state of Pakistan. Even though it is not a very crucial issue for some of the scholars, but in the lime light, small arms are emerging as one of the major obstacle in the prevalence of peace in Pakistani society. Ramifications of illicit transfer of weapons in Pakistan have political, economic and social constraints for stability and peace in the state of Pakistan.59 The business of illicit firearms has increased by 50% in the last decade in Pakistan.60
The crime-terror networks are booming the illicit diffusion of SALWS in the Pakistani society. These hybrid networks are targeting civil and military infrastructure in Pakistan via SALWS. The causal relationship of illicit diffusion of SALWS and crime-terror networks in Pakistan has serious repercussions on the security environment of the state of Pakistan in conjunction with regional security. The causes which led to the diffusion of SALWS in the state of Pakistan are noteworthy.
Even though Pakistani state authorities are taking actions against the perpetrator of illicit SALWS, the inability of law enforcement agencies to bring an end to illicit diffusion of SALWS is increasing the sense of insecurity among the citizens of Pakistan. State response in terms of policy initiatives including military and search operations against the net- works, counter terrorism policies and amendments in weapon acquisition procedures lacks proper implementation.
Illicit diffusion of SALWS is leading to a deteriorated state of security in Pakistan. Small arms spread as a tool of violence ultimately lead to the deterioration of the society in socio-economic aspect. Due to the increased number of terror incidents and criminal activities in the state foreign investors are reluctant to invest in the state of Pakistan. Likewise, the social instability further aggravates the culture of violence and chaos in the society.
Criminals are availing the window of opportunity to smuggle SALWS via defined pipelines of the cold war period. The porous border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and lawlessness in the tribal areas pave the way for criminals to get financial benefits from illicit SALWS trade. They involve in trade with terrorists usually as terrorists are the best purchasers of illicit SALWs.
Conversion of terrorists in hybrid network by indulging in criminal and terrorist activities is another significant cause of illicit diffusion of SALWS in Pakistan. As terrorist’s infrastructure and ambitions grow in the operational activities makes crime-terror nexus. As military oper- ations have been launched against the terrorist they are looking for new ways to generate money and with that aim they have expanded links with criminals.
Another important factor for illicit diffusion of small arms is the politi- cal and ethnic rifts which have been increasing with weaponization of the society of Pakistan. The province of Balochistan is facing the most dangerous situation due to the illicit transfer of weapons from Afghanistan into Balochistan. As Pakistan has also been a transit route for the smuggling of weapons, Balochistan has become a focal point for small arms trafficking. The north-western districts of Pashin, Zhob and Chaman have acquired a standard status in smuggling of firearms in other provinces of Pakistan.61 Similarly in Karachi the situation is getting worse as the city of Karachi has seen an increase in number of small arms in recent years. The ethnic rifts in Karachi are getting worse due to the availability of small arms within the society and its access to the terrorist organizations. The ultimate objective of these terrorist groups is to shatter the economy and destabilization of the state of Pakistan. One of the recent examples is the naval base (PNS Mehran) and the air force base (PAF Base Shahrah e Faisal) in Karachi. The havoc has been created by the terrorists with arms and ammunition while attacking the security forces areas of the state. It was a display of challenge for the state authorities by the terrorist to attain their ultimate goals politically. In such circumstances the terrorists acquire weapons through illicit means as it has been identified in the reports that Taliban’s assault team who attacked the naval base were highly equipped with heavy and light guns and challenged the writ of the state.62
The reciprocal between transnational relation criminal networks and terrorist organizations for illicit diffusion of small arms in the Pakistani society and through the Pakistani state has also deteriorated the inter-state relations of the state of Pakistan with the neighbouring states, i.e. Afghanistan and India. As Afghanistan is playing a significant role in the weaponization of insurgency in Balochistan. The non-state actors in including terrorists and criminal networks are providing firearms to the Baloch insurgents and their ultimate aim is to destabilize the state of Pakistan. Likewise, as most of the opium from Afghanistan has been smuggled to other countries through Balochistan in Pakistan, the arms traffickers and drug traffickers holds very strong bond with each other. It is obvious that when drug cartels are moving from one place to the other they require small arms for their security purpose and for deliverance in other area for financial benefits.63
The links between LeT and D- company as described earlier is a great set back to the peace and security efforts of the state of Pakistan. The connection between the two has hampered the inter- state relations between India and Pakistan and at the same time it has also affected the internal security situation inside the state of Pakistan. There is a probability of increase in this trend in the South Asian region and especially in Pakistan. As the number of small arms is increasing in the state of Pakistan due to growing nexus between transnational criminal networks and terrorist organízations the violence is taming within the society. The existential terrorist threat hampers the very notion of human security through be small arms accessibility as an apparatus of force. Nuance of human security cannot achieved unless the security from terror, caused by the proliferation of small arms, is not assured by the state authorities. As the existence of individuals in insolent societies reinforces the fear of unstable frenzy charisma, acts of terrorization with malfunctioning of the state authorities to restrain the disguised antagonist are making a rigorous proviso for frustration and inconsistency of the state, the society and the individual.
In the light of the aforementioned causes for illicit diffusion of SALWS in Pakistan, the effects are enormous and negative. The trust deficit is increasing between the law enforcement agencies and the citizens of Pakistan due to increasing incidents of terrorism in the society. All the security sectors have been affected by the illicit diffusion of SALWS in the state of Pakistan. The polarization of different ethnic and separatist groups can be observed in Pakistan getting impetus from illicit SALWS for operational use, likewise the writ of the state has been challenged by the illicit diffusion of SALWs and its operationalization by hybrid crime-terror net-. works. The proxy warfare is increasing with cross border terrorist activities at regional level and is hampering the overall security environment in the state of Pakistan and in the South Asian region.
In a nutshell, the above mentioned discussion on the security environment of Pakistan and illicit trafficking of SALWS via crime-terror networks asks for the securitization of the issue. The state of Pakistan has been taking measures against the issue of illicit SALWS but a better security environment can only be possible when the benefit seekers of the deteriorating security environment are eliminated.
End Notes
1 Pakistan Security Report 2012, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies), 36.
2 Small Arms Survey Research Report, 2011 available at www.small- armssurvey.org (accessed on 4th February, 2012).
3 Small Arms Survey 2003: Development denied, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 Keeping the estimate of licensed firearms and total number of firearms available through small arms survey report the figure has been calculated.
5 Small arms survey 2001: Profiling the Problem, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
6 Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965, (W.P. Ord. xx of 1965), Islamabad: Central Government of Pakistan, 8 June, 1965.
7 Ibid.
8 Salma Malik, ‘Domestic Production, Illegal Manufacturer and Leakage of small Arms: A Case Study of Pakistan’, in Dipanker Banerjee (ed.), South Asia at Gun Point: Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 107.
9 See, Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-State Actors, (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 5-6.
10 Christine Fair & Peter Chalk, ‘United States Internal Security Assistance to Pakistan’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2006, p. 334.
11 Gretchen Peters, Haqqani Network Financing: the evolution on an industry, p. 38.
12 lbid.
13 Pakistan Data Sheets, available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/coun- tries/pakistan/database/index.html accessed on 13 June 2013.
14 Latizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 178-9.
15 Gretchen Peters, Haqqani Network Financing: The The Evolution of an Industry, (Washington: Combating Terrorism Centre, 2012), 56
16 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011”,avaialbe at http://www.trans- parency.org
17 Salis Bin Perwaiz, ‘Three arms. smugglers held after encounter’, in The News Intemational, 10 July 2012.
18 Ibid.
19 Rachel Stohl, The small arms trade: a beginner’s guide, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), pp. 1-10.
20 Most Wanted Terrorists (2012), Counter Terrorism Wing, Federal Investigative Agency (FIA), Islamabad, Pakistan, p. ii.
21 Pakistan Security Report 2012, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peaces Studies, 2012), p. 7.
22 lbid.
23 Murder Spotlights Pakistan Heroin Kingpin’, in Express Tribune, September 5, 2012, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/431764/mur- der-spotlights-pakistans-heroin-kingpin/ accessed on 15 May, 2013.
24 lbid.
25 Sajid Hussain, ‘The Godfather Among us’, in The News International, March at 13, 2012, ‘ available http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays- News-9-97404-The-Godfather-among-us accessed on 16 May 2013.
26 Ibid.
27 Alok Bansal, “Balochistan: It’s Continuing Violence and Implications”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. no. 30, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, available at http://idsa.in/system/files/strategic- analysis abansal_0306.pdf accessed on 14 May, 2013.
28 lbid.
29 Balochistan Assessment 2013, Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakist an/Balochistan/index.html accessed on 13 May, 2013.
30 Mohammad Zafar, “Terror Threat: Prisons in Balochistan Put on High Alert”, in Express Tribune, June, 18, 2013.
31 For further readings see, Syed Saleem Shehzad, ‘US Turns to Drug Baron to Rally Support’, Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com Accessed on 8 January, 2011, United Nations, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, (United Nations Publication, 2009) and Lee V. Barton, ‘Afghanistan Narcotics and US Policy’, in Illegal Drugs and Govemmental Policies, (Japan: United Nations office on Drugs and Crimes, 2009).
32 Rachel Stohl, The small arms trade: a beginner’s guide, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009) pp. 16- 18.
33 For detailed study see, Brain Fishman, The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict across the FATA and NWFP, (Washington DC: New America Foundation, 2010).
34 lbid.
35 Ibid.
36 Gretchen Peters, Peters, Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, p. 69.
37 Ibid.
38 Nasir Jamal & M. Faisal Ali, ‘Professionals, armatures and con men’, The Herald, 16 April, 2012 13 15.
39 Gretchen Peter, Op. Cit, 69.
40 Pakistan Security Report, Op. Cit,
41 Pakistan Security Report, Op. Cit,
42 Taliban Takes its Influence to Karachi”, Central Asia Online, available at www.centralasiaonline.com (accessed on 14th May, 2013).
43 Huma Yusuf, “Conflict Dynamics in Karachi”, A Report published by the United States Institute for Peace, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2012), 12.
44 lbid., 15.
45 Ibid., 15.
46 lbid.
47 Ibid.
48 lbid.
49 Ibid.
50 lbid.
51 Op. Cit
52 lbid.
53 Salman Siddique, ‘The Weapons Trail: An Endless Supply of Arms’, in The Express Tribune, May 17, 2012, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/380032/the- weapons-trai-part-1-where-do-20m-ille- gal-arms-come-from/ accessed, on 29 May, 2013
54 lbid.
55 Ibid.
56 Hasan Mansoor, ‘Tracking the Guns’, in Dawn, 7 July, 2013.
57 Ibid.
58 Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non- State Actors, (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 85.
59 Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial, ‘Pakistan’, in Caroline Zyemke and Julian Droogan (eds.), Asian Transnational Security Challenge, Emerging Trends, Regional Visions, (Sydney: The Council for Asian Transnational threat Research, 2005). pp. 41-45.
60 Ghani Kakar, ‘Gun Smuggling on the Rise in Balochistan’, Central Asia Online, 9 April 2010, www.cen- tralasiaonline.com Accessed on 8 January 2012.
61 M. Ahmed, ‘Cargo of Death’, in The Herald, Pakistan, March 2007.
62 Bill Roggio, ‘Taliban Assault Team Attacks Paksistan Navy Base’, in The Long War Journal, May 22, 2011, www.thelongwarjournal.org Accessed on 9 January, 2011.
63 Suba D. Chandran, ‘Drug Trafficking and the security of the state: A case study of Pakistan’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1998, pp. 903-922.
