Background
In 1998 both India and Pakistan abandoned their ‘bomb in the basement’ policy and exploded multiple nuclear devices to announce their formal entry into the nuclear weapons club. Knowledgeable nuclear experts had then predicted that eventually the two would be involved in a nuclear arms race where production and integration of tactical nuclear weapons in the overall nuclear deterrence posture was but inevitable. True to their assessment the nuclear weapons arsenal of the two nations has more than doubled or even tripled since then and both are suspected of clandestinely developing tactical nuclear weapons. India is yet to officially declare or accept the development or possession of tactical nukes. Pakistan on the other hand has officially revealed its tactical nuclear weapons capability during the recently concluded Pakistan Army annual Exercise Azm Nau 4 in November 2013.
Live firing of Hatf IX (Nasr) Short Range Surface to Surface Missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads of appropriate size (read tactical nukes) was demonstrated in front of foreign dignitaries that included the Indian Defence Attaché at the conclusion of the Exercise. ISPR report further elaborated that the nuclear tipped Nasr would form an integral part of the minimum credible nuclear deterrence doctrine of Pakistan and that such a step was a natural military response to the Indian Cold Start and Pro Active Operations (PAO) doctrines. Indian Cold Start and PAO doctrines have been developed to enable the Indian Armed Forces to launch short, swift and limited military offensive against Pakistan despite the latter possessing a very credible strategic nuclear weapons capability that has made large scale wars between the two nuclear armed nations almost suicidal for both.
The revelation that Hatf IX missiles armed with tactical nuclear warheads would form an integral part of Pakistan’s military response against any Cold Start / PAO misadventure by India rang serious alarm bells among the international community, especially within the Indian defence establishment. Articles and TV talk shows mostly authored and sponsored by the Indian defence and foreign ministries condemning Pakistan’s act as dangerous, foolish and irresponsible flooded their print and electronic media. Even some of the Pakistani writers and TV talk hosts have questioned the wisdom of tactical nuclear weapons deployment terming the move as counterproductive and dangerous. While the analyses and writings of those opposed to the possession of tactical nukes were not entirely without merit, either because of insufficient knowledge or inbuilt bias against Pakistan these did not reveal the full truth and much like opposing attorneys and debaters painted only the negative aspects of the issue. Without a thorough comprehension of the historical lessons associated with the development tactical nuclear weapons a true picture of the merits and demerits of their employment cannot emerge. This article will explore the background that led to the development of tactical nuclear weapons exploring its positive and negative facets so that the readers can better decide if these small but deadly weapons promote or degrade Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence especially against India.
History of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The end of WWII witnessed the emergence of USA as the eminent super power of the world, and as it feared, their erstwhile war ally, USSR turned overnight into its main adversary. After the war, Western Europe lay devastated and it demobilised speedily to concentrate on rebuilding with the massive financial support of USA’s Marshal Plan. USSR on the other hand did not demobilise and it soon became apparent that USSR’s conventional forces could overwhelm Western Europe. NATO was created to defend Western Europe against USSR and its allies that grouped together militarily under the Warsaw Pact. USA used its nuclear arsenal to redress the conventional imbalance by promulgating the Massive Retaliation doctrine, which stated that any Soviet attack in Western Europe will be countered through the massive use of nuclear weapons to obliterate the aggressor. Massive Retaliation changed to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) once the Soviet Union carried out the A-Bomb test in August 1949 and subsequently built up of a sizeable nuclear arsenal.
Berlin crisis of 1948 and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 brought home the inflexibility of the Massive Retaliation doctrine and McNamara soon introduced a major change in the NATO nuclear policy in the shape of Flexible Response. This new doctrine spelt out that while USA was prepared to respond immediately with nuclear weapons to the use of nuclear weapons against one or more members of the Alliance, USA was also prepared to counter with nuclear weapons any Soviet conventional attack so strong that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means. Compared to the Massive Response doctrine, Flexible Response called for two important changes. First, nuclear escalation was to come as late as possible, only after considerable efforts at conventional defence had failed. Second, the planned nuclear response at the tactical level would be far more limited in nature than had been planned under Massive Retaliation or MAD doctrines.
Flexible Response was made possible because USA by then had successfully miniaturized the nuclear bombs terming them as tactical nuclear weapons. USSR and the other three nuclear powers, UK, France and China followed soon as did Israel, the undeclared nuclear power, with still bomb in the basement policy, developing tactical nuclear weapons and adopting the Flexible Response concept.
The concept of Flexible Response came under a great deal of scrutiny by various think tanks and strategists where in a number of war games where tactical nuclear weapons were employed by one side, these eventually led to a full-scale nuclear exchange. The flexibility of using tactical nuclear weapons with the hope of ending the war quickly and favourably without the attendant risk of escalation to a full-scale nuclear war turned out to be a mirage. To that extent low yield tactical nuclear weapons did not deliver but it created a different and equally powerful impact.
While nuclear deterrence provided by the strategic nuclear weapons has so far prevented major conflicts between two nuclear armed states there is a school of thought which firmly believes that even when operating under a nuclear overhang, there is space where a short swift limited military campaign can be prosecuted without the fear of escalation to a nuclear war at the strategic level. The Indian Cold Start and PAO have been based on such an assumption that there exists sufficient space to engage in short swift conventional military campaign while remaining below the perceived nuclear threshold of the adversary with the confidence that these can be contained and if escalation is feared, ceasefire can be declared before the matter goes out of hand.
General Andre Beaufre of France, a renowned military thinker and strategist studied the tactical nuclear weapons phenomenon and concluded that their judicious integration as a vital component of the overall national defence strategy will result in extension of nuclear deterrence from full scale wars to even small ones. In other words it will further reduce the ‘space’ for short swift conventional battles and virtually close the option of military aggressions by the adversary even at a small scale. He proposed the introduction of low-yield nuclear weapons into the conventional battlefield. Two distinct advantages are likely to accrue, he argued: by the threat of employment of a new weapon previously untried in battle, complete uncertainty is created as to the tactical result of the battle and therefore to the entire course of a campaign; secondly, the employment of low yield nuclear weapons would create the fear of the possibility or near certainty of escalation to the strategic nuclear level. The deterrence achieved for full scale wars by the strategic nuclear weapons thus gets extended to even small or limited wars merely by the possession and threat of their employment in a conventional battle.
Explaining further his postulation, General Andre Beaufre reasoned that while deterrence by strategic nuclear weapons exerts a powerful stabilizing influence in the overall deterrence, this influence extends only for military campaigns at a relatively large scale – in other words it deters full scale conflicts only. Limited Intensity conflicts are not deterred unless the nuclear and conventional levels are firmly linked by the threat of employment of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional battle.
The singular disadvantage being: the employment of tactical nuclear weapons introduces a high risk of conflict escalation until it reaches a tipping point which provokes the use of strategic weapons. In other words, the nuclear threshold will be considerably lowered and the risk of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear war increases. General Andre Beaufre argues that this very phenomenon transfers the deterrence value of nuclear weapons to short / limited conflicts as well because the aggressor would fear that it could easily spiral into an all out nuclear war should the defender exercise his stated tactical nuclear employment strategy. He concludes by pointing out: only by paying this price and accepting the risk of a lowered nuclear threshold nuclear deterrence can be made effective across the entire spectrum of warfare between two warring states – all out / limited / short. To sum up induction of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons as an indispensable part of the national defence would appear to be a very attractive option especially for the weaker side.
The Indian Dilemma
The Indian Army and their defence establishment are incensed by this ominous development. First the conventional military juggernaut that they had built at a great cost to bully their pesky western neighbour into submission was stymied when Pakistan displayed its strategic nuclear assets which could easily turn any major offensive into the feared Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) mode. They then came up with the Cold Start or PAO doctrine to teach its annoying nemesis a lesson for his alleged meddling in its affairs by conducting a short swift lightning military campaign staying below his (Pakistan’s) perceived nuclear threshold. And now the induction of the silly tactical nuclear weapons appears to have closed this window also as even a short swift campaign where Pakistan employs his tactical nuclear assets in defence will trigger a full scale nuclear reaction by India again leading to the dreaded MAD scenario.
The Indian military now faces a severe dilemma that is difficult to overcome. A million strong Army, the fourth largest Air Force in the world and a Blue Water Navy finds itself paralysed by the deterrence caused by the combination of Pakistani strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. If the mighty Indian military cannot conduct any meaningful military operations big or small against Pakistan, the justification of its humongous size and very high operating cost becomes difficult. The Cold Start and PAO doctrines were, therefore, conceived to convince their civilian leadership and the masses that the Indian military could still punish Pakistan for its intransigence should the civilian leadership consider it necessary even under the nuclear overhang. Now the tactical nukes apparently have closed that option also.
The Indian military think tanks are at pains to project their Cold Start and PAO doctrinal validity despite Pakistan’s induction of tactical nukes but their saner elements realise that this is not true and a few of their writers have candidly admitted as much in their analysis. The Indian military juggernaut fears the public and the civilian leadership may ask are the mighty Indian Armed Forces then meant merely to frighten their non nuclear neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka only and if so do they need to be so huge? Surely the Himalayas prevent any major air and land operations against the Peoples Republic of China, against whom India has developed nuclear deterrence based on long range nuclear tipped missiles like the Agni series. That said, the Indian military will continue to come up with PAO style doctrines to establish their relevance in the changed environment and their civilian masters in the near future at least are unlikely to publicly challenge the assumptions even if they are convinced about their invalidity.
The induction of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan has in effect sounded the death knell to the already tottering Indian Cold Start and PAO doctrines and their vociferous condemnation in the print and electronic media is simply a reflection of their frustration. Their flaying the new development calling it irresponsible and dangerous is, to that extent, perfectly understandable.
Conclusion
Pakistan will do well to remember that the safety provided by their nuclear weapons against any military aggression by India will work only in defence. A Kargil like misadventure or if the state’s direct involvement in a major terror attack in India is established beyond doubt, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence will not survive and India will react in any manner it deems fit, including a military response that could well breach its perceived nuclear threshold and Pakistan’s threat to go MAD in all likelihood will be ignored and the world opinion will be totally in favour of India. In any other situation where the state of Pakistan is not perceived as the aggressor in the eyes of the world, its combination of conventional and nuclear deterrence that covers almost the entire spectrum of conventional warfare is likely to hold.
The 2001-2 and 2008 standoffs where despite all attempts by India to malign the state of Pakistan by establishing its complicity in the terror raids did not fully succeed; hence nuclear deterrence played its role and was one of the key factors that prevented any military misadventure by India. The international pressure on nuclear India and Pakistan to stand down also played a crucial role in prevention of another military showdown between the two. Would the international community have exerted a similar pressure if Pakistan was not a nuclear state? Judging by the events of 1965 and 1971 when the two were not nuclear states, the rest of the world watched with disinterest and disdain as they went to war, the answer probably would be in the negative. The direct and indirect impact of the nuclear factor, therefore, was central to the prevention of another debilitating armed conflict between the two arch enemies.
While the Indian negative stance on Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons is understandable, our own military writers and thinkers should avoid the pitfall of supporting or condemning this new development without thoroughly studying the advantages and disadvantages of such a move. To determine if the induction of tactical nukes has increased or weakened the country’s defence and security, the entire matter must be examined keeping in mind the historical lessons of tactical nuclear weapons, the geopolitical environment and the peculiar existential threat the country faces. Any conclusion backed by logic and common sense drawn after a critical study would then be fair. One should also remember that nuclear deterrence is a very complex phenomenon – even when analysing with similar assumptions and premises two very different and seemingly logical conclusions may be arrived at about its efficacy. The argument and conclusions one accepts would so depend on one’s background, biases and experience.
